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Addiction is an ideal puzzle for economic theory: why do most addicts expend 
resources to acquire their targets of addiction but then incur real costs to try and 
reduce or limit their consumption of these goods? Furthermore, why is the typical 
course of addiction characterised by repeated unsuccessful attempts to quit prior to 
final abstention? From the standpoint of standard consumer theory in economics these 
patterns of behaviour are difficult to rationalise. There is a rich theoretical literature in 
economics which models habit-forming behaviours, of which addiction is the 
exemplar, but there is a paucity of experimental economic studies eliciting and 
comparing the preferences – specifically, risk and time preferences – that economic 
theory suggests may differ between addicts and non-addicts. The experimental 
research that has been conducted has been dominated by psychologists, and some 
economists have begun to follow their methodological lead. However, detailed 
reviews of the experimental literature on addiction highlight a number of 
methodological and statistical flaws in the ways these data have been collected and 
analysed. This thesis is primarily concerned with methodological and statistical issues 
at the boundary between economics and psychology as these bear upon developing a 
general, consistent explanation of addiction. An incentive-compatible experimental 
design is formulated which lends itself to the estimation of several different theories 
of choice under risk and over time. In addition, a full information maximum 
likelihood statistical framework, which is consistent with the data generating 
processes proposed by structural theories and accounts for subject errors in decision 
making, is used to explore the relationship between risk preferences, time preferences 
and addiction. This thesis challenges some of the maintained assumptions in the 
addiction literature; e.g., that the probability discounting and hyperbolic discounting 
models best characterise choice under risk and over time, respectively. But it also 
replicates a previous finding; i.e., that smokers tend to discount the future more 
heavily than non-smokers. It shows, therefore, that some results withstand careful 
methodological and statistical scrutiny, whereas other results do not. Ultimately, this 
thesis argues that tools from experimental economics and econometrics, which have 
been under-used in addiction studies, contribute to a more accurate and reliable 
characterisation of this phenomenon.  
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This thesis is about addiction and the ways in which economists and researchers from 
other disciplines model it theoretically, investigate it experimentally, and analyse it 
statistically. While there is a rich theoretical literature in economics which models 
habit-forming behaviours, of which addiction is the exemplar, there is a paucity of 
experimental economic studies eliciting and comparing the preferences – specifically, 
instantaneous1  risk  and  time  preferences,  intertemporal  risk  preferences,  and 
subjective beliefs – that economic theory suggests may differ between addicts and 
non-addicts.  
 
The experimental research that has been conducted has been dominated by 
psychologists, and some economists have begun to follow their methodological lead. 
This thesis shows that tools from experimental economics and econometrics, which 
have been under-used in addiction studies, contribute to a more accurate and reliable 
characterisation of this phenomenon. Thus, this thesis is primarily concerned with 
methodological and statistical issues at the boundary between economics and 
psychology as these bear upon developing a general, consistent explanation of 
addiction. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a motivation for studying addiction by chronicling the history of 
substance use and abuse, discussing current trends in drug consumption and 
dependence, and highlighting the costs that addiction imposes on society. This broad 
overview makes it clear that addiction is a pressing public health concern that 
warrants the attention that economists have increasingly been devoting to it.  
 
Psychologists, with clinical concerns in mind, have worked to devise a diagnostic 
classification system which distinguishes between addicts and non-addicts. Chapter 2 
traces the history of the diagnostic classification of addiction and highlights the view 
                                                
1 The prefix “instantaneous” is used to differentiate instantaneous risk and time preferences from 
intertemporal risk preferences. Intertemporal risk preferences refer to preferences over intertemporal 
lotteries, the outcomes of which may be serially correlated. By contrast, instantaneous risk and time 
preferences define, respectively, atemporal attitudes to risk and uncertainty, and the valuation of goods 
which are available at different points in time.  
 -2- 
that classification systems do not solely serve scientific ends but that they develop in 
concert with wider political, social, and economic forces. The chapter draws attention 
to a number of issues with the measurement and interpretation of addiction. It also 
recognises, though, that no classification system is ever perfect, and that research into 
substance dependence has made progress over the last 50 years by refining the 
definition and measurement of addiction. 
 
The disease model of addiction is the primary understanding of substance dependence 
among the medical fraternity, the public, and the media. Chapter 2 shows why the 
disease model of addiction gained general acceptance in the 20th century. It then 
outlines Heyman’s (2009) critique of this model and his argument that addiction is 
more usefully characterised as a disorder of choice and thereby amenable to economic 
analysis.  
 
Ardent proponents of the disease model and Heyman’s (2009) choice-based account 
of addiction appear to lie at two extreme ends of a continuum of explanations for 
substance dependence. But Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich and Spurrett (2008) explain that 
these apparently contradictory hypotheses are ultimately compatible if one attends to 
distinctions between different levels of scientific analysis. Chapter 2 therefore 
outlines the reconciliation which Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich and Spurrett (2008) 
formulate because this resolves the tension between these two views and motivates 
research, at different but inextricably linked levels, into the various causes of 
substance dependence. The chapter then discusses economic models of choice which 
are relevant to the study of addiction. 
 
In many ways addiction is an ideal puzzle for economic theory. Why do most addicts 
expend resources to acquire their targets of addiction while maintaining concurrent 
commitments, involving real costs, to personal policies and programmes aimed at 
reducing or limiting their consumption of these goods? Furthermore, why is the 
typical course of addiction characterised by repeated unsuccessful attempts to quit 
prior to final abstention? From the standpoint of standard consumer theory in 
economics these patterns of behaviour are difficult to rationalise.  
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The economic models reviewed in Chapter 2, which seek to explain these behavioural 
puzzles, are organised into three categories: models of rational addiction; dual self 
and dual system models; and exogenous addiction models. The chapter outlines the 
models’ similarities and differences and a deep philosophical issue on which the 
comparisons among these models force attention: the nature of agency in economic 
theory. The discussion of these models is used to provide theoretical justification for 
the empirical analyses conducted in later chapters. These empirical analyses centre on 
the instantaneous risk and time preferences of addicts and non-addicts, so particular 
attention is given to the role of these preferences in the different theoretical models. 
 
Instantaneous risk and time preferences are important components of economic 
models as they define, respectively, atemporal attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, 
and the valuation of goods which are available at different points in time. It makes 
intuitive sense that instantaneous risk and time preferences may be an important 
factor in addiction. For example, people who discount the future heavily will tend to 
focus on the short-term benefits of addictive consumption while putting relatively less 
weight on the future costs, thereby inclining them to consume the addictive good. 
Similarly, the decision to consume an addictive good involves clear risks, such as the 
potential for negative health consequences, so it is presumably linked to an 
individual’s attitude towards risk.  
 
The economic models in Chapter 2 adopt different assumptions about agents’ time 
preferences and they place more or less emphasis on the role that risk plays in driving 
choice behaviour. Given these differences across the economic models of addiction, 
and the plethora of different theories of choice under risk and over time, the question, 
from methodological and statistical perspectives, turns to how best to elicit and 
analyse the instantaneous risk and time preferences of addicts and non-addicts. 
 
The three empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) provide detailed 
reviews of the experimental and statistical tools which have been used to compare the 
instantaneous risk and time preferences of addicts and non-addicts. Chapter 3 reviews 
studies investigating the instantaneous time preferences of smokers and non-smokers 
and finds that in the majority of these studies there is a positive relationship between 
smoking and time discounting: smokers indeed tend to discount the future more 
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heavily than non-smokers. Chapter 4 introduces and critiques the probability 
discounting model which has become a popular framework in psychology and 
addiction studies for exploring people’s atemporal attitudes to risk. Chapter 5, 
building on the exposition in Chapter 4, reviews studies investigating the 
instantaneous risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers and finds that the 
relationship between attitudes to risk and smoking is equivocal. 
 
Unfortunately, these reviews paint a depressing picture of the methodological and 
statistical practices commonly used in experimental studies of addiction. First, the 
bulk of this empirical research makes a number of strong, and unwarranted, 
assumptions about the nature of instantaneous risk and time preferences (e.g., that 
discounting is hyperbolic, utility is linear in money, and risk attitudes are determined 
solely by the shape of a probability weighting function). Second, the experimental 
tools used in these studies typically do not satisfy Smith’s (1982) precepts for 
controlled microeconomic experiments (e.g., the studies often employ hypothetical 
incentives and use elicitation mechanisms which are susceptible to being “gamed” by 
subjects). Finally, the statistical tools used to analyse the experimental data are 
potentially mis-specified (e.g., subjects’ “inconsistent” choices are assumed away 
rather than modelled statistically and point estimates are used as data in statistical 
models).  
 
Given these problems with experimental design and statistical analysis, how should 
one go about eliciting and comparing the instantaneous risk and time preferences of 
addicts and non-addicts so as to draw accurate and robust inferences? Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström (2014) argue that theory, experimental design, and econometrics are 
complementary. In other words, it is crucial to review and understand theory because 
this informs experimental design and analysis. And analysis itself should be 
constrained by, and interpreted jointly with, theoretical considerations, prior empirical 
work, complementary data, econometric methodology, and intended applications.  
 
Thus, it is crucial to have an intimate theoretical knowledge of different models of 
instantaneous risk and time preferences and their implications for choice behaviour 
generally, and addiction, specifically. This knowledge should then be used to design 
experiments to elicit instantaneous risk and time preference data that are amenable to 
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rigorous statistical analysis. Clearly, the statistical models which are developed to 
analyse these data must be structured by the theory and informed by the experimental 
design so that valid inferences can be drawn. And the results from these models must 
be interpreted jointly with the theory and experimental design which motivated the 
models’ development. 
 
Consequently, this thesis advocates, and lends more credence to, experimental designs 
which are incentive compatible, incorporate transparent payment schemes and offer 
salient rewards, and include tasks that are easily understood. Only experimental 
designs which satisfy these criteria promote the truthful revelation of preferences. In 
addition, an experimental design should lend itself to the estimation of several 
different theories of choice under risk and over time because these have different 
implications for our understanding of addiction.  
 
For example, the quasi-hyperbolic or β-δ discounting model has become a popular 
theory of instantaneous time preferences because it captures the potential for time 
inconsistency, an apparent hallmark of addiction, in a mathematically tractable 
framework. To facilitate estimation of this model it is helpful to vary the front end 
delay (FED) to the smaller, sooner (SS) reward in a discounting task. Specifically, a 
zero day FED allows one to pin down the estimate of β, which captures a “passion for 
the present” or “present-bias” in decision making, whereas positive FEDs (e.g., a 
delay of 7 days to the SS reward) allow one to estimate the long-term discounting 
parameter δ. Experimental designs which do not incorporate a zero day FED must 
assume that a subject’s present-bias persists beyond the present to estimate β. Thus, 
theory must inform experimental design so that features of the theory can be 
identified by the experiment and subsequently estimated statistically. 
 
As another example of how theory should inform experimental design and statistical 
analysis consider the work of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) (AHLR). 
As a matter of theory, time preferences are defined over time-dated utility flows, not 
flows of money. These are equivalent if a utility function is linear but AHLR showed 
that if a utility function is concave then the assumption of linearity will, for the same 
observed choices, bias the estimation of discounting parameters upwards. Thus, to 
draw accurate inferences about discounting behaviour it is important to incorporate 
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utility function curvature in the estimation of discounting models. AHLR used a risk 
preference task to elicit the concavity of the utility function, under the assumption that 
expected utility theory characterises choice under risk, and a time preference task to 
elicit discounting behaviour. The researchers then adopted a full information 
maximum likelihood statistical framework to estimate the parameters of time 
preference models jointly with the curvature of the utility function. This statistical 
approach is adopted in Chapter 5 because it represents a consistent union between 
theory, experimental design, and econometrics. 
 
At a more general statistical level, this thesis stresses the importance of understanding 
and respecting the type of data generating processes (DGP) encountered in addiction 
research, so that valid inferences can be drawn. A practice which is far too common in 
the experimental literature on addiction is a two-step approach to statistical analysis. 
In the case of time preferences, this two-step approach entails using non-linear least 
squares (NLLS), or some other technique, to estimate discounting parameters at the 
level of the individual and then using these point estimates as data in subsequent 
statistical models. The problem with the two-step approach, other than that it often 
uses tiny samples to estimate discounting parameters at the level of the individual, is 
that estimated discounting parameters are estimates, and not data. Such estimates 
comprise both a point estimate (of the mean) and a standard error, and to use only the 
point estimate is to throw away information on the uncertainty of that estimate. 
Moreover, using an estimated discounting parameter as a datum violates the statistical 
assumptions of the second-stage models: specifically, that the covariates are measured 
without error. Thus, the statistical inferences drawn from this approach are simply not 
valid. 
 
The full information maximum likelihood statistical approach which this thesis adopts 
estimates instantaneous risk and time preference parameters as a linear function of 
observable characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and addiction) so that the statistical 
uncertainty of the estimates propagates into the inferences which are drawn from the 
data. This approach allows one to make relatively strong claims about differences in 
the instantaneous risk and time preferences of addicts and non-addicts. 
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Another issue which is typically ignored, or assumed away, in the analysis of 
experimental data in psychology and addiction studies is the presence of 
“inconsistent” choices. For example, a person’s pattern of choices on a discounting 
task may not be deterministically consistent with a particular discounting parameter. 
In this case, researchers typically calculate the discounting parameter which is 
consistent with the highest proportion of the subject’s choices and use this 
discounting parameter thereafter; if multiple discounting parameters yield the same 
level of consistency, an average of these values is used instead. 
 
The problem with this approach is that the uncertainty surrounding a particular 
parameter estimate is ignored when the estimate is treated as a datum which is 
measured without error. This thesis adopts the view that people’s choice behaviour in 
experiments is inherently stochastic and one should be mindful of this fact and model 
it statistically. Consequently, the statistical models in this thesis formally incorporate 
the possibility that subjects make mistakes in experiments by adopting a behavioural 
error specification which is estimated jointly with the parameters of instantaneous risk 
and time preference models. This behavioural error specification becomes part of the 
structural theory being tested and applied, rather than being included as a statistical 
“after thought.” 
 
Determining which theories of choice under risk and over time best characterise the 
choices of people in experiments has important implications for our understanding of, 
and policy response to, addiction. For example, time inconsistency is an important 
feature of many economic models of addiction. Under the assumption of an 
additively-separable intertemporal utility function, only the exponential discounting 
model is time consistent whereas hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and Weibull 
discounting functions may yield time inconsistency. When agents are time 
inconsistent they can benefit from interventions which lock in their current 
preferences if they are apt to change in future; time-consistent agents do not benefit 
from these interventions. Thus, it is important to know whether people discount 
exponentially or, say, hyperbolically because this sharpens our understanding of, and 
influences our policy response to, addiction. 
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Unfortunately what few tests have been conducted in the addiction literature 
comparing the various theories of choice under risk and over time are not valid 
statistically. And these invalid statistical tests have been used to justify the near-
universal adoption of the hyperbolic discounting and probability discounting models 
in experimental studies of addiction. This thesis employs statistically-valid Clarke 
(2007) non-nested model selection tests to adjudicate between the various models of 
risk and time preference. Importantly, Chapter 3 shows that the exponential 
discounting model better characterises the data than the hyperbolic discounting 
model. In addition, Chapter 4 shows that the probability weighting function (PWF) 
popularised by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the PWF developed by Prelec 
(1998) better characterise the data than the PWF implicit in the probability 
discounting model.  
 
Clearly these findings are specific to the datasets used in these chapters, but they 
should give researchers pause when they are inclined to assume that one model of 
choice under risk or over time best characterises the choices of all subjects under all 
circumstances. Consequently, this thesis advocates the estimation of several theories 
of instantaneous risk and time preferences so that the ability of these theories to 
explain the data can be tested formally and so that one can check the sensitivity and 
robustness of the results across different specifications. 
 
A related issue is whether the assumption that only one theory of choice under risk or 
over time can adequately characterise all of the choices in a dataset is justified. A 
recent development in the estimation of instantaneous risk and time preference 
models is to employ a mixture of different specifications. When one separately 
estimates particular models of choice under risk or over time one is implicitly 
assuming that only one DGP characterises all of the choices in the data. But what if 
one theory better explains some choices in a dataset while another theory better 
explains other choices in that same dataset? In this case, forcing all the data to fit one 
model will yield biased estimates of the underlying parameters. Mixture models allow 
one to combine different theories of choice under risk or over time and estimate the 
weight accorded to the different theories in the data. These models therefore directly 
incorporate the potential for multiple DGPs and provide an alternative measure of 
how much support each theory finds in the data. Mixture models are used extensively 
 -9- 
in the three empirical chapters of this thesis because they formally recognise the 
heterogeneity in responses to instantaneous risk and time preference tasks. 
 
With this background to the theoretical, methodological and statistical approach 
advocated in this thesis, some specific details on the three empirical chapters can be 
provided. Chapter 3 focuses solely on instantaneous time preferences and takes a step 
back from the ideal world in which theory, experimental design, and econometrics 
coalesce perfectly. The fundamental question which this chapter addresses is: if you 
have a dataset of discounting choices, which was generated by an experiment that 
does not satisfy Smith’s (1982) precepts, and which does not include information that 
makes it possible to jointly estimate utility function curvature and discounting 
behaviour, what is the appropriate way to proceed statistically? In other words, this 
chapter takes the data that are typically collected in psychology experiments of time 
preferences and addiction, and provides an approach to data analysis which is 
statistically coherent. 
 
If one delves into the literature on instantaneous risk preferences and addiction, one 
inevitably encounters the probability discounting model of Rachlin and colleagues 
(Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon and Frankel (1986), Rachlin, Castrogiovanni and Cross 
(1987), Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991)) which attempts to tie probabilistic choice 
to a temporal framework by reinterpreting the probability of a reward as the delay to, 
or rate of reinforcement of, that reward. The probability discounting model has 
become a popular framework in psychology and addiction studies for eliciting and 
analysing people’s atemporal attitudes to risk. Despite the model’s popularity in these 
fields it is virtually unheard of in economics. Consequently, Chapter 4 traces the 
development of the model and reinterprets it in language familiar to economists, 
statisticians, and decision theorists. The chapter then conducts an empirical analysis 
of the efficacy of the model’s PWF in comparison to other PWFs commonly used in 
empirical studies of instantaneous risk preferences. 
 
The complementarity between theory, experimental design, and econometrics is 
exemplified in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The chapter discusses a set of incentive-
compatible experiments which were designed to elicit the instantaneous risk and time 
preferences of smokers and non-smokers, and to jointly estimate utility function 
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curvature and discounting behaviour. The experimental design lends itself to the 
estimation of different models of choice under risk and over time so as to rigorously 
explore the relationship, if any, between smoking status and instantaneous risk and 
time preferences.  
 
In sum, this thesis discusses the experimental elicitation and estimation of preferences 
which may be relevant to our understanding of addiction. It stresses the importance of 
the theory, experimental design, and econometric trinity which is necessary to draw 
accurate and reliable inferences about potential differences between addicts and non-
addicts. It also can serve as a constructive guide to others who aim to conduct 
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Economic models of addiction have a long lineage and in many ways addiction is an 
ideal puzzle for economic theory. Why do most addicts expend resources to acquire 
their targets of addiction while maintaining concurrent commitments, involving real 
costs, to personal policies and programmes aimed at reducing or limiting their 
consumption of these goods? Furthermore, why is the typical course of addiction 
characterised by repeated unsuccessful attempts to quit prior to final abstention? From 
the standpoint of standard consumer theory in economics these patterns of behaviour 
are difficult to rationalise. 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with methodological and statistical issues at the 
boundary between economics and psychology in the context of addiction. Research 
into the behavioural aspects of addiction has been dominated by psychologists but I 
will argue that there should be a greater reliance on the tools from experimental 
economics and econometrics so as to draw accurate inferences about potential 
differences between addicts and non-addicts.  In this chapter I discuss addiction 
generally and then focus on economic models of this phenomenon to highlight the 
role that instantaneous risk and time preferences1, intertemporal risk preferences2, and 
subjective beliefs play in the initiation, maintenance, and resolution of substance 
dependence3.  
 
                                                
1 Instantaneous risk and time preferences are important components of economic models as they 
define, respectively, atemporal attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, and the valuation of goods which 
are available at different points in time. Formally, instantaneous risk preferences are defined over 
lotteries, where a lottery is a probability distribution over outcomes. Under expected utility theory, the 
concavity or convexity of a utility function determines attitudes to risk. Time preferences are defined 
over time-dated utility flows and are captured by a discounting function, which implies discounting 
behaviour. Although time preferences imply discounting behaviour, these terms (i.e., “time 
preferences” and “discounting behaviour”) will be used interchangeably, and context will clarify the 
distinction. 
2 Intertemporal risk preferences refer to preferences over intertemporal lotteries, the outcomes of which 
may be serially correlated. Intertemporal risk preferences will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter. 
3 The terms “dependence” and “addiction” refer to the most severe form of problematic substance use 
and will be used interchangeably. This is in keeping with the history of diagnostic classification 
systems for addiction, which I discuss later. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. I provide a brief overview of the history of 
substance use and abuse, discuss current trends in drug consumption and dependence, 
and highlight the costs that addiction imposes on society. I discuss the way in which 
addiction has been diagnosed over time and then chronicle the history of the disease 
model of addiction, which is the primary understanding of substance dependence 
among the medical fraternity, the public, and the media. I provide a brief outline of 
Heyman’s (2009) critique of the disease interpretation and then discuss the 
reconciliation provided by Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich and Spurrett (2008) (RSVS) which 
resolves the tension between these apparently contradictory views. Finally, I review a 
number of economic models which are relevant to the study of addiction and 
emphasise the roles that instantaneous risk and time preferences, intertemporal risk 





Substance Use and Abuse: A Brief History and Current Trends 
 
Psychoactive substances have been used by different cultures for millennia. Wine 
vessels, dating back to late prehistorical and early historical times, have been found in 
shipwrecks in the Mediterranean and burial sites in China (Westermeyer (2005)). 
Ancient Greek archaeological artefacts from the Bronze Age (1600 – 1200 BC) 
include representations of the poppy seed capsule and poppy seed caches have been 
found in a prehistoric site in northern Turkey (Heyman (2009)).  
 
Anthropological studies of preliterate societies suggest that psychoactive substance 
use was prevalent in a variety of different cultures. Tribes in North and South 
America cultivated numerous stimulant (e.g., coca leaf, tobacco leaf, and coffee bean) 
and hallucinogenic (e.g., peyote) drugs while different ethnic groups in Africa and the 
Middle East produced qat, a stimulant, and cannabis. Societies on the Eurasian land 
mass and Africa extracted alcohol from a number of sources including honey, grains, 
fruits, and milk, and the stimulant betel nut was used from Oceania to South Asia 
(Westermeyer (2005)).  
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Early Egyptian and Chinese writings make reference to alcohol, opium, and other 
substances whereas Mayan, Aztec, and Incan statues and glyphs depict rituals in 
which drugs were consumed. Alcohol became an integral part of the Jewish Passover 
festival and the Roman Catholic Mass while opium was used in certain Hindu 
marriages (Westermeyer (2005)). The early history of psychoactive substances 
suggests that they were used medicinally, in specific ceremonies or for particular 
purposes, e.g., manual labour or long hunts, and possibilities for abuse were severely 
circumscribed (Westermeyer (2005), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) (2012)).  
 
Over the last few centuries, economic and technological changes have had a marked 
impact on the cost and distribution of drugs, usage patterns, and methods of 
administration (Westermeyer (1987)). Industrialisation and international trade led to 
large increases in substance production and distribution, and rising incomes fostered 
recreational drug use. New modes of administration like snorting, smoking, and 
injecting, delivered drug doses to the brain far more rapidly and efficiently than 
ingestion, and as the rate and efficiency of delivery increases so too does the drug’s 
concentration at active sites in the brain. New methods for purifying and modifying 
plant compounds along with laboratory synthesis has led to the production of drugs 
that are more potent and more easily smuggled (Westermeyer (2005)). Some of these 
changes coincided with, and were responsible for, the first large-scale instances of 
substance abuse. 
 
The first two large drug abuse epidemics occurred at roughly the same time but in 
different regions and with respect to different substances. The English gin epidemic or 
gin plague began in the late 1600s and lasted several decades. The proximate causes 
were: the importation of vast quantities of rum and gin which were sold very cheaply; 
a lack of traditions and social sanctions to deter over-consumption of these beverages; 
and the start of the Industrial Revolution which led to mass urbanisation and the 
erosion of traditional rural values. The gin plague was eventually “cured” through a 
combination of import taxes on alcohol, anti-alcohol propaganda, and the formation 




The Asian opium epidemic affected numerous countries in East and Southeast Asia 
and lasted for centuries. Opium had been used in Asia for millennia with few adverse 
consequences until Europeans introduced tobacco smoking to the region. Asians 
began to add opium to their tobacco pipes and this fast became a common practice. 
Smoking opium delivers the active ingredient, morphine, to the brain far more quickly 
and efficiently than ingestion and, as discussed earlier, this magnifies its effect. A 
stronger pharmacological effect coupled with surplus wealth, available leisure time, 
and a genetic aversion to alcohol, precipitated an opium crisis (Heyman (2009)). 
According to a report prepared by the International Opium Commission (1909), 
approximately one quarter of the population of China used opium at the start of the 
20th century. As Westermeyer (2005, p. 28) notes, some Asian countries (e.g., China, 
Japan, and South Korea) managed to arrest the epidemic in the 20th century, while 
others are still plagued by it (e.g., Laos, Afghanistan, and Myanmar). 
 
Current patterns of substance use and abuse have been linked to the emergence of 
“youth culture” in the US in the 1960s, which spread rapidly to Western Europe and 
other parts of the world (UNODC (2012)). Cannabis and hallucinogenic drugs, like 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), became anti-authority symbols and were used by 
increasing numbers of people to explore altered states of consciousness (Westermeyer 
(2005)). Heroin use also became more widespread during this period, and was 
particularly high among veterans of the Vietnam war. Cocaine use began to expand in 
the 1960s but was mostly confined to the richer segments of society until the 
invention of “crack,” a cheaper form of cocaine that is typically smoked, led to an 
explosion in use in the early 1980s. Towards the end of this decade, cocaine use 
started to stabilise but this coincided with the start of the “rave” scene which became 
synonymous with the use of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or 
“ecstasy”) and other amphetamine-type stimulants (UNODC (2012)). 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that approximately 42 percent of 
the world’s population, aged 15 years and older4, consumed alcohol in 2004 and that 
11.5 percent of these people (4.8 percent of the world’s population) engaged in heavy 
episodic drinking on a weekly basis (WHO (2011)). With regard to past-month 
                                                
4 All of the estimates presented in this section relate to people aged 15 years and older. 
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prevalence, approximately 25 percent of the world’s population smoked tobacco in 
2006, whereas 19 percent smoked tobacco daily in 2009 (WHO (2010)). The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that approximately 5 percent 
of the world’s population used an illicit drug in 2010. The most widely-used illicit 
substance is cannabis, with approximately 119 – 224 million users worldwide. 
Amphetamine-type stimulants (including “ecstasy”) have the second highest 
prevalence rate with between 14.3 and 52.5 million users. Opioids and cocaine round 
out the top four most used illicit substances, with approximately 39.6 – 55.5 million 
users in 2010 (UNODC (2012)). 
 
Illicit drug use is typically initiated in the teens or early twenties and is largely a 
youth phenomenon in many countries (UNODC (2012)). Men in urban areas are 
particularly susceptible and there is a large gender gap in use. Prevalence rates for 
substance use peak among people aged 18 – 25, and then decline gradually until 
reaching very low levels in people older than 65. Approximately 27 million people, or 
0.6 percent of the world’s population, meet the criteria for substance use disorders; 
these criteria will be discussed in more detail later. In addition, in 2008, there were an 
estimated 16 million injecting drug users, of which approximately 19 percent were 
living with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 46.7 percent were infected 
with hepatitis C, and 14.4 percent had hepatitis B. Less than 20 percent of people who 
require treatment for substance use disorders receive it but those seeking treatment are 
typically in their late 20s or early 30s. Drug-related deaths are also concentrated 
among the younger members of society, with an average age in the mid-30s (UNODC 
(2012)). 
 
The Costs of Substance Use and Abuse 
 
Estimating the costs to society of substance use and abuse is a difficult task, not least 
because usage tends to be underreported, many of the drugs are illegal, and the extent 
to which they independently affect crime, productivity, mortality, and morbidity is 
difficult to gauge. These issues notwithstanding, the UNODC and WHO, drawing on 
numerous sources, compile estimates of the impact of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit 
drugs on society. 
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Tobacco use has been identified as the leading cause of preventable death on earth 
(WHO (2013)).5 Globally, approximately 12 percent of all deaths among people over 
30 can be attributed to tobacco. In 2004 alone, about 5 million people died from the 
direct use of tobacco, while another 600,000 died as a result of second-hand smoke. In 
addition, among people over the age of 30, 5 percent of all deaths from communicable 
diseases, and 14 percent of all deaths from non-communicable diseases have been 
linked to tobacco (WHO (2012)). Finally, estimates from 2009 suggest that 56.9 
million disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) will be lost to the use of tobacco 
(WHO (2009)). 
 
A WHO (2009) Global Health Risks report identified alcohol use – along with 
childhood underweight, unsafe sex, and unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene – as one 
of the leading global risks for burden of disease as measured by DALYs. Specifically, 
the report estimates that 69.4 million DALYs will be lost due to alcohol use. In 
addition, alcohol use, high blood pressure and the other factors mentioned previously 
(i.e., unsafe sex etc.), account for one quarter of all deaths in the world and one fifth 
of all DALYs. Alcohol use has also been identified as a causal factor in at least 60 
major types of diseases and injuries and it leads to approximately 2.5 million deaths 
each year. This implies that 4% of all deaths globally are attributable to alcohol. In 
addition, alcohol is responsible for between 20 and 50 percent of all cases of cirrhosis 
of the liver, epilepsy, poisonings, road accidents, violence, and numerous cancers 
(WHO (2011)).  
 
Illicit drug use leads to approximately 245,000 deaths each year worldwide and about 
half of these deaths are due to fatal overdoses (WHO (2009)). Some 4.5 million 
people are in treatment for drug-related problems globally but, as mentioned earlier, 
this is less than 20% of people with substance use disorders. Billions of dollars are 
spent on treatment each year but the UNODC estimates that, at current prevalence 
                                                
5 While the harm caused by tobacco use is undoubtedly huge, whether it is the leading cause of 
preventable death globally is questionable. For example, providing clean water and sanitation to people 
who live without them my be more cost-effective, and have a far greater impact, than trying to curb 
tobacco use, particularly in less developed countries, where the bulk of the global population resides. 
The provision of clean water and sanitation was one of the key themes of the World Bank’s (1992) 
World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment and numerous subsequent World 
Bank (1993, 2003, 2010) and WHO (2009) publications stress the importance of clean water and 
sanitation for reducing the global burden of disease. 
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rates, $200 - $250 billion would have been required to cover global costs associated 
with treatment for illicit drug use in 2010; these amounts dwarf current expenditure. 
 
Productivity losses due to substance abuse are linked to a number of factors including 
labour force non-participation, unemployment, absenteeism, workplace accidents, and 
incarcerations. Deriving precise estimates of these losses is difficult, but a US study 
by the National Drug Intelligence Center (2011) estimated that $120 billion (0.9 
percent of GDP) in productivity losses were due to the use of illicit drugs in 2007. A 
2002 study in Canada, covering alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs, estimated that 
productivity losses totalling 4.7 billion Canadian dollars (0.4 percent of GDP) could 
be attributed to substance abuse (Rehm et al. (2006)). Finally, an Australian study, 
focussing on legal and illegal substances, calculated productivity losses at 2.1 billion 
Australian dollars (0.3 percent of GDP) in 2004/2005 (Collins and Lapsley (2008)). 
 
Psychoactive substances affect crime through a number of different channels: the use 
of drugs can promote criminal acts by lowering inhibitions; crimes are often 
committed to finance drug-taking; competition between drug traffickers can lead to 
“turf wars;” and the sale of drugs is often closely linked to fraud and corruption. 
Studies linking drugs to crime have found that the costs can be substantial. In the UK, 
the cost of drug-related crime in England and Wales was estimated at £13.9 billion in 
2003/2004, which amounted to almost 90 percent of all social and economic costs 
associated with drug abuse (Gordon, Tinsley, Godfrey and Parrott (2006)). Similarly, 





The two primary diagnostic classification systems for substance use disorders are The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), and The International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD), published by the WHO. These two systems differed markedly when 
they were first published but a sustained standardisation effort by the APA, WHO, 
and scientists working in the area of mental disorders, has ensured that the diagnostic 
systems are now compatible (WHO (1994)). The latest version of the ICD (ICD-10) 
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was published in 1994, whereas the most recent version of the DSM (DSM-5) was 
published in 2013. Given the massive growth in addiction-related research over the 
last 20 years, I will focus on the DSM criteria in what follows and trace the history of 
the diagnostic classification of addiction. 
 
The first edition of the DSM (APA (1952)) included categories for “Alcoholism” and 
“Drug addiction” under the more general category of  “Sociopathic Personality 
Disturbances.” The diagnosis of alcoholism was confined to cases “in which there is a 
well established addiction to alcohol without recognizable underlying disorder” (APA 
(1952, p. 39)). Presumably clinical judgement and experience was needed to 
determine whether a “well established addiction to alcohol” was present. Drug 
addiction, by contrast, was a symptom of an underlying personality disorder and was 
reserved for cases where “the individual is actually addicted” (APA (1952, p. 39)).  
 
The second edition of the DSM (DSM-II) (APA (1968)) included categories for 
“Alcoholism” and “Drug dependence” under the more general category of  
“Personality Disorders and Certain Other Non-psychotic Mental Disorders.” 
Alcoholism itself was split into three categories, representing greater levels of 
severity: episodic excessive drinking, habitual excessive drinking, and alcohol 
addiction. Alcohol addiction, the most severe form, was confined to people who were 
“dependent on” alcohol, although the term “dependent on” was not defined (APA 
(1968, p. 45)). The best evidence for a diagnosis of alcohol addiction was the 
presence of withdrawal symptoms, but failing that, heavy drinking for a period of 
three months was taken as presumptive evidence of dependence.  
 
A diagnosis of drug dependence was reserved for people who were “addicted to or 
dependent on” drugs other than alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine, but like alcohol 
addiction, the key terms “addicted to” and “dependent on” were not defined. 
Diagnosis required evidence of habitual use and the manual recognised that 
withdrawal only occurs with certain substances (e.g., opioids) and not others (e.g., 
marijuana). 
 
DSM-III (APA (1980)) marked a fundamental shift in the classification of mental 
disorders by incorporating specific criteria for diagnosis so as to improve reliability. 
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“Substance Use Disorders” were given their own category in the manual and 
“Substance abuse” was distinguished from “Substance dependence.” Substance abuse 
was diagnosed when there was: 1) a pattern of pathological use which 2) lasted for at 
least one month and 3) led to impairment in social or occupational functioning. A 
detailed explanation was given for each criterion so as to aid diagnosis. 
 
Substance dependence, a more severe form of substance abuse, was diagnosed when 
there was evidence of physiological dependence, specifically, tolerance or 
withdrawal. The only exceptions were alcohol and cannabis dependence where a 
pattern of pathological use and impairment in social or occupational functioning was 
also required. An interesting change in DSM-III, other than specific criteria for 
diagnosis, was the decision to drop the term “addiction” in favour of “dependence.” 
This was done to reduce the stigma associated with the term “addiction” and in the 
hope that “dependence” would provide a more objective and precise definition (RSVS 
(2008)).  
 
DSM-IV (APA (1994)) kept the abuse/dependence distinction but provided a far more 
detailed set of criteria to diagnose either mental disorder. Substance dependence was 
defined as, “… a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms 
indicating that the individual continues use of the substance despite significant 
substance-related problems. There is a pattern of repeated self-administration that 
usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive drug-taking” (APA (1994, p. 
176)).  
 
A diagnosis of substance dependence required the presence of at least three of the 
following criteria within a 12-month period: 1) tolerance; 2) withdrawal; 3) the 
substance is taken in larger amounts or for a longer period than was intended; 4) there 
is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control substance use; 5) a 
large amount of time is spent in activities to obtain the substance, use the substance, 
or recover from its effects; 6) important social, occupational or recreational activities 
are given up or reduced due to substance use; and 7) there is continued use of the 
substance despite persistent or recurrent problems linked to use (APA (1994, p. 181)). 
Note that tolerance and withdrawal were no longer mandatory criteria for a diagnosis 
of substance dependence.  
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Substance abuse, by contrast, was defined as, “… a maladaptive pattern of substance 
use manifested by recurrent and significant adverse consequences related to the 
repeated use of substances” (APA (1994, p. 182)). Only one of the following criteria 
needed to be present within a 12-month period for a diagnosis of substance abuse: 1) 
failure to fulfil major role obligations; 2) recurrent substance use in situations in 
which it is physically hazardous; 3) recurrent substance-related legal problems; and 4) 
continued substance use despite problems caused or exacerbated by the substance 
(APA (1994, p. 183)).  
 
DSM-5 (APA (2013)) created a new overarching category called “Substance-Related 
and Addictive Disorders” which incorporates a behavioural addiction, “Gambling 
Disorder,” in addition to substance use disorders. DSM-5 also dropped the distinction 
between substance abuse and dependence in favour of the single term “substance use 
disorder” which has three levels of severity: mild, moderate, and severe. The 
definition of a substance use disorder is identical to the definition of substance 
dependence in DSM-IV, “… a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological 
symptoms indicating that the individual continues using the substance despite 
significant substance-related problems” (APA (2013, p. 483)).6 A new set of criteria, 
drawing heavily on DSM-IV, and new thresholds for diagnosis were also adopted. 
Table I lists the criteria for a substance use disorder in DSM-5. 
 
The criteria in Table I are broken down into four main categories: impaired control, 
social impairment, risky use, and pharmacological criteria (APA (2013, p. 483)). The 
list of symptoms is a mixture of the criteria for substance abuse and dependence in 
DSM-IV, other than criterion (4). Criterion (4), craving, is an important addition to 
the list because it was mentioned in DSM-III and DSM-IV but was not included as a 
symptom even though it is “… likely to be experienced by most (if not all) individuals 
with Substance Dependence” (APA (1994, p.176)).  
  
                                                
6 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), Third Edition (2010), defines addiction as, “Immoderate or 
compulsive consumption of a drug or other substance; spec. a condition characterized by regular or 
poorly controlled use of a psychoactive substance despite adverse physical, psychological, or social 
consequences, often with the development of physiological tolerance and withdrawal symptoms; an 
instance of this.” Thus, the definition of addiction in the OED and the definition of substance 
dependence in the DSM are very similar. 
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TABLE I 
CRITERIA FOR SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN DSM-5 
A problematic pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as 
manifested by at least two of the following, occurring within a 12-month period: 
   Impaired control 
(1) The substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than was 
intended. 
   (2) There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control substance use. 
   (3) A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the substance, use the 
substance, or recover from its effects. 
   (4) Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use the substance. 
   Social impairment 
(5) Recurrent substance use resulting in failure to fulfil major role obligations at work, school, 
or home. 
   (6) Continued substance use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal 
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of the substance. 
   (7) Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because of 
substance use. 
   Risky use 
(8) Recurrent substance use in situations in which it is physically hazardous 
   (9) Substance use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical or 
psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by the substance. 
   Pharmacological criteria 
(10) Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: 
 (a) A need for markedly increased amounts of the substance to achieve intoxication or 
desired effect. 
 (b) A markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of the 
substance. 
   (11) Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: 
 
(a) a substance-specific problematic behavioral change, with physiological and cognitive 
concomitants, that is due to the cessation of, or reduction in, heavy and prolonged 
substance use.1 
 
(b) the same (or a closely related) substance is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal 
symptoms. 
Source: DSM-5 (APA (2013, p 483-484)). 
1Criterion (a) is specific to each substance in the DSM because the nature of withdrawal tends to 
differ across substances; I have included criterion (a) in its most general form (APA (2013, p. 
486)). 
 
An important change in DSM-5 is that only two criteria need to be present for a 
diagnosis of substance use disorder; in DSM-IV, one criterion needed to be present 
for substance abuse while three had to be present for substance dependence. As 
mentioned previously, DSM-5 also includes a severity specifier: 2 – 3 criteria 
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represent mild substance use disorder, 4 – 5 criteria are indicative of moderate 
substance use disorder, whereas 6 or more symptoms imply severe substance use 
disorder. DSM-5 makes reference to the term “addiction” in the title of the mental 
disorder category (i.e., “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders”) but then 
explains why the term is not used anywhere else in the manual, “… because of its 
uncertain definition and its potentially negative connotation” (APA (2013, p.485)). 
 
The evolution of the diagnostic classification of addiction raises some important 
issues. First, iterations of the DSM show that diagnostic criteria and classification 
systems do not solely serve scientific ends but that they develop in concert with wider 
political, social, and economic forces (RSVS (2008)). For example, a diagnosis of 
substance dependence in DSM-III required evidence of physiological dependence, 
regardless of other forms of harm that a person may inflict on herself7 through 
substance use, because this was regarded as a clear sign of a disease state and the 
disease model of addiction had gained general acceptance.  
 
Second, the terms “addiction” and “dependence” have changed from being descriptors 
of behaviour into explanations of that behaviour. RSVS (2008, p. 4) state this point 
clearly, “This appears to have happened over the years with the term ‘addiction,’ 
which has gone from being a metaphorical description of devotion to a particular 
activity, to being an hypothesized internal state, the existence of which is revealed by 
that devotion, and, finally, to being the cause of that devotion.” Akers (1991, p. 779) 
makes a similar point and then argues, “However precisely it is defined, addiction is a 
label, a term applied to behavior. It cannot, itself, provide an explanation for that 
behaviour.” 
 
Third, West (2006) recognises that DSM diagnostic criteria leave much room for 
interpretation. For example, how strong do cravings need to be to be classified as 
such? Similarly, how painful or pronounced does withdrawal have to be to tick off 
this symptom? Either we need to rely on clinical judgement to adjudicate, recognising 
that clinicians will have different views, or let the individual decide when she fills out 
a diagnostic questionnaire. 
                                                
7 In this thesis I adopt the convention of using the female gender in even-numbered chapters and the 
male gender in odd-numbered chapters. 
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Finally, given that only two criteria need to be present for a diagnosis of substance 
use disorder, we can have up to 5 “addicts” with non-overlapping symptoms. In 
addition, every criterion is weighted equally in the diagnosis of addiction even though 
certain criteria (e.g., withdrawal) tend to be more indicative than others (e.g., 
interpersonal problems). 
 
These issues notwithstanding, research into addiction has made steady progress over 
the last 50 years by using the criteria set out in the DSM. Clearly no classification 
system is perfect but addiction research has improved, and will continue to improve, 
as DSM criteria and the definition of substance dependence evolve.  
 
The Disease Model of Addiction 
 
Warner (1994) traces the history of the disease model of addiction back to the early 
17th century. As alcoholism or “habitual drunkenness,” as it was referred to at the 
time, became increasingly widespread, members of the clergy began to focus on its 
causes, course, and consequences. They argued that alcoholism was caused by the 
consumption of spirituous alcohol, as opposed to fermented liquors 8 , which 
subsequently led to a loss of control over the use of alcohol. This loss of control 
implied that habitual drunkenness was a disease, the only cure for which was 
complete abstinence.  
 
For example, in 1609, John Downame referred to people “addicted to drunkennese” 
who turned “delight into necessitie” (cited in Warner (1994, p. 687)). In 1619, Robert 
Harris described alcoholism as a “dropsilike disease” (cited in Warner (1994, p. 688)). 
In 1677, Edward Bury argued that habitual drunkenness was a disease “so 
epidemical” that “all the Physicians in England know not how to set a stop to it” 
(cited in Warner (1994, p. 688)). As Heyman (2009, p. 98) notes, members of the 
clergy reasoned that they were dealing with a disease because their parishioners were 
                                                
8 “Spirituous alcohol” refers to distilled spirits like whiskey, rum, gin and brandy, whereas “fermented 
liquors” refer to types of alcohol - like beer, wine and cider - that are produced through a process of 
fermentation. 
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still pious but had lost control over the use of alcohol and continued drinking despite 
alcohol-related problems.  
 
This view, that addiction is a disease, won few adherents in the 1600s but, a century 
or so later, was embraced by Benjamin Rush, who is often credited as the father of 
American psychiatry (e.g., Westermeyer (2005, p. 23)). Rush believed that 
consumption of alcohol over a period of time could turn a voluntary drinker into an 
involuntary one. In other words, drinking became a compulsion or necessity merely as 
a function of prior consumption. Rush’s work coupled with a marked increase in 
alcohol consumption in the US post-1780, and the subsequent rise in opium and 
morphine abuse, brought addiction to the attention of the wider medical community 
(Weiner and White (2007)). 
 
In the 1850s and 1860s a number of asylums and sanatoria were established in the US 
and Europe to treat addiction, and greater awareness of addiction as a problem which 
required medical treatment culminated in the establishment of the American 
Association for the Cure of Inebriety (AACI) in 1870. The AACI was based on four 
founding principles: 1) addiction is a disease; 2) like other diseases, addiction is 
curable; 3) its primary cause is a “constitutional susceptibility” to addiction; 4) and 
this susceptibility can be either acquired or inherited (Weiner and White (2007)). 
 
The AACI published the Quarterly Journal of Inebriety in 1876, which was the first 
scientific journal focussing specifically on addiction, and the first to explicitly 
embrace the disease interpretation of this disorder. Weiner and White (2007) trace the 
history of this journal and the terms that were used to describe dependence on 
psychoactive substances. Although “inebriety” remained the professional term of 
choice throughout the journal’s history, “alcoholism” and “addiction” took on greater 
prominence over the years. 
 
Despite the growing acceptance of the disease model of addiction among the set of 
physicians studying substance dependence, lay people and religious organisations 
vehemently opposed this conception (Weiner and White (2007)). Levine (1978) 
explains that the public were of the opinion that addicts chose to abuse their targets of 
addiction, rather than being compelled to do so, as the disease interpretation implies. 
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The American Medical Temperance Movement (AMTA) was formed in 1891 and it 
published the Bulletin of the American Temperance Association to expound this 
alternative view. AMTA advocated the prohibition of alcohol and the legal regulation 
of opiates and cocaine, policy suggestions which were ultimately codified in the 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 (Weiner and White (2007)). 
 
The Harrison Act did not explicitly cover recreational drug use and addiction, but 
according to Heyman (2009, p. 9) it was enforced as though its goal was to eradicate 
substance use and abuse. This shift in policy from treatment to prosecution of 
addiction led to the demise of the American Medical Society for the Study of Alcohol 
and Other Narcotics (AMSSAON), the successor to the AACI, and all but a handful 
of the sanatoria and asylums which had been established in the 19th century (Weiner 
and White (2007)). 
 
However, the failure of prohibition in the US and the growing awareness of substance 
abuse and addiction following World War II, led to renewed interest in the etiology, 
treatment, and prevention of addiction, and the establishment of alcohol and drug 
abuse divisions under the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). In 1952, the 
first edition of The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
was published and, as discussed earlier, it included addiction to alcohol and drugs as 
recognised mental disorders. The hope at the time was that the scientific recognition 
of addiction as a mental disorder would lead to better research into, and treatment and 
prevention of, addiction. 
 
However, post-World War II increases in alcohol abuse, and the cannabis, LSD, and 
opiate epidemics of the 1960s, made it clear that the alcohol and drug divisions of the 
NIMH were not responding adequately to substance use problems in the US. This 
prompted the formation of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
(NIAAA) in 1970 and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) in 1974, both of 
which fell under the NIMH. The formation of these institutes provided the funding 
and impetus for large-scale research into, and treatment of, addiction (Westermeyer 
(2005)). They also became two of the most important proponents of the disease model 
of addiction, which Heyman (2009, p. 17) argues is the primary understanding of 
addiction among the public, the medical fraternity, and the media. 
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That NIDA and the NIAAA still embrace the disease model of addiction is evident in 
their press releases, research reports, and publicly disseminated information. For 
example, NIDA’s webpage “DrugFacts: Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction” 
provides the following definition of addiction: 
 
“Addiction is a chronic, often relapsing brain disease that causes compulsive 
drug seeking and use, despite harmful consequences to the addicted individual 
and to those around him or her. Although the initial decision to take drugs is 
voluntary for most people, the brain changes that occur over time challenge an 
addicted person’s self control and hamper his or her ability to resist intense 
impulses to take drugs” (NIDA (2012)). 
 
Similarly, the NIAAA’s webpage on “Alcohol Use Disorders” states that, “Like many 
other diseases, alcoholism is typically considered chronic, meaning that it lasts a 
person’s lifetime” (NIAAA (2014)). In the next section I discuss Heyman’s (2009) 
critique of the disease model of addiction and outline his argument for understanding 
addiction as a disorder of choice. I then present the reconciliation provided by RSVS 
which resolves the traditional tension between these hypotheses. 
 
The Disease Model of Addiction: A Critique and Reconciliation 
 
Heyman (2009, p. 91) argues that proponents of the disease interpretation of addiction 
typically rely on at least one of the following justifications for their adoption of this 
model: 1) addiction has a biological basis; 2) psychoactive substances can convert a 
voluntary drug user into an involuntary one; and 3) the disease model is the humane 
interpretation and leads to better treatment for addicts. Heyman critiques each of these 
justifications and I will discuss them in turn. 
 
Numerous research studies have found that genes influence substance dependence 
(for recent reviews consult Li (2003), Agrawal and Lynskey (2008), Li and 
Burmeister (2009)) and this has been used as evidence in favour of the disease model 
of addiction. The logic is as follows: people do not choose their genes, if genes 
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influence behaviour then that behaviour cannot be voluntary, genes influence 
addiction, thus addiction is not voluntary, it is a disease. 
 
While genes certainly influence addiction, this does not imply that addiction is a 
disease because the correlation between genes and addiction is far from perfect. A 
recent review of twin and adoption studies (Agrawal and Lynskey (2008)) finds that 
genetic influences on addiction range from 0.3 – 0.7. In other words, a genetic 
predisposition to addiction raises the likelihood of addiction without making it 
certain. In addition, the fact that genes influence behaviour does not imply that 
behaviour is involuntary; genes affect many behaviours which are clearly voluntary. 
For example, Heyman (2009, p. 94) cites numerous studies showing that a range of 
attitudes and beliefs (e.g., support for the death penalty and religious beliefs) are 
heritable. In other words, just because something is heritable does not mean it is 
involuntary: attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours which are voluntary have genetic as 
well as cultural, social, and psychological antecedents. Thus, the link between genes 
and substance dependence does not imply that addiction is a disease. 
 
Another line of reasoning which forms part of the biological justification for the 
disease interpretation of addiction is that drug use leads to neuroadaptation. As drug 
use changes brain structure and function, addiction must be a disease, specifically a 
brain disease, or so the argument goes (see, for example, Leshner (1997), Hanson, 
Leshner and Tai (2002)). The major flaw with this hypothesis is that voluntary 
behaviours lead to neuroadaptation too. In other words, the fact that drug use leads to 
neuroadaptation does not mean that addiction is a disease. Changes in voluntary 
behaviour lead to changes in the brain and it is this plasticity which makes voluntary 
behaviour possible (Heyman (2009, p. 95-96)). Thus, using neuroadaptation as the 
basis for the disease model of addiction runs the risk of classifying everything which 
leads to changes in the brain as a disease.  
 
In sum, genes are related to addiction and addiction causes changes in the brain, but 
genes also influence a host of voluntary behaviours and these voluntary behaviours 
lead to neuroadaptation. Thus, the biological basis of addiction, in and of itself, does 
not imply that addiction is a disease. For addiction to be classified in this way, drugs 
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must lead to a loss of control over substance use and thereby transform a voluntary 
drug user into an involuntary one. It is to this point that I now turn. 
 
Heyman (2009, p. 97-98) recognises that to determine whether drug use turns a 
voluntary user into an involuntary one, an impartial understanding of voluntary and 
involuntary behaviour is crucial. The history of the disease model of addiction shows 
that the disease concept is closely linked to the idea that addicts are compelled to 
consume drugs of abuse despite the deleterious effects this has on their welfare. In 
other words, the disease model of addiction is tied to the idea that people do not 
voluntarily engage in self-destructive acts. Under this conception, voluntary 
behaviour is optimal behaviour, in the sense of maximising benefits and minimising 
costs, and as addiction is not optimal it cannot be voluntary. 
 
Heyman (2009, p. 104) provides an alternative definition of voluntary behaviour, “… 
the degree to which an activity is voluntary is the degree to which it systematically 
varies as a function of its consequences, and the degree to which it is feasible to apply 
such consequences.” This definition distinguishes blinking and sneezing, which are 
involuntary acts because they do not vary as a function of their consequences, from 
winking and spitting, which do. The second component of this definition 
accommodates cases where it is not feasible to adjust consequences so as to alter a 
voluntary act; in this case, voluntary behaviour is functionally involuntary. For 
example, eating is a voluntary act but, as there are no substitutes for calories, it is not 
feasible to apply consequences to completely deter eating. In the context of addiction, 
drug use may become involuntary if it is not sensitive to its consequences or if it is 
not legitimate or practical to apply these consequences. 
 
Studies of addicts have found that there is a clear inverse relationship between price 
and consumption of drugs, and between access to alternative, substitutable activities 
and substance use (Vuchinich and Heather (2003) provide an overview of the 
literature on this topic). In other words, addiction is responsive to changes in its 
consequences. Furthermore, according to a set of addicts’ self-reports, many decided 
to quit using drugs in response to fears of arrest, financial problems, and the desire to 
be good parents (Heyman (2009, p. 44-65)).  
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Heyman draws attention to the four largest epidemiological studies of addiction ever 
conducted in the US: the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study (Anthony and 
Helzer (1991)); the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) (Warner et al. (1995)); the 
National Comorbidity Survey Replication (Kessler et al. (2005a, 2005b)); and the 
National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) 
(Stinson et al. (2005)). He finds that the vast majority of addicts quit by their early 
thirties and do so without seeking formal treatment, which echoes the findings of the 
2012 World Drug Report (UNODC (2012)). In other words, as the demands of 
adulthood take on greater significance, many addicts successfully manage to quit their 
targets of addiction, which clearly implies that addiction varies as a function of its 
consequences and thereby involves voluntary behaviour. 
 
Heyman (2009, p. 86-87, 105-108) also focuses on contingency management (CM) as 
a treatment for addiction. CM aims to modify behaviour by incentivising and 
reinforcing changes in behaviour through the provision of vouchers, modest financial 
rewards, and prizes. If addiction is voluntary and responds to changes in its 
consequences then CM may be an effective form of treatment. Heyman finds that a 
large number of studies successfully employed CM techniques to promote abstinence 
and prevent relapse.  
 
This finding suggests that the disease interpretation of addiction may not yield the 
best treatment for addicts, which is a common justification for the model. If addiction 
is a chronic, relapsing disorder, characterised by involuntary drug use, then CM 
treatment should have little effect. However, a recent meta-analysis of CM techniques 
concluded that it is one of the most effective approaches for the treatment of addiction 
(Prendergast et al. (2006)).  
 
The preceding discussion is a brief outline of Heyman’s thesis and his critique of the 
three primary justifications for the disease model of addiction. His argument casts 
doubt on the validity of the disease model and it suggests that addiction involves 




RSVS argue that these two apparently contradictory hypotheses (i.e., the disease 
model and Heyman’s voluntary choice model) can be reconciled by focussing on 
recent developments in behavioural science and neuroscience and by adopting the 
appropriate levels or scales of scientific analysis. Addiction manifests itself and can 
be understood at both molar (i.e., behavioural) and molecular levels; these levels put 
constraints on each other but neither can be reduced to the other. Heyman provides a 
molar account of addiction whereas the disease model is inherently molecular in that 
neuroadaptation produces a disease state typified by compulsive drug-taking.  
 
RSVS adopt Ainslie’s (1992, 2001) “picoeonomic” framework to provide a molar 
scale account of addiction. Ainslie argues that Samuelson’s (1937) discounted utility 
model – which assumes an additively-separable intertemporal utility function and 
exponential (E) discounting, and thereby implies time-consistent preferences – is an 
inaccurate description of how people and nonhuman animals discount delayed 
rewards. Numerous studies in psychology (see Green and Myerson (2004) for a 
review) suggest that people discount rewards hyperbolically9 which, in contrast to E 
discounting with an additively-separable intertemporal utility function, can lead to 
preference reversals (viz., time-inconsistent choices): preference for a larger, later 
(LL) reward switches to a smaller, sooner (SS) reward temporarily when the SS 
reward is imminent.  
 
Hyperbolic (H) discounting provides an explanation for the pattern of behaviour 
described at the start of this chapter: addicts consume drugs while taking active, and 
costly, steps to prevent or limit their consumption of these goods. It also explains the 
common cycle of quit attempts and relapse observed in addicts. For example, a 
smoker who wants to quit may take active steps to stop smoking so as to enjoy the 
long-term health benefits which result (i.e., the smoker has a preference for the LL 
reward) but then cave in when offered a cigarette by a friend (i.e., switch to the SS 
reward when it is imminent). Thus, H discounting provides an explicit rationale for 
the time-inconsistency which we observe in addicts. But if all people discount 
                                                
9 As this thesis focuses on statistical and experimental methodology at the boundary of economics and 
psychology, I will rigorously interrogate the claim that hyperbolic discounting more accurately 
characterises time preferences in later chapters. 
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hyperbolically then what prevents the vast majority of people who use drugs from 
becoming addicted?  
 
To explain this apparent tendency to make time-inconsistent choices while accounting 
for the fact that people successfully avoid the temptation of SS rewards most of the 
time, Ainslie models molar choice behaviour as the Nash equilibrium of a bargaining 
game among subpersonal interests (hence “picoeconomics”). These subpersonal 
interests are a succession of selves who bargain with one another across time and 
ultimately determine whether SS or LL rewards are consumed.  
 
Ainslie lists four mechanisms which are used by long-term interests to supplant short-
term interests in these intertemporal bargaining games. First, external commitment 
devices, like the drug disulfiram which makes consumption of alcohol extremely 
unpleasant, can commit the agent to a course of action when there is a temptation to 
renege. Second, long-term interests can control the attention of the agent so as to 
prevent the processing of information about the availability of a SS reward; this is a 
form of internal, as opposed to external, commitment. Third, long-range interests can 
inhibit the agent’s emotional response to “visceral rewards” (Loewenstein (1996, 
1999)) and thereby make consumption of the visceral SS reward less likely.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, “personal rules” can be used to bundle together whole 
series of LL rewards so as to bolster the agent’s self-control and subvert short-term 
interests which favour immediate consumption. Note that preference reversal is more 
likely when an agent chooses between a discrete SS-LL reward pair as opposed to two 
series of SS and LL rewards. As Ainslie (2005, p. 640) explains, H discount curves 
level off at longer delays which means that when a set of LL rewards are bundled 
together in a series, the aggregate value of the LL series increases, relative to the SS 
series, as both series lengthen. With a long enough series, the total value of the LL 
series may not only exceed the value of the associated SS series but also the value of a 
lone SS reward which is available immediately. If so, then the agent may choose to 
forgo both the single SS reward and the series of SS rewards in favour of the series of 
LL rewards and thereby achieve self-control.  
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This framing of choice as between series of rewards rather than individual rewards is 
more likely if the agent views her current choice as predictive of future choices. If the 
current choice is a test case for future choices, this puts the whole bundle of LL 
rewards at stake in the current choice. What this means is that if the agent chooses the 
SS reward, she not only loses out on the LL reward but also the expectation of 
choosing LL rewards in future. Ainslie argues that people often adopt personal rules 
to promote the bundling of rewards. These rules specify the choice to be made within 
particular classes or categories of decision problems and they are strengthened by 
adherence and weakened by transgression. Ainslie (1992, 2001) provides detailed 
discussions of the conscious and unconscious formation of personal rules, their likely 
efficacy, and the role they play in circumscribing and promoting patterns of 
behaviour. In the context of addiction, addicts are understood as people who have lost 
the ability to make and “enforce” personal rules which prevent or curtail their 
consumption (see Monterosso and Ainslie (2009) for more details). Heyman’s view 
that addiction is a disorder of choice fits squarely within this framework. 
 
At a molecular level, RSVS argue that a pattern of drug consumption affects the way 
in which the brain’s dopamine reward system learns. The dopaminergic circuit of the 
brain, which projects from the ventral tegmental area through the ventral striatum and 
into the orbitofrontal cortex, releases dopamine spikes when rewards turn out better 
than expected, and it learns to predict the cues that precede these spikes. The purpose 
of this learning process is to prime animals to exploit stochastic consumption 
opportunities and, as such, the dopamine system integrates valuation, attention, and 
motor preparation (Ross (2012)). 
 
Addictive substances influence the brain in different ways, but all ultimately affect the 
dopamine reward system and the way in which it learns. Specifically, drugs influence 
reward timing signals in the dopamine system which makes it “surprised” and hyper-
stimulated, implying that a reward-rich environment has been found. Consequently, 
the brain reduces GABA and serotonin inhibitory signals that typically prevent the 
dopamine system from directly controlling behaviour. That the use of drugs is paired 
with reliable cues for reward-rich consumption, makes the reward system learn to 
predict and respond to cues that are linked to drug use, which ultimately leads to the 
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relentless pursuit of addictive consumption. As RSVS (2008, p. 16) argue, the reward 
system “commits mutiny against the normal personal control apparatus.”  
 
To provide a bridge between these molar and molecular scale accounts, RSVS explain 
that choice behaviour at the molar level is what allows the reward system to learn. 
Similarly, changes in the reward system limit available options but do not preclude 
choice. As discussed previously, the majority of addicts quit by their early thirties and 
do so without seeking formal treatment, implying that a reward system which has 
adapted to seek out and use drugs does not completely predetermine behaviour. But 
from the other direction, recovered addicts who relapse tend to escalate drug use far 
faster than people in the early stages of addiction who have no history of dependence. 
This implies that reward system learning is not completely forgotten. Thus, the molar 
and molecular scales place constraints on each other but do not absolve the need to 
understand addiction at both levels. 
 
The reconciliation provided by RSVS resolves the tension between choice-based and 
disease models of addiction by recognising that both of them contribute to our 
understanding of substance dependence and should be judged on their own respective 
levels of analysis. To borrow the analogy from Ross (2012, p. 336), there is nothing 
contradictory about the following two statements, “… in consequence of an inherited 
condition, lactose tolerant people are more likely to quench their thirst with milk than 
are lactose-intolerant people; and everyone who drinks milk chooses to do so.” 
 
In what follows, I will discuss economic models of choice which are relevant to the 
study of addiction and thereby highlight some of the molar scale factors which can 
precipitate substance dependence. I do this in full knowledge though that choice-
based accounts of addiction provide only a partial understanding of this phenomenon, 





III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF ADDICTION 
 
Deep philosophical issues which models of addiction bring to light are the notions of 
choice, agency, and rationality in economic theory. Ross (2005, 2012, 2014) argues 
that any entity which behaviourally responds to incentives, specifically changes in 
relative opportunity costs, is an economic agent. This definition includes people as 
well as firms, industries, countries, nonhuman animals, and clusters of brain cells.  
 
Economic agents, faced with various incentives and constraints, make choices. To 
make a choice, in the economic sense, agents must process changes in real or 
expected costs and benefits somewhere, but as Ross (2012, p. 325) argues, this 
processing is not necessarily “internal” to the agent. For example, changes in the 
external environment may limit the supply of certain goods (e.g., typewriters and fax 
machines) which leads to a reduction in their consumption without the agent 
internally processing this change. Instead the agent merely responds to the incentives 
and constraints created by the lack of supply (e.g., purchases a computer and a 
wireless router). As this example shows, choices need not involve any conscious 
processing or deliberation. Clearly some choices do involve this sort of reasoning but 
others are triggered by changes in the external environment and some are simply 
conditioned responses to stimuli; these conditioned responses still conform to the 
economic notion of choice because they are sensitive to their consequences. 
 
An issue which will become apparent in my discussion of economic models of 
addiction is whether agency is tied to the whole biological life of a person. Some of 
the models (e.g., Becker and Murphy (1988), Orphanides and Zervos (1995), Laibson 
(2001)), either implicitly or explicitly, make this assumption while others (e.g., 
Gruber and Köszegi (2001), Benhabib and Bisin (2004), Fudenberg and Levine 
(2006, 2011, 2012)) adopt a more circumscribed notion of agency. The issue with 
models which assume that people are the prototypical economic agents is that 
people’s tastes naturally change over time. This can be accommodated by indexing 
preferences to life-stages or particular life events which reliably track these changes 
(e.g., Becker and Mulligan (1997)). But in cases where preferences are not indexed in 
this way, we must assume that the agent (viz., person) maximises a single lifetime 
utility function which represents a stable set of preferences. Clearly this is a very 
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strong assumption and one which creates serious problems, discussed later, for the 
economic models of addiction which adopt it. 
 
Ross (2005, 2012, 2014) argues that there is nothing in the axioms of economic 
theory which makes agency synonymous with a whole biological person. Thus, 
agency can instead be ascribed to temporal slices of a person, under the assumption 
that in each temporal slice a person’s preferences are locally stable. Under this 
formulation, a biological person is made up of a sequence of economic agents and 
these agents interact strategically because later agents inherit the consequences (i.e., 
debts, contracts, etc.) of earlier agents’ choices. A major strength of this approach is 
that changes in tastes are easily modelled as the Nash equilibria of intertemporal 
strategic interactions among a sequence of agents (recall the discussion of Ainslie’s 
picoeconomic framework). Thus, models which adopt this formulation account for 
taste change at the level of the person (i.e., the molar level) by associating agency 
with a temporal slice of the person. 
 
Ross (2014, p. 34) identifies two forms of rationality which have been emphasised in 
economics: 1) preference consistency over outcomes; and 2) the formation of accurate 
statistical predictions given available information. I will briefly focus on the first form 
of rationality (i.e., consistency of preferences over outcomes) because it is intimately 
linked to conceptions of agency, and is particularly relevant to economic models of 
addiction given that addicts often appear to make inconsistent (viz., irrational) 
choices, e.g., seek out and use drugs while paying real costs to prevent or limit the 
consumption of these goods. 
 
In a deterministic intertemporal choice context, preference consistency means that an 
agent’s valuation of different consumption bundles is invariant through time. In other 
words, if the agent prefers bundle A to bundle B at time point t, she will also prefer A 
to B at all other time points. Strotz (1955-1956) famously showed that, in the class of 
additively-separable intertemporal utility functions, such preference consistency only 
arises under the assumption of E discounting. Under this formulation, the agent 
compares the exponentially discounted costs and benefits of different consumption 
streams and chooses the one which maximises her utility through time.  
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Becker and Murphy (1988) modify this standard framework by incorporating 
intertemporal complementarities in consumption of the addictive good (viz., they 
abandon the assumption of complete additive separability of the intertemporal utility 
function). Their model is one of “rational addiction” where “rationality means a 
consistent plan to maximize utility over time” (Becker and Murphy (1998, p. 675)). 
While this model captures some of the salient features of addiction, it cannot explain 
the typical course of addiction (i.e., multiple unsuccessful quit attempts before 
eventual abstinence) because it conflates the agent with a whole biological person 
who must implement a consistent plan. As I will discuss later, the model also cannot 
account for the use of commitment devices and rehabilitation, and other seemingly 
inconsistent choices that are the hallmarks of addiction.  
 
The models which I discuss in the next section have been grouped into three 
categories: 1) models of rational addiction; 2) dual self and dual system models; and 
3) exogenous addiction models. I will provide an overview of these models and 
discuss their similarities and differences. The discussion of these models is used to 
provide a theoretical justification for the empirical analyses conducted in later 
chapters. These empirical analyses centre on the instantaneous risk and time 
preferences of addicts and non-addicts so particular attention will be given to the role 
of these preferences in the different theoretical models. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this approach is consistent with Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014) who argue that 
theory, experiments, and econometrics are complementary. In other words, it is 
crucial to review and understand theory because this informs experimental design and 
analysis. And analysis itself should be constrained by, and interpreted jointly with, 
theoretical considerations, prior empirical work, complementary data, econometric 





III.I RATIONAL ADDICTION MODELS 
 
Although many researchers made important contributions to economic theories of 
addiction (see Stigler and Becker (1977), Elster (1979), Spinnewyn (1981), Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981), Schelling (1984)), Becker and Murphy (1988) (BM)10, building 
on the work of Stigler and Becker (1977), developed a theory of rational addiction 
which largely supplanted previous models and became the cornerstone of the 
neoclassical perspective on addiction (Bernheim and Rangel (2007)). The stated 
purpose of the model is to show that addiction can be explained as the outcome of 
forward-looking rational choice which does not rely on dividing the economic agent 
into multiple selves. 
 
As mentioned previously, the BM model abandons the standard additively-separable 
intertemporal utility function so as to incorporate intertemporal dependencies in 
consumption of the addictive good. Specifically, BM assume that utility is additively 
separable over time in the stock of addictive capital, the addictive good, and the non-
addictive good altogether, but not in the addictive and non-addictive goods alone 
because their marginal utilities are influenced by the stock of addictive capital. In 
other words, current consumption of an addictive good is affected by past 
consumption of the addictive good through changes in a person’s stock of addictive 
capital.11 Despite the fact that the intertemporal utility function is not completely 
additively separable in all variables, agents in the BM model have perfect foresight, 
discount exponentially, and therefore make time-consistent choices. As Johnsen and 
Donaldson (1985) explain, as long as intertemporal complementarities are properly 
encoded in current preferences, agents who discount exponentially will formulate and 
follow time-consistent plans. 
                                                
10 When I use the abbreviation BM without a date reference I am referring to Becker and Murphy’s 
seminal article on addiction (Becker and Murphy (1988)). If I make reference to other papers that they 
have co-authored I will still use the abbreviation BM but include the relevant date reference. The same 
applies to all the author abbreviations that I use in this chapter. 
11 Elster (1997, p. 750-751) argues that BM use a person’s stock of addictive capital as an analogy for a 
firm’s stock of physical capital. Physical capital has three features: 1) it is produced by the investment 
decisions of firms; 2) investment lowers profits now but promises to increase profits in future; and 3) it 
decays or depreciates over time. The stock of addictive capital displays feature 1) but it does not 
typically display feature 2) in that consumption of an addictive good increases present utility at the cost 
of a decrease in future utility. Thus, consumption of an addictive good is akin to disinvesting. 
Furthermore, it is unclear whether it retains feature 3) because, as discussed earlier, relapse and 
escalation in usage after prolonged periods of abstinence is quite common. This implies that the effects 
of previous consumption have not depreciated or worn off completely. 
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The BM model tries to capture some of the salient features of addiction (e.g., 
tolerance, reinforcement, and withdrawal) through restrictions on the instantaneous 
utility function which agents maximise. To capture the effect of tolerance, BM 
assume that an increase in consumption of the addictive good leads to a decline in 
future utility through an increase in the stock of addictive capital. This is the sense in 
which the addiction is harmful: repeated use lowers welfare.12 
 
This restriction also implies that abstention or a decline in consumption of the 
addictive good will lead to an increase in welfare over time due to a fall in the stock 
of addictive capital. However, a decrease in consumption of the addictive good leads 
to an immediate fall in utility which represents the physiological process of 
withdrawal.  
 
The assumption that substance use leads to a decline in future welfare is one 
conception of tolerance to an addictive good but another, arguably more plausible 
one, would be that greater past consumption of an addictive good lowers the marginal 
utility of present consumption, implying that one needs to consume more of the good 
over time to enjoy the same overall level of utility. The DSM defines tolerance as, “… 
requiring a markedly increased dose of the substance to achieve the desired effect or a 
markedly reduced effect when the usual dose is consumed” (APA (2013, p. 484)). 
Thus, tolerance would be better captured by the assumption that past consumption 
lowers the utility of present consumption.13 
 
However, the BM model assumes that higher consumption of the addictive good in 
the past raises the marginal utility of present consumption. In other words, the more 
                                                
12 It is also harmful in that greater consumption of the addictive good decreases the marginal utility 
from consumption of the non-addictive good. This can be interpreted as the crowding out effect that 
drug use often has on the enjoyment of other goods and activities. 
13 Ferguson (2000, p. 588) also recognises that the BM tolerance assumption is strange because 
addiction typically involves some form of habituation where greater prior use yields lower satisfaction 
from each successive unit of the addictive good (Goldstein (2001, p. 86)). He argues that this can be 
incorporated easily in the model by adding a new variable to the instantaneous utility function which 
represents “kicks” from consumption of the addictive good. These kicks would be produced by a 
production function which takes consumption of the addictive good as its argument and where the 
marginal utility of kicks increases as the stock of addictive capital rises. However, as consumption of 
the addictive good increases, the marginal productivity of addictive consumption in the production of 
kicks declines, implying that higher levels of consumption are necessary to satisfy the demand for 
kicks. 
 -40- 
you have consumed, the greater the benefit from consumption now.14 This is a 
necessary condition for the addictive good to capture the property of reinforcement 
(i.e., greater past consumption leads to greater present consumption). The sufficient 
condition for reinforcement is that the benefits from consumption now must offset the 
harmful effects which accumulate over time. When these necessary and sufficient 
conditions are satisfied, “adjacent complementarity” holds, which means that 
consumption of the addictive good is a complement, rather than a substitute, across 
time periods.15,16 This assumption is central to most of the economic models of 
addiction reviewed in this section (an important exception is Bernheim and Rangel 
(2004)) because it provides the rationale for why agents continue to consume their 
targets of addiction despite the decline in welfare associated with increases in the 
stock of addictive capital. 
 
The intuition of the BM model is relatively straightforward. People inherit a stock of 
addictive capital in time period 0. They then make intertemporal consumption 
decisions pertaining to addictive and non-addictive goods while taking into account 
the effect of these choices on their current and future welfare as determined by the 
restrictions on the instantaneous utility function and the addiction dynamics captured 
by the equation of motion for the stock of addictive capital. This is the sense in which 
agents are rational: they take into account all past, present and future implications of 
their consumption choices and implement a consistent plan to maximise their welfare 
through time. 
 
The BM model admits multiple possible consumption patterns depending on the 
relationship between the immediate benefits of consumption of the addictive good and 
the long-term consequences which result. This is the tension inherent in the model. 
                                                
14 This resembles the notion of “cravings” which is defined as, “… an intense desire or urge for the 
drug” (APA (2013, p. 483)). 
15 Adjacent complementarity implies that anything which affects consumption of the addictive good at 
one point in time will affect consumption of the addictive good at all points in time. For example, an 
expected increase in future prices will not only decrease consumption when the change comes into 
effect but will also decrease consumption in every period leading up to that date. This is an important 
testable implication of the BM model and has led to a cottage industry of econometric models which 
attempt to show that consumers respond to future price changes by adjusting current consumption. For 
a review of this literature in relation to tobacco smoking consult Chaloupka and Warner (2001). For 
critiques of this literature consult Ferguson (2000) and Baltagi (2007). 
16  Adjacent complementarity also has important implications for intertemporal risk preferences. 
Specifically, in stochastic economic models of addiction, it yields correlation seeking behaviour. As 
the BM model is deterministic though, I defer this discussion until later. 
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Consumption of the addictive good raises welfare now and makes addictive 
consumption more attractive in future while simultaneously lowering future welfare 
through increases in the stock of addictive capital. So, do you consume now and enjoy 
the short-term benefit of addictive consumption while suffering the long-term costs or 
do you abstain now and enjoy the long-term benefits which arise due to a decrease in 
the stock of addictive capital? 
 
Given the deterministic nature of the BM model, there is no place for subjective 
beliefs, instantaneous risk preferences nor intertemporal risk preferences in the 
analysis of choice behaviour.17 The role of time preferences, however, is readily 
apparent. As BM (p. 682) assert, “our analysis implies the common view that present-
oriented individuals are potentially more addicted to harmful goods than future-
oriented individuals.” In other words, people who discount the future heavily will 
tend to focus on the short-term benefits of consumption of the addictive good while 
putting relatively little weight on the future costs, thereby inclining them to consume 
the addictive good. This is a testable implication of the BM model which has been 
studied extensively in psychology but only in a handful of studies in economics (e.g., 
Chabris et al. (2008), Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010), Kang and Ikeda (2014)). In 
Chapter 3, I provide a detailed review of experimental studies focussing on the 
relationship between time preferences and smoking behaviour and highlight the 
methodological and statistical issues that plague the bulk of studies in this literature. 
  
The fact that consumers choose to become addicts and are “happy,” in a utility-
maximising sense, with the consequences of their choices is one of the most 
controversial implications of rational addiction because the common view of addicts 
is that they regret their choices and would be better off if they had never consumed 
the addictive good. As Gul and Pesendorfer (2007, p. 150) state, “the Becker-Murphy 
formulation entails an a priori rejection of ‘the problem’ of addiction.” According to 
the BM model, even though a person’s welfare declines over time through 
consumption of the addictive good, this was taken into account when the good was 
originally consumed (i.e., choices were made with full cognisance of their 
repercussions and as such there is no place for regret). This has clear implications for 
                                                
17 The impact of subjective beliefs, and instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences come to the 
fore in the model of Orphanides and Zervos (1995), which is discussed next.  
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policy: any restrictions placed on consumption of the addictive good, other than those 
to eliminate negative externalities, are necessarily welfare reducing. As BM (p. 691) 
assert, “[people] would be even more unhappy if they were prevented from 
consuming the addictive goods.” 
 
Orphanides and Zervos (1995) (OZ) take the BM model and relax the assumption of 
perfect foresight so as to incorporate the roles of instantaneous risk preferences, 
intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs in the explanation of addiction. 
Note that the OZ model is still rational in the sense that people form consistent plans 
to maximize expected utility through time. However, these plans are based on agents’ 
subjective beliefs about their addiction potential and these beliefs, although updated 
optimally via a Bayesian learning process, can lead to addiction and regret. 
 
The OZ model is based on three fundamental assertions: consumption of the addictive 
good affects people in different ways (i.e., it may be very harmful to some but not at 
all harmful to others); people have subjective beliefs concerning their addiction 
potential; and these beliefs are updated through the information that consumption of 
the addictive good imparts. 
 
To capture the idea that people have different susceptibilities to addiction, OZ assume 
that the population consists of two groups: non-addicts and potential addicts. 
Increases in the stock of addictive capital have no effect on non-addicts but can 
produce harmful side effects in potential addicts. An agent formulates her 
consumption plan by trading off the costs and benefits of consumption of addictive 
and non-addictive goods. Whether a particular consumption plan leads to addiction 
critically depends on a person’s vulnerability to addiction and the speed with which 
uncertainty about the person’s true type (i.e., non-addict or potential addict) is 
resolved.  
 
If a potential addict consumes the addictive good and experiences no negative side 
effects then she will revise the probability of being a non-addict upwards over time. 
When the uncertainty regarding her true type is finally resolved and she realises she is 
a potential addict, her subsequent consumption decisions will be determined by the 
stock of addictive capital she has accumulated over time. The longer it takes for this 
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uncertainty to be resolved and the larger the stock of addictive capital, the more likely 
it is that the person will become addicted.18 
 
The preceding discussion highlights one of the crucial insights of the model, which is 
that addiction is voluntary but unintentional. People in this model do not want to 
become addicts because they recognise the harmful consequences of addiction. But 
they may decide to risk the possibility of addiction because they are unsure of their 
addiction potential and consumption of the addictive good is attractive. As OZ (p. 
741) argue, “[addiction] is the unintended occasional outcome of experimenting with 
an addictive good known to provide certain instant pleasure and only probabilistic 
future harm.” What this implies is that addicts in the OZ model are not “happy 
addicts” because they did not want to become addicted ex ante. Owing to their 
erroneous initial beliefs and/or the slow resolution of uncertainty, they were “hooked” 
into an addiction and now suffer regret. 
 
Thus the BM and OZ models differ markedly in their explanation of addiction. In the 
BM model, people choose to become addicts after comparing all the costs and 
benefits of consumption of the addictive good. In the OZ model, people do not want 
to be addicts but may choose to experiment with the addictive good, which over time 
leads to a harmful addiction. In addition, the BM and OZ models have notably 
different policy implications. As discussed previously, there is no room for 
government intervention in the BM model except to combat externalities associated 
with consumption of the addictive good. The OZ model, by contrast, prescribes a 
more interventionist role for government policy, specifically in the provision of 
accurate information about the true probability of addiction P*. Furthermore, there 
may be a role for insurance against people’s idiosyncratic risks of addiction. 
 
                                                
18 A person’s initial beliefs P0 play an important role in the decision to experiment with the addictive 
good. Let P* represent the true probability that the person is a non-addict. In the case where someone 
knows P* with certainty, she will set her initial belief P0 = P*. In general this is not the case and the 
person will need to form her initial beliefs by using information from different sources. The weight that 
people give to particular sources can have a large impact on the formation of their initial beliefs. For 
example, if a person puts a lot of weight on the information provided by a non-addict, this could yield 
an overoptimistic prior, P0 > P*, which inclines the individual to experiment with the addictive good. 
By contrast, if someone puts a high weight on information from an anti-drug campaign this may yield a 
conservative prior, P0 < P*, and prevent that person from experimenting with the good. 
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The OZ model makes it clear how instantaneous risk and time preferences, 
intertemporal risk preferences and subjective beliefs interact to influence addiction.19 
In the case of time preferences, if the future costs of consumption of the addictive 
good are discounted at a high rate then potential addicts may be inclined to 
experiment with the addictive good which provides immediate benefits. With only 
moderate discounting of the future though, both the present benefits and future costs 
of consumption of the addictive good will loom large in the mind of a potential addict 
and may prevent her from consuming the good. 
 
In the case of instantaneous or atemporal risk preferences, the stochastic nature of the 
OZ model implies that every decision is affected by people’s attitudes toward risk. 
Someone who is very risk averse with respect to atemporal payoffs may never choose 
to consume the addictive good as she fears the risk of harmful consequences and/or 
the realisation of her true type. Someone who is less risk averse with respect to 
atemporal payoffs may be willing to gamble on the possibility of harmful 
consequences and/or the realisation of her addiction potential. Thus, instantaneous 
risk preferences are crucial for explaining the initial choice to use an addictive good 
and any subsequent decisions to increase or decrease consumption of the good. 
 
Intertemporal risk preferences20 play an important role in the OZ model, and in the 
other stochastic models which I discuss in this chapter, and thereby deserve further 
comment. Richard (1975) is credited with introducing intertemporal risk preferences 
to the economic literature (see Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007)), albeit with 
different terminology, but the concept apparently first appeared in de Finetti (1952). 
Richard (1975) basically extended the notion of risk preferences over one variable to 
                                                
19 The role of subjective beliefs has been discussed in detail so I will only focus on instantaneous risk 
and time preferences and intertemporal risk preferences in the remainder of this section. 
20 The literature on intertemporal risk preferences emerged from the literature on multi-attribute utility 
theory (see Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014b) for reviews). 
A multi-attribute utility function captures the idea that agents may take into account multiple 
characteristics or attributes of a good when making choices. For example, suppose someone wants to 
purchase a dishwasher and cares both about the speed with which it finishes its cycle and its energy 
efficiency. One machine may be very fast but energy inefficient while another is slower but more 
efficient. To represent the person’s preferences over these different attributes one could employ a 
multi-attribute utility function. In the context of intertemporal consumption streams, both the amounts 
of different goods and the times at which they are received can be regarded as two distinct attributes or 
characteristics of the consumption stream. Viewed in this way, preferences over intertemporal 
consumption streams are modelled naturally using a multi-attribute utility function. 
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risk preferences over multiple variables and referred to the latter as multivariate risk 
aversion.21  
 
To understand this idea, consider the following two lotteries which yield outcomes in 
two time periods. Lottery L1 gives an even chance of either high consumption in 
period 1 and low consumption in period 2 or low consumption in period 1 and high 
consumption in period 2. Lottery L2, by contrast, gives an even chance of either high 
consumption in both periods or low consumption in both periods. Note that the 
outcomes in Lottery L1 are negatively serially correlated whereas the outcomes in 
lottery L2 are positively serially correlated. If an agent chooses lottery L1 over lottery 
L2, she displays intertemporal risk aversion or correlation aversion because, as 
Richard (1975, p. 12) remarked, “[she] prefers getting some of the ‘best’ and some of 
the ‘worst’ to taking a chance on all of the ‘best’ or all of the ‘worst.’”22 If the agent is 
indifferent between the lotteries she is intertemporally risk neutral or correlation 
neutral, and if she prefers lottery L2 to lottery L1 she is intertemporally risk seeking or 
correlation seeking. 
 
Richard (1975) showed that the sign of the cross partial derivatives of an agent’s 
intertemporal utility function determines her preferences towards serially correlated 
lotteries. Specifically, if ∂2U(c)/(∂ci∂cj) ≤ 0 the agent is intertemporally risk averse. In 
words, if the intertemporal utility function’s cross partial derivative is non-positive 
then the agent prefers lotteries where the outcomes are negatively serially correlated 
because the marginal utility of current consumption is decreasing in past 
consumption. By contrast, if ∂2U(c)/(∂ci∂cj) = 0 the agent is intertemporally risk 
neutral, whereas if ∂2U(c)/(∂ci∂cj) ≥ 0 the agent is intertemporally risk seeking. Thus, 
                                                
21 Researchers in the field of intertemporal risk preferences typically employ the risk averse component 
of these preferences in their terminology. Keeney (1973) used the term “conditional risk aversion,” 
Richard (1975) referred to “multivariate risk aversion,” Epstein and Tanny (1980) defined “correlation 
aversion,” Strzalecki (2013) employed “long-run risk aversion,” and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2014b) used “intertemporal risk aversion” or “intertemporal correlation aversion.” I prefer 
the term “intertemporal risk preferences” because it does not presuppose an aversion to lotteries with 
positive serial correlation. I think this is particularly important in the context of economics models of 
addiction because adjacent complementarity is linked to intertemporal risk seeking behaviour. Note 
that when I refer to a particular type of intertemporal risk preference (i.e., intertemporal risk aversion) I 
will use the “intertemporal risk” and “correlation” prefixes (i.e., correlation aversion) interchangeably. 
22 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014b, p. 5) provide another intuitive definition for 
correlation aversion when drawing an analogy between instantaneous risk aversion and intertemporal 
risk aversion: “The correlation averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs across periods, 
just as the risk averse individual prefers to have non-extreme payoffs within periods.” 
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the form of an agent’s intertemporal utility function determines her intertemporal risk 
preferences, just as the form of an agent’s instantaneous utility function determines 
her instantaneous risk preferences under expected utility theory.23 
 
The standard additively-separable intertemporal utility function exhibits intertemporal 
risk neutrality because consumption at different points in time are independent so the 
cross partial derivatives of the intertemporal utility function are necessarily zero. 
Thus, even though people may be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking over 
instantaneous or atemporal lotteries, an additively-separable intertemporal utility 
function yields correlation neutrality.24,25 The natural question that emerges in the 
context of this chapter is: what does the form of the intertemporal utility function in 
economic models of addiction imply for agents’ intertemporal risk preferences?  
 
Recall that adjacent complementarity, which drives the addiction dynamics in most 
economic models of addiction, means that consumption of the addictive good is a 
complement across time periods; this clearly has implications for intertemporal risk 
preferences. As Bommier and Rochet (2006, p. 725-726) recognise, models of habit 
formation, of which economic models of addiction are some of the exemplars, place 
strong restrictions on the intertemporal utility function. Specifically, as consumption 
of the addictive good increases the stock of addictive capital and increases in the 
stock of addictive capital increase the marginal utility of addictive consumption, 
∂2U(c)/(∂ci∂cj) > 0, implying that agents in these models are typically correlation 
seeking.  
 
That agents in these stochastic models tend to be correlation seeking makes intuitive 
sense in the context of addiction. Referring back to the lotteries L1 and L2, the 
                                                
23 Much as the literature on instantaneous choice under risk has evolved to incorporate rank and sign 
dependence (which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4), so too has the literature on intertemporal risk 
preferences (see Fishburn (1984), Miyamoto and Wakker (1996)). 
24 The same is true for other combinations of instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences. In other 
words, agents can be risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking with respect to atemporal payoffs and yet 
exhibit correlation aversion, correlation seeking or correlation neutrality with respect to intertemporal 
lotteries. 
25 That an additively-separable intertemporal utility function yields correlation neutrality has the 
unfortunate implication that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution simply equals the inverse of 
instantaneous risk attitudes. In economic models of addiction, where the intertemporal utility function 
is not completely additively separable, this link between instantaneous risk attitudes and the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is broken (see Bommier (2007), Andersen, Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2014b)). 
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correlation seeking agent prefers to gamble on all of the best or all of the worst, rather 
than accept some of the best and some of the worst. With regard to addictive 
consumption, this preference for lotteries with positive serial correlation seems to 
characterise the intertemporal risk preferences of addicts quite well: they chase the 
positive serial correlation in “good” realisations of addictive lotteries while running 
the risk of positive serial correlation in “bad” realisations of addictive lotteries. 
Correlation averse agents, by contrast, prefer non-extreme payoffs across periods 
(e.g., a binge in one period followed by abstention in the next), which potentially, but 
only partially, immunises them against the progressive, deleterious effects of 
addiction. 
 
Although stochastic economic models of addiction typically assume, sometimes 
implicitly, that agents are correlation seeking, Bommier and Rochet (2006) and 
Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily (2012) show that correlation averse preferences are not 
incompatible with habit formation. Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily (2012) develop two 
models, one of which is a generalised exponential utility model and another which is a 
generalised power utility model, which assume correlation aversion a priori and yet 
still generate intertemporal dependencies in consumption. This leads the researchers 
to conclude that habits should be understood from two perspectives. The first, which 
they refer to as “habit formation,” can be viewed as an input to a decision-making 
model, and they show that habit formation is consistent with both correlation seeking 
and correlation averse preferences. The second, which they refer to as “habit 
following,” can be understood as an output of a behavioural model: specifically, that 
current behaviour positively influences future behaviour. Thus, while economic 
models of addiction tend to assume correlation seeking preferences, one can still 
generate some of the qualitative features of addiction (e.g., reinforcement in 
consumption of the addictive good) with correlation averse preferences. As I will 
discuss later, this is a feature of the model by Bernheim and Rangel (2004). 
 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014b) conducted a set of instantaneous risk 
and time preference experiments, coupled with an intertemporal risk preference 
experiment, on a representative sample of 413 people in Denmark. The researchers 
used a full information maximum likelihood statistical framework to jointly estimate 
instantaneous risk and time preference parameters and an intertemporal risk 
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preference parameter. They found that, on average, the sample displayed 
intertemporal risk aversion but that about 5% of the sample was intertemporally risk 
neutral or risk seeking. Although not a focus of their research, it would be interesting 
to use this robust experimental design and statistical framework to explore potential 
differences in the intertemporal risk preferences of addicts and non-addicts. It may be 
that addicts are more likely to be correlation seeking than non-addicts, which would 
provide support for the basic structure of most economic models of addiction, but if 
not, the theoretical work of Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily (2012) is particularly 
important because correlation seeking is not a prerequisite for habit formation. 
 
Given the importance of instantaneous risk and time preferences, intertemporal risk 
preferences, and subjective beliefs in the determination of choice behaviour in the OZ 
model, it is worthwhile to empirically test the extent to which these preferences and 
beliefs differ among addicts and non-addicts. In Chapter 5, I will present results from 
a study which was designed to elicit people’s instantaneous risk and time preferences 
so as to explore rigorously potential differences between smokers and non-smokers; 
investigation of potential differences in the intertemporal risk preferences and 
subjective beliefs of smokers and non-smokers is deferred for future research. 
 
In sum, the OZ model is an important extension to the theory of rational addiction for 
a number of reasons. First, it deals with the objection to “happy addicts” in the BM 
model; addicts in the OZ model are not happy, did not choose to be addicts ex ante 
and regret experimenting with an addictive good. Second, the model incorporates the 
uncertainty inherent in consumption of the addictive good. That people can perfectly 
foresee the long-term negative consequences of consumption of an addictive good 
when first deciding whether to experiment with it, is a very strong assumption. OZ 
relax it to show how the slow resolution of uncertainty can hook someone into a 
harmful addiction. The model also provides an explanation for the success of public 
awareness campaigns which provide people with information on the true probability 
of addiction and the negative side effects which result from consumption of addictive 
goods. Finally, the stochastic nature of the model highlights the role that 
instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences play in addiction. 
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However, as discussed previously, theories of rational addiction assume time 
consistency and tie agency to the whole biological life of a person. These assumptions 
are so restrictive that the BM and OZ models fail to account for the typical course of 
addiction (i.e., multiple unsuccessful quit attempts, before final abstention), a point 
recognised by Ross (2010). People who are substance dependent do not usually 
consume drugs until they have exhausted their budgets, as these models imply. 
Rather, they tend to expend resources to prevent or limit their consumption of these 
goods.  
 
Ross (2010) explains that the models of rational addiction could incorporate this by 
assuming that addicts limit their consumption so as to reduce their tolerance to drugs; 
this would allow them to get high cheaply, at least for a time. But if this is the 
rationale for limiting use, the models must then explain why most addicts eventually 
quit. To accommodate this fact, the models must assume that addicts only come to 
learn how bad addiction is through experience and this prompts a quit attempt.26 
While this behaviour can be rationalised, it is difficult to reconcile with the tendency 
for addicts to relapse. To do so, we must assume that when an addict quits and then 
relapses, she was merely trying to recalibrate her tolerance levels. But, when she 
finally quits for good, we must then assume that she eventually learnt that she was 
doing herself more harm than good. If she never quits then we must assume that she 
was not doing herself more harm than good, at least in her own terms.  
 
As Ross (2010, p. 133) argues, “… to capture addiction in a traditional economic 
model, it seems we must characterise the most common course of addiction as 
involving a radical psychological discontinuity between unsuccessful and successful 
attempts at quitting: the former are for the sake of enhanced enjoyment of the 
addiction, and the latter result from a decision to abandon this enjoyment.” This 
                                                
26 In the OZ model, the agent understands the consequences of addiction but may nevertheless decide 
to consume the addictive good so as to reveal information about her true type. Thus, one would still 
need to revise the OZ model such that agents are ignorant about the consequences of addiction. If the 
model was adapted in this way (i.e., agents are ignorant of their addiction potential and unaware of the 
consequences of addiction) it would be reminiscent of the literature in social psychology (e.g., Kruger 
and Dunning (1999)) which ties competence in a particular domain to the ability to evaluate 
competence in that domain. The analogue for the refined OZ model would be that if a person is 
ignorant of their addiction potential they may also be unable to accurately assess the consequences of 
addiction. 
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psychological explanation is unpersuasive and there is no empirical evidence to 
support it. 
 
The BM and OZ models of rational addiction have generated a remarkable amount of 
controversy since their publication (for a particularly scathing critique consult 
Rogeberg (2004)). Despite their shortcomings, it is crucial to understand the 
importance of these theories in modelling addiction. One the BM model’s foremost 
critics recognised this when he wrote: 
 
“Although I disagree sharply with much of it, it has raised the level of 
discussion enormously. Before Becker, most explanations of addiction did not 
involve choice at all, much less rational choice. By arguing that addiction is a 
form of rational behavior, Becker offers other scholars the choice between 
agreeing with him or trying to identify exactly where he goes wrong. 
Whatever option we take (I’m going to take the second), our understanding of 
addiction will be sharpened and focused.” Elster (1997, p. 758). 
 
As Elster recognises, the BM and OZ models of rational addiction provide some 
important insights on this phenomenon. The BM model captures the tension between 
consuming addictive goods and abstaining from them, and it highlights the role that 
time preferences play in this decision. The stochastic nature of the OZ model shows 
how instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs, may 
foster experimentation with drugs which can ultimately hook someone into a harmful 
addiction. However, the models misinterpret the physiological process of tolerance so 
as to incorporate reinforcement in consumption of the addictive good which 
ultimately drives the addiction dynamics in the models. More importantly, both 
models are hamstrung by the assumption of time consistency and their decision to link 
economic agency to the whole biological life of a person. This means that the models 
cannot account for addicts’ time-inconsistent choices nor quit attempts and relapse 
and, thus, they fail to capture the typical course of addiction. The models in the next 
section dispense with this agency assumption so as to better capture the salient 




III.II DUAL SELF AND DUAL SYSTEM MODELS 
 
Dual self and dual system models are subpersonal in nature which means they do not 
link agency to the whole biological life of a person. These models are either 
diachronic or synchronic or both.27 Dual system models are typically synchronic in 
that multiple systems or processes jostle for control of behaviour at the same time. 
Dual self models, by contrast, are usually diachronic which means that each self has 
full control of the person’s cognitive and other capacities at a single point in time but 
that there is a succession of selves over time. One dual self model (Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006, 2011, 2012)) in this section is actually both synchronic and diachronic 
because in each time period a short-run (SR) and long-run (LR) agent compete for 
control of the person, but there is a succession of short-run selves over time. As 
mentioned above, a real strength of the subpersonal agency assumption is that it 
allows one to model time-inconsistent choice behaviour. All of the models in this 




In the spirit of early economic models of addiction which divided agents into multiple 
selves (see Winston (1980), Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Schelling (1984)), Gruber and 
Köszegi (2001) (GK) extend the model of rational addiction to incorporate time-
inconsistent preferences. When people are time-inconsistent, the preferences they 
have now over options available in the future can differ to the preferences they have 
                                                
27 There is rich tradition of dual self and dual system models in psychology (see Chaiken and Trope 
(1999), Stanovich and West (2000) for reviews). As Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014a) 
explain, most models of choice in economics posit multiple psychological processes but are ultimately 
characterised in terms of single decision criteria. By contrast, models in psychology often assume that 
multiple decision criteria simultaneously affect choice; a good example is the SP/A theory of Lopes 
(1984, 1995). Unlike expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and cumulative prospect 
theory, which characterise choice in terms of a single decision criterion, SP/A theory evaluates lotteries 
in terms of dual criteria. Specifically, the first criterion is based on the “security” and “potential” (i.e., 
SP) of a lottery, where security relates to the smallest outcomes in a lottery and potential to the highest. 
Thus, the first criterion gives special weight to the extreme outcomes in a lottery and less weight to the 
intermediate outcomes. The second criterion is the “aspiration” (i.e., A) level of the decision maker and 
serves as a reference point which determines the extent to which a lottery satisfies the subject’s 
aspirations. Conflict between the SP and A criteria ultimately determine choice behaviour according to 
the theory and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014a) show how one can model the conflict 
between these different criteria using finite mixture models; these models will be used extensively in 
later chapters. 
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over these same options as the future becomes the present.28 For example, someone 
may prefer to study hard next week for a test rather than procrastinate but when next 
week arrives they may prefer to procrastinate rather than study hard. In other words, 
the mere passage of time can lead to changes or reversals in preference thereby, 
“raising the spectre of intrapersonal conflict over decisions that have implications for 
the future” (GK, p. 1277). To model time-inconsistent preferences, GK assume that 
each person is made up of multiple selves and that each intertemporal incarnation of 
the agent (i.e., each self) makes choices according to the preferences prevailing at the 
time (i.e., the model is diachronic). 
 
As discussed previously, the BM model incorporates standard time-consistent 
preferences by assuming that people discount future utility with a constant E discount 
factor DE(t) = 1 / (1 + δ)t and that they correctly encode the effect of current choices 
on future welfare (i.e., they have perfect foresight). Phelps and Pollak (1968) 
developed a mathematically tractable quasi-hyperbolic (QH) discounting function 
which incorporates time inconsistency. This specification was popularised by Laibson 
(1997) and it is the one that GK employ. The QH discounting function has a discount 
factor: 
 
 DQH(t) = 1  if t = 0 (1a)  
 
 DQH(t) = β / (1 + δ)t  if t > 0 (1b)  
 
Note that when β < 1, the discount factor between the current period and the next one 
(β / (1 + δ)) is lower than the discount factor for consecutive periods in the future (1 / 
(1 + δ)); hence, non-constant discounting. Thus, when β < 1, people have a “present-
bias”29 or a “passion for the present” and may fail therefore to carry out plans they 
make for the future. In other words, someone’s current preferences over future 
                                                
28 Stated formally, under an additively-separable intertemporal utility function, preferences are time-
inconsistent when the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at two future points in time 
varies according to the date at which it is evaluated (Caillaud and Jullien (2000)). 
29 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, p. 106) define present-biased preferences in the following way, 
“When considering trade-offs between two future moments, present-biased preferences give stronger 
relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer.” 
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options may diverge from the choices they make over these options in the future (i.e., 
they may act in a time-inconsistent manner). 
 
GK cite experimental studies from psychology as one reason for incorporating time-
inconsistent preferences in their model; as these studies typically employ hypothetical 
incentives, elicitation methods which are not incentive compatible, and statistical 
tools which are not appropriate for the data that are collected, one should treat the 
results with caution. In a review of this literature, Green and Myerson (2004) argue 
that H discounting functions30, almost without fail, fit discounting data better than E 
functions.31 In other words, in the experiments which Green and Myerson (2004) 
review, which predominately use hypothetical rewards and lack incentive 
compatibility, people tend to make choices which reveal a higher discount factor for 
options available in the future and a lower discount factor when these options are 
shifted closer to the present (i.e., non-constant discounting).  
 
Time-inconsistent preferences also provide an explanation for the use of commitment 
devices by addicts. Note that in the BM model addicts have no need for commitment 
devices because they form consistent plans through time. Consequently, any 
constraints on their behaviour will be welfare reducing. By contrast, if someone has 
time-inconsistent preferences then she can benefit from the use of commitment 
devices to lock in her current preferences if they are apt to change in future. Thus, the 
GK model provides a rationale for the use of rehabilitation (viz., a costly commitment 
device) by addicts. 
 
Bénabou and Tirole (2004) (BT) develop a formal model of willpower and personal 
rules which is based on the picoeconomic framework of Ainslie (1992, 2001), 
discussed earlier. While the GK model emphasises the importance of external 
commitment devices for locking in long-term preferences and controlling behaviour, 
                                                
30 The studies which Green and Myerson (2004) review typically make use of Mazur’s (1984) H 
discounting function which has a discount factor: DH(t) = 1 / (1 + δt). Ainslie (2012) discusses the 
important qualitative differences between H and QH discounting functions.  
31 This is a very strong claim and one which will be interrogated in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. As noted 
above, experimental studies in psychology typically use hypothetical incentives and elicitation methods 
which are not incentive compatible, so people have little reason to respond truthfully. In addition, the 
statistical tools that have been applied to these data do not take into account all the information that 
people’s choices impart and they do not allow multiple data generating processes to account for these 
data. This makes it difficult to draw robust inferences from these studies. 
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Ainslie (1992, 2001) and BT focus on internal commitment devices (i.e., personal 
rules) for achieving the same ends.  
 
A major stumbling block with the notion of internal commitment mechanisms is that 
they lack enforceability and hence, credibility. In other words, why would someone’s 
resolution not to eat chocolate have any effect on her behaviour if her resolution does 
not circumscribe her behaviour in any way and if she can renege on the promise 
without any tangible costs or punishments? According to Ainslie (1992, 2001), and 
formalised by BT, personal rules acquire their force through their impact on self-
reputation. Thus, sticking to your personal rules serves a self-signalling function (see 
Bodner and Prelec (2001)) about the type of person you are and if this identity is 
valuable, in that it allows you to overcome temptations, you may take costly actions 
to support it. What this implies is that if you succumb to temptation in any one 
instance, this lapse may set a precedent for future lapses and thereby undermine your 
reputation and your long-term goals.  
 
There are two key features of the BT model: imperfect willpower, which is captured 
by a QH discounting function; and imperfect recall of past actions or the 
circumstances in which past actions were taken. This imperfect recall means that 
agents have a limited understanding of their willpower and propensity for self-control. 
Such understanding can only be acquired through direct experience but direct 
experience does not perfectly reveal an agent’s willpower because she is apt to forget 
the exercise of willpower, or lack thereof, and the extraneous circumstances involved 
when her willpower was last put to the test. 
 
The development and maintenance of personal rules in the context of uncertainty 
about the agent’s preferences (i.e., willpower) is modelled as a game of imperfect 
information among the agent’s selves in each period (i.e., the model posits diachronic 
subpersonal agents). Ultimately this is a signalling game which admits separating 
equilibria (i.e., where weak willed and strong willed agents take different actions) and 
pooling equilibria (i.e., where weak and strong willed agents take the same actions). 
But unlike signalling games involving multiple players, this game is about signals 
sent between different intertemporal incarnations of the same player. 
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With regard to the literature on addiction, agents in the BT model have a strong desire 
for external commitment devices that make consumption less likely and informational 
aids to improve their recall of past motives and actions. But the real strength of the 
model is that it provides a rationale for internal commitment mechanisms which allow 
agents to bundle rewards and achieve self-control. Where these personal rules are 
eroded, either through transgression or ex post rationalisation, excessive consumption 
is likely. As a corollary to this result, BT show that external constraints on behaviour 
can make an individual less likely to formulate their own personal rules and thus less 
likely to exercise self-control when these external constraints are lifted or relaxed. 
 
The BT model formalises many of Ainslie’s (1992, 2001) insights but does so by 
assuming a QH specification as opposed to Ainslie’s preferred H discounting function 
(see Mazur (1984)). As Ainslie (2012) explains, H discount curves provide a natural 
explanation for the formation of personal rules while the QH function does not. 
Consequently, BT rely on the imperfect recall of past actions, which means agents 
must draw inferences about their past behaviour, to provide a rationale for the 
creation and maintenance of personal rules. Ainslie (2012, p. 27) critiques this 
“roundabout route” which is used to preserve the implications of his theory. 
 
Note that both the GK and BT models explain the pattern of quit attempts and relapse 
which typically characterises addiction. The present self may decide to quit her target 
of addiction, possibly with the help of a commitment device, only to have her plan 
undone by a future self who is tempted by the immediate benefit of addictive 
consumption. In the GK model this occurs when the agent fails to recognise her future 
self-control problem (i.e., the agent is “naïve” in the terminology of O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999)). In the BT model, a personal rule which bundles the LL rewards of 
quitting but which lacks credibility, gets hijacked by the immediate temptation of 
addictive consumption. That the models incorporate the typical course of addiction, 
highlights the benefit of divorcing agency from biology. 
 
As the preceding discussion shows, the role of time preferences take centre stage in 
the GK and BT frameworks. But, rather than simply being an issue of how heavily the 
future is discounted, time preferences in these models also determine the extent to 
which people’s behaviour is time-inconsistent. For example, suppose that with β = 1, 
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like in the BM model, a person’s discount rate δ is low enough that she decides not to 
consume the addictive good and thus does not become addicted. An otherwise 
identical person with a present-bias (i.e., β < 1)32 may choose to consume the 
addictive good now with every intention of limiting consumption in the future so as to 
avoid addiction. However, this noble intention may be undone by the person’s self-
control problem, thereby leading to a cycle of good intentions and lapses which 
ultimately leads to addiction. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine empirically the extent 
to which addicts and non-addicts discount the future according to the QH discounting 
function. It may be the case that addicts and non-addicts discount the distant future 
similarly but that addicts have a passion for the present which non-addicts do not. 
 
This discussion highlights a potential shortcoming of the GK and BT models: they 
assumes that a present-bias always influences intertemporal choice behaviour. In 
other words, a passion for the present is not specific to addictive goods, which means 
that anything which provides immediate benefits but entails future costs will be 
consumed excessively from the perspective of former selves unless internal or 
external commitment devices are in place.  
 
By adopting the QH discounting specification, the GK and BT models account for 
addicts time-inconsistent choices, their use of commitment devices, and the pattern of 
quit attempts and relapse. It also promotes empirical tests of the discounting 
behaviour of addicts and non-addicts, not only with respect to the steepness of 




The models in this section posit synchronic subpersonal agents that jostle for control 
of behaviour at each moment in time. Both models assume E discounting but manage 
to generate inconsistent choice behaviour through the presence of stochastic 
temptations. These temptations potentially overwhelm cognitive processes and drive 
consumption in the direction of immediate gratification. As these temptations are 
                                                
32 O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) assume that time-consistent and time-inconsistent agents do not 
discount the future at all (δ = 0) to focus specifically on the role of present-bias (β < 1) in decision-
making. 
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realised stochastically, the role of instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences 
come to the fore in these models.33 This stands in stark contrast to the deterministic, 
diachronic models reviewed previously, where time preferences are responsible for 
inconsistent choice behaviour. 
 
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) (BR) develop an economic theory of addiction based on 
the assumption that the brain has a Hedonic Forecasting Mechanism (HFM) which 
uses environmental cues to predict the short-term hedonic effects of consumption. 
The HFM works quickly and, at least in the case of non-addictive goods, gives 
relatively accurate predictions and tends to produce optimal outcomes (i.e., ones 
where preferences and choices coincide). However, addictive goods act directly on 
the HFM and exaggerate the predicted short-term benefits of consumption. If people 
made all of their choices on the basis of HFM predictions, minimal exposure to 
addictive goods would rapidly trigger addiction.34 
 
But people also make use of higher cognitive processes that are responsible for 
functions like deliberation and future planning which can override exaggerated HFM 
predictions. Competition between these systems often yields outcomes where 
preferences and choices coincide but can, particularly in the case of addictive goods, 
lead to outcomes where preferences and choices diverge.35 Thus, the BR model is a 
dual system approach to inconsistent choice which posits synchronic subpersonal 
agents. 
 
To incorporate the roles of the HFM and higher cognitive processes in decision-
making BR develop the following model. They assume that people make decisions in 
one of two modes: a deliberative “cold” mode where higher cognitive processes take 
                                                
33 This does not imply that time preferences play no role in these models. Time preferences always 
matter in a dynamic choice context because they affect a person’s valuation of rewards available at 
different points in time. However, the role of time preferences in these synchronic models is no 
different to their role in theories of rational addiction so I will not dwell on them in any detail. 
34 BR cite evidence from incentivised laboratory experiments with rats (e.g., Gardner and David 
(1999)) showing that these nonhuman animals rely exclusively on HFM predictions and, if given the 
chance, will compulsively self-administer cocaine until they die. The rats therefore ignore all other 
drives like hunger, thirst, and reproduction due to the exaggerated HFM predictions associated with 
cocaine use. 
35 The notion that preferences and choices can diverge is heretical to revealed preference theory 
because choices reveal preferences. In other words, preferences are understood as a summary of 
choices (Ross (2014, p. 251). 
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precedence and ensure that choices and preferences coincide; and a dysfunctional 
“hot” mode where the HFM assumes control and choices and preferences may 
diverge. 
 
The agent enters each period in the cold mode and chooses an activity after taking 
into account all the present and future costs and benefits associated with that activity. 
This choice, in combination with the person’s addictive state and other environmental 
factors, determine the likelihood that the person observes cues related to past 
consumption of the addictive good which trigger the hot mode. If the hot mode is 
triggered, the person always consumes the addictive good regardless of underlying 
preferences. If not triggered, the person rationally chooses whether to consume the 
addictive good or not. BR assume that initial use of an addictive good is intentional 
but that through repeated use, people become more susceptible to stochastic addictive 
cues which trigger mistaken usage. 
 
The BR model’s distinctive features arise due to the inclusion of state-contingent 
stochastic shocks which can trigger the hot mode and cause preferences and choices 
to diverge; without these shocks the model reduces to BM. These taste shocks explain 
cue-triggered relapse, cue-avoidance through cognitive and behavioural therapies, and 
rehabilitation which commits the agent to abstention.  
 
While other economic models of addiction rely on adjacent complementarity to 
generate addictive consumption patterns, the BR model can do without it as long as 
the probability of entering the hot mode increases with the addictive state.36 This is an 
important departure from other theories because, as discussed previously, repeated 
exposure to an addictive good often leads to hedonic tolerance which implies that the 
marginal benefit of consumption is lower, not higher, at more advanced addictive 
states. Thus, only the BR model is able to incorporate the physiological process of 
tolerance.  
 
                                                
36 In the context of intertemporal risk preferences, this feature of the BR model (i.e., that it does not 
rely on adjacent complementarity) implies that addictive consumption can be generated with 
correlation averse preferences, as the discussion earlier made clear (see Bommier and Rochet (2006) 
and Lichtendahl, Chao and Bodily (2012)). To the extent that correlation aversion characterises most 
people’s intertemporal risk preferences (see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014b)), this is a 
noteworthy feature of the BR model. 
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The BR model generates different consumption patterns depending on characteristics 
of the individual, the addictive good and the environment; this is something which is 
neglected by all other theories. BR use simulations to show that consumption 
trajectories differ markedly for goods like caffeine, tobacco, alcohol and heroin and 
that these trajectories produce very different addiction prevalence rates in the 
population. For example, BR (2005, p. 120-125) show that plausible assumptions 
concerning the characteristics of tobacco and heroin yield far higher population 
prevalence rates of tobacco addiction than heroin addiction. 
 
Benhabib and Bisin (2004) (BB) develop a model of internal commitment 
mechanisms and self-control which has a number of similar features to the BR model 
(i.e., temptations are stochastic and decisions are influenced by multiple decision-
making processes: controlled and automatic) but is more general in scope. The BB 
model is of a single agent who faces temptation shocks and responds to them 
according to the interplay of expected future regret and present attention costs which 
are incurred when controlled processing is activated. Note that these temptation 
shocks are exogenous and undefined, and in this way, the BB model shares 
similarities with the exogenous addiction models discussed in the next section. In the 
BR model, by contrast, temptation shocks are specific to addictive goods and are 
more likely with a larger stock of addictive capital. 
 
BB take as their starting point the literature on time-inconsistent choice behaviour and 
argue that to understand the choices of agents with time-inconsistent preferences it is 
imperative to model internal commitment mechanisms. This is similar in spirit to 
Ainslie (1992, 2001) and BT although BB’s model does not assume H, nor QH, 
discounting as a primitive. As explained earlier, BB’s model employs an E discount 
factor but the presence of stochastic temptations can produce time-inconsistent 
choices (viz., a present-bias).  
 
An agent’s choice behaviour in the BB model is driven by two processes: automatic 
processes which can be hijacked by temptations and controlled processes which are 
immune to these temptations. Automatic processes are essentially conditioned 
responses which are sensitive to environmental cues whereas controlled processes are 
responsible for long-term goals. Controlled processes either invoke cognitive 
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processes or inhibit automatic processes to fulfil these goals. An overarching 
executive function, or supervisory attention system, determines the extent to which 
these processes, automatic and controlled, are activated and influence behaviour. As 
alluded to previously, the executive system will only activate controlled processing if 
the expected future regret from excessive consumption exceeds the attention costs 
needed to suppress it. 
 
An important feature of the model is that if an agent gives in to temptation, she will 
anticipate that this temptation will be followed by others in future, and the agent will 
adjust her long-term goals to incorporate the presence of these temptations; the model, 
therefore, derives similar predictions, albeit from a different starting point, to Ainslie 
(1992, 2001) and BT. In the context of addiction, an agent who succumbs to the 
temptation of consuming drugs may revise her long-term goals to incorporate the 
possibility that she will consume drugs in future which may lead to a self-fulfilling 
pattern of repeated drug use.  
 
BB focus on the effect of increasing the presence of temptations on dynamic choice 
behaviour; this is accomplished through a first order stochastic dominance increase in 
the distribution of temptations. With a high volume of temptations, agents exercise 
self-control more often so as to inhibit automatic processes. However, they also tend 
to set less ambitious long-term goals because they expect, and take into account, the 
higher volume of temptations in future. Thus, even though automatic processes are 
inhibited more often, agents consume more under controlled processes than they 
would have if there was no increase in temptations. This example has an interesting 
parallel with enlistees in the Vietnam war, many of whom went to Vietnam never 
having tried opiates but then became addicted to heroin due to the widespread 
availability of the drug and a high level of drug-related temptations. As Robbins, 
Davis and Goodwin (1973) showed, the vast majority of heroin addicts managed to 
quit when they returned home to the US, one reason for which was the large decrease 
in the volume of temptations.  
 
The notion of competing systems which jostle for control of behaviour has been the 
focus of neuroimaging studies conducted by McClure et al. (2004, 2007). These 
researchers claim to have found that parts of the brain which humans share with other 
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nonhumans (i.e., the reward system) respond only to the availability of SS rewards, 
whereas the pre-frontal cortex, which is uniquely developed in humans, responds to 
both SS and LL rewards. McClure et al. (2004, 2007) interpret this neuroimaging data 
as evidence of an internal tug of war between subpersonal agents which generates 
non-constant discounting at the behavioural level.37 Although certainly a compelling 
idea, and one which gives credence to these synchronic models, the evidence for this 
hypothesis has not withstood rigorous replication (e.g., Glimcher, Kable and Louie 
(2007), Pine et al. (2009)). 
 
Instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences assume crucial roles in the BR and 
BB models. In the BB model, even though stochastic temptations are realised at the 
start of the decision making period, all future costs and benefits depend on the future 
stochastic realisation of temptations, and therefore hinge on the agent’s intertemporal 
risk preferences. In the BR model, the presence of stochastic shocks which can trigger 
the hot mode may make someone who is risk averse with respect to atemporal payoffs 
avoid consumption of the addictive good altogether whereas someone who is less risk 
averse with respect to atemporal payoffs may be willing to gamble on 
experimentation. Clearly an agent’s instantaneous risk preferences combine with their 
intertemporal risk preferences to affect every consumption decision, not just initial 
use, because deciding to consume the addictive good now increases the risk of 
entering the hot mode in future. 
 
A Synchronic and Diachronic Model 
 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011, 2012) (FL) develop a dual self model of impulse 
control which has numerous economic applications, many of which are relevant to the 
study of addiction. In the FL (2006, 2011) model, a patient, less risk averse LR self 
(i.e., a “planner”) and a sequence of completely myopic, more risk averse SR selves 
(i.e., “doers”) interact strategically to determine behaviour. 
 
                                                
37 This assertion is a strong form of reductionism which implies that behaviour at the molar level can 
be explained by dynamics at the molecular level. RSVS and Ross (2014) provide detailed critiques of 
reductionism in science generally, and with regard to the McClure et al. (2004, 2007) hypothesis, 
specifically. 
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The stage-game between the LR self and one intertemporal incarnation of the SR self 
plays out across two phases. In the first phase, the LR self chooses a self-control 
action that affects the utility function of the SR self. Specifically, the LR self can alter 
the baseline preferences of the SR self by incurring a self-control cost which is borne 
by both selves. In the second phase, the SR self makes a decision based on the 
preferences determined in the first phase. Although this interaction plays out across 
two hypothetical phases, it determines behaviour at a single moment in time and is 
best considered synchronic. The model is also diachronic because the LR self 
interacts with a sequence of SR selves over time. 
 
FL (2006) apply their model to a set of economic problems: a simple savings model; a 
model of banking, commitment, and risk aversion; a stationary stopping-time 
problem; and a model of cognitive load and self-control. In the simple savings model, 
the saving rate is determined by the interplay of the LR self’s time preference and the 
cost of self-control. As the agent becomes more present-oriented or as the cost of self-
control rises, so the savings rate falls. The analogues with addictive consumption are 
immediate: as a person becomes more present-oriented, consumption of addictive 
goods will tend to rise, implying that investment in future health and welfare declines. 
Moreover, as the cost of self-control rises, perhaps due to a larger stock of addictive 
capital, exercising self-control becomes less likely, which then leads to an increase in 
addictive consumption and a reduction in welfare over time. 
 
The model of banking, commitment, and risk aversion shows how the interaction 
between LR and SR selves can yield time-inconsistent choices. For example, suppose 
an agent is offered the choice between one unit of a good next period or two units of 
the good in two periods. As the SR self is completely myopic and the options are only 
available in the future, the LR self can influence behaviour at no cost and select the 
more rewarding utility stream. By contrast, if the agent is offered a choice between 
one unit of a good now, or two units of a good next period, the SR self will be 
inclined to consume one unit of the good now. To prevent this, the LR self would 
have to exercise self-control and this may be too costly. Thus, the agent, who prefers 
the LL reward when both options are delayed, switches to choosing the SS reward 
when it is available immediately, and thereby exhibits time inconsistency. In this 
 -63- 
model, time inconsistency is driven by the myopia of the SR self, and is very similar, 
therefore, to models of QH discounting. 
 
FL use a stopping-time problem to show how self-control problems can lead to 
procrastination and delay. In every period, the SR self must choose whether to act or 
wait: waiting yields a stochastic amount of utility, the value of which is known at the 
start of the period. Acting, by contrast, leads to a flow of utility starting next period, 
the present value of which is larger than the present value of waiting forever. If the 
agent waits, the problem repeats itself next period. Note that waiting confers a payoff 
in the present whereas acting only yields a payoff next period; this pits the interests of 
the SR selves in direct conflict with the LR self.  
 
FL show that the solution to this problem is a cutoff rule: wait if the immediate payoff 
is above a threshold, act if the immediate payoff is below the threshold. Clearly this 
model is relevant to addiction, and, specifically, attempts to quit. To exercise self-
control and act (e.g., stop using addictive goods) is costly in that one forgoes the 
payoff from waiting (e.g., consuming addictive goods). This is why there will be a 
tendency to procrastinate and delay. However, when the payoff from waiting drops 
below a threshold (perhaps due to the decline in welfare associated with advanced 
addictive states), acting becomes optimal. FL show that it is always eventually 
optimal to act but that waiting can occur for long periods of time. Thus, the FL model 
provides one explanation for why addicts, who often express a sincere desire to quit 
immediately and unconditionally, often procrastinate and delay before attempting to 
quit. 
 
Finally, FL show how a heavy cognitive load can defeat attempts at self-control. To 
do so they adopt a nonlinear cost of self-control specification to capture the idea that 
self-control is a limited resource. As an agent’s cognitive load gets heavier, it 
becomes increasingly costly to exercise self-control and, thus, self-control becomes 
less likely. This model could easily be reformulated or reinterpreted such that the cost 
of self-control is linked to the addictive state, rather than the level of cognitive load, 
and where higher addictive states make it more costly to exercise self-control. With a 
high enough addictive state, self-control can be so costly that it is not used, thereby 
perpetuating the tendency to consume addictive goods.  
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Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) apply the FL (2006) model when 
jointly estimating the instantaneous risk and time preferences of a sample of 253 
people in Denmark. The researchers’ motivation for using FL’s theory is to model the 
extent to which money earned in experiments is integrated with lifetime wealth. Rabin 
(2000) showed that if people integrate their experimental income with their lifetime 
wealth, then the risk aversion that is observed with small stakes in the lab yields 
implausible levels of risk aversion with larger stakes. 38  But to what extent is 
experimental income integrated with lifetime wealth? Applying the logic of the FL 
model, the extent to which this occurs will be determined by the interaction between 
an impulsive SR self and the more patient LR self. While the LR self wants to 
perfectly integrate experimental income with lifetime wealth, the SR self has 
diametrically opposed preferences, and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) 
show how to incorporate this conflict in the analysis of experimental data. 
 
                                                
38 Formally, Rabin’s (2000) so-called “calibration critique” is based on four propositions: 1) economic 
agents are risk averse expected utility maximisers; 2) expected utility theory assumes full asset 
integration (i.e., the agent’s utility function is defined over terminal wealth); 3) agents turn down small-
stakes gambles at all wealth levels, or, at least, over a range of wealth levels; and 4) agents turn-down 
large-stakes gambles that have extremely favourable expected values. Rabin’s (2000) primary claim is 
that if 1), 2) and 3) hold, then 4) follows. In other words, if risk averse expected utility maximisers, 
with utility functions defined over terminal wealth, display risk aversion over small-stakes gambles, 
then this yields implausible levels of risk aversion over large-stakes gambles. The implication that 
Rabin (2000) draws from this implausible large-stakes risk aversion is that 1) must, therefore, be false 
(i.e., economic agents do not satisfy expected utility theory). But, clearly, 4) will not hold if any of the 
three propositions which jointly imply 4) do not hold. Note there is nothing in the axioms of expected 
utility theory which implies that proposition 2) must hold. In other words, utility need not be defined 
over terminal wealth. Andersen et al. (2014) elicited the instantaneous risk preferences of a nationally-
representative sample of people in Denmark to explore the asset integration hypothesis: specifically, 
whether the subjects integrate their experimental earnings with their wealth fully (i.e., utility is defined 
over terminal wealth), partially (i.e., utility is defined over wealth and experimental income and these 
two arguments of the utility function are not perfect substitutes), or not at all (i.e., utility is defined 
purely over experimental income). They then matched each subject’s experimental data with detailed 
information on their individual wealth provided by Statistics Denmark. Using this uniquely rich 
combination of data sources, Andersen et al. (2014) find that partial, rather than full, asset integration 
best characterises their data, which thereby challenges proposition 2). Furthermore, with partial asset 
integration, the small-stakes risk aversion which the researchers observe is consistent with plausible 
levels of large-stakes risk aversion. Proposition 3) is also open to question: do people display small-
stakes risk aversion over a relatively large range of wealth? Cox and Sadiraj (2008, p. 33) argue that 
proposition 3) could be tested using a within-subject experimental design where subjects are given 
some initial wealth w at the start of the experiment and then endowed, sequentially, with increasing 
amounts of income xt such that the range over which the subjects’ wealth varies during the course of 
the experiment is relatively large. Each time subjects are endowed with xt they are asked whether they 
are willing to play a 50:50 gamble for, say, a gain of 11 and a loss of 10, where lab wealth is greater or 
equal to 10. Only if subjects reject the gamble for four sequential values of xt, and thereby display risk 
aversion over a relatively large range of wealth, can one argue that proposition 3) holds. Until such an 
experiment is conducted, the validity of this proposition remains untested. 
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FL (2011) focus specifically on the implications of non-linear self-control costs in 
their model. The model still predicts time inconsistency but it also leads to an 
additional implication: preference reversals are less likely when the probability of 
receiving the SS and LL rewards declines. This result is based on the dichotomy 
between the SR and LR selves: the SR self is less patient and more risk averse than 
the LR self. When temptations are high, the cost of self-control is high, and more 
weight is given to the impatient, more risk averse SR self. When temptations are low, 
by contrast, the cost of self-control is low and little weight is given to the SR self. 
Thus, if the probability of receiving delayed rewards declines, the SS reward becomes 
less tempting, the cost of self-control declines, and the likelihood of selecting the SS 
reward falls. This implies that time-inconsistent preference reversals are less likely 
when the probability of receiving the SS and LL rewards declines; tentative evidence 
for this hypothesis is provided by the experiments of Keren and Roelofsma (1995). 
 
FL (2012) extend the dual self model to account for some of their original model’s 
implausible predictions regarding the timing of decisions. First, they assume that the 
SR self is not completely myopic but values future utility less than the LR self.39 
Second, FL formulate their model in discrete time but investigate how the solutions 
change with the length of decision-making periods. Finally, FL incorporate a stock of 
willpower which is depleted by using self-control. The evolution of this stock means 
that the use of self-control in one period can spill over to the next and thereby affect 
decision making. 
 
FL (2012) explore the implications of their new model through a series of examples, a 
number of which are relevant to the study of addiction. To flesh out these examples 
they make use of an important conceptual tool: a simple temptation. A simple 
temptation is a choice between either utility 0 in every period or a flow of utility ug > 
0 for a set number of periods N, followed by the flow of utility ub < 0 every period 
thereafter. A simple temptation pits the interests of the LR and SR selves against each 
other and is easy to extend to other types of temptation. For example, a persistent 
temptation is a simple temptation which is present each period unless or until it is 
accepted. Similarly, an intermediate temptation [my terminology] is intermediate 
                                                
39 To justify this assumption, the SR selves can be regarded as successive intertemporal incarnations 
with random lifetimes or as a single SR self who has a lower discount factor than the LR self. 
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between a simple and persistent temptation: resisting the temptation in period n 
removes the temptation until period n + j where j  (1, ∞).
 
As discussed previously, Ainslie argues that temptations may be easier to resist when 
they are “bundled” together rather than tackled individually. To incorporate this idea 
in the dual self model, consider an agent who faces a set of simple temptations over 
time. If the agent is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the first simple 
temptation, she will strictly prefer to reject the second simple temptation, if that 
choice can be made now. The explanation for this result is that the LR self always 
prefers to resist the temptation and, if the temptation is far enough in the future, so too 
does the SR self. If we extend this logic, the agent who would accept a set of simple 
temptations presented one at a time, may choose to reject a bundle of these 
temptations. This bundle is easier to resist because the SR self is less tempted by 
future rewards than rewards available immediately. Thus, the FL (2012) model 
directly incorporates the potential for reward bundling. 
 
Ainslie (2012) argues that H, but not E nor QH, discounting functions provide an 
obvious rationale for the formation of personal rules so as to promote reward 
bundling. The reason for this difference is that a H discounting function declines 
gradually at long delays and thus has higher tails than E or QH functions. 
Consequently, the value of a series of LL rewards grows relative to a series of SS 
rewards as the length of the series increases, which motivates the formation of 
personal rules to bundle rewards. The original dual self model (i.e., FL (2006, 2011)), 
and the QH discounting model, imply that after a one-time decline in value after the 
first period, incremental discount rates are time-invariant. By dropping the 
assumption of completely myopic SR selves, FL’s dual self model incorporates the 
qualitative properties of a H discounting function (i.e., discount rates decline 
gradually at long delays), which provides a further impetus, over and above the one 
discussed previously, to bundle rewards. 
 
In sum, FL model choice behaviour as the outcome of a strategic interaction between 
a patient, less risk averse LR self and a sequence of impatient, more risk averse SR 
selves. The SR selves are present-oriented and care most about immediate 
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consumption but the LR self can manipulate the preferences of the SR selves by 
exercising costly self-control. The interaction between the LR and SR selves can 
promote reward bundling to serve the agent’s long-term interests but it can also lead 
to overconsumption, time inconsistency, and an inability to act. The FL (2012) model 
is arguably the most flexible of those reviewed in this section and it highlights the 
importance of uncertainty and the timing of decisions in choice behaviour. 
 
The dual self and dual system models that I have covered divorce agency from 
biology and explain molar choice behaviour as the outcome of strategic interactions 
between subpersonal agents. All of the models incorporate time-inconsistent 
behaviour and thereby accommodate the empirical observation of addicts expending 
resources to consume their targets of addiction while simultaneously paying real costs 
to reduce or limit their consumption of these goods. The models also predict the 
typical course of addiction which involves a series of quit attempts and relapses prior 
to final abstention. The diachronic models emphasise the importance of time 
preferences in these dynamics whereas the synchronic models highlight the role 
which instantaneous and intertemporal risk preferences play. Thus, one should 
empirically investigate the instantaneous risk and time preferences, and intertemporal 
risk preferences, of addicts and non-addicts to determine whether they differ in the 
ways that these models suggest. 
 
 
III.III EXOGENOUS ADDICTION MODELS 
 
The economic models discussed in this section share the features that agency is tied to 
the whole biological life of a person and temptations are exogenous40 to the agent and 
present a challenge to welfare maximisation (Ross (2010, 2012)). Ross (2012, p. 330) 
explains that these models, sometimes implicitly, make neural processing exogenous 
to the agent which, “… involves treating the person’s ‘true’ agency as logically prior 
to all neural processing, that is, regarding parts of their brain as generating exogenous 
impacts on their choice and budget sets, just like features of the environment outside 
their skulls.”  
                                                




This family of models draws its inspiration from Loewenstein’s (1996, 1999) visceral 
account of choice behaviour. The basic argument here is that only some types of 
rewards (i.e., visceral rewards like drugs and desserts) are discounted hyperbolically 
while others are not (i.e., non-visceral rewards like petrol and dishwashing liquid).41 
In other words, these visceral rewards can produce a strong drive or impulse for 
immediate consumption which overpowers other goals. And if utility maximisation 
entails “cold,” deliberative processing, then visceral rewards are an “autonomous” 
impediment to this goal; in Ross’ (2010, p. 147) words, these visceral rewards are, 
“… a threat to successful maximization lying in ambush in the ‘external’ environment 
within the brain.” In the context of addiction, a genetic predisposition to substance 
dependence is archetypical of an exogenous impediment to utility maximisation. 
 
Laibson (2001) develops a cue-theory of consumption which assumes that cues 
influence habit-forming behaviours by altering the marginal utility of a good which 
was previously consumed in the presence of the cue. In other words, cues associated 
with past consumption of a good are complementary with current consumption (i.e., 
cues raise the marginal utility of current consumption).  
 
The model admits four steady states, two of which coincide with the “addiction” and 
“no addiction” steady states of the BM model in which cues play no role. The other 
two steady states are characterised by cue-contingent consumption. Specifically, 
choices are directly influenced by cues (e.g., cues for visceral rewards) even though 
the cues are just white noise which are not correlated with any other variables in the 
decision maker’s choice problem. This captures an important feature of addiction: 
cue-triggered recidivism. 
 
The model also implies that consumers are willing to spend significant resources to 
manage the cues that they receive so as to manage their susceptibility to cue-
contingent consumption which can have deleterious effects on future welfare (e.g., 
addictive consumption). Thus, the model can reconcile the empirical phenomenon of 
                                                
41 Loewenstein (1996, p. 273) argues that visceral factors have two characteristics: a direct hedonic 
impact; and an effect on the relative valuation of other goods and actions. 
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people simultaneously expending money on a good and taking active steps to try and 
control or prevent their consumption of this good. 
 
Despite the fact that consumers have time-consistent preferences in Laibson’s model, 
there is a role for commitment devices which limit the choice set of agents. This result 
arises when cues and consumption opportunities are linked such that to consume a 
good, a cue for consumption of that good must be present. When cues and 
consumption possibilities are linked, a large choice set implies a large number of cues 
and consumers who want to limit their exposure to cue-contingent consumption may 
choose to limit their choice set. 
 
Laibson’s model also incorporates the possibility of non-constant discounting (viz., 
time inconsistency) through the linkage of cues and rewards. The idea is that if a cue 
is paired with a reward, this may make the reward irresistible even though the 
consumer could receive a larger quantity of the reward by delaying consumption. In 
other words, the consumer has a passion for the present which is driven by the cue. 
By contrast, when a cue is present but the reward is only available in the future, the 
consumer can trade off the benefits and costs of consumption without the cue driving 
choice in a particular direction. Thus, people may simultaneously display a passion 
for the present and patience over consumption opportunities available in the future 
(viz., non-constant discounting). 
 
Laibson’s model is similar to BB and BR in that stochastic shocks affect choice 
behaviour. But unlike BB and BR, these shocks do not produce an internal tug of war 
between competing systems. Instead, a unified agent faces external shocks that 
impede successful utility maximisation. As Laibson (2001, p. 109) argues, a storm of 
visceral temptations implies that, “… behavior changes rapidly from moment to 
moment, temptation can/should be actively avoided, and public consumption can be a 
negative externality.” 
 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) (LOR) develop a model of projection 
bias which assumes that people tend to understand the way in which their tastes will 
change over time but struggle to accurately predict the magnitude of these changes. 
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Consequently people tend to project their current preferences into the future without 
adequately accounting for the extent to which tastes will change. 
 
These errors in prediction, which cause predicted and realised utilities to diverge, 
imply that behaviour may not correspond to intertemporal utility maximisation with 
perfect foresight; projection bias is like a cognitive deficit which is “external” to a 
person’s “true” agency. This failure of intertemporal utility maximisation can have 
particularly problematic effects in the case of habit forming behaviours like addiction 
where current consumption of the addictive good raises the marginal utility of future 
consumption while simultaneously leading to a fall in future welfare through 
increases in the stock of addictive capital. With projection bias, people may fail to 
realise, or may underappreciate, the extent to which current consumption affects 
future welfare, leading them to consume more of the good in the present than they 
would with perfect foresight. Furthermore, if tastes change over time but people fail 
to predict the magnitude of these changes, they may make plans which they fail to 
carry out. Thus, projection bias can lead to time inconsistency. Note that LOR assume 
that decision makers are completely unaware of this potential for time inconsistency 
and, thus, the agents are like the naïve QH discounters in O’Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999). 
 
LOR argue that economic models of addiction capture many of the properties of 
substance dependence but often fail to explain how people became addicted to goods 
in the first place. Projection bias provides two possible and related explanations. If 
people fail to predict the future negative consequences of addictive consumption they 
may consume too much of the addictive good in the present. In addition, if people fail 
to predict the extent to which current consumption alters the marginal utility of future 
consumption they will underappreciate the power of habit formation. Consequently 
people may intend to consume an addictive good now without doing so in future, but 
without accurately predicting the influence of habit formation may then revise their 
plans in the future and continue to consume the addictive good.  
 
LOR also highlight the role that day-to-day fluctuations in tastes have on a particular 
aspect of addiction: craving. For example, if someone’s craving for a drug is 
particularly high on one day and this is projected on to the future, they may be 
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unwilling to quit because they incorrectly predict how difficult it will be to do so. 
Conversely, when a person’s craving for an addictive good is low, they may 
overestimate the ease of quitting and make repeated attempts to quit which ultimately 
fail when cravings return to normal levels.  
 
The model of projection bias adds to our understanding of addiction by highlighting 
the role that expectations of future utility have on current choices and how prediction 
errors can make addiction more likely and more intractable. An interesting difference 
between the models of LOR and BT is that the former focuses on errors in prediction 
while the latter focuses on errors in recall. In LOR, agents struggle to correctly 
forecast the effect of current actions on future welfare and may therefore take actions 
with immediate benefits without appropriately internalising their future costs. In BT, 
imperfect recall means that agents may have to continually “prove” to themselves that 
they have and can exercise willpower, a process that can unravel through 
transgression and precipitate addiction. 
 
Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) (GP) develop an axiomatic theory of addiction which 
builds on their earlier work on models of temptation and self-control (GP (2001, 
2004)). In this framework a person’s welfare depends on the choices that she makes 
as well as the set of options from which choices are made. The key idea here is that 
the set of options may contain tempting alternatives that lower an agents’ utility either 
by skewing her choice, requiring the use of costly self-control, or both. With regard to 
addiction, consumption of an addictive good is a tempting option which undermines 
self-control in the future. Thus, people are more likely to give in to temptation, the 
greater their past consumption of the addictive good. 
 
This logic is formalised through the notion of “compulsive consumption” (GP, p. 
154). A choice is compulsive if it differs to what would have been chosen if 
commitment were available. A good is addictive if consumption now leads to more 
compulsive consumption in future. Thus, addiction is defined as an increasing 
divergence between what is chosen and what would have been chosen absent 
temptation. Note that temptations here are ever-present, external shocks to the agent’s 
welfare which must be combatted, if possible, through the use of commitment devices 
or costly self-control. 
 -72- 
 
In the GP model, an agent’s preferences are defined over the set of decision problems 
rather than the set of consumption bundles. This relatively large domain of 
preferences allows GP to incorporate the ideas of commitment, self-control and 
temptation in their model. For example, a person may strictly prefer decision problem 
A to decision problem B because the latter includes tempting alternatives that are 
difficult to resist. Even though this person may make the identical choice under each 
decision problem, she may strictly prefer decision problem A because making the 
same choice under B requires costly self-control. Thus, the person can benefit by 
committing to decision problem A at the outset. 
 
Unlike GP’s earlier work (GP (2001, 2004)), preferences in this model depend on the 
person’s consumption history. Specifically, only consumption of the addictive good in 
the last period affects the person’s current preferences and this is captured by the 
addictive state: the greater the agent’s past consumption of the addictive good the 
higher the addictive state. Note that the cost of self-control increases at higher 
addictive states, implying that it becomes increasingly difficult to resist temptation. 
 
Thus, if someone resists temptation now, it will be easier to do so in the next period 
because the addictive state and hence the cost of self-control will decline. By contrast, 
if someone succumbs to temptation in this period it will be harder to resist temptation 
next period because the addictive state rises and with it, the cost of self-control. 
Clearly, these intertemporal trade-offs are influenced by the person’s time 
preferences. Someone who discounts future consequences heavily will downplay the 
effect of an increase in addictive consumption now on the difficulty of resisting 
temptation in future. Such a person will tend to consume more of the addictive good 
now which implies more compulsive consumption in future and ultimately, 
addiction.42 
 
A shortcoming of the GP model is that there is no place for inconsistent choice 
behaviour. Choice in this model represents the ideal trade-off between the utility 
                                                
42 GP’s earlier models (GP (2001, 2004)) incorporate risk and uncertainty but their model of addiction 
is defined solely over deterministic decision problems. Consequently, instantaneous and intertemporal 
risk preferences play no role in this framework. 
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gained from consumption of non-addictive goods and the self-control costs which 
must be incurred to limit consumption of addictive goods. Although agents desire 
commitment devices, this is not the product of time inconsistency. Instead, agents 
demand commitment devices so as to remove temptations, decrease the cost of self-
control, and increase welfare.  
 
 Another issue with the model is that it assumes only consumption of the addictive 
good in the previous period affects current preferences. What this implies is that if 
someone abstains successfully, perhaps with the help of a commitment device, then 
all previous effects of consumption of the addictive good wear off completely by the 
subsequent period. In other words, even with extreme exposure to an addictive good a 
person will return to a “virgin” state through successful abstention where it is as if 
they never consumed the good. This is a difficult assumption to justify given that the 
effects from extreme exposure to an addictive good tend to persist. 
 
The models discussed in this section link agency to the whole biological life of a 
person and regard deficits in human intelligence or reasoning as separate to, and 
distinct from, the person’s “true” agency, and which should be modelled as 
exogenous influences on the agent’s decision-making. Cues in Laibson’s framework 
are external taste shocks which must be resisted where possible; projection bias is a 
cognitive deficit which can have problematic effects by causing predicted and realised 
utilities to diverge; and the exogenous temptations in GP’s model are a threat to utility 
maximisation because they necessitate the use of costly self-control. These models 
capture many of the salient features of addiction and do so from a completely 
different starting point to the dual self and dual system models discussed previously.  
 
In sum, the economic models of addiction reviewed in this chapter find common 
ground on the importance of instantaneous risk and time preferences, intertemporal 
risk preferences, and subjective beliefs in the explanation of addiction. Thus, these 







In this chapter I provided an overview of the history of substance use and abuse, 
discussed current trends in drug consumption and dependence, and focussed on the 
costs that addiction imposes on society. This broad overview made it clear that 
addiction is a pressing public health concern and motivates research into the causes, 
course, and consequences of substance dependence.  
 
I then focussed on the diagnostic classification of addiction to highlight the view that 
classification systems do not solely serve scientific ends but that they develop in 
concert with wider political, social, and economic forces. Despite some issues with 
measurement and interpretation, research into substance dependence has made 
progress over the last 50 years by refining the definition of, and diagnostic criteria for, 
addiction. 
 
As a prelude to my discussion of economic models of addiction, I traced the history of 
the disease concept of substance dependence. I also outlined Heyman’s (2009) 
critique of the disease model to provide an alternative account of the nature of 
addiction but ultimately relied on the reconciliation of RSVS which shows that these 
apparently contradictory hypotheses are ultimately compatible if one adopts the 
appropriate levels of scientific analysis. 
 
In the second half of the chapter I reviewed a set of economic models which are 
relevant to the study of addiction so as to highlight the role that instantaneous risk and 
time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs play in 
substance dependence. The models that I covered were organised into three 
categories: models of rational addiction; dual self and dual system models; and 
exogenous addiction models. 
 
The models of rational addiction tie agency to the whole biological life of a person 
and assume time consistency. These models show how the interplay of instantaneous 
risk and time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs can 
precipitate addiction. OZ (p. 741) provide a succinct statement of this point when they 
argue that people often experiment with drugs because they, “… provide certain 
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instant pleasure and only probabilistic future harm.” While these models manage to 
capture some of the salient features of addiction they ultimately founder by mis-
predicting the typical course of addiction; the models cannot account for addicts’ 
inconsistent choice behaviour and the pattern of quit attempts and relapse. 
 
Dual self and dual system models assume that strategic interactions among 
subpersonal agents determine molar level choice behaviour. When these subpersonal 
agents are divided synchronically, they become a community of agents. When they 
are divided diachronically, they become a sequence of agents (Ross (2012, p. 31)). All 
of the dual self models which I covered incorporate time-inconsistent choice 
behaviour but do so through different mechanisms. GK and BT assume QH 
discounting and thereby link inconsistency directly to discounting behaviour. BB and 
BR, by contrast, make use of standard E discounting but assume that stochastic 
shocks lead to an internal tug of war between competing systems which often 
produces time-inconsistent choices at the molar level. FL adopt a synchronic and 
diachronic subpersonal framework and model inconsistent choice as the outcome of 
interactions between a patient, less risk averse LR self and an impatient, more risk 
averse SR self. The FL (2012) model captures the qualitative features of H 
discounting which provides a rationale for Ainslie’s notion of reward bundling. 
 
The exogenous addiction models link agency to the whole biological life of a person 
and view temptations as exogenous to the agent and an impediment to successful 
utility maximisation. These models are inspired by Loewenstein’s visceral factors 
which can overwhelm “cold,” deliberative reasoning and drive choice in the direction 
of immediate gratification. These models show how cues for consumption, prediction 
errors, and temptations can affect an agent’s intertemporal trade-offs and generate 
behavioural choice patterns that share a number of similar features of addiction. 
 
The models as a group highlight the roles that instantaneous risk and time 
preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs play in addiction.43 
From a methodological standpoint the question now turns to how best to measure 
                                                
43 As discussed previously, I do not explore potential differences in the intertemporal risk preferences 
and subjective beliefs of addicts and non-addicts in this thesis, but defer these important areas of 
enquiry for future research. 
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instantaneous risk and time preferences, particularly considering that the models 
incorporate different discounting specifications and place more or less emphasis on 
the roles that risk and uncertainty play. In Chapter 3, I provide a comprehensive 
review of the literature on time preferences and smoking behaviour to discuss the 
different experimental tools which have been used to elicit these preferences, and to 
draw attention to their benefits and drawbacks. In Chapter 4, I critique the probability 
discounting model which has been used extensively in psychology and addiction 
studies to measure instantaneous risk attitudes. In Chapter 5, I review alternative 
approaches to the experimental elicitation of instantaneous risk preferences and 
discuss a battery of risk preference questions which were developed to allow both 
utility function curvature and probability weighting to determine atemporal attitudes 
toward risk. I also present a set of time preference questions which were carefully 
constructed to reliably estimate alternative discounting models. 
 
From a statistical perspective, economic models of addiction suggest that one should 
adopt a flexible estimation framework which can incorporate different instantaneous 
risk and time preference specifications. In other words, one should not be wedded to a 
particular discounting function or atemporal risk preference theory because these not 
only differ across the economic models that I reviewed but may also differ across 
people. Thus, it is crucial to employ a flexible statistical framework to draw accurate 
inferences about potential differences between addicts and non-addicts. In Chapter 3, 
I present a statistical approach to the analysis of experimental data which incorporates 
E, H, QH, and Weibull discounting specifications and which allows multiple data 
generating processes to account for the data. In Chapter 4, I extend this approach to 
the study of instantaneous risk preferences and in Chapter 5, I combine the insights 
from the previous chapters in a joint estimation framework of instantaneous risk and 
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3. TIME PREFERENCES AND SMOKING 




Cigarette smoking involves a clear intertemporal trade off: any short-term benefits 
from smoking are coupled with the potential for large long-term costs. The 
intertemporal implications of the decision to smoke have stimulated research into the 
relationship between instantaneous time preferences1 and smoking behaviour. There 
is a large literature in psychology and a burgeoning literature in economics which 
analyses this relationship. The most common, although not universal, finding is that 
smokers tend to discount future rewards more heavily than non-smokers2, implying 
that smokers place greater emphasis on the present relative to the future.  
 
However, most of the studies in this literature rely on small samples, hypothetical 
rewards, restrictive assumptions about the form that discounting takes, and statistical 
tools which are not appropriate to the data that are collected. In this chapter, I remedy 
some of these shortcomings: I use two relatively large samples, four distinct 
discounting functions, and a full information maximum likelihood statistical approach 
which allows one to draw robust inferences from discounting data. 
 
I find that, in contrast to the maintained assumption of most studies in this literature, 
simple hyperbolic (H) discounting, such as the function proposed by Mazur (1984), 
does not provide the best fit to the data. Furthermore, I find that there is a need to 
allow multiple decision processes to characterise discounting choices. Finally, I find a 
significant relationship between smoking status and discounting behaviour which is 
relatively robust across the different discounting specifications. 
 
                                                
1  Chapter 2 highlighted the distinction between instantaneous risk and time preferences and 
intertemporal risk preferences. However, as this thesis only empirically examines instantaneous risk 
and time preferences, all subsequent references to “time preferences” will dispense with the 
“instantaneous” prefix. 
2 The term “non-smokers” refers to both ex-smokers and never-smokers. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section II reviews previous research on the 
relationship between discounting and smoking behaviour. Section III introduces the 
different discounting models which will be estimated. Section IV discusses the studies 
that will be used to investigate the smoking-discounting relationship and Section V 
formulates the statistical approach to data analysis. Section VI presents the results and 
Section VII concludes. 
 
 
II. A REVIEW OF THE SMOKING AND DISCOUNTING LITERATURE 
 
Table I provides a detailed summary of experimental studies investigating the 
relationship between smoking and time preferences. Online searches of PubMed and 
Econlit, employing the search criteria “smoking” and “discounting” and their variants 
(e.g., “smoke”, “discount”, and “time preference”), were used to locate these papers. 
An initial list of over 50 studies was trimmed according to the following rules: the 
study had to include a clear smoker, non-smoker comparison3; study participants had 
to make choices between amounts of money, rather than cigarettes or quality-adjusted 
life years, available at different points in time4; and the instrument used to assess 
discounting had to include at least 20 questions.5 The 30 studies satisfying these 
criteria are listed in Table I. 
 
Mitchell (1999) and Bickel, Odum and Madden (1999) conducted the first 
experiments investigating the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. Mitchell (1999) presented 20 relatively heavy6, current smokers (NS = 20) 
and 20 never-smokers (NNS = 20) with 137 choice questions between a real larger, 
later (LL) reward of $10 available after one of six delays (0, 7, 30, 90, 180, or 365 
days, i.e., the temporal horizon ranged from 0 to 365 days) and a real smaller, sooner 
                                                
3 A number of studies (e.g., Field et al. (2006), Dallery and Raiff (2007), Epstein et al. (2003)) focus 
purely on discounting among smokers and were excluded due to the lack of non-smokers in the sample. 
4 Odum, Madden and Bickel (2002) and van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) focus on the discounting of 
health outcomes and Field et al. (2006) and Odum and Baumann (2007) focus on the discounting of 
hypothetical cigarette rewards. 
5 Some panel studies (e.g., the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)) include a module to assess 
discounting behaviour but the limited number of questions (e.g., three questions in the HRS, see 
Bradford (2010)) makes precise estimation and inference difficult, so these studies were excluded. 
6 The smokers in Mitchell’s (1999) study stated that they smoked at least 15 cigarettes per day and 
provided a breath sample to verify their smoking status. 
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(SS) reward, which varied between $0.01 and $10.50, available immediately.7 The 
questions were drawn randomly from this battery, without replacement, and presented 
to subjects sequentially. At the end of the experiment, one of a subject’s choices was 
selected randomly for payment. 
 
Mitchell used each subject’s choices to determine an indifference point between the 
LL reward (i.e., $10) available after a particular delay (e.g., 7 days) and an SS reward 
available immediately. For example, if a subject chose $10 in 7 days over $6.50 
immediately but then chose $7 immediately over $10 in 7 days, the subject was 
assigned an indifference point of $6.75. Taking the average of these two values is 
arbitrary and doing so throws away information about the uncertainty of this estimate; 
all that one can infer from this pattern of choices is that a subject’s indifference point 
lies in the open interval ($6.50, $7). Interval data of this form is analysed 
appropriately using interval regression methods but Mitchell (1999) used the 
estimated indifference points as data to construct Mann-Whitney tests of differences 
in the indifference points of heavy smokers and never-smokers. Mitchell (1999) found 
that current smokers’ indifference points were significantly lower than never-
smokers’ indifference points for the 7 day (p < 0.05), 30 day (p < 0.01), and 90 day (p 
< 0.06) delays.  
 
In addition, Mitchell (1999) fitted Mazur’s (1984) H discounting function to the 
indifference points for each subject and then compared the estimated discounting 
parameters of current smokers and never-smokers using a Mann-Whitney test; she 
found that current smokers discounted significantly more than never-smokers (p < 
0.06). Note that using the point estimate of a discounting parameter as a datum 
ignores the uncertainty of this estimate and, thus, should not be used for inferential 
purposes.
                                                
7 One would expect people to choose $10.50 now over $10 available after a delay so incorporating this 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bickel, Odum and Madden (1999) (BOM) presented 23 heavy, current smokers, 22 
never-smokers, and 21 ex-smokers (NS = 23, NNS = 22, and NES = 21)8 with 189 
choice questions between a hypothetical LL reward of $1000 available after one of 
seven delays (the temporal horizon ranged from 7 days to 25 years) and a hypothetical 
SS reward available immediately. For each delay, the SS rewards were presented 
sequentially in descending and then ascending order and subjects were asked to 
indicate their preference between each SS reward and the LL reward of $1000. A 
simple average of the last SS reward chosen in descending order and the first SS 
reward chosen in ascending order was used to define a person’s indifference point for 
the $1000 LL reward at a particular delay; this method was used to derive 7 
indifference points, for the seven delays in the task, for each subject even though 
taking the average of these two values is arbitrary and doing so throws away 
information about the uncertainty of the estimate. 
 
BOM then fitted an exponential (E) function and Mazur’s (1984) H function, using 
non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimation, to each subject’s 7 derived indifference 
points. For each subject, BOM then compared9 the fit of these two functions using the 
coefficient of determination, R2, and found that for most subjects, H provided a better 
fit than E. They then used each subject’s estimated R2 value for the E and H functions 
as data to construct tests of whether the E or H functions provided a better fit to the 
discounting data across all subjects in the different smoking groups. Using the point 
estimate of a statistic (i.e., the value of R2) as a datum ignores the uncertainty of this 
estimate and, thus, does not produce a valid test of one function’s ability to better 
explain discounting data. Nevertheless, BOM state that the H function provided a 
better fit than the E function among current smokers (p < 0.01), never-smokers (p < 
0.01), and ex-smokers (p < 0.01). 
 
Finally, BOM compared the point estimates of the H discounting function across the 
current smoker, never-smoker, and ex-smoker groups by estimating an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) model which included a smoking status covariate; they found a 
                                                
8 The smokers in BOM (1999) reported smoking at least 20 cigarettes per day for 5 years and had a 
Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence score of at least 6. Never-smokers reported never smoking 
and ex-smokers reported abstinence for at least one year following 5 years of smoking at least 20 
cigarettes a day.  
9 Note that this was a simple comparison of the point estimates of R2 for the E and H functions and not 
a formal statistical test. 
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significant overall effect of smoking status but estimates should not be used as data 
for inferential purposes. In addition, planned Mann-Whitney pairwise comparisons of 
the H discounting function estimates showed that current smokers discounted 
significantly more than never-smokers (p < 0.01), and ex-smokers (p < 0.01); there 
was no significant difference between never-smokers and ex-smokers. 
 
Thus, the first two studies analysing the relationship between smoking and 
discounting behaviour suggested that current smokers discount more heavily than 
never-smokers. In addition, it appeared that this result was robust to different subjects 
pools, real as opposed to hypothetical rewards, different LL reward magnitudes ($10 
versus $1000), and different elicitation mechanisms (random versus ordered choice). 
Although not confirmed by both studies, there was some evidence that the H function 
provided a better fit to the discounting data than the E function. 
 
Reynolds, Karraker, Horn and Richards (2003) (RKHR), in a study with adolescent 
smokers (NS = 19), adolescent never-smokers (NNS = 19), and adolescent “triers” (NT 
= 17)10, provided the first null result in this literature. They used the titration 
procedure of Richards, Zhang, Mitchell and de Wit (1999) (RZMW), dubbed 
“Titration (random) – Richards et al. (1999)” in Table I, to derive indifference points 
for real $10 LL rewards available at different points in time (the temporal horizon 
ranged from 1 to 365 days). This titration procedure has been used extensively in the 
smoking and discounting literature and deserves further comment. 
 
A titration procedure uses a subject’s choices to determine the next set of choices that 
the subject faces. As a simple example, if someone chooses $10 after 7 days over $5 
now, the titration algorithm assumes that $10 after 7 days will be chosen over all 
amounts of money less than $5 available now (e.g., $4 or $3 available now). 
Consequently, the titration algorithm will narrow the search for a subject’s 
indifference point for that delay period (i.e., 7 days in our example) to the open 
interval ($5, $10). Some titration procedures take the average of the two values 
defining that interval to determine the next SS reward presented to the subject, $7.50 
                                                
10 “Triers” had smoked cigarettes for the first time in the 6 months prior to the study and they smoked 
an average of 3.76 cigarettes in total over this time span. Smokers, by contrast, had smoked every week 
for at least 6 months prior to the study and they smoked 46.42 cigarettes, on average, per week. 
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in this case. If the subject chooses $7.50 now over $10 in 7 days, then the range for 
indifference points is narrowed to ($5, $7.50). If, by contrast, the subject chooses $10 
in 7 days over $7.50 now, then the range for indifference points is narrowed to ($7.50, 
$10). By continually splitting the difference of an interval, the titration algorithm 
converges to a subject’s indifference point for a particular delay.11,12 
 
An issue with this titration procedure is that if a subject makes a mistake (e.g., 
chooses $10 after 7 days when he meant to choose $5 now), it becomes impossible to 
recover the subject’s “true” indifference point because the algorithm uses that mistake 
to refine the subsequent set of choices presented to the subject. The algorithm 
developed by RZMW is more sophisticated and uses two top and two bottom limits, 
rather than one top limit (e.g., $10 in our previous example) and one bottom limit 
(e.g., $5 in our previous example), to alleviate this issue. By employing multiple top 
and bottom limits, the algorithm of RZMW can recover a subject’s indifference point 
even after a mistake. 
 
Another issue with a simple titration algorithm which splits the difference of an 
interval is that the adjusting nature of the algorithm is evident to the subject and he 
can deduce that his future choices depend on his current choices. This raises an 
obvious incentive-compatibility problem because the subject can “game” the 
algorithm so as to be presented with higher SS rewards on subsequent decisions. The 
algorithm of RZMW attempts to mitigate this problem by randomly drawing SS 
amounts from within an interval, rather than simply splitting the difference, and by 
randomly selecting LL reward delays, rather than determining the indifference point 
for one delay before moving on to the next. 
 
RKHR used this algorithm to investigate the discounting behaviour of adolescent 
smokers, never-smokers, and “triers.” Subjects also completed a probability 
discounting task, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, and they were 
paid for one choice across both tasks; this payment scheme is referred to as 1-out-of-
                                                
11 Clearly the algorithm must terminate at some point, lest it continue indefinitely. In studies with $10 
LL rewards, as in RKHR, the algorithm stopped when the difference between the rewards in the 
interval had declined to $0.50. 
12 As the interval within which a person’s indifference point lies gets smaller and smaller, it is 
questionable whether that person is willing or able to make increasingly fine-grained choices. 
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2-tasks in Table I. The H discounting function was estimated for each subject, using 
NLLS, and the estimated discounting parameters were log transformed to normalise 
their distribution.13 These transformed discounting parameters were used as data and 
fed into an ANOVA model so as to compare the discounting behaviour of the 3 
smoking groups: there were no significant differences between smokers, never-
smokers and “triers.” 
 
This two-step approach to analysis (i.e., using NLLS, or some other technique, to 
estimate discounting parameters and then using the, typically log-transformed, point 
estimates as data in subsequent statistical models) is remarkably common in this 
literature. Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010) (HLR) is the only study in Table I 
which does not use this method, and for good reason. The problem with the two-step 
approach, other than that it often uses tiny samples to estimate discounting parameters 
at the level of the individual, is that estimated discounting parameters are estimates, 
and not data. Such estimates comprise both a point estimate (of the mean) and a 
standard error, and to use only the point estimate is to throw away information on the 
uncertainty of that estimate.14 Moreover, using an estimated discounting parameter as 
data violates the statistical assumptions of the second-stage models: specifically, that 
the covariates are measured without error. Thus, the statistical inferences drawn from 
this approach are simply not valid. HLR estimate discounting parameters as a linear 
function of observable characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and smoking status) so that 
the uncertainty of the discounting parameter estimates propagates into the inferences 
which are drawn from the data. This valid statistical approach will be used in this 
chapter. 
 
Table I collates the results from the other studies and, on inspection, a number of 
interesting patterns emerge. The vast majority (i.e., 24) of the studies investigating 
                                                
13 RKHR used the common (i.e., base 10) logarithm to transform their data. A number of studies (e.g., 
Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004), Reynolds (2004), Heyman and Gibb (2006), Johnson, 
Bickel and Baker (2007) also adopt the common logarithmic transformation while others (e.g., Baker, 
Johnson and Bickel (2003), Bickel, Yi, Kowal and Gatchalian (2008), Jones, Landes, Yi and Bickel 
(2009), Sheffer et al. (2013)) use the natural logarithm to transform discounting parameters.  
14 This problem is compounded when indifference points are computed by taking an average of the 
interval within which a person’s indifference point lies (i.e., taking the average of an interval derived 
by a titration mechanism). In this case, there are two levels of uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the 
indifference points and uncertainty about the parameter estimates) which are ignored when the final 
point estimate of a discounting parameter is used as data. 
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smoking and discounting behaviour were conducted in the US, 2 took place in Japan, 
1 in Denmark, 1 in Canada, 1 in Germany, and 1 recruited subjects internationally 
over the internet. An important feature of these studies is that they have relatively 
diverse subject pools (i.e., they do not typically rely on convenient student samples 
but rather recruit from the community at large) which thereby bolsters the external 
validity of the results.  
 
However, most of the studies have small sample sizes: 19 of the 30 studies recruited 
less than 100 people and 15 of these studies had samples of less than 70 people. 
Fortunately, since 2008, the trend has been towards larger and larger samples (e.g., 
Sweitzer et al. (2008) recruited 710 subjects, Audrain-McGovern et al. (2009) 
recruited 909 subjects, Kang and Ikeda (2014) used a sample of 3450 people, and 
Stillwell and Tunney (2012) recruited 9038 individuals). 
 
With regards to elicitation mechanisms, 16 studies used choice procedures, 13 used 
titration, and 1 employed both methods (see Balevich, Wein and Flory (2013)). The 
task designed by Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999) (KPB) was used in 3 of the choice 
procedure studies and this task will be discussed in more detail in Section IV because 
it was used in the research projects reported in this chapter. 
 
A perennial issue in the interpretation of experimental results is whether real or 
hypothetical rewards were used in a study. If a study uses hypothetical rewards, all it 
really elicits is the choices a person thinks he would make when faced with those 
contingencies, or the choices he thinks the experimenter wants him to make. If real 
rewards are used, by contrast, a subject’s choices ultimately determine the payment he 
receives and this – coupled with a task that is easily understood, a transparent 
payment scheme, salient rewards, and an incentive-compatible experimental design – 
promotes truthful revelation of preferences. Thus, one should give far more credence 
to studies using real as opposed to hypothetical rewards because in the former 
instance one can analyse what people actually did rather than what they think they 
would do or what they want the experimenter to think they would do. 
 
Of the studies in Table I, 5 only used real rewards (Mitchell (1999), Reynolds et al. 
(2007), Melanko et al. (2009), Reynolds and Fields (2012), Kobiella et al. (2014)) 
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whereas 4 used a combination of real and hypothetical rewards (Baker, Johnson and 
Bickel (2003), Heyman and Gibb (2006), Johnson, Bickel and Baker (2007), Mitchell 
and Wilson (2012)). Entirely hypothetical rewards were used in 15 studies (BOM, 
Ohmura, Takahashi and Kitamura (2005), Reynolds (2006), Bickel, Yi, Kowal and 
Gatchalian (2008), Sweitzer et al. (2008), Adams and Nettle (2009), Jones, Landes, Yi 
and Bickel (2009), Businelle, McVay, Kendzor and Copeland (2010), Bickel et al. 
(2012), Stillwell and Tunney (2012), Wing, Moss, Rabin and George (2012), 
Balevich, Wein and Flory (2013), Poltavski and Weatherly (2013), Sheffer et al. 
(2013), Kang and Ikeda (2014)), 1 study did not report whether real or hypothetical 
rewards were used (Audrain-McGovern et al. (2009)), and 5 studies used probabilistic 
payment schemes (RKHR, Reynolds (2004), Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker 
(2004), Chabris et al. (2008), HLR).15 Thus, approximately half of the studies in Table 
I used entirely hypothetical rewards and this should be taken into account when 
drawing conclusions about the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. 
 
The temporal horizon (i.e., the time delay between the SS and LL rewards) of the 
studies reported in Table I ranges from 6 hours to 25 years. Studies using real rewards 
or probabilistic payment schemes tend to employ far shorter temporal horizons than 
studies using hypothetical rewards; this makes sense because the credibility of 
payments in the distant future would be open to question. Of the studies using real 
rewards or probabilistic payment schemes, only 1 had a temporal horizon as long as 2 
years (i.e., HLR) whereas 7 studies using hypothetical rewards had temporal horizons 
extending out to 25 years (BOM, Baker, Johnson and Bickel (2003), Johnson, Bickel 
and Baker (2007), Bickel, Yi, Kowal and Gatchalian (2008), Jones, Landes, Yi and 
Bickel (2009), Businelle, McVay, Kendzor and Copeland (2010), Sheffer et al. 
(2013)). 
 
                                                
15 Studies employing real rewards typically make use of the random lottery incentive mechanism 
(RLIM) to determine subject payment. RLIM randomly selects one of a subject’s choices on a task and, 
in a study with real rewards, pays out this choice with certainty. A probabilistic payment scheme also 
makes use of RLIM but subjects are only given some chance of being paid for the randomly selected 
choice (i.e., subjects are not paid with certainty). In Chabris et al. (2008) subjects were given a 1-in-6 
chance of being paid for one of their choices while in HLR subjects were given a 1-in-10 chance of 
being paid for one of their choices. By contrast, RKHR, Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004) 
and Reynolds (2004) paid subjects for 1 choice across two different tasks, implying that subjects had 
roughly a 50% chance of being paid for one of their choices on the discounting task.  
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Time preferences are represented mathematically using a discounting function. There 
are a number of discounting functions which have been proposed (see Section III) but 
the majority of studies in Table I (i.e., 22 out of 30) adopted the assumption that 
people discount hyperbolically and, thus, only used Mazur’s (1984) H function in 
their analyses.16 There are 4 studies in Table I which directly compared the E and H 
discounting functions, using either R2 or the residual sum of squares (RSS) to 
adjudicate between them, and all of the studies found that the H function better 
explains discounting data (BOM, Ohmura, Takahashi and Kitamura (2005), Bickel, 
Yi, Kowal and Gatchalian (2008), Stillwell and Tunney (2012)). There are 3 studies 
(Reynolds et al. (2007), Melanko et al. (2009), Reynolds and Fields (2012)) which 
only used the “theoretically neutral” area under the curve (AUC) method of Myerson, 
Green and Warusawitharana (2001) to compare the discounting of smokers and non-
smokers17, and 1 study (HLR) estimated a statistical model that allows both E and H 
discounting functions to characterise the data.  
 
HLR’s approach is based on the sensible idea that some discounting choices may be 
better explained by an E function whereas others may be better explained by an H 
function and that the data should be used to determine the proportion of choices best 
explained by each model. Using this so-called “mixture model” approach, HLR found 
that approximately 25% - 40% of discounting choices were best characterised by the 
H function. This suggests that researchers investigating the link between smoking and 
discounting behaviour may have relied too heavily on the H function because it does 
not explain all discounting choices all of the time.  
 
Mixture models also address a deeper issue of bias in the estimation of discounting 
models. Suppose, for example, that at least 50% of the choices in a dataset are best 
characterised by the H function whereas the remaining fraction is best characterised 
                                                
16 Businelle, McVay, Kendzor and Copeland (2010) and Poltavski and Weatherly (2013) assumed 
hyperbolic discounting but also used the area under the curve (AUC) method of Myerson, Green and 
Warusawitharana (2001) to draw inferences about the relationship between smoking and discounting. 
Mitchell and Wilson (2012) assumed hyperbolic discounting but also estimated a quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting function. 
17 The AUC method is “theoretically neutral” because it does not assume that discounting takes a 
particular form (e.g., E or H). Instead, when using the AUC method, one calculates the area under a 
subject’s derived indifference points and normalises this to lie in the closed unit interval [0, 1]. Larger 
AUCs imply shallower discounting and, thus, the AUCs of smokers and non-smokers can be compared 
to determine whether the groups differ in their discounting behaviour. 
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by the E function. If one just estimates the H model on the whole dataset then one will 
reject the E model in favour of the H model because the estimate obtained from the H 
model will be halfway between the “true” H estimate and the estimate one would 
obtain from the E model. Thus, if one just estimates the H model then this biases 
against the E model. Mixture models remove this source of bias by allowing both 
discounting models to account for the data, and by estimating the proportion of the 
data which each model explains. In this chapter I will adopt the approach of HLR and 
estimate mixture models of a number of different discounting specifications so as not 
to be wedded to any particular discounting framework and to determine the proportion 
of discounting choices that is explained by each specification. 
 
HLR deserves further comment because it was the first study in this literature to use a 
front end delay (FED) to the SS reward and it is the only study which incorporates 
utility function curvature when estimating discounting models. Prior to the work of 
Coller and Williams (1999) it was common to make receipt of the SS reward 
immediate, as is the case in most of the studies in Table I. An issue with an 
experimental design where the SS reward is immediate (i.e., a design with no FED) is 
that it may increase preference for the SS reward due to the additional transaction 
costs and uncertainty associated with receipt of the LL reward. A FED is used to hold 
these transactions costs constant across the two rewards. Following the work of HLR, 
Mitchell and Wilson (2012), Kang and Ikeda (2014) and Kobiella et al. (2014) used a 
FED for some of the choices they presented to subjects. 
 
Time preferences are defined over time-dated utility flows, not flows of money. These 
are equivalent if a utility function is linear but Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
(2008) showed that if a utility function is concave then the assumption of linearity 
will, for the same observed choices, bias the estimation of discounting parameters 
upwards. Thus, to draw accurate inferences about discounting behaviour it is 
important to incorporate utility function curvature in the estimation of discounting 
models. To my knowledge, HLR are the only researchers to incorporate the shape of 
the utility function when analysing the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. They used a risk preference task to determine the shape of the utility 
function, under the assumption that expected utility theory characterised choices over 
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risky prospects, which they then estimated jointly with the parameters of discounting 
models.  
 
Incorporating utility function curvature had a marked effect on their results. Assuming 
linear utility, HLR found that both male and female smokers discount significantly 
more than their non-smoking counterparts. However, when the discounting models 
were estimated jointly with the curvature of the utility function, only male smokers 
discounted significantly more than male non-smokers; there was no statistically 
significant difference in the discounting behaviour of female smokers and non-
smokers. The null result for women, under joint estimation, was driven by the fact 
that female smokers were significantly more risk averse (i.e., had significantly more 
curvature in their utility functions) than female non-smokers. By assuming linear 
utility, this difference in utility function curvature among women showed up as a 
difference in their discounting behaviour.   
 
Thus, to draw accurate inferences about smoking and discounting, it is crucial to 
jointly estimate utility function curvature and discounting parameters. Unfortunately 
the studies used in this chapter did not collect data on risk preferences so I cannot 
incorporate the shape of the utility function in this way. Nevertheless, I will briefly 
discuss a parametric approach to this issue later. 
 
An important feature of the estimates presented in Table I is that 26 of the studies 
computed daily discount rates. This is common in the behavioural psychology 
literature but not in economics where annual discount rates are the norm. Of the 
remaining studies, 3 estimated annual rates, and 1 estimated weekly rates. I estimate 
daily discount rates in this chapter due to a puzzling inferential issue which emerges 
when estimating or inferring annual discount rates with the KPB discounting task. In 
Appendix A I focus directly on this inferential issue by conducting 125,000 
replications of a simulation which generates KPB discounting data. The weight of the 
simulation evidence in Appendix A suggests that daily estimates are more reliable 
numerically than annual estimates, irrespective of whether I assume a daily or annual 
discount rate data generating process (DGP). 
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The last column of Table I reports whether the researchers found a significant 
statistical relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour. To understand 
this column, note that a “positive” relationship between smoking and discounting 
means that smokers discount more heavily than non-smokers. Some of the papers in 
Table I report findings from different studies or from different treatments in the same 
study. For example, Baker, Johnson and Bickel (2003) report results from real and 
hypothetical experimental treatments whereas Chabris et al. (2008) report findings 
from multiple studies. In some cases (e.g., Baker, Johnson and Bickel (2003)) results 
were the same across studies and treatments, while in others (e.g., Chabris et al. 
(2008), Heyman and Gibb (2006)) they differed. Of the 36 reported findings in Table 
I, 28 were positive and significant while the remaining 8 were null results.18 Thus, the 
bulk of findings in this literature – irrespective of whether real or hypothetical 
rewards, long or short temporal horizons, choice or titration elicitation mechanisms, 
small or large samples, and simple or complex statistical procedures were used – point 
to a positive relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour. 
 
In this chapter I will examine the smoking-discounting relationship using two 
relatively large samples, four distinct discounting models, and a statistical framework 
which allows one to draw robust inferences from data generated by the KPB 
discounting task. I will also estimate a mixture of the different discounting 
specifications to determine what proportion of choices is best characterised by the 
different models, and to explore the possibility that smokers are more prone to time-
inconsistency than non-smokers in that, under the assumption of an additively-
separable intertemporal utility function, they are more likely to discount according to 
the H model than the E model. In the next section I discuss the different discounting 
models which will be used. 
 
                                                
18 Some studies classified smokers using more than one category (e.g., heavy and light smokers in 
Stillwell and Tunney (2012)), others classified non-smokers using more than one category (e.g., never-
smokers and ex-smokers in BOM), and still others separated male and female smokers and non-
smokers (e.g., Jones, Landes, Yi and Bickel (2009) and HLR). In a few of these cases, comparisons 
between some of the groups were significant while others were not, which makes coding the study 
problematic. To resolve this issue, studies were coded as having found a significant result if at least one 
smoker, non-smoker comparison was statistically significant. Clearly this is not a perfect system but it 
is arguably preferable to coding a study as having found no significant results just because one 
comparison (between, say, light smokers and non-smokers) was not significant even though another 
comparison (between, say, heavy smokers and non-smokers) was significant. 
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III. DISCOUNTING FUNCTIONS 
 
Samuelson (1937) developed the discounted utility model which has been the 
workhorse of theoretical and empirical economics since its conception.19 From about 
the mid-1950s though, both economists (e.g., Strotz (1955-1956) and Phelps and 
Pollak (1968)) and psychologists (e.g., Herrnstein (1961) and Ainslie (1975)) have 
challenged the validity of the model on theoretical and empirical grounds, which has 
led to the development of numerous alternative models of discounting behaviour. In 
this section, I will introduce the discounted utility model and some of the major 
alternatives by drawing on the exposition in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
(2014, p. 16-17) (AHLR), which provides a general framework for discussing the 
various models of time preference. 
 
The discount factor D is the scalar, for a particular time horizon τ, which equates the 
utility of income received at time t with the utility of income received at time t + τ: 
 
 U(yt) = DU(yt+τ), (1)  
 
for some utility function U(·). A common assumption in the empirical literature is that 
U(·) is linear in y which means that D is then the discount factor that equalises income 
received at time t with income received at time t + τ. Other than HLR, every study in 
Table I makes this assumption.  
 
Samuelson’s (1937) discounted utility model employs the exponential (E) discount 
factor: 
 
 DE(t) = 1 / (1 + δ)t, (2)  
 
for t ≥ 0, and where the discount rate d is: 
 
 dE(t) = δ (3)  
 
                                                
19 Samuelson (1937) was explicit that he did not expect the model to describe the discounting behavior 
of real people but the model was nevertheless adopted for this purpose. 
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Two important features of this model are that it is mathematically tractable (i.e., the 
geometric series ∑t DE(t) converges in the limit), and the discount rate dE(t) is a 
constant over time which, when coupled with an additively-separable intertemporal 
utility function, implies time-consistent preferences.20 
 
Phelps and Pollak (1968) developed the quasi-hyperbolic (QH) discounting function, 
in the context of a social planning problem, which has a discount factor: 
 
 DQH(t) = 1  if t = 0 (4a)  
 
 DQH(t) = β / (1 + δ)t  if t > 0 (4b)  
 
If β = 1 the QH specification collapses to the E model, whereas if β < 1 discounting is 
quasi-hyperbolic. I use β and δ to represent the parameters in all of the discounting 
models in this chapter even though there is nothing which implies that they should be 
equal across the different specifications; this choice was made for notational 
simplicity. The QH discounting function was first used to model individual behaviour 
by Elster (1979, p. 71) and was subsequently popularised by Laibson (1997). It plays 
a prominent role in behavioural economics because it is mathematically tractable (i.e., 
∑t DQH(t) converges in the limit) and it incorporates the potential for time-inconsistent 
preferences (i.e., preferences over future options can change depending on the time 
point at which these future options are evaluated) when β < 1 and the intertemporal 
utility function is additively separable.  
 
The discount rate in the QH model is the value of dQH(t) which solves DQH(t) = 1 / (1 
+ dQH)t. Thus, 
 
 dQH(t) = [β / (1 + δ)t](-1/t) – 1, (5)  
 
for t > 0. Clearly the discount rate under the QH model is not constant over time if β < 
1. When β < 1, there is a sharp drop in the value of a reward if it is not available 
immediately, but the extent of this drop declines over time as the discount rate 
                                                
20 As discussed in Chapter 2, time consistency, or the lack thereof, is central to economic models of 
addiction. 
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asymptotes towards δ. As AHLR (p. 17) note, “the drop 1 – β can be viewed as a 
fixed utility cost of discounting anything relative to the present ….” Thus, the QH 
model can account for a “present-bias” or a “passion for the present” in discounting 
behaviour. 
 
Mazur (1984, p. 427) developed the H discounting function to account for pigeons’ 
preferences over fixed and variable schedules of reinforcement. The H specification 
has a discount factor: 
 
 DH(t) = 1 / (1 + δt) (6)  
 
This function has been used extensively in the psychology literature and in 27 of the 
30 studies in Table I. Unlike the E and QH discounting specifications, the harmonic 
series ∑t DH(t) does not converge and the H model has not been widely used therefore 
in the theoretical economics literature. Mazur’s (1984) H function forms part of a 
whole family of hyperbolic discounting models, but I will use (6) due to its 
importance in the literature on time preferences and smoking. The discount rate dH(t) 
for this model is: 
 
 dH(t) = (1 + δt)(1/t) – 1, (7)  
 
which declines over time and therefore admits time-inconsistent preferences under the 
assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal utility function.  
 
The final discounting function which will be used in this chapter was originally 
proposed by Read (2001, equation 16, p. 25) and has been dubbed the “Weibull” 
(WB) discounting function by Jamison and Jamison (2011, p. 5) because it has an 
associated Weibull probability density function. The discount factor for the WB 
specification is: 
 
 DWB(t) = exp(-δt(1/β)), (8)  
 
for δ > 0 and β > 0. Note that when β = 1, (8) collapses to the E specification so, in the 
terminology of Jamison and Jamison (2011, p. 25), the parameter β either “expands” 
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or “contracts” time. When β > 1, it is as if time has contracted or is perceived to be 
“slowing down” by the individual. By contrast, when β < 1, it is as if time has 
expanded or is “speeding up” as perceived by the individual.21 The discount rate for 
the WB model is: 
 
 dWB(t) = exp(δt(1-β)/β) – 1, (9)  
 
which is constant over time when β = 1, declines over time when β > 1, and increases 
over time when β < 1. AHLR (Appendix D, p. A35) draw the analogy between 
subjective distortions of probabilities in the literature on choice under risk and 
subjective distortions of time as captured by β in the WB model. Just as people may 
perceive probabilities as different to their objective values when making choices 
under risk, they may perceive time to be faster or slower when making choices over 
time-dated utility flows. The WB model incorporates this possibility in a flexible 
specification which may shed further light on the relationship between smoking and 
discounting behaviour. 
 
In this section I have discussed four models which have been proposed to explain the 
way in which people discount future utility flows. These models are but a small subset 
of those which exist in the literature (see, for example, Harvey (1986), Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1992), Bleichrodt, Rohde and Wakker (2009), Benhabib, Bisin and 
Schotter (2010)) but they were chosen for good reason. The E, H, and QH models are 
the most prominent in the economics, psychology, and addiction literatures so they 
should be included for the sake of comparison with previous studies. The WB model 
was included due to its flexibility (i.e., it admits constant, increasing, and decreasing 
discount rates) and because it incorporates the notion of subjective time perception 
which may be an important driver of behaviour and may shed light on the relationship 




                                                
21 Read (2001, p. 25) credits Green, Fry and Myerson (1994) with the notion that subjective time 
perception influences discounting behaviour. 
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IV. THE UCLA AND USC DISCOUNTING STUDIES 
 
Researchers at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and the University 
of Southern California (USC) collected the discounting data which will be analysed in 
this chapter.  
 
The UCLA Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics (CNP) is a large, 
collaborative research project focussing on the genetic and environmental bases of 
variation in psychological and neural system phenotypes. It was one of nine 
interdisciplinary research consortia supported by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) Roadmap Initiative starting in 2007 (Bilder et al. (2009)). Discounting data was 
obtained as part of this ambitious project. 
 
Study participants were recruited from the Los Angeles metropolitan area using print 
advertisements, flyers, internet postings (e.g., craigslist.org) and presentations by 
study investigators. All potential participants underwent telephone screening followed 
by additional in-person screening to ensure that they satisfied study 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Subjects were required to be men or women between the 
ages of 21 and 50; speak English or Spanish; have at least 8 years of formal 
education; have no significant medical illness; test negative for drugs of abuse; have 
visual acuity of 20/60 or better; and have no Axis I or II disorders as defined by the 
DSM-IV. 
 
Following a thorough explanation of the research project, participants gave written 
informed consent and completed a number of tasks and questionnaires (consult Bilder 
et al. (2009) for more information on the other tasks and questionnaires). All 
procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Boards at UCLA and the Los 
Angeles County Medical Department of Mental Health. Smoking status was assessed 
by self-report; specifically, subjects answered the question, “Have you ever smoked 
cigarettes on a daily basis?” by choosing “no” “yes, current” or “yes, past.” Subjects 
who self-identified as current smokers were also asked how many cigarettes they 
smoked per day, on average, and the length of time they had been smokers. The mean 
number of cigarettes smoked per day is 11.13 with a standard deviation of 18.99. The 
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mean smoking duration is 9.77 years with a standard deviation of 7.34.22 Thus, the 
UCLA sample provides information on current and former smoking status, as well as 
the severity and duration of smoking among current smokers.  
 
For the USC study, recruitment took place through internet postings on craigslist.org 
and was confined to the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The postings attracted 380 
individuals who signed informed consent to be interviewed for inclusion in the study. 
Of these people, 229 self-identified as current cigarette smokers and 109 self-
identified as never-smokers. As with the UCLA study, participants were screened for 
Axis I and II pathologies, and subjects meeting diagnostic criteria for Axis I or II 
disorders were excluded. From the original recruitment pool, 88 smokers and 86 
never-smokers met all inclusion/exclusion criteria and completed a demographic 
questionnaire, a discounting task, and a neuroimaging task. One of the subject’s 
choices across both tasks was randomly selected for payment using gift cards. If the 
randomly selected choice had an associated delay, that gift card was activated on the 
corresponding day. The neuroimaging task will not be discussed further. 
 
In the USC study, all smokers were nicotine-dependent according to DSM-IV criteria, 
as assessed using the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.) 
(Sheehan et al. (1998)). Additionally, smoker inclusion required: 1) self-reported 
smoking of at least 15 cigarettes per day for at least two years; and 2) biochemical 
confirmation of smoking by either carbon monoxide in expired breath of at least 15 
ppm, or a positive urinalysis (cutoff level = 200ng/ml). Thus, subjects in the USC 
sample were either heavy, current smokers or never-smokers. The mean number of 
cigarettes smoked per day is 19.50, with a standard deviation of 4.27, and the mean 
smoking duration is 11.78 years, with a standard deviation of 7.41. Mann-Whitney 
tests confirm that smokers in the USC study smoked significantly more cigarettes per 
day (p < 0.001) and smoked for a significantly longer period of time (p = 0.055) than 
smokers in the UCLA sample.  
 
  
                                                
22 In the health sciences literature, smoking status is often defined on the basis of a 100-cigarettes-in-a-
lifetime threshold. In the UCLA sample, 71 out of the 75 self-identified current smokers satisfy this 
criterion, 2 did not provide information on smoking duration so they cannot be classified, and 2 do not 
satisfy this criterion as they only started smoking in the month prior to the study. 
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TABLE II 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF UCLA AND USC STUDIES 
 
UCLA (N = 1031) USC (N = 174) Combined (N = 1205) 
 
Mean Mean Mean 
Variable (Std deviation) (Std deviation) (Std deviation) 
Agea 31.451 33.810 31.792 
 
(8.526) (8.574) (8.570) 
Hispanicb 0.403 0.121 0.363 
 
(0.491) (0.327) (0.481) 
Maled 0.455 0.552 0.469 
 
(0.498) (0.499) (0.499) 
Years of educationc 15.045 14.884 15.022 
 
(1.992) (2.111) (2.009) 
Smoker: past 0.202 0 0.173 
 
(0.401) (0) (0.378) 
Smoker: presentb 0.073 0.506 0.135 
  (0.260) (0.501) (0.342) 
aSignificantly different across samples at the 1% level according to a Mann-Whitney test 
bSignificantly different across samples at the 1% level according to a χ2 test 
cSignificantly different across samples at the 5% level according to a Mann-Whitney test 
dSignificantly different across samples at the 5% level according to a χ2 test 
 
Summary statistics for the two samples are presented in Table II. In the combined 
sample, approximately 36% of subjects are Hispanic, 47% are male, 17% are past or 
ex-smokers, and 14% are current smokers. In addition, subjects are approximately 32 
years old and have 15 years of education on average. The UCLA and USC samples 
differ markedly according to these demographic characteristics. The USC sample is 
significantly older, has a higher proportion of men, a lower proportion of Hispanics, 
fewer years of education on average, and a far greater proportion of current smokers. 
Clearly it will be important to control for these differences in statistical models of the 
relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour.  
 
Discounting data in both studies was collected using a questionnaire originally 
developed by Kirby and Maraković (1996) and later refined by KPB. Subjects had to 
make 27 choices between SS and LL monetary rewards. The monetary rewards were 
entirely hypothetical in the UCLA study whereas subjects had a chance of receiving 
payment for one of their choices in the USC study. To accommodate this difference in 
payment scheme and other potential differences across studies, a fixed effect dummy 






DELAY DISCOUNTING TASK WITH FRACTION OF SUBJECTS CHOOSING LL AMOUNT 
 






LL Fraction choosing LL 
Order SS LL Delay1 size Smokers Non-smokers2 
13 $34 $35 186 0.00016 1 0.00016 S 0.01 0.03 
1 $54 $55 117 0.00016 1 0.00016 M 0.08 0.11 
9 $78 $80 162 0.00016 1 0.00016 L 0.03 0.05 
20 $28 $30 179 0.0004 2 0.0004 S 0.02 0.08 
6 $47 $50 160 0.0004 2 0.0004 M 0.06 0.07 
17 $80 $85 157 0.0004 2 0.0004 L 0.02 0.05 
26 $22 $25 136 0.001 3 0.0009 S 0.04 0.08 
24 $54 $60 111 0.001 3 0.0009 M 0.05 0.09 
12 $67 $75 119 0.001 3 0.0009 L 0.03 0.10 
22 $25 $30 80 0.0025 4 0.0023 S 0.06 0.13 
16 $49 $60 89 0.0025 4 0.0023 M 0.15 0.21 
15 $69 $85 91 0.0025 4 0.0023 L 0.17 0.27 
3 $19 $25 53 0.006 5 0.005 S 0.18 0.29 
10 $40 $55 62 0.006 5 0.005 M 0.13 0.23 
2 $55 $75 61 0.006 5 0.005 L 0.28 0.43 
18 $24 $35 29 0.016 6 0.013 S 0.29 0.36 
21 $34 $50 30 0.016 6 0.013 M 0.42 0.55 
25 $54 $80 30 0.016 6 0.013 L 0.59 0.67 
5 $14 $25 19 0.041 7 0.03 S 0.53 0.60 
14 $27 $50 21 0.041 7 0.03 M 0.61 0.73 
23 $41 $75 20 0.041 7 0.03 L 0.75 0.79 
7 $15 $35 13 0.10 8 0.07 S 0.71 0.75 
8 $25 $60 14 0.10 8 0.06 M 0.86 0.90 
19 $33 $80 14 0.10 8 0.07 L 0.84 0.88 
11 $11 $30 7 0.25 9 0.15 S 0.91 0.94 
27 $20 $55 7 0.25 9 0.16 M 0.88 0.88 
4 $31 $85 7 0.25 9 0.15 L 0.90 0.93 
Source: Author's construction but based on Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999) 
 Notes: The “Order” column lists the order of each question as presented to subjects. SS refers to the 
smaller, sooner reward. LL refers to the larger, later reward. “δE at indiff.” and “δH at indiff.” list the 
parameter values at which the SS and LL amounts are of equal value as determined by the 
exponential (2) and hyperbolic (6) discounting functions, respectively. “δH rank” groups the 
discounting questions according to their implied δH indifference values. S, M, and L refer to the 
small, medium and large LL reward sizes, respectively. 
1Delays are in days 
2Non-smokers include both never-smokers (n = 834) and ex-smokers (n = 208). 
 
In the KPB task, the SS reward is always available immediately whereas the delay to 
the LL reward varies between 7 and 186 days. Of the 27 questions, 9 use small reward 
magnitudes (LL reward: $25 - $35), 9 use medium reward magnitudes (LL reward: 
$50 - $60), and 9 use large reward magnitudes ($75 - $85). Table III lists the 27 
binary choice questions.  
 
Under the assumption that the utility function U(·) is linear in income y, one can use a 
participant’s choices in Table III to determine a range for the discounting parameters 
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in the E and H models.23 Table III includes the values of δE and δH for each choice 
question at which the SS and LL rewards are of equal value as determined by the E 
(2) and H (6) discounting functions, respectively. These values and a subject’s pattern 
of choices can be used to determine his discounting parameters under either 
specification. For example, suppose that someone chooses the SS reward on the first 3 
rows of the table. This implies that the person’s discounting parameter, under either 
the E or H model, is greater than 0.00016. Suppose further that this person switches to 
the LL reward on row 4 of the table and continues to select the LL reward on every 
subsequent row. This implies that the person’s discounting parameter, under either the 
E or H model, is less than 0.0004. Thus, this pattern of choices reveals a discounting 
parameter which lies in the open interval (0.00016, 0.0004). KPB used the geometric 
mean24 of these two values (i.e., (0.00016×0.0004)½ = 0.00025) as the person’s 
discounting parameter. 
 
One shortcoming of this approach is that it discards information on the precision of 
the parameter estimate. In other words, the pattern of choices described above reveals 
a discounting parameter which lies in the open interval (0.00016, 0.0004). By 
calculating the geometric mean of this interval (i.e., 0.00025) and using it as the 
person’s discounting parameter, one ignores the uncertainty surrounding this estimate. 
In other words, a person’s “true” discounting parameter may be 0.00036 or it may be 
0.00017 and one cannot tell which value it is based on the choices that the person 
made (i.e., either value is consistent with the DGP). In effect, KPB change interval 
data into point estimates by implicitly assuming a uniform distribution within the 
discount rate intervals. 
 
Unfortunately this method is even less tenable in the presence of “inconsistent” 
choices. As Kirby and Maraković (1996, p. 102) and KPB (p. 81) point out, a person’s 
choices on this task are not always deterministically consistent with a particular 
                                                
23 The QH and WB models have two parameters so a participant’s choices in Table III cannot pin down 
a range of values for both parameters. This can be achieved statistically though, as I will discuss in the 
next section of this chapter. 
24 The stated rationale for using a geometric, rather than an arithmetic, mean was, “… to avoid 
underweighting the smaller of the two rate parameters” (KPB, p. 80). A geometric mean is useful when 
calculating a measure of central tendency for two values which have different ranges (i.e., one value 
falls within the closed interval [0, 3] while the other falls within the closed interval [0, 100]). However, 
in the context of the KPB task it is unclear how an arithmetic mean underweights the smaller value 
because the smaller and larger values are given equal weight. 
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discounting parameter. Building on the example from earlier, suppose that instead of 
someone switching to the LL reward on row 4 of Table III and then consistently 
choosing the LL reward on every subsequent row, the person switches back and 
chooses the SS reward on rows 5, 6, and 7 and then chooses the LL reward for every 
subsequent row. In such a case, Kirby and Maraković (1996) and KPB calculated the 
discounting parameter which was consistent with the highest proportion of a subject’s 
choices and used this discounting parameter thereafter. If multiple discounting 
parameters yielded the same level of consistency, the geometric mean of these values 
was used as the person’s discounting parameter.  
 
From the preceding discussion the problem with this method should be clear. In this 
case there is even less certainty about a particular parameter estimate and yet it is 
treated as a datum which is measured without error.25 The statistical approach which I 
adopt remedies these problems by recognising the uncertainty of parameter estimates 
and by incorporating a behavioural error specification which allows for the possibility 
that subjects make mistakes in their discounting choices. 
 
 
V. STATISTICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
The statistical method I employ is direct estimation by maximum likelihood of a 
structural model of a latent choice process. The latent choice process in question is 
captured by the various discounting models discussed earlier. These models provide 
the structure necessary to estimate people’s time preferences using their choice data. 
One of the major benefits of the maximum likelihood approach is that it uses all of the 
available information which the participants’ data impart to estimate the discounting 
parameters and the precision of these estimates. Following Andersen, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström (2008), I review the basic logic of the estimation strategy below, 
focussing on the canonical case of the E model. I will then briefly discuss the 
straightforward extension to the other discounting models. 
 
                                                
25 As discussed previously, interval data is analysed appropriately using interval regression methods. 
For a discussion of this point, in the context of experimental studies of choice under risk, consult 
Harrison and Rutström (2008, §2.1) 
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Under the E model, δ is the discounting parameter which equalises the utility of 
income received at time t with the utility of income received at time t + τ: 
 
 [1 / (1 + δ)t]U(yt) = [1 / (1 + δ)t+τ]U(yt+τ) (10)  
 
for some utility function U(·). In the KPB task, the SS reward is available 
immediately, so (10) simplifies to: 
 
 U(y0) = [1 / (1 + δ)τ]U(yτ) (11)  
 
Without data on risk attitudes, it is not possible to jointly estimate the curvature of the 
utility function U(·) and the discounting parameter δ but one can make parametric 
assumptions about the form and shape of U(·) and then estimate “profile likelihoods” 
to determine the optimal shape of U(·) given the data. This will be taken up in 
Appendix B but for what follows I will assume that U(·) is linear in income y so that 
(11) simplifies to: 
 
 y0 = [1 / (1 + δ)τ]yτ (12)  
 
Note that y0 in (12) represents the SS reward in the KPB task whereas yτ represents 
the LL reward in this task. Thus, δ is the discounting parameter which equalises the 
value of the SS and LL rewards under the assumptions of the E model and linear 
utility. Stated another way, the left hand side (LHS) of (12) represents the present 
value (PV) of the SS reward: 
 
 PVSS = y0 (13)  
 
The right hand side (RHS) of (12) represents the PV of the LL reward: 
 
 PVLL = [1 / (1 + δ)τ]yτ (14)  
 
To determine the value of δ, the PV of the SS and LL rewards are calculated for an 
initial estimate of δ and the index below is formed:  
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 ∇PV = PVSS – PVLL (15)  
 
Note that this is a latent index, based on latent preferences, which captures the 
difference in present values of the two rewards presented to subjects. This index is 
then linked to the subjects’ observed choices using the cumulative logistic distribution 
function Λ(∇PV). This function takes any argument (∇PV) between ±∞ and 
transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. Thus, we have the so-called “logit” link 
function: 
 
 Pr(Choose SS reward) = Λ(∇PV) (16)  
 
The latent index in (15) is linked to subjects’ observed choices by specifying that the 
SS reward is chosen when Λ(∇PV) > ½, which is precisely what (16) tells us. To see 
this note that if PVSS = PVLL then ∇PV = 0. Plugging 0 into the cumulative logistic 
distribution function (i.e., Λ(0)) yields a value of 0.5. In other words, when the PV of 
the SS and LL rewards are equal, the probability of choosing the SS reward is 0.5 
(i.e., there is an equal chance of choosing the SS reward or the LL reward). By 
contrast, if ∇PV > 0 then Λ(∇PV) > 0.5 (i.e., the probability of selecting the SS 
reward is greater than 0.5 when its PV exceeds the PV of the LL reward) and if ∇PV 
< 0 then Λ(∇PV) < 0.5 (i.e., the probability of selecting the SS reward is less than 0.5 
when its PV is less than the PV of the LL reward). 
 
Thus, the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the E model being true, 
depends on the estimates of δ given the statistical model above and the choices of 
subjects in the discounting task. The conditional log-likelihood of the model is: 
 
 ln Li(δ; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Λ(∇PV) × I( zi = 1)) + (ln (1 - Λ(∇PV)) × I( zi = 0))], (17)  
 
where I(·) is the indicator function, zi = 1(0) denotes the choice of the SS (LL) reward 




One of the advantages of structural maximum likelihood estimation is that it is a 
straightforward extension to make the parameter of interest, the discounting parameter 
δ, a linear function of individual characteristics. In this case, one estimates δ = δ0 + 
δβ×X, where δ0 is a fixed parameter and δβ is a coefficient vector linked to the variable 
vector X of individual characteristics. If no individual characteristics are included in 
the model we estimate δ = δ0, which is the discounting parameter estimated at the 
level of the sample without taking into account observed, individual heterogeneity 
(i.e., assuming homogenous preferences). Note that every estimate of δ includes a 
standard error which reflects our ignorance and uncertainty as to the “true” value of δ. 
This stands in stark contrast to the deterministic method of calculating a person’s 
discounting parameter which Kirby and Maraković (1996) and KPB employ. 
 
Another important extension to the simple model defined above is to allow for some 
errors on the part of subjects when they make choices between the SS and LL 
rewards. This error could be as simple as a “tremble,” where, say, a subject wants to 
choose the SS reward but mistakenly selects the LL reward instead. A different 
behavioural error specification introduced by Fechner (1966) uses the latent index: 
 
 ∇PV = (PVSS - PVLL) / µ, (18)  
 
rather than (15). Note how different values of µ affect our ∇PV index. As µ → 0 our 
specification collapses to a deterministic choice model where the choice is strictly 
determined by the PV of the two rewards. However, as µ → ∞, ∇PV → 0, and a 
subject’s choice is essentially random (i.e., the probability of selecting either reward 
is 0.5). When µ = 1 we are back to specification (15), so the Fechner error term is a 
parameter which basically flattens the logit link function as its value increases. In this 
chapter I will estimate the E model with and without the Fechner error term to 
highlight the importance of incorporating it; I will always include the error term in the 
other discounting models. Note that by using a behavioural error term one formally 
accommodates subjects’ inconsistent choices on the KPB task, rather than letting this 
inconsistency be soaked up by the standard errors on the discounting parameter 
estimates. Thus, the Fechner error term allows one to model behavioural errors 
directly instead of capturing these errors as part of a statistical error term. 
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Fortunately it is a simple matter to incorporate other discounting models in this 
statistical framework. Assuming linear utility, one simply replaces the E model’s 
discount factor in (12) with the discount factors for the other specifications. In the 
case of the WB model, for example, (12) becomes: 
 
 y0 = [exp(-δτ(1/β))]yτ (19)  
 
One then adjusts (13) and (14) appropriately to incorporate this new expression, and 





The primary focus of this chapter is to explore differences in discounting behaviour 
between smokers and non-smokers when applying the appropriate statistical tools to 
the data generated by the KPB discounting task. The second aim of this chapter is to 
highlight the methodological issues involved in drawing accurate inferences about the 
smoking-discounting relationship. 
 
A. Baseline Estimates 
 
The final columns of Table III show the fraction of smokers and non-smokers26 who 
selected the LL reward for each choice question. As is evident, the fraction of non-
smokers selecting the LL reward is greater than the fraction of smokers selecting the 
LL reward for every question other than number 27, which is in the second last row of 
the table, where the fractions are equal. This provides preliminary evidence of 
differences in the discounting behaviour of smokers and non-smokers. Before any 
definitive conclusions are reached though, the data must be subjected to appropriate 
statistical analysis. 
 
                                                
26 As discussed previously, non-smokers include both never-smokers and ex-smokers. In subsequent 
analyses I distinguish between never-smokers and ex-smokers. 
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Table IV presents baseline estimates of the E, H, QH, and WB discounting models. 
Note that the results pool choices across all individuals, which means I am estimating 
the value of δ0 for the E and H models, and δ0 and β0 in the case of the QH and WB 
models, for the sample as a whole. In other words, I am assuming homogenous 
preferences. Note further that the results account for clustering at the individual level 
which adjusts the standard errors of the estimates to take into account the fact that 
each respondent made multiple choices across 27 questions. Finally, note that I have 
estimated daily discount rates so as to conform to the bulk of studies in the smoking-
discounting literature, and due to a puzzling inferential issue which I investigate in 
Appendix A. 
 
TABLE IV: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Exponential Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
 No error Fechner error Fechner error Fechner error Fechner error 
Discounting 
parameter (δ) 0.00510*** 0.00955*** 0.01283*** 0.00432*** 0.02160*** 
 
(0.00008) (0.00044) (0.00066) (0.00037) (0.00441) 
Discounting 
parameter (β) 
   
0.80607*** 1.26329*** 




15.04102*** 13.54160*** 10.85905*** 13.55935*** 
    (0.38471) (0.33044) (0.40535) (0.49900) 
N 32535 32535 32535 32535 32535 
log-likelihood -87637.774 -14722.578 -14737.615 -14694.619 -14714.908 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The E model results are sensible and fall well within the range of estimates implied by 
the questions on the task: 0.00016 - 0.16 (see Table III). Note that the estimate of the 
discounting parameter δ is almost twice as large when we incorporate the Fechner 
error term in the model. Note further that the estimate of the error term µ is large and 
statistically significant. Finally, the log-likelihood of the model which includes the 
Fechner error term is far higher than the log-likelihood of the model which does not. 
These results highlight the importance of incorporating a behavioural error 
specification when estimating models of discounting behaviour and thus, every 
subsequent analysis includes this error term.  
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The estimate of δ in the H model also falls well within the range of estimates implied 
by the task: 0.00016 – 0.25. The log-likelihood of the H model is less than the log-
likelihood of the E model, which provides preliminary evidence that the E model 
better characterises these data. This is an important finding given that 22 of the 
studies in Table I just assumed that discounting was hyperbolic and did not estimate 
the E model at all. This result, that E outperforms H, will be subjected to closer 
scrutiny later when I conduct non-nested model selection tests and estimate mixture 
models of discounting behaviour. 
 
The QH results reveal significant evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and, thus, 
declining discount rates. Specifically, the estimate of β = 0.806 is less than 1 at any 
standard level of significance (p < 0.001). The estimate of δ = 0.004 is approximately 
half the estimate of δ in the E model, which suggests that part of the discounting of 
future rewards is attributable to a present-bias in decision making. Finally, the log-
likelihood for the QH model is the highest of all the models that were estimated, 
which suggests that it provides the best fit to these data. 
 
The WB results suggest that subjective time perception plays an important role in 
discounting behaviour. The estimate of β = 1.263, which is significantly greater than 1 
(p < 0.01), implies that subjects tend to perceive time as “slowing down” and this 
generates declining discount rates over time. Thus, both the QH and WB results 
suggest that discount rates decline over time which, under the assumption of an 
additively-separable intertemporal utility function, raises the spectre of time-
inconsistent choices. However, the two models provide competing explanations for 
time inconsistency: a present-bias in the case of the QH model and subjective time 




B. Non-Nested Model Selection Tests 
 
A comparison of the E, H, QH, and WB models’ log-likelihoods is a somewhat crude 
measure of their ability to explain the data. The hypothesis that one model better 
characterises the data than another can be tested formally using Vuong (1989) and 
Clarke (2007) non-nested model selection tests.27 
 
Vuong (1989) developed a model selection test for non-nested models which can be 
used to adjudicate between the various discounting functions. The Vuong (1989) test 
uses the likelihoods for each observation under each model and forms the ratio of 
these values. Thus, for observation i one forms the ratio of the likelihood from, say, 
the E model with the likelihood from the H model. One then calculates the natural 
logarithm of this ratio and tests whether the expected value of these log-ratios is zero 
over the entire sample. This produces a test statistic which is normally distributed 
under fairly general conditions and allows one therefore to compare the models and 
determine which model better characterises the data. 
 
Clarke (2007) developed an alternative test for non-nested model selection. He 
showed that this test is asymptotically more efficient and has greater power in 
discriminating between models than the Vuong (1989) test when the distribution of 
the individual log-ratios is highly peaked. In other words, when the distribution of 
these log-ratios is leptokurtic28, the Clarke (2007) test is superior, from both statistical 
efficiency and power perspectives, to the Vuong (1989) test. 
 
Figure I plots the distribution of the individual log-ratios, with a normal density 
overlay, for the six discounting model comparisons. The distribution of these log-
ratios is leptokurtic which suggests that the Clarke (2007) test is more appropriate for 
these data. The Clarke (2007) test yields a test statistic based on the binomial 
distribution which must be compared to a critical value to determine which model, in 
                                                
27 The QH and WB models are nested in the E model, but not in each other. We know from earlier that 
if β = 1 in either the QH or WB models, these models collapse to the E model. So an obvious test of 
whether discounting is, say, E or WB is to test whether β = 1 in the WB model, as I did earlier. 
Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to conduct formal model selection tests even if models are nested in 
each other, as will become clear later. 
28 The normal distribution is the quintessential mesokurtic distribution. A distribution which has 
positive excess kurtosis (i.e., a highly peaked distribution) is leptokurtic. 
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a pairwise comparison, receives the most support in the data. A Clarke (2007) test 
comparing the E and H models yields a test statistic of 17737, which is above the 
critical value of 16267.5, implying that the E model better characterises the data (p < 
0.001). This result provides formal confirmation of the earlier finding that the E 
model provides a better fit to these data than the H model, which was based on a 
comparison of their log-likelihoods. To my knowledge, this is the first valid statistical 




A Clarke (2007) test comparing the E and QH models finds in favour of the QH 
model (p < 0.001) whereas the test comparing the E and WB models finds in favour 
of the E model (p < 0.001). This last result, that E outperforms WB, is revealing 
because when estimating the WB model previously we could easily reject the 
hypothesis that β = 1. Thus, even though there was significant evidence of subjective   
time perception in the WB model, the E model better characterises the data, at least 
according to the Clarke (2007) test. This highlights the value of conducting model 































Figure I: Distribution of individual log-ratios
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parameter test or a comparison of the models’ log-likelihoods29; the log-likelihood of 
the WB model was higher than the E model.  
 
A Clarke (2007) test comparing the H and QH models suggests that the H model finds 
more support in the data (p < 0.001) and the test of the H and WB models also finds 
in favour of the H model (p < 0.001). Finally, a Clarke (2007) test of the QH and WB 
models suggests that the QH model better characterises the data (p < 0.001). The 
preceding results show quite clearly that the WB model has the least support in the 
data because the E, H, and QH models outperform it on the Clarke (2007) test. 
Finding a transitive ranking of the other discounting models though, is not possible. 
We found that the E model outperforms H, that H outperforms QH, but that QH 
outperforms E. This yields an intransitive or cyclic ranking: E > H > QH > E. Thus, 
although the Clarke (2007) test provides a formal method for comparing models it is 
not immune to cyclical rankings which clearly makes it difficult to claim that one 
model is the obvious winner in terms of goodness of fit. 
 
C. Smoking and Discounting Behaviour 
 
To analyse the link between smoking and discounting behaviour, one can make the 
parameters of interest in the four discounting models a linear function of smoking 
status. By estimating these models one captures the “total effect” of smoking status on 
discounting behaviour without controlling for any potential differences between 
smokers and non-smokers, like age, education, and gender, and any potential 
differences between the UCLA and USC study sites. In other words, these models 
provide a first pass at exploring this relationship. 
 
Table V presents the results from the E, H, QH, and WB models where the 
discounting parameters are estimated as a linear function of smoking status. In the E 
model, current smokers discount significantly more heavily than both never-smokers 
(p < 0.01), the omitted base category, and ex-smokers (p < 0.01). To see the economic 
significance of this result, note that the coefficient estimate for current smokers of 
0.006 means that they have a daily discount rate approximately 0.5% higher than 
                                                
29 As I will discuss later, there is also little value in making strong claims about the superiority of one 
model over another when multiple decision-making processes may be present in the data. 
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never-smokers. Note that there is no significant difference in the discounting 
behaviour of ex-smokers and never-smokers, which echoes the results of BOM and 
Sweitzer et al. (2008). 
 
TABLE V: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
SMOKING TOTAL EFFECT 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Smoker: past 0.00064 0.00114 -0.00025 0.01004 
 
(0.00103) (0.00164) (0.00068) (0.01301) 
Smoker: present 0.00585*** 0.00887*** 0.00225** 0.01191 
 
(0.00168) (0.00261) (0.00112) (0.01291) 
Constant 0.00882*** 0.01168*** 0.00420*** 0.01857*** 
 
(0.00048) (0.00071) (0.00041) (0.00444) 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    Smoker: past 
  
-0.03434 0.14817 










   
(0.01641) (0.08854) 
Error (µ) 
    Constant 14.91054*** 13.42915*** 10.85760*** 13.46171*** 
  (0.37865) (0.32563) (0.40395) (0.49746) 
N 32535 32535 32535 32535 
log-likelihood -14667.145 -14683.557 -14637.089 -14658.484 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In the H model, current smokers discount significantly more heavily than never-
smokers (p < 0.01) and ex-smokers (p < 0.01) but there is no significant difference 
between ex-smokers and never-smokers. In the QH model, the estimate of δ, 
sometimes referred to as the “long-term discount rate,” is significantly higher for 
current smokers than never-smokers (p < 0.05) and ex-smokers (p < 0.05). The 
estimate of β though, which reflects a present-bias, does not differ significantly 
among current smokers, never-smokers and ex-smokers. Finally, in the WB model, 
there are no significant differences between current smokers, never-smokers, and ex-
smokers in the estimate of δ. Similarly, there are no significant differences in 
subjective time perception (i.e., in the estimate of β) between these groups. However, 
a test of the joint hypothesis that current smoking status has no effect on discounting 
across both equations can be rejected (p = 0.015). These results imply that the effect 
of current smoking status in the WB model cannot be confined to particular parameter 
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estimates but, rather, that current smoking status has a statistically significant effect 
on the model as a whole. 
 
These results provide a simplistic - in the sense that the models only include the 
smoking status covariate - but nuanced view of the relationship between smoking and 
discounting behaviour. While the estimate of δ is significantly higher among current 
smokers than never-smokers and ex-smokers in the E, H, and QH models, this is not 
the case in the WB model. Furthermore, current smokers do not differ significantly 
from never-smokers and ex-smokers in terms of present-bias in the QH model, nor 
subjective time perception in the WB model. Clearly these results are only 
preliminary because we need to control for a number of factors which may mediate 
the relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour.  
 
Table VI presents the results from the E, H, QH, and WB models that take into 
account observed, individual heterogeneity by conditioning the discounting parameter 
estimates on a set of covariates and task parameters. Specifically, the models include 
the demographic variables from Table II as well as a fixed effect dummy variable for 
study site and two dummy variables for LL reward size. In addition, the models 
incorporate heteroskedasticity by making the Fechner error term a linear function of 
study site30 and the subject’s decision time on each question in the task. 31 
 
In the E model, current smokers discount significantly more heavily than never-
smokers (p < 0.05), even after controlling for other potential differences between 
these groups. However, a Wald test of the hypothesis that current smokers discount 
more heavily than ex-smokers fails to reach significance (p = 0.103). There is also 
evidence of a magnitude effect in discounting behaviour in that higher LL reward 
sizes are associated with significantly lower discounting. Years of education has a 
negative impact on discounting whereas age and Hispanic ethnicity tend to increase 
                                                
30 As discussed previously, the UCLA and USC study sites used different payment schemes for the 
discounting task. In addition, the study sites employed different researchers. It is natural, therefore, to 
allow for heteroskedasticity by study site. 
31 Hey (1995) found that a subject’s decision time on each question of a risk preference task was 
negatively and significantly associated with the estimate of a Fechner error term. In other words, 
people who spent longer on each question in the task made fewer behavioural errors than people who 
went through each question at a faster pace. I use the natural logarithm of decision time because this 
variable was measured in milliseconds and, thus, it has an enormous range. 
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the discounting of delayed rewards. Finally, the USC study site is associated with 
significantly fewer behavioural errors; this is not surprising given that subjects were 
incentivised at this site. 
 
TABLE VI: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HETEROSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Exponential Hyperbolic 
 Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.00007* 0.00004 0.00012** 0.00006 
Hispanic 0.00121* 0.00071 0.00222** 0.00109 
Male 0.00017 0.00056 0.00027 0.0008 
Years of education -0.00051*** 0.00015 -0.00080*** 0.00019 
Smoker: past 0.00033 0.00074 0.00057 0.00109 
Smoker: present 0.00278** 0.00136 0.00418** 0.00211 
LL size: medium -0.01327*** 0.00069 -0.01925*** 0.00117 
LL size: large -0.01697*** 0.00084 -0.02450*** 0.00141 
USC sample 0.00122 0.00118 0.0017 0.0017 
Constant 0.02804*** 0.00262 0.03971*** 0.00358 
Error (µ) 
    Decision time (ln) -0.27509 0.35758 -0.20374 0.32448 
USC sample -1.88827** 0.9091 -1.93433** 0.81023 




 log-likelihood -14064.931   -14121.63   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The pattern of results in the H model is qualitatively identical to the E model. 
Specifically, current smokers discount significantly more than never-smokers (p < 
0.05) but not ex-smokers (p = 0.116). LL reward size and years of education have a 
negative impact on discounting whereas age and Hispanic ethnicity tend to increase 
discounting. The USC study site is also associated with fewer behavioural errors. 
 
In the QH model, with a full set of covariates, smoking status is not significantly 
associated with the long-term discount rate δ nor the extent of present-bias β. The 
point estimates are in the expected direction (i.e., positive for δ signifying higher 
long-term discounting, and negative for β signifying more present-bias) but they fail 
to reach significance. Furthermore, a test of the joint hypothesis that smoking has no 
effect on discounting across both equations, cannot be rejected (p = 0.189).  
 
In the WB model, by contrast, the estimate of δ is significantly higher among current 
smokers than never-smokers (p < 0.001) and ex-smokers (p < 0.01). In addition, the 
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estimate of β is significantly higher among current smokers than never-smokers (p < 
0.001) and ex-smokers (p < 0.01). Thus, current smokers in the WB model discount 
the future more heavily than never-smokers and ex-smokers and current smokers are 
more likely to perceive time as “slowing down” than never-smokers and ex-smokers. 
 
TABLE VI: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES (CONTINUED) 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HETEROSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
 Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age -0.00006*** 0.00002 -0.00013*** 0.00004 
Hispanic -0.00118** 0.00047 0.04797*** 0.01214 
Male 0.00031 0.0004 0.00152 0.00124 
Years of education 0.00024** 0.00011 0.00019*** 0.00007 
Smoker: past 0.00008 0.00055 0.00397 0.0068 
Smoker: present 0.00083 0.00067 0.06284*** 0.01751 
LL size: medium -0.03089*** 0.00255 0.07314*** 0.02294 
LL size: large -0.03395*** 0.00268 0.19204*** 0.0454 
USC sample -0.00194*** 0.00057 0.00031 0.00178 
Constant 0.03475*** 0.0035 0.00360** 0.00169 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    Age -0.00518*** 0.0013 -0.00630*** 0.00154 
Hispanic -0.10241*** 0.0249 0.64905*** 0.11729 
Male 0.0141 0.02286 0.03721 0.04399 
Years of education 0.02881*** 0.00617 0.03523*** 0.00916 
Smoker: past -0.00827 0.03327 0.09659 0.14436 
Smoker: present -0.0056 0.0354 0.68462*** 0.12416 
LL size: medium -0.59887*** 0.06211 1.53727*** 0.35252 
LL size: large -0.64385*** 0.06668 6.12850** 2.67538 
USC sample -0.12031*** 0.03149 -0.0498 0.05762 
Constant 1.20748*** 0.1384 0.31942** 0.14713 
Error (µ) 
    Decision time (ln) -0.16724 0.26206 -0.2609 0.24016 
USC sample -3.03018*** 0.66895 -1.60585*** 0.55084 




 log-likelihood -13582.172 
 
-13764.512 
 Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In sum, the preceding results provide a complex perspective on the relationship 
between smoking and discounting behaviour. In the E, H, and WB models, current 
smokers tend to discount the future more heavily than never-smokers, but current 
smokers only discount more heavily than ex-smokers in the WB model. Current 
smokers are also more likely to perceive time as “slowing down” in the WB model 
than ex-smokers and never-smokers. By contrast, there are no significant differences 
between current smokers, ex-smokers, and never-smokers in the QH model.  
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D. Mixture Models of Discounting Behaviour 
 
The analyses conducted thus far have been based on the implicit assumption that the 
observations are produced by only one DGP (i.e., E, H, QH, or WB) when more may 
be present in the data. In other words, the E model may explain some discounting 
choices better than the H model whereas the H model may explain other choices 
better than the E model. The assumption that only one DGP characterises all of the 
data, clearly precludes such a possibility. 
 
Finite mixture models32 allow two or more DGPs to account for the data and also 
provide a measure of the proportion of the data which is explained by each process. In 
the current context, one can estimate a mixture model of, say, the E and H discounting 
functions and then ask the data to determine how much support each function has. To 
do so one specifies a “grand likelihood” function which is just a probability-weighted 
average of the likelihoods of the two models. 
 
Letting πE represent the probability that the E model is correct, and πH = (1 – πE) the 
probability that the H model is correct, the grand likelihood is the probability-
weighted average of the two conditional likelihoods LE and LH for the E and H 
models, respectively. Thus, the likelihood for the mixture model is given by: 
 
 ln Li(δE, δH, µ, κ; z, X) = Σi ln [(πE × LE) + (πH × LH)] (20)  
 
where κ is a parameter which defines the log odds of the probability of the E model: 
πE = 1 / (1 + exp(κ)). Note that this transformation allows the parameter κ to take on 
any value during the maximisation process but it constrains the probabilities πE and πH 
to lie within the unit interval. The grand likelihood in (20) is maximised to estimate 
the parameters of each model and the weight accorded to each model in the data. 
 
                                                
32 For detailed discussions of mixture models consult McLachlan and Peel (2000), Harrison and 
Rutström (2009), and Conte, Hey and Moffat (2011). 
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Table VII presents estimates of the mixture model of the E and H discounting 
functions, assuming homogenous preferences and homoskedastic errors. 33  The 
estimate of πE = 0.537 implies that the E model accounts for approximately 54% of 
the choices in the data; the H model therefore accounts for roughly 46% of the 
choices. A hypothesis test that πE = 0.5 cannot be rejected at any regular level of 
significance (p = 0.204 as noted in the table).34 Thus, the E and H discounting models 
both account for approximately half of the choices in the dataset. This result implies 
that it is a mistake to assume that only one DGP characterises the data. 
 
TABLE VII: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.00317*** 0.00021 <0.001 0.00277 0.00357 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.53692*** 0.02909 <0.001 0.4799 0.59394 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.06232*** 0.00738 <0.001 0.04784 0.07679 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.46308*** 0.02909 <0.001 0.40606 0.5201 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 8.37233*** 0.17598 <0.001 8.02742 8.71724 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14427.64     
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value = 0.20440 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
In addition, it suggests that model selection tests are fraught with difficulty because 
each model has to account for all the data. To use an analogy, assuming that the E or 
H model accounts for every discounting choice is like embarking on a DIY project 
                                                
33 Appendix C contains the results from all of the two process mixture models that can be estimated 
from the four discounting models used in this chapter. I only present the results from the E and H 
mixture model in this section because these are the most commonly used discounting functions in the 
addiction literature and they are representative of the results from the other mixture models.  
34 The mixture probabilities in all of the mixture models estimated in Appendix C are close to 0.5. 
However, in the E and QH mixture model, the QH mixture probability is significantly greater than 0.5 
(p < 0.01). Similarly, in the H and QH mixture model, the QH mixture probability is significantly 
greater than 0.5 (p < 0.05). 
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armed only with a hammer. If a model selection test favours the E model over the H 
model, all that this tells us is that the E model is better at explaining all the data. This 
is similar to the finding that a hammer is more useful than a wrench for most DIY 
jobs. But if there are multiple DGPs then we should respect this feature of the data 
and estimate a mixture of these processes, just like one should use a wrench to tighten 
a bolt and a hammer to knock in a nail. 
 
The mixture model in Table VII also shows how discounting parameter estimates are 
distorted when the E or H models have to account for all the data. Figure II plots the 
discounting parameter estimates from the E and H models in Table IV (i.e., when they 
are assumed to account for all the data) and the discounting parameter estimates from 




In Model 2 of Table IV, where the E model was assumed to be the sole DGP, the 
estimate of δE = 0.0096. In the mixture model, the estimate of δE, which I refer to as 
δEmix in Table VII and Figure II, is far lower at 0.0032. This implies that when one 
tries to make all the data fit the E model, one inflates the estimate of the discounting 
parameter. Similarly, in Model 3 of Table IV, where the H model was assumed to be 
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Figure II: Exponential and hyperbolic discount factors
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the sole DGP, the estimate of δH = 0.0128. In the mixture model in Table VII, the 
estimate of δHmix is far higher at 0.0623. Thus, by assuming one DGP we are 
averaging the estimates that we derive when allowing multiple DGPs to characterise 
the data. 
 
Finally, notice that the estimate of the Fechner error term µ = 8.372 in the mixture 
model in Table VII is far lower than the estimates of µ for the E and H models in 
Table IV. Thus, what was being captured as subject errors in decision making when 
estimating the E and H models separately is partly the product of forcing the data to 
fit one DGP. 
 
Mixture models also allow one to explore the hypothesis that current smokers are 
more prone to time inconsistency than ex-smokers and never-smokers, under the 
assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal utility function, by making the 
mixture probability a function of observable characteristics and task parameters. 
Recall that with an additively-separable intertemporal utility function the E model 
implies time-consistent preferences whereas the H model may yield time-inconsistent 
choices. If one finds that current smokers are more likely to discount according to the 
H model as opposed to the E model, this implies that they may be more prone to time 
inconsistency.  
 
Table VIII presents estimates of the mixture model of the E and H discounting 
functions with a heterogenous mixture probability, heterogenous preferences, and 
heteroskedastic errors. The results show that there are no significant differences in the 
likelihood that current smokers, ex-smokers and never-smokers discount according to 
the E model. Thus, under the assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal 
utility function, current smokers are no more prone to time inconsistency than ex-
smokers and never-smokers. However, large LL rewards and more years of education 
increase the likelihood of discounting according to the E model, and thus decrease the 
likelihood of discounting according to the H model. By contrast, people who took part 





TABLE VIII: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES  
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND MIXTURE PROBABILITY AND 
HETEROSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
Discounting parameter (δEmix) 
     Age -0.00002 0.00002 0.26122 -0.00006 0.00002 
Hispanic -0.00049 0.00039 0.20272 -0.00125 0.00027 
Male 0.00021 0.00034 0.52564 -0.00045 0.00087 
Years of education 0.00007 0.00008 0.39723 -0.00009 0.00023 
Smoker: past 0.00018 0.00044 0.67261 -0.00067 0.00104 
Smoker: present 0.00110* 0.00058 0.05813 -0.00004 0.00225 
LL size: medium -0.01484*** 0.00148 0.00000 -0.01774 -0.01194 
LL size: large -0.01487*** 0.00126 0.00000 -0.01734 -0.01241 
USC sample -0.00030 0.00056 0.58801 -0.00141 0.00080 
Constant 0.01773*** 0.00201 0.00000 0.01380 0.02166 
Discounting parameter (δHmix) 
     Age 0.00051 0.00036 0.15314 -0.00019 0.00121 
Hispanic 0.01100* 0.00592 0.06300 -0.00060 0.02260 
Male 0.00158 0.00584 0.78628 -0.00985 0.01302 
Years of education -0.00363*** 0.00089 0.00005 -0.00538 -0.00188 
Smoker: past 0.00619 0.00810 0.44452 -0.00968 0.02207 
Smoker: present 0.01756 0.01190 0.13993 -0.00576 0.04088 
LL size: medium 0.00671* 0.00355 0.05883 -0.00025 0.01366 
LL size: large 0.08974*** 0.01725 0.00000 0.05593 0.12356 
USC sample 0.00674 0.00885 0.44647 -0.01061 0.02408 
Constant 0.06166*** 0.01562 0.00008 0.03104 0.09228 
Mixture probability (πE) 
     Age -0.00498 0.00313 0.11148 -0.01111 0.00115 
Hispanic -0.08435 0.05209 0.10537 -0.18644 0.01774 
Male 0.02903 0.03526 0.41038 -0.04008 0.09814 
Years of education 0.03239*** 0.00647 0.00000 0.01972 0.04507 
Smoker: past 0.00888 0.04498 0.84350 -0.07928 0.09704 
Smoker: present 0.03490 0.04750 0.46247 -0.05819 0.12799 
LL size: medium -0.09518 0.08167 0.24384 -0.25526 0.06489 
LL size: large 0.15659** 0.06940 0.02405 0.02057 0.29261 
USC sample -0.08818* 0.05207 0.09038 -0.19024 0.01388 
Constant 0.26554 0.16868 0.11544 -0.06507 0.59615 
Error (µ) 
     Decision time (ln) -0.42812 0.27743 0.12279 -0.97187 0.11563 
USC sample -2.19142*** 0.57184 0.00013 -3.31221 -1.07064 
Constant 13.00284*** 2.22874 0.00000 8.63459 17.37110 
N 32508 
    log-likelihood -13652.552         
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In sum, the results from the mixture model analyses suggest that it is mistaken to 
assume that only one model of discounting behaviour accurately characterises all 
discounting choices by all subjects on the KPB task. In other words, by forcing the 
data to conform to one DGP one may draw incorrect inferences about the type and 
extent of discounting behaviour. Finally, the results suggest that, under the 
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assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal utility function, current smokers 
are no more prone to time inconsistency than ex-smokers and never-smokers. 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter provided a detailed summary of the studies which have been conducted 
to explore the relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour. This review 
highlighted a number of patterns in the literature: 1) most of the studies have been 
conducted in the US; 2) approximately half of the studies used hypothetical rewards; 
3) there was a roughly equal split between choice and titration elicitation mechanisms; 
4) every study except HLR used a two-step approach to data analysis; 5) a majority of 
studies assumed hyperbolic discounting; 6) the subject pools, although somewhat 
small, were fairly representative of the general population; and 7) the vast majority of 
studies found a positive and significant relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. 
 
I sought to replicate this finding of a positive and significant relationship between 
smoking and discounting behaviour by using two relatively large datasets, four 
distinct discounting models, and a statistical framework which respects the 
process(es) generating the data.  
 
The baseline estimates presented in Section VI highlighted the importance of 
incorporating a behavioural error specification to account for subjects’ inconsistent 
choices, rather than assume them away, on the KPB discounting task. Thus, this error 
specification was included in all subsequent analyses. A comparison of the models’ 
log-likelihoods provided preliminary evidence that the E model had more support in 
the data than the H model. This is a striking finding given that the bulk of studies in 
this literature assume hyperbolic discounting. Finally, the QH and WB model 
estimates showed that discount rates decline over time, thereby raising the spectre of 
time-inconsistent choice behaviour under the assumption of an additively-separable 
intertemporal utility function. 
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To formally adjudicate between the discounting models, Clarke (2007) non-nested 
model selection tests were conducted. These tests confirmed that the E model better 
characterised the discounting data than the H model. In addition, I found that the WB 
model had the least support in the data but that it was not possible to find a transitive 
ranking of the remaining specifications.  
 
The relationship between smoking and discounting was explored in two ways. The 
first simply added a smoking status covariate to the discounting models so as to 
capture the “total effect” of smoking. In the E and H models I found that current 
smokers discounted significantly more than both ex-smokers and never-smokers. In 
the QH model, the long-term discount rate δ was significantly higher among current 
smokers than both ex-smokers and never-smokers but there were no significant 
differences between these groups in terms of present-bias (i.e., the estimate of β). 
Finally, in the WB model, there were no significant differences between current 
smokers, ex-smokers, and never-smokers in the separate estimates of β and δ, but the 
estimates of β and δ were jointly significant for current smokers. 
 
The second approach to exploring this relationship was to include a full set of 
covariates and task parameters in the models. In so doing, the focus switched to the 
“marginal effect” of smoking, over and above what was accounted for by other 
observable individual characteristics. In the E and H models, current smokers 
discounted significantly more than never-smokers. In the QH model, by contrast, 
there were no significant differences in the estimates of β and δ, either individually or 
jointly, across the smoking status groups. Finally, in the WB model, the estimate of δ 
was significantly higher for current smokers than both never-smokers and ex-
smokers. Furthermore, current smokers were significantly more likely to perceive 
time as slowing down than both never-smokers and ex-smokers. 
 
The final set of statistical analyses was the estimation of mixture models of the 
different discounting specifications. These models showed that multiple decision 
processes characterise the discounting of delayed rewards and that it is a mistake to 
force all discounting choices to fit one particular model. In addition, the models 
allowed me to explore the hypothesis that smokers are more prone to time 
inconsistency than non-smokers, under the assumption of an additively-separable 
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intertemporal utility function, by making the mixture probability a function of 
smoking status. No significant differences were found in the extent to which smokers, 
never-smokers, and ex-smokers discount hyperbolically. 
 
This research makes a number of contributions to the literature. This is the first study 
of the smoking-discounting relationship which estimates four distinct models of 
discounting behaviour. These estimates were produced using a statistical framework 
which recognises, and takes into account, the uncertainty of discounting parameter 
estimates and the potential for subject errors in decision making (i.e., this framework 
makes it possible to draw accurate statistical inferences). That the smoking-
discounting relationship was robust to different discounting models lends further 
credence to the hypothesis that smokers discount the future more heavily than non-
smokers. 
 
This was also the first study in this literature to provide a valid statistical test of 
whether the E or H models better characterise all of the discounting data. According 
to the Clarke (2007) test, the E model outperformed the H model in this dataset, and 
this result should give researchers pause when deciding whether to assume hyperbolic 
discounting. 
 
The two samples used in the analyses were relatively large and subjects were 
carefully screened to ensure that they did not suffer from other mental disorders 
which may have biased the smoking-discounting results. While careful screening is 
common in this literature (e.g., Epstein et al. (2003), Dallery and Raiff (2007), 
Sweitzer et al. (2008)), this is the largest sample (N = 1205) where potential 
participants were screened for a wide range of mental disorders. 
 
Perhaps the most important result in this chapter, which echoes the findings of HLR 
and Coller, Harrison and Rutström (2012), is that multiple decision processes 
characterise discounting data and that one should adopt statistical models which can 
accommodate this. This turns the argument about the superiority of E or H into one 
which focuses on the relative contributions of each model to the explanation of 
discounting behaviour. It also allows one to determine whether different subsamples 
are more or less likely to discount according to the E or H specifications. 
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This research also suffers from a number of shortcomings. That only a small subset 
(N = 174) of the people in this study were incentivised, and only probabilistically, 
means that, to a large extent, I am drawing inferences about the choices people think 
they would make when faced with those contingencies, or the choices they think the 
experimenter wants them to make, rather than the choices they made and experienced. 
 
In addition, the KPB discounting task is a relatively blunt instrument for making 
precise inferences about discounting behaviour. A task employing more choices, 
different reward magnitudes, a larger range of implied interest rates, and front end 
delays to the SS reward, would lend itself more to the precise estimation of 
discounting parameters. 
 
Finally, the lack of a risk preference task in these studies makes it difficult to estimate 
discounting parameters jointly with the curvature of the utility function. As HLR 
show, this can be very important for the conclusions that one draws. In Appendix B I 
discuss a parametric approach to this problem which involves the estimation of 
“profile likelihoods.” 
 
These issues notwithstanding, this chapter can serve as a constructive guide to 
researchers who want to explore the relationship between smoking and discounting 
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The probability discounting (PD) model is a popular framework for investigating 
people’s instantaneous or atemporal attitudes toward risk1 in experimental settings 
(see Green and Myerson (2004), Madden and Bickel (2010) for reviews). It is 
particularly common in studies of addiction where delay discounting data is also often 
obtained (see, for example, Mitchell (1999), Richards, Zhang, Mitchell and de Wit 
(1999), Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004)). This model was developed in 
a series of three papers by Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon and Frankel (1986) (RLGF), 
Rachlin, Castrogiovanni and Cross (1987) (RCC), and Rachlin, Raineri and Cross 
(1991) (RRC). As its name suggests, PD draws its inspiration from models of 
temporal or delay discounting, where the delay to a reward is replaced with the odds 
against receiving a reward. This chapter explains the PD model in language familiar 
to decision theorists, statisticians and economists, it shows how the model relates to 
standard theories of choice under risk like expected utility theory, prospect theory, 
rank-dependent utility theory, and rank-dependent expected value theory, and it 
highlights some of the shortcomings of the PD approach. 
 
RLGF set themselves the task of translating Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) (KT) 
cognitive model of choice (i.e., prospect theory2) into a behavioural model of choice 
inspired by Herrnstein’s (1961) pioneering work on the “matching law”3 which relates 
behavioural outputs to environmental inputs. Prospect theory was developed to 
account for a number of purported anomalies in choice among lotteries4 that the 
canonical model of choice under risk (i.e., expected utility theory) allegedly cannot 
                                                
1 The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of both instantaneous and intertemporal risk 
preferences in the analysis of choice behaviour. However, as this thesis only empirically examines 
instantaneous risk preferences, all subsequent references to “risk preferences” refer to the instantaneous 
or atemporal variety, unless otherwise noted. 
2 Prospect theory has become one of the popular theories of choice under risk in addition to expected 
utility theory. This chapter will discuss prospect theory extensively, not to put it on a pedestal but 
rather to determine whether Rachlin and colleagues were able to develop a behavioural model of 
choice which indeed has the same features as prospect theory. 
3 Other early contributions to the literature on the matching law are Davenport (1962), Logan (1965), 
Chung (1965), Chung and Herrnstein (1967), and Herrnstein (1970). 
4 The terms “lottery,” “gamble,” and “prospect” refer to a probability distribution over outcomes and 
will be used interchangeably. 
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explain. It proposes that two phases take place during the choice process: an initial 
editing phase which typically yields a simpler representation of the gambles; and a 
subsequent evaluation phase where the edited gambles are evaluated and the one with 
the highest value is chosen. KT provide a descriptive explanation of the editing phase 
and develop a formal model of the evaluation phase. The model of the evaluation 
phase will be outlined briefly, along with other popular models of choice under risk, 
so as to highlight the link between these cognitive models and the behavioural model 
of Rachlin and colleagues. 
 
 
II. THEORIES OF CHOICE UNDER RISK WITH SIMPLE, REGULAR 
PROSPECTS 
 
Using the notation in KT, (x, p; y, q) is a prospect yielding outcome x with probability 
p, outcome y with probability q and 0 with probability 1 – p – q, where p + q ≤ 1. KT 
define a “regular” prospect as one where: p + q < 1, or x ≥ 0 ≥ y, or x ≤ 0 ≤ y. For the 
present discussion I will be concerned with regular prospects of the following form (x, 
p; 0, q): prospects that pay x with probability p and 0 with probability q, where p + q 
= 1. I make use of these simple, regular prospects because the theory of probability 
discounting developed by Rachlin and colleagues appears to be limited only to 
gambles involving the outcome 0 and one positive or negative outcome x. In the 
language of prospect theory, I will only consider lotteries in the gain frame (i.e., 
where x ≥ 0) to keep the discussion simple. 
 
During the evaluation phase of prospect theory (PT), simple, regular prospects are 
evaluated according to the following function: 
 
 V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y), (1)  
 
where v(0) = 0, π(0) = 0, π(1) = 1, π(·) is an increasing function of p, and π(p) ∈ [0, 
1]. According to KT, people respond differently to gains and losses. This matters in 
(1) because the outcomes x and y are evaluated relative to some reference point r 
which determines whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses. KT were 
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agnostic about the determination of r whereas their subsequent model, Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), assumes the reference point 
coincides with zero income (i.e., r = 0). I adopt the latter assumption for ease of 
exposition because it implies that when x, y ≥ 0, the lottery is in the gain frame, and I 
need not worry about the outcomes being perceived as losses. 
 
As v(0) = 0 and I am concerned with simple, regular prospects (x, p; 0, q), (1) reduces 
to: 
 
 V(x, p; 0, q) = π(p)v(x) (2)  
 
In other words, the value V of prospect (x, p; 0, q) is determined solely by the product 
of some function π(·) of the probability p assigned to outcome x and some utility 
function v(·) of the outcome x. The function π(·) is referred to as a probability 
weighting function (PWF) in the literature because it takes probabilities as its 
argument and returns so-called decision weights. In other words, the function π(·) 
incorporates the possibility of subjective distortions of objective probabilities (i.e., the 
objective probability 0.1 may be subjectively perceived as greater or less than 0.1). 
Under the PT formulation, risk preferences are determined both by the shape of the 
utility function v(·) and the shape of the PWF π(·). 
 
Unlike PT, rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory (Quiggin (1982)) is not defined 
relative to some reference point r, it does not treat gains and losses differently, and it 
applies rank-dependent transformations of probabilities to lotteries involving more 
than two prizes. However, under the assumption that r = 0, and with simple, regular 
prospects of the form I am considering (i.e., gambles in the gain frame with only two 
prizes), RDU is equivalent to PT. Thus, risk preferences are determined both by the 
shape of the utility function v(·) and the shape of the PWF π(·) under RDU.  
 
By contrast, expected utility (EU) theory assumes π(p) = p and defines the value V of 
prospect (x, p; 0, q) as: 
 
 V(x, p; 0, q) = pv(x) (3)  
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EU is not defined relative to a reference point, it does not treat gains and losses 
differently, and probabilities are interpreted objectively. Thus, risk preferences are 
determined solely by the shape of the utility function v(·) because V(·) is linear in p.5  
 
Finally, Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk, sometimes referred to as the 
rank-dependent expected value (RDEV) model (see Harrison and Rutström (2008)), 
defines the value of a simple, regular prospect as: 
 
 V(x, p; 0, q) = π(p)x (4)  
 
Like EU and RDU, RDEV is not defined relative to a reference point and it does not 
treat gains and losses differently. As V is linear in outcome x in (4), risk preferences 
in this model are determined solely by the shape of the PWF π(p). 
 
As I will discuss later, risk preferences in the PD model are determined solely by the 
shape of the PWF and it is therefore equivalent to RDEV, except that the PD model is 
limited to simple, regular prospects and it employs a specific PWF whereas the 
RDEV model is more general. KT (p. 280-284) argue empirically that people tend to 
overweight low probabilities (i.e., π(p) > p for small p) and underweight moderate to 
high probabilities (i.e., π(p) < p for moderate to high probabilities). This 
overweighting and underweighting yields an “inverse S-shaped” PWF π(·) with the 
following properties: subcertainty, subproportionality, and subadditivity. Note that 
these properties do not define the model, they are simply specific assumptions within 
the model. In Section V I will conduct empirical analyses to determine whether this 





                                                
5 Note that V(·) is unique up to a positive affine transformation so U(·) = a + bV(·), for b > 0, represents 
the same preferences as (3). 
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III. THE PD MODEL: A BEHAVIOURAL THEORY OF CHOICE UNDER RISK 
 
Rachlin and colleagues (RLGF (1986), RCC (1987), RRC (1991)) developed the PD 
model in a series of three papers. As each paper built on its predecessor, the papers 
will be discussed in chronological order. This will provide an historical account of the 
development of the model while highlighting some of the problems that arose during 
each stage. 
 
RLGF (1986): Cognition and Behavior in Studies of Choice 
 
RLGF (p. 35) explain that a behavioural model of choice is one where an animal’s 
behaviour in a specific environment is described by two sets of rules. The first 
consists of reinforcement schedules that are independent of the animal’s behaviour 
while the second describes an animal’s behaviour as a function of exposure to 
environmental stimuli. The following behavioural model of choice has been used to 
explain a large proportion of animal choice data: 
 
 B1/B2 = (A1/A2)a(R1/R2)r(D2/D1)d, (5)  
 
where B1 and B2 are rates of responding on two levers, buttons etc., during a particular 
time interval, A1 and A2 are the respective reinforcement amounts that are delivered 
over that interval, R1 and R2 are the respective rates of reinforcement over that 
interval, D1 and D2 are the respective delays to the rewards, and a, r and d represent 
an animal’s sensitivity to amount, rate and delay, respectively. 
 
This function occupies a venerable space in the experimental literature on animals’ 
choice behaviour between different schedules of reinforcement. It is a generalised 
version of Herrnstein’s (1961) matching law and it has been used to explain the 
commonly found tendency of animals to sharply discount delayed rewards (RLGF 
(1986, p. 36)).6  
                                                
6 Kagel, Battalio and Green (1995) critique the matching law and its implications for the commodity-
choice behaviour (p. 51-71), labour-supply behaviour (p. 110-128), and time discounting (p. 178-180) 
of animals, predominantly rats and pigeons, under experimental conditions. They argue in favour of an 
economic account of animal choice behaviour that relies on maximising (i.e., the comparison of 
marginal rates of return) rather than matching (i.e., the comparison of average rates of return). 
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Although this function was derived to provide an account of animals’ delay 
discounting behaviour, RLGF employ it to explain how people value probabilistic 
rewards. The crucial step in this reformulation is to interpret the probability associated 
with a reward as the delay to, or the rate of reinforcement of, this reward. As RLGF 
(p. 35) note, delay and rate of reinforcement are typically interdependent in 
experiments, an issue to which I will return later. 
 
To understand this reformulation of probability, consider the following thought 
experiment presented in RLGF (p. 36). A person plays a gamble with a probability p 
= ⅓ of winning x and a probability of 1 – p = ⅔ of receiving 0. A physical 
randomisation device is used to determine whether the subject wins x and the gamble 
is repeated periodically.7 Suppose that the physical randomisation device takes c 
seconds to deliver a result and the intertrial interval (ITI) between gambles is t 
seconds. Then, timed from the start of the first gamble, the average or expected delay 
(D) to the person’s first win is given by the following waiting-time function: 
 
 D = [(t + c) / p] – t (6)  
 
Note that t is subtracted on the assumption that there is no delay to the first gamble. 
Expression (6) shows how, at least in the repeated-gambles case, probability and 
delay are linked. As probability increases so delay to reward falls, and vice versa. In 
addition, probability affects the rate of reinforcement of a reward in the following 
way. Using the parameters from the description above (i.e., p  = ⅓), over a long series 
of repeated gambles, the rate at which the person would receive money is x / [3(t + c)] 
per second.  
 
Now suppose that the person is in one room and the physical randomisation device is 
in another. If the person wins x this is delivered through a trapdoor. Suppose further 
that there are two randomisation devices, for two different lotteries, and two 
trapdoors, and that the person must choose between them. According to RLGF (p. 
                                                
7 As the gamble is repeated and the person wins x on successful realisations of the gamble, payoffs in 
this thought experiment are cumulative. RLGF implicitly assume away the effect that cumulative 
payoffs have on choice behaviour. In other words, they assume that the person does not have an 
intertemporal utility function which is affected by changes in income. 
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36), the choice can be viewed as one between gambles or as one between rates of 
reinforcement. The behavioural model of choice developed by RLGF assumes that the 
person is choosing between different rates of reinforcer delivery and in so doing 
reinterprets probabilities as delays to, or rates of reinforcement of, rewards.  
 
In experiments where people choose between lotteries, the two effects of probability 
(i.e., on the rate of reinforcement of a reward and the delay to a reward) are 
confounded. Following RLGF (p. 39), to see how this affects the generalised 
matching law equation (5), let R1 = 1/D1 and R2 = 1/D2 so that rate and delay are 
perfectly confounded. This yields the following equation: 
 
 B1/B2 = (A1/A2)a(D2/D1)r+d (7)  
 
Using (6) and assuming that c1 = c2 = c and t1 = t2 = t, (7) becomes: 
 
 B1/B2 = (A1/A2)a([p1(t(1 – p2) + c)] / [p2(t(1 - p1) + c)])r+d (8)  
 
Expression (8) represents the matching law for probabilistic rewards when the rate of 
reinforcement of a reward is perfectly confounded with the delay to that reward. 
 
RLGF derive this expression to provide a behavioural account of choice among 
gambles: preference for lottery 1 over lottery 2, as measured by rate of responding 
(B1/B2) over a time interval, is a function of the rewards in these lotteries (A1 and A2), 
the probabilities associated with these rewards (p1 and p2), the reward delivery period 
c, the ITI length t, and the sensitivity exponents a, r, and d. RLGF use (8) and set p2 = 
1, t = 1, c = 0.2, and A1 = A2, in an attempt to replicate KT’s assertion that people 
overweight low probabilities and underweight moderate to high probabilities. Under 
these assumptions, (8) becomes: 
 
 B1/B2 = [(0.2p1) / (1.2 - p1)]r+d (9)  
 
Plotting B1/B2 as a function of p1/p2 (where p2 = 1) for different values of r + d, yields 
Figure I. In the figure, sR = r and sD = d according to the notation that I have used. 
RLGF (p. 39) argue that when r + d = 0.5, the plotted function is their model’s 
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counterpart to the inverse S-shaped PWF of KT which is based on the overweighting 
of low probabilities and the underweighting of moderate to high probabilities.8 Note 
that a PWF relates stated probabilities (i.e., p1 and p2) to subjective decision weights 
(i.e., π(p1) and π(p2)). Figure I, by contrast, plots relative rate of responding (B1/B2) as 
a function of relative probabilities (p1/p2). While the shape of the curve in Figure I 
when r + d = 0.5 resembles an inverse S-shaped PWF, it does not relate probabilities 
to decision weights and hence it is inaccurate for RLGF to claim that they have 
translated KT’s model into a behavioural model of choice.  
 




 Source: RLGF (p. 40), Figure 4.  
 
Furthermore, Figure I was plotted on the assumptions that A1 = A2 and p2 = 1. In other 
words, the rewards under both lotteries are the same but reward A2 is received with 
certainty under lottery 2. Over almost its entire range, Figure I has p1 < 1 but the 
figure suggests that lottery 1 will still be chosen some of the time (i.e., B1/B2 ≠ 0). 
This means that a lottery which pays, say, $100 with a probability less than one and 
                                                
8 As stated previously under expression (1), π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1, which, when coupled with the 
properties of subadditivity, subcertainty, and subproportionality, means the KT PWF has jump 
discontinuities at p = 0 and p = 1. KT (p. 282-283) suggest that these discontinuities may capture the 
distinction between certainty and uncertainty and conclude that their function is not well-behaved near 
the end points of the probability interval [0, 1]. Figure I does not incorporate these jump 
discontinuities. 
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the left one saying $100, the right one saying $250. The initial
expected value of the sure thing was thus $ 100 X l7/is, or $94.44.
The initial expected value of the risky gamble was $250 X '/is,
or $97.22.2 The experimenter read the following instructions to
each subject:
The purpose of this experiment is to see how you subjectively judge various
imaginary gambles. A gamble takes place when I spin one of the spinners
in front of you. Your job is to choose which of the two spinners you
prefer. If the pointer of the spinner lands on white, you win. On your
left the hypothetical amount would be $100. On your right the hypo-
thetical amount would be $250. If the pointer lands on black you win
nothing. After each gamble I may change the odds by turning over one
or more chips from black to white or white to black. Please do not try
to calculate odds or plan ahead. Just judge the gamble that most appeals
to you in each individual case. You must make your choice within five
seconds after I ask you to.
Then, the subject was asked to choose a spinner (which all
subjects did immediately), and the chosen spinner was spun by
the experimenter. The choice and spin together took about 5 s.
If the pointer landed on white, the experimenter said, "you won."
If on black, the experimenter said, "you lost." This constituted
a trial. Each subject was given 10 trials. (Subjects were not told
how many trials there would be.) After each trial the experimenter
removed the apparatus (to her lap) and turned over a chip on
the risky side. If the subject had chosen the sure-thing side on
the previous trial, a black chip was turned over to white on the
risky side for the next trial (making that side less risky, hence
more attractiv , we presumed). If the subject had chosen the
risky side on the previous trial, a white chip was turned over to
black for the next trial (making that side more risky, hence less
attractive, we presumed). This is, technically, a titration proce-
dure. Over trials, it adjusts the risky gamble's odds so that, at
1.0
.2 .4 .6 .8 1.0
Figure 5. The experimental apparatus.
equilibrium, the subject is indifferent between it and the sure
thing.
For all 30 subjects, the first trial was the same. After that, for
one group of 15 subjects, the experiment was conducted as
quickly as possible, consistent with accurate recording and subject
readiness. For these subjects the sessions (not counting instruc-
tions) lasted about 5 min (30 s per trial). For the other 15 subjects,
the experimenter kept the spinners on her lap, out of view of the
subject, until 1.5 min had elapsed since the start of the previous
trial. Then the spinners were presented and the subject made her
choice. (Several subjects in this group spontaneously complained
about the del y.) For these subjects, sessions lasted about 20 min.
The two groups were treated identically except for the time
between trials. If, as the cognitive theory implies, each probability
is independently converted to a decision weight, then (unless
some supplementary mechanism is invoked) one might expect
this difference in treatment to have no effect on performance.
If, on the other hand, a stated (in this case, visually perceived)
probability represents a delay of reward, then the actual expe-
rienced delay should supplant whatever stereotypical delay the
subjects' reinforcement history might have supplied and the two
groups should behave differently. Specifically, if risk aversion with
gains is, as we suspect, a form of impulsiveness (a lack of self-
control), then the subjects with the longer delay (the greater values
of / in Equation 2) should avoid the risky choice more.
To see this prediction roughly in terms of Equations 2 and 3,
suppose AI = 100; Pi is about equal to 1.0; A2 = 250; ct = c2 =
5 s; f i = /j = t, as in the present experiment; and for simplicity,
SA = SK + SD - ' -0. The experimental procedure assures Bt =
82 at equilibrium. Substituting in Equations 2 and 3, pz = (t +
5) -r (t + 12.5). If t were zero, p2 at equilibrium (after the 10
trials) would equal 0.4. As t increases, PI approaches 1.0 (which
in the above experiment would represent complete avoidance of
the risky choice). Thus, the higher t (the intertrial interval) is,
the greater p2 should be at equilibrium. (In our experiment, a
high PI corresponds to more white chips for the risky gamble.)
In other words, the greater the intertrial interval (ITI), the more
Figure 4. Preference (B|/52) for uncertainty (p\ < I ) relative to certainty
(Pi = 1) for various sensitivities (SK + SD) to rate and delay.
2 These values were selected so as to make it difficult to calculate ex-
pected values. Subjects interviewed after the experiment said that they
had not performed such calculations. Furthermore, subjects did not ap-
pear to learn the rule by which probability was varied; they thought that
probability changes depended on whether they won or lost rather than
on which gamble they chose.
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$0 otherwise will be chosen over a degenerate lottery which pays $100 for sure. 
While KT (p. 284) recognise that their model can lead to violations of stochastic 
dominance, and subsequently developed CPT to account for this, they argued that 
such violations were unlikely because dominated prospects would be removed during 
the initial editing phase. Clearly this is not the case in the model of RLGF because 
Figure I implies that the stochastically dominated lottery will be chosen at least some 
of the time. 
 
A testable implication of (8) is whether a longer ITI t will affect choice among 
probabilistic rewards. RLGF conducted an experiment to test this hypothesis, one 
which was replicated by Silberberg, Murray, Christensen and Asano (1988) (SMCA). 
Both studies used hypothetical rewards so their results should be treated with caution. 
In the experiment, subjects chose between two spinners, each of which rotated over a 
circle made up of 18 pie-shaped wedges (see Figure II). The wedges were black on 
one side and white on the other. If the spinner landed on a white wedge, the subject 
was told that she had won, if it landed on a black wedge, the subject was told that she 
had lost. One spinner, referred to as the “sure thing,” had 17 white wedges and 1 
black wedge whereas the other spinner, referred to as the “risky gamble,” had 7 white 
wedges and 11 black wedges. The hypothetical payoff for the sure thing was $100 and 
the hypothetical payoff for the risky gamble was $250. 
 




 Source: RLGF (p. 40), Figure 4.  
 
The number of white wedges on the sure thing spinner remained constant throughout 
the experiment. However, the number of white wedges on the risky gamble spinner 
was adjusted depending on the subject’s previous choice: a choice of the sure thing 
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the left one saying $100, the right one saying $250. The initial
expected value of the sure thing was thus $ 100 X l7/is, or $94.44.
The initial expected value of the risky gamble was $250 X '/is,
or $97.22.2 The experimenter read the following instructions to
each subject:
The purpose of this experiment is to see how you subjectively judge various
imaginary gambles. A gamble takes place when I spin one of the spinners
in front of you. Your job is to choose which of the two spinners you
prefer. If the pointer of the spinner lands on white, you win. On your
left the hypothetical amount would be $100. On your right the hypo-
thetical amount would be $250. If the pointer lands on black you win
nothing. After each gamble I may change the odds by turning over one
or more chips from black to white or white to black. Please do not try
to calculate odds or plan ahead. Just judge the gamble that most appeals
to you in each individual case. You must make your choice within five
seconds after I ask you to.
Then, the subject was asked to choose a spinner (which all
subjects did immediately), and the chosen spinner was spun by
the experimenter. The choice and spin together took about 5 s.
If the pointer landed on white, the experimenter said, "you won."
If on black, the experimenter said, "you lost." This constituted
a trial. Each subject was given 10 trials. (Subjects were not told
how many trials there would be.) After each trial the experimenter
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the risky side. If the subject had chosen the sure-thing side on
the previous trial, a black chip was turned over to white on the
risky side for the next trial (making that side less risky, hence
more attractive, we presumed). If the subject had chosen the
risky side on the previous trial, a white chip was turned over to
black for the next trial (making that side more risky, hence less
attractive, we presumed). This is, technically, a titration proce-
dure. Over trials, it adjusts the risky gamble's odds so that, at
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is independently converted to a decision weight, then (unless
some supplementary mechanism is invoked) one might expect
this difference in treatment to have no effect on performance.
If, on the other hand, a stated (in this case, visually perceived)
probability represents a delay of reward, then the actual expe-
rienced delay should supplant whatever stereotypical delay the
subjects' reinforcement history might have supplied and the two
groups should behave differently. Specifically, if risk aversion with
gains is, as we suspect, a form of impulsiveness (a lack of self-
control), then the subjects with the longer delay (the greater values
of / in Equation 2) should avoid the risky choice more.
To see this prediction roughly in terms of Equations 2 and 3,
suppose AI = 100; Pi is about equal to 1.0; A2 = 250; ct = c2 =
5 s; f i = /j = t, as in the present experiment; and for simplicity,
SA = SK + SD - ' -0. The experimental procedure assures Bt =
82 at equilibrium. Substituting in Equations 2 and 3, pz = (t +
5) -r (t + 12.5). If t were zero, p2 at equilibrium (after the 10
trials) would equal 0.4. As t increases, PI approaches 1.0 (which
in the above experiment would represent complete avoidance of
the risky choice). Thus, the higher t (the intertrial interval) is,
the greater p2 should be at equilibrium. (In our experiment, a
high PI corresponds to more white chips for the risky gamble.)
In other words, the greater the intertrial interval (ITI), the more
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resulted in one more white wedge on the risky gamble (i.e., an increase in the odds of 
winning on the risky gamble) whereas a choice of the risky gamble led to one less 
white wedge on the risky gamble (i.e., a decrease in the odds of winning on that 
spinner). This titration procedure9 was used so that, at equilibrium, the subject would 
be indifferent between the sure thing and the risky gamble (i.e., B1 and B2 in (8) 
would be equal at equilibrium). Subjects made 10 choices in total in the experiment.10 
 
To see the effect of a longer ITI on choice between the two gambles, note that A1 = 
100, A2 = 250, p1 is approximately equal to 111, c1 = c2 = 5s, t1 = t2 = t and, for 
simplicity, a = r + d = 1. Substituting these values into (8), remembering that at 
equilibrium B1 = B2, and solving for p2:  
 
 p2 = (t + 5) / (t + 12.5) (10)  
 
When the ITI t = 0, p2 = 0.4. In other words, a person choosing between the spinners 
would be indifferent between the sure thing and the risky gamble when the probability 
of receiving $250 under the risky gamble is 0.4. However, as t increases so p2 → 1. 
Thus, with a long ITI, a subject is only indifferent between the sure thing and the 
risky gamble when the likelihood of receiving $250 under the risky gamble is 
approximately 1. This is precisely the implication that RLGF and SMCA set out to 
test.12 
 
                                                
9 As discussed in Chapter 3, titration procedures are susceptible to being “gamed” by subjects and do 
not, therefore, promote truthful revelation of preferences (i.e., they lack incentive compatibility). For 
example, subjects may disproportionately choose the sure thing spinner on the first few trials so as to 
increase the odds of winning on the risky gamble in the final trials of the experiment. This point is 
moot for studies involving hypothetical rewards as these lack incentive compatibility to begin with, but 
should be taken into account for studies with titration procedures and real rewards. 
10 Whether 10 choices are enough to reach equilibrium is an open question and one which is not taken 
up by RLGF. 
11 KT (p. 265) argue that people respond differently to certain outcomes as opposed to near-certain 
outcomes. RLGF ignore this point by assuming that when p = 17/18 this is the same as p = 1. In other 
words, they treat an inherently risky prospect as one involving no risk. 
12 This implication is at odds with the literature on the matching law applied to choice among delayed 
rewards. This literature, cited previously, suggests that as the delay to all rewards increases, the 
likelihood of selecting the larger, more delayed reward - rather than the smaller, more immediate 
reward - increases. If people understand probability as delay then a low probability is equivalent to a 
long delay. So as the ITI increases (i.e., as the delay to both rewards increases), subjects should be 
more likely to select the larger, more uncertain reward (viz., the larger, more delayed reward). This 
works against the hypothesis which RLGF sought to test. 
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RLGF found evidence in support of this hypothesis in a between-subject experimental 
design involving 30 subjects, where one group’s (n1 = 15) ITI was 30s and the other 
group’s (n2 = 15) ITI was 90s.13 Specifically, the group with the longer ITI selected 
the sure thing spinner more often, which means that the odds of winning on the risky 
gamble was higher, than the group with the shorter ITI. This comparison used the 
number of risky gamble choices of each subject over the course of the experiment as 
the data on which to conduct a t-test. Subjects in the 30s ITI group selected the risky 
gamble an average of 5.87 times, whereas the subjects in the 90s ITI group selected 
the risky gamble an average of 3.93 times, over the course of the experiment; this 
difference was significant, t = 4.65, df = 28, p < 0.01. 
 
SMCA replicated RLGF’s experiment, albeit with three procedural differences: 
SMCA used a computer, rather than an experimenter, to present and record subjects’ 
choices; SMCA added an additional experimental treatment: some of the subjects 
began the experiment with a choice trial while others14 started the experiment with an 
ITI; and one group had an ITI of 25s as compared to the RLGF study where the 
comparable group had an ITI of 30s.  
 
SMCA recruited 101 subjects to take part in the experiment. They compared the 
number of white wedges on the risky gamble spinner in the final round of the 
experiment across the groups (choice trial vs. ITI × 25s vs. 90s), using a Kruskal-
Wallis test, and found a significant between-group difference: H(3) = 15.8, p < 0.05. 
Using pairwise post hoc contrasts, they found no statistically significant differences15 
between subjects who began the experiment with a choice trial and subjects who 
began the experiment with an ITI. However, subjects in the short ITI group, 
regardless of whether they started the experiment with a choice trial or ITI, selected 
the risky gamble spinner significantly more often than subjects in the long ITI group. 
Thus, SMCA replicated the result of RLGF. 
 
In a follow-up experiment, SMCA decided to test the robustness of this result by 
telling subjects how many choices (i.e., 10) they would make in the experiment; this 
                                                
13 With different ITIs, temporal discounting behaviour could drive the results in the experiment. RLGF 
implicitly assume that their subjects did not discount delayed rewards. 
14 Unfortunately SMCA do not provide the exact number of subjects in each experimental treatment. 
15 SMCA do not report the test statistics nor p-values for the pairwise post hoc contrasts. 
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information was not provided in SMCA’s original experiment nor the experiment of 
RLGF. Using a sample of 20 students, SMCA found that there was no significant 
difference in the number of risky gamble choices between the group with the short ITI 
and the group with the long ITI, although they did not provide test statistics nor p-
values for their comparisons.16 
 
Finally, SMCA conducted another experiment with 40 students where, in addition to 
the different ITIs, they told one group of subjects that they had been endowed with 
$10 of hypothetical money and the other group was told that they had been endowed 
with $10,000 of hypothetical money. This information was given to subjects at the 
start of the experiment and they were also told that the experiment consisted of 10 
choice trials. They found differences between the group endowed with $10 and the 
group endowed with $10,000 but no differences between the short ITI and the long 
ITI groups. In sum, SMCA replicated the result in RLGF but found that the ITI effect 
disappeared as soon as subjects were told how many choices they would have to make 
in the experiment. Thus, the results reported by RLGF appear to be very sensitive to 
the information provided to subjects.  
 
Ignoring the sensitivity of these results for the moment, what does the RLGF model 
imply when these different ITIs are used? Using (10), when t = 30s, p2 ≈ 0.82 ≈ 15/18 
white wedges on the risky gamble. When t = 90s, p2 ≈ 0.84 ≈ 15/18 white wedges on 
the risky gamble. So, for these parameters, the RLGF model implies very little 
difference in the choice behaviour of the two groups.17 RLGF (p. 41) found that, at 
                                                
16 SMCA dropped the treatment where one group of subjects started the experiment with a choice trial 
while the other group started with an ITI. 
17 Harrison (1989, 1992, 1994) provides a detailed critique of inferences drawn from experimental 
studies when the studies fail to satisfy Smith’s (1982) precepts for controlled microeconomic 
experiments. Harrison (1989, 1992, 1994) shows that deviations from “optimal” behaviour in many 
experiments often entail such a low cost in terms of forgone expected income that experimental 
subjects have almost no incentive to find the theoretical optimum nor reveal their preferences with any 
real precision. In other words, some experimental tasks do not adequately incentivise subjects to reveal 
their “true” preferences because the expected increase in earnings from doing so does not offset the 
required cognitive effort. Thus, many experiments fail to satisfy Smith’s (1982) precept of 
“dominance,” which requires that the experimental reward medium dominates the subjective costs of 
decision making in the experiment; Harrison refers to this as the “payoff-dominance critique” whereas 
Bardsley et al. (2010) refer to this as the “flat maximum critique.” Morgan and Tustin (1992, p. 1142-
1143) make a similar point in the context of labour supply choices by pigeons: to locate the optimum in 
some decision problems requires the comparison of margins which are so small that only a fully 
informed, optimising agent could conceivably evaluate. In these cases, the decision problems do not 
provide a valid test of the theory. The experiment of RLGF is a case in point. 
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the end of the experiment, the group with the longer ITI had an average of 9 white 
wedges on the risky gamble whereas the group with the shorter ITI had an average of 
6 white wedges on the risky gamble. Thus, the model of RLGF not only predicts very 
little difference between the groups it also vastly overestimates the number of white 
wedges on the risky gamble spinner. 
 
A fundamental problem with this model is the assumption that people interpret 
probabilities as delays to reward or as rates of reinforcement of reward. The thought 
experiment described earlier makes a case for this view, but it assumes that 
individuals are exposed to repeated gambles. How then do people behave when faced 
with a one-shot gamble? This is when the logic of the model becomes tenuous. RLGF 
(p. 38) argue that, “… the behavioral model must infer the existence of past external 
events (events that had been paired with the stated probability).” In other words, 
RLGF are forced to assume that people still interpret the probability of winning a 
reward as a delay to that reward which is linked to some past, external event, even in 
a one-shot setting. They must maintain this assumption even though, in a one-shot 
gamble with a prize of 0 and a prize of x > 0 (i.e., a simple, regular prospect), the 
probability of receiving x represents the likelihood that one receives x and the 
complementary probability represents the likelihood of receiving nothing. This is a 
problem because if one does not receive x then it will not be received, regardless of 
the length of time that one waits. 
 
Another issue with the thought experiment described earlier is that people only 
observe the outcome of a gamble when it is favourable. In other words, there is an 
implicit assumption that a subject chooses one gamble and then simply waits for it to 
pay out rather than choosing a gamble and observing when it does and does not pay 
out. These procedural differences likely have a large impact on how the experiment is 
perceived by the subject. Choosing a gamble and then waiting until it pays out 
without observing each trial, frames the task as one involving amounts and delays. 
Watching a gamble pay out or not across repeated trials, frames the experiment as one 
involving risk and allows the subject to estimate the probability of receiving x, and the 
complementary probability of receiving 0. In the former case, interpreting probability 
as delay may be valid because that is how the subject experiences the task. In the 
latter case, the link between probability and delay is tenuous to the point of vanishing. 
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Finally, note what the RLGF model implies for the relationship between risk aversion 
and the length of the ITI. A person is risk averse if she prefers the certain outcome x 
to a gamble with an expected value of x. From (10) it is clear that as the ITI increases, 
p2 increases, which means that as the ITI increases, risk aversion increases too. 
Pushing this logic to its natural conclusion, a long enough ITI would generate an 
aversion to risk that would make a small, certain reward preferable to a far larger, 
near-certain reward. While this may apply to some agents in some circumstances, 
empirical evidence supporting the general validity of this prediction is not provided 
by RLGF. 
 
RCC (1987): Probability and Delay in Commitment 
 
RCC conducted an experiment with real rewards to bolster RLGF’s claim that 
probabilistic choice can be tied to a temporal framework. The experiment was based 
on Rachlin and Green (1972) who studied the behaviour of pigeons in a delay-
commitment paradigm. The major difference with this experiment, other than that 
RCC used human subjects, was that delays were replaced with probabilities: long 
delays with low probabilities and short delays with high probabilities. 
 
To understand the RCC experiment, it helps to discuss the original experiment of 
Rachlin and Green (1972). Figure IIIa shows the experimental design of Rachlin and 
Green (1972) whereas Figure IIIb shows the experimental design of the RCC study. 
Rachlin and Green (1972) gave pigeons a choice, at point B, between the path leading 
to point A or the path leading to point C; pigeons pecked at illuminated keys to make 
this choice. If pigeons chose the path leading to point A, they made a subsequent 
choice between a smaller, sooner (SS) reward (a = 2s, d = 0s) and a larger, later (LL) 
reward (a = 4s, d = 4s).18 Thus, choice of the path leading to point A gave pigeons 
flexibility in their choice in the second stage. If pigeons chose the path leading to 
point C, there was no subsequent choice and the pigeons automatically received the 
LL reward (a = 4s, d = 4s). Thus, choice of the path leading to point C committed 
pigeons to the LL reward. 
                                                
18 Note that the reward a is measured in seconds because this is the amount of time that pigeons were 
given access to food. 
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Rachlin and Green (1972) manipulated the delay t to points A and C from a choice at 
B to determine whether this delay affected choice behaviour at point B. They found 
that when t was short (t < 4s), pigeons at point B predominantly chose the path 
leading to point A and then subsequently chose the SS reward (a = 2s, d = 0s) over 
the LL reward (a = 4s, d = 4s) on almost every trial (i.e., more than 90% of the time). 
By contrast, when t was relatively long (t > 4s), pigeons at point B predominantly 
chose the path leading to point C where only the LL reward was available (a = 4s, d = 
4s). This is a delay-commitment paradigm because it tests whether commitment (i.e., 
choice of the path leading to point C over the path leading to point A) increases as the 
delay to all rewards increases. Rachlin and Green (1972) found that longer delays lead 
to a preference for commitment. 
 




 Source: RCC (p. 348), Figure 1.  
 
As mentioned previously, RCC replaced delays with probabilities, and pigeons with 
humans. Their experiment played out across two stages. In the first stage, subjects had 
to choose whether to allocate a blue chip (probability q = 3/18 of advancing to stage 
2) or red chip (probability q = 15/18 of advancing to stage 2) to one of two cards: X 
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Fig. 2. Arrangement of cards and spinner. The num-
bers in parentheses correspond to numbers on the sections
of the 18-section spinner.
subject and the spinner were five cards ar-
ranged as in Figure 2, a lower rank of two
cards, X and Y, and an upper rank of dollar
S5 4/18 11 cards. The cards were labeled as in the figure.The numbers in parentheses on the cards refer
to the numbers on the spinner.
Fig. 1. Part (a) shows a paradigm of the choice struc-
ture for a delay-commitment paradigm (Rachlin & Green,
1972), Part (b) shows the analogous paradigm for the
present experiment with human subjects choosing among
monetary rewards of various probabilities.
q were a high probability (corresponding to a
short delay) the subjects, at B, would prefer
the path leading to A, thence to choose the
small, highly probable, reward. However, if q
were a low probability (corresponding to a
long delay) the subjects, at B, would prefer the
path leading to C over that leading to A and,




Eleven Stony Brook undergraduates, 9 wo-
men and 2 men, volunteered as subjects. The
experiment was run individually for each sub-
ject.
Apparatus
The subject stood in front of a spinner with
18 white sectors labeled 1 through 18. The
spinner provided a way to unpredictably select
one of the 18 numbers. The experimenter sat
across the table from the subject. Between the
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment each
subject was given 20 poker chips, 10 red and
10 blue, and the experimenter read the in-
structions (included below). Each choice was
indicated by putting a chip on a card. In the
first stage the subject could put a red or a blue
chip on Card X or Card Y. Then the exper-
imenter spun the spinner. If the spinner did
not land within the range of numbers on the
card that corresponded to the color of the chip
played, the experimenter took the chip and a
new trial began immediately with another chip.
If the spinner did land within the winning
range, the trial proceeded to the next stage. If,
in the first stage, the subject had chosen X and
won, the subject could choose either the $1 or
the $4 bet by moving the chip from Card X
to either of the dollar cards above it. If in the
first stage, the subject had chosen Y and won,
the chip could be moved from Card Y to the
$5 card above it. Then the experimenter spun
the spinner again. After a win on one of the
dollar cards, the experimenter took the red or
blue chip and gave the subject a number of
white chips equal to the dollar amount won.
After a loss, the experimenter simply took the
chip. Thus each trial consisted of one or two




or Y. Card X corresponds to point A and card Y corresponds to point C in Figure IIIb. 
After allocating a red or blue chip to card X or Y, a spinner, programmed with the 
relevant probability (i.e., q = 3/18 for the blue chip or q = 15/18 for the red chip), was 
used to determine whether the subject proceeded to stage 2.  
 
If a subject allocated her chip to card X and was successful, she moved on to stage 2 
(point A) where she had to choose whether to play a low reward, high probability 
gamble (i.e., $1 reward with probability 17/18) or a high reward, low probability 
gamble (i.e., $4 reward with probability 5/18). Thus, if the subject allocated a chip to 
card X and was successful, she had flexibility in her choice at stage 2. If, by contrast, 
she placed her chip on card Y during stage 1 and was successful, she then played a 
high reward, low probability gamble (i.e., $5 reward with probability 4/18) in stage 2 
(point C). Thus, by allocating a chip to card Y, the subject was committed to the high 
reward, low probability gamble in stage 2, if it was reached. As mentioned previously, 
the rewards used in this study were real, rather than hypothetical, and subjects were 
paid their winnings at the end of the experiment.  
 
At the start of the experiment each subject was given 10 blue chips and 10 red chips 
which they could allocate, in any order, to card X or Y across 20 trials. This differs 
from the design in Rachlin and Green (1972) because pigeons could not choose the 
delays themselves; the pigeons were exposed to the different delay treatments. RCC 
provide a strange justification for this difference: 
 
“This method of having the subjects themselves select trial order was chosen 
because pilot experiments of ours as well as published accounts of human 
laboratory analogs to animal experiments … indicate that corresponding 
results are more likely when people’s tasks are made more complicated and 
varied than corresponding animal tasks. For similar reasons, the two larger 
rewards ($5 and $4) were not identical (although their expected values were 
identical).” (RCC (p. 349)). 
 
RCC argue that their experiment is the probabilistic choice analogue of the 
experiment in Rachlin and Green (1972). Rather than manipulate the delay t to points 
A and C from B, RCC manipulated the probability q of reaching points A and C from 
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B. Choice of the path leading to point A (i.e., allocating a token to card X) gives a 
subject flexibility in her choice in the second stage of the experiment, if it is reached. 
By contrast, choice of the path leading to point C (i.e., allocating a token to card Y) 
commits the subject to a high reward, low probability gamble in the second stage of 
the experiment, if it is reached. By varying q, RCC could test whether a low 
continuation probability, which RCC argue is analogous to a long delay, is associated 
with more commitment choices than a high continuation probability. 
 
RCC found that at point A (i.e., after allocating a token to card X and successfully 
proceeding to stage 2), 28% of choices were for the high reward, low probability 
gamble, as represented by the bar on the far left of Figure IV. Note that this fraction 
of choices was significantly less (t = 3.28, df = 10, one-tailed test) than 50%. In other 
words, if point A was reached, there was a preference for the low reward, high 
probability gamble. Note that this result does not line up perfectly with Rachlin and 
Green (1972), who found an almost exclusive preference for the smaller, sooner 
reward at point A. 
 




 Source: RCC (p. 351), Figure 3.  
 
In stage 1, approximately 18% of the high continuation probability chips (i.e., red 
chips where q = 15/18) and 53% of the low continuation probability chips (i.e., blue 
chips where q = 3/18) were placed on card Y, as represented by the bars on the right 
COMIMITMENT
that the low-amount reinforcer was almost im-
mediately available to pigeons, but not certainly
available to our human subjects (p = 17/18).
Occasionally, subjects did not win the $1 when
they chose this alternative.
The matching law (Herrnstein, 1961) easily
explains the shift in an organism's choices (Bl /
B2) when, as in the Rachlin and Green (1972)
experiment, a constant delay (t) is added to
two alternatives differing in amount (a1 and
a2) and delay (d1 and d2):
B la1 (t+d2)








If the ratio of the amounts is less than the ratio
of the delays, and t is small, the Equation 1
predicts that animals will prefer the alternative
with the shorter delay. As t grows, however,
the addition of a constant to both d1 and d2
brings the delay term of the matching equation
closer to unity although the amount term is
unchanged. Thus, regardless of how small the
difference of amount originally was, at some
point, as t increases, that difference will come
to predominate, no matter how large the dif-
ference of delay originally was. As t increases,
an animal that originally chose the alternative
with the smaller delay ("impulsiveness") will
come to choose the alternative with the larger
amount ("self-control"). The matching law
thus predicts that, with the commitment par-
adigm of Figure la, as t increases, an animal
at B will come to choose C, commitment.
Although the matching law easily accounts
for the results of the Rachlin-Green experi-
ment in which time was varied, when prob-
abilities are substituted for delays the matching




a, (q x pi) (2)
B2 a2 (q x P2)
The difference between Equation 1 and Equa-
tion 2 is that whereas delays must be added to
calculate overall delay, probabilities must be
multiplied to calculate overall (conditional)
probability. Thus, in Equation 2, the value of
q is irrelevant-the q's cancel out-and the
matching law cannot account for the shift in
choice with different values of q. (This is just
a restatement of the "independence axiom" of










Fig. 3. Percentage of choices of larger reward at A
and of commitment to larger reward at B for q = 15/18
and q = 3/18 (see Figure 1). The brackets indicate one
standard deviation.
choice is one of the several violations of that
axiom found in s udies of hoice; see Machina,
1987.) Because the concepts of matching and
utility maximization both necessitate conform-
ity to the matching law (Rachlin, Green, Ka-
gel, & Battalio, 1976) and reflect our most
fundamental conceptions of choice (Rachlin,
1971), the fact that Equation 2 does not ex-
plain the results of the current experiment is
a matter of concern.
However, if we assume that delay, not prob-
ability, is the effective independent variable in
humans' rule-governed choice as well as in
animals' contingency-governed choice, then the
present results are easily explainable by
matching. If delay were the effective indepen-
dent variable, then, where probabilities are
concatenated, it would be proper to convert
probabilities to delays and add the delays rather
than multiply the probabilities.
In a series of trials with constant probability
outcomes, the relationship between the arith-
metic-mean-delay-to-outcome and probabil-
ity-of-outcome is (from Rachlin et al., 1986):
i + cd = _~l
p
where i is the interval between trials, c is trial
duration, and p is the probability of the out-




of Figure IV.19 Note that the allocation of red chips to card Y was significantly less 
than the allocation of blue chips to card Y (t = 5.42, df = 10, two-tailed test). RCC 
interpret the preceding set of results as evidence that a preference for the low reward, 
high probability gamble changed to indifference when the continuation probability q 
fell from 15/18 to 3/18.  
 
The conclusion which RCC reached relies on a strange and dubious comparison: the 
allocation, approximately 53%, of low continuation probability blue chips to card Y 
during stage 1, as shown by the bar on the far right of Figure IV, and the choice of the 
$4 low probability gamble during stage 2 of card X (approximately 28%), as shown 
by the bar on the far left of Figure IV. In other words, the comparison is between the 
choice of gambles after the resolution of stage 1 uncertainty and the initial stage 1 
choice between cards prior to the resolution of uncertainty.  
 
A more appropriate comparison would be with the allocation of red and blue chips to 
cards X and Y in stage 1. Subjects allocated significantly more red chips than blue 
chips to card X (t = 5.42, df = 10, two-tailed test). This means that subjects had a 
preference for flexibility in stage 2, rather than commitment in stage 2, when using 
the high continuation probability red chips.20 This does not imply the converse 
though: that subjects had a preference for commitment over flexibility when using 
low continuation probability blue chips. Subjects were practically and statistically 
indifferent between flexibility and commitment when allocating blue chips. RCC (p. 
350) simply state that the 53% allocation of blue chips to card Y is not significantly 
different to 50% without providing test statistics, although this can be seen to be true 
by looking at the whiskers of the box on the far right of Figure IV. 
 
Thus, RCC replicated the Rachlin and  Green (1972) result of a preference for 
flexibility at short delays (viz., high probabilities), but failed to replicate the result of 
a preference for commitment at long delays (viz., low probabilities). While the 
fraction of commitment choices was greater with low probabilities than with high 
                                                
19 RCC do not provide standard deviations for these estimates but these are represented by the whiskers 
in Figure IV. 
20 Recall that allocating a chip to card X gives you freedom of choice (viz., flexibility) in stage 2, if it is 
reached. By contrast, allocating a chip to card Y commits you to playing the high reward, low 
probability gamble in stage 2, if it is reached. 
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probabilities, this fraction was not significantly different to 0.5. Thus, it is not valid 
for RCC (p. 350) to claim that, “these results parallel those obtained with pigeons 
choosing among rewards of various amounts and delays.”  
 
A major experimental design issue of the RCC study was the sequential allocation of 
tokens: subjects had to allocate a token, observe the result of the ensuing gamble, and 
then allocate another token, until all of their red and blue tokens were finished. 
Consequently, each person’s idiosyncratic payoff history may have influenced her 
subsequent choices. In other words, this design is not immune to order or wealth 
effects across trials.21 This is a point which RCC (p. 350) acknowledge, but their 
approach to the problem is not satisfactory.  
 
RCC focussed on the last four trials of the experiment to see whether choices during 
these trials were markedly different to the choices made in previous trials. At the level 
of the sample as a whole, there was an equal number of red and blue tokens left for 
allocation over the last four trials. Thus, the last four trials, at least in terms of the 
proportion of red and blue tokens in the sample, were comparable to the trials at the 
start of the experiment. RCC found that the allocation of tokens to cards X and Y was 
very similar in the last four trials as in the experiment as a whole.22 In addition, they 
found that choices in stage 2 of card X (i.e., between the high reward, low probability 
gamble and the low reward, high probability gamble) were very similar in the last 
four trials as in the experiment as a whole.  
 
While these results suggest that order and wealth effects were unlikely to be driving 
RCC’s findings, one should heed the warning of Harrison (2007) that appropriate 
statistical techniques need to be used to draw inferences from experimental data when 
there is the potential for correlation of responses at the level of the individual and over 
time. RCC ignore these possibilities by treating the K choices of each subject as 
independent and by not taking into account the time path of choices in the experiment. 
 
                                                
21 A cleaner experimental design would be to ask subjects to allocate their red and blue tokens across 
the cards and across the gambles at stage 2 at the outset of the experiment, as if they were constructing 
a portfolio of risky assets, and then play out all of the gambles. 
22 RCC compared the last four trials to the full twenty trials. Ideally they should have compared the last 
four trials to the first sixteen trials of the experiment. 
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In addition to the issues outlined above, only 11 subjects took part in the experiment 
so there was minimal power for the statistical tests that were conducted. Furthermore, 
RCC specifically asked their subjects not to make any mathematical calculations even 
though they were presented with options that had real financial consequences. Thus, 
the experiment of RCC does little to support their contention that probability is best 
interpreted as delay. 
 
RRC (1991): Subjective Probability and Delay 
 
The preceding two papers laid the foundations for the PD model, but it was the 
method in RRC that has been replicated numerous times (see, for example, 
Ostaszewski (1997), Mitchell (1999), Richards, Zhang, Mitchell and de Wit (1999), 
Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004)) and has defined the model as it is 
currently employed. RRC drew on the work of Mazur (1984), who ran a series of 
delay discounting experiments with pigeons, to further develop the purported link 
between probability and delay. Mazur ((1984, p. 427)) found that the pigeons’ delay 
discounting data was best explained by a hyperbolic discounting function: 
 
 V = x / (1 + δD), (11)  
 
where V is the present or discounted value of the delayed reward x, D is the delay to 
the reward, and δ is a parameter which captures the extent to which future values are 
discounted; as δ increases so the present value of a delayed reward declines.23 
 
RRC argue, once again, that probability is best interpreted as delay and then use the 
waiting-time function (6) to derive the following result. On the assumption that c, 
which is the time it takes for a physical randomisation device to deliver a result, is 
small relative to the ITI t, the waiting-time function (6) can be re-written as:  
 
 D = (t / p) – t = t[(1 / p) – 1] = tΘ, (12)  
 
where Θ = ((1 / p) – 1) represents the odds against receiving a reward. 
                                                
23 Using the notation from Chapter 3, the hyperbolic (H) discounting function has a discount factor 
DH(t) = 1 / (1 + δt). RLGF distinguish between the delay to a reward D and the ITI t so, using their 
notation, the discount factor (DF) for the hyperbolic function is: DFH(D) = 1 / (1 + δD). 
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Thus, if the probability of receiving reward x under some gamble is 0.2, then the odds 
against receiving x is 4:1. As RRC (p. 235) note, in the context of repeated gambles, 
odds against is the average number of losses expected before a win. 
 
The derivation in (12) relies on the assumptions that c = 0 and that there is no ITI 
prior to the outcome of the first gamble in a set of repeated gambles. This latter 
assumption is why t is subtracted in the waiting-time function (6) and why Θ =  
((1 / p) – 1) represents the odds against receiving a reward; if t was not subtracted 
then Θ = (1 / p). 
 
RRC used (11) and (12) to develop the following function, which they argue is 
analogous to the delay discounting function (11), to describe how people value or 
“discount” lotteries of the form (x, p; 0, q): 
 
 V = x / (1 + γΘ), (13)  
 
where γ performs the same role as δ in (11): it captures the extent to which the 
probabilistic reward x is “discounted” as a function of the odds against receiving it. 
Expression (13) defines the PD model as it is currently employed. 
 
This derivation appears quite sensible and (13) certainly looks just like (11), with γ 
taking the place of δ and Θ taking the place of D. However, if probability and delay 
are inextricably linked24 then presumably the correct substitution for D in (11) is tΘ 
which is the result that was derived in (12). After all, Θ only represents odds against 
when we subtract t in the waiting-time function (6). Thus, to derive a probability 
discounting function which takes the same form as the delay discounting function 
                                                
24 Researchers have investigated the link between probability and delay by conducting discounting 
experiments where they vary the probability that subjects receive payment for one of their choices on 
the task. Keren and Roelofsma (1995) conducted an experiment, using hypothetical rewards, where 
subjects were offered a choice between 100 Dutch Guilders now or 110 Guilders in 4 weeks. When the 
probability of payment was 1, 82% of 60 subjects chose the SS reward. When the payment probability 
was reduced to 0.9, only 54% of 70 subjects chose the SS reward, and when the payment probability 
declined to 0.5, only 39% of 100 subjects chose the SS reward. These results suggest that probability 
and delay are linked, and that they have similar effects on behaviour. However, follow-up studies by 
Weber and Chapman (2005), using hypothetical rewards, and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
(2014), using real rewards, failed to replicate this result. 
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(11), RRC simply abandoned the link between probability and delay which they 
argued was so central to the way people interpret probability. This point should not be 
ignored because it was the stated rationale for performing the experiment with 
different ITIs in RLGF. 
 
RRC set out to test the PD model (13) and the delay discounting model (11) by 
recruiting 80 undergraduate students to take part in experiments with hypothetical 
rewards: 40 subjects were used to obtain a PD function and 40 were used to obtain a 
delay discounting function. In the PD experiment, subjects made binary choices 
between $1,000 available with different probabilities (0.95, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1 and 
0.05) and an amount of money to be received with certainty ($1,000, $990, $980, 
$960, $940, $920, $900, $850, $800, $750, $700, $650, $600, $550, $500, $450, 
$400, $350, $300, $250, $200, $150, $100, $80, $60, $40, $20, $10, $5 or $1). For 
each probability, half of the subjects in the PD experiment were presented with these 
certain amounts of money in decreasing and then increasing order, while the other 
subjects were presented with these amounts in increasing and then decreasing order. 
This elicitation procedure was used to find the certain amount of money that was 
subjectively equivalent (i.e., that made the subject indifferent) to $1,000 with the 
various probabilities listed above.  
 
Note that points of indifference (viz., certainty equivalents) were obtained by 
averaging the amounts of money before and after a switch was made.25 For example, 
if someone chose $1,000 with a probability of 0.9 over $850 with certainty, and then 
chose $900 with certainty over a 0.9 probability of receiving $1,000, then the 
indifference point was assumed to be $875 for a probability of 0.9. The procedure in 
the delay discounting experiment was identical except that probabilities were replaced 
with delays: 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 25 years and 50 years. 
 
                                                
25 Taking the average of these amounts is arbitrary and doing so throws away information on the nature 
and uncertainty of the estimate. The correct approach for analysing interval data (e.g., where a person’s 
indifference point lies in the interval ($850, $900)) is interval regression (see Harrison and Rutström 
(2008, p. 62-69) for a discussion of this point) but this is not the approach which RRC adopt. While 
interval regression is the appropriate statistical model for interval data it does not allow one to compare 
different PWFs which, as I discuss later, is an express purpose of this chapter. Consequently, I adopt a 
complementary full information maximum likelihood framework, which directly incorporates the 
uncertainty of the estimates and models it statistically, so that I can draw robust inferences about the 
ability of different PWFs to characterise PD data. 
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RRC fitted the hyperbolic delay (11) and probability (13) functions to the median26 
indifference points and certainty equivalents in the sample, respectively. They argued 
that these hyperbolic functions provided a better fit to the data than exponential 
functions, but they did not conduct formal statistical tests of this assertion. 
Nevertheless, they concluded that, “the corresponding form of Equations [11] and 
[13] implies that odds against in probabilistic discounting acts like delay in delay 
discounting and tends to confirm the speculation of Rachlin et al. (1986) that stated 
probability and stated delay have corresponding effects on behaviour” (RRC (p. 239-
240)). In the remainder of this section, I will evaluate this claim to determine whether 
it is justified. 
 
As discussed earlier, the “probability as delay” interpretation relies on a repeated 
gambles context. As RRC (p. 243) admit, the probabilities in their experiment were 
“one-shot” as opposed to repeated gambles. Furthermore, subjects did not experience 
any of the gambles, and hence did not experience any delay between choice and 
reward, because the experiment was entirely hypothetical. Thus, the original 
reinforcement rationale underlying the thought experiment in RLGF does not apply in 
this study and, thus, the probability as delay interpretation is tenuous in this context. 
 
A more fundamental problem is that the link between probability and delay in (6) and 
(12) was severed by removing the parameter t from expression (13). RRC provide no 
justification for this omission and I have been unable to find any explanation in 
studies which employ the PD model. 
 
Methodologically and statistically, the elicitation method suffers from notable 
drawbacks. To illustrate this point, suppose that someone is indifferent between $850 
with certainty and a lottery that pays $1,000 with a probability of 0.9 and $0 with a 
probability of 0.1. This implies that certain amounts greater than $850 will be 
preferred to the gamble but certain amounts less than $850 will not. Given that people 
cannot state indifference and that the amounts used in the procedure were typically in 
                                                
26 Using the median of the sample’s indifference points for each delay, and the median of the sample’s 
certainty equivalents for each probability, ignores the distribution of these indifference points and 
certainty equivalents (see Figure V). This approach, therefore, discards crucial information which 
should be used when drawing inferences from these data. In the analyses conducted in Section V I 
specifically use all of the information which the data imparts so as to estimate the parameters of PWFs 
and the uncertainty of these estimates. 
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increments of $50, the elicitation procedure will always over- or under-estimate this 
true value.  
 
For example, suppose a subject with this indifference point is offered the choice 
between $1,000 with a probability of 0.9 and $850 for sure. Given that the subject is 
indifferent between these options we can assume, for the sake of argument, that she 
selects either one with equal probability. If the subject selects $850 for this pair but 
then switches to the gamble when offered $800 with certainty, as her preferences 
dictate, her derived indifference point will be $825. If, on the other hand, the subject 
selects $1,000 with probability 0.9 over $850 with certainty, having selected the 
certain $900 previously, then her derived indifference point will be $875. Thus, unless 
a person’s true indifference point lies midway between two of the certain values used 
in the elicitation procedure, one will always over- or under-estimate her indifference 
point. This problem is magnified if people make mistakes in their decisions by, for 
example, selecting a less preferred option to a more preferred option. 
 




 Source: RRC (p. 237), Figure 3.  
 
This methodological issue raises an important statistical issue. Given that the estimate 
of an indifference point contains some error, one should be cognisant of the 
uncertainty of the estimate and model it statistically. In other words, every point 
PROBABILITY AND DELAY
ative to expected value), generating a function
similar (over most of its range) to the one pro-
posed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
When h < 1, Equation 5 predicts underdis-
counting of probabilistic outcomes.
METHOD
Subjects
Eighty students enrolled in an undergrad-
uate psychology course at the State University
of New York at Stony Brook served as subjects.
Their participation in this experiment was a
course requirement. Forty of the subjects were
used to obtain a probability discount function,
and 40 were used to obtain a delay discount
function.
Materials
Each subject was tested individually in a
small room containing two chairs and a table.
Cards were presented in pairs to all subjects.
One card stated an amount of money to be
paid for sure ($1,000, $990, $980, $960, $940,
$920, $900, $850, $800, $750, $700, $650,
$600, $550, $500, $450, $400, $350, $300,
$250, $200, $150, $100, $80, $60, $40, $20,
$10, $5, or $1). For subjects in the probability
discount group, the other card stated a prob-
ability of $1,000 as a percentage (95%, 90%,
70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, and 5% chances of win-
ning $1,000), whereas for subjects in the delay
discount group, the other card stated a delay
of $1,000 (1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years,
10 years, 25 years, and 50 years).
Procedure
Subjects in both probability and delay dis-
count groups were asked to state a preference
between the two cards. The probabilistic or
delayed $1,000 card remained in front of the
subject while the certain-immediate cards were
presented one by one next to it. Subjects in-
dicated their preference by pointing to one of
the cards.
The order in which both probabilistic $1,000
and delayed $1,000 cards were presented was
from highest valued to lowest valued. Thus,
the highest probabilities and lowest delays were
tested first. For each probability or delay, the
set of certain-immediate amounts was titrated
up and then down for 20 subjects and down
and then up for the other 20. A subject was
considered to have switched to the initially dis-
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Fig. 3. Distributions of individual certain-immediate
amounts equivalent to $1,000 with various probabilities.
of that alternative. Points of equivalence were
obtained by averaging the amounts just before
and just after the switch.
The following instructions were read to all
subjects in the probability discount groups:
The purpose of this experiment is to compare
your preferences for different amounts of money.
In this experiment you will be asked to make
a series of hypothetical decisions between mon-
etary alternatives. The experimenter will pre-
sent two sets of cards to you. The cards on your
left will offer you an amount of money that
will vary, but will always be given to you for
sure. On the cards on your right the amount
of money will be $1,000, but its payment will
be uncertain. That is, there will be a specified
chance that you get the 51,000. The chance of
winning the $1,000 will be written as a per-
centage. Please ask the experimenter to show
you an example of both sets of cards and clarify
any questions you might have.
You must always choose one of the two cards
by pointing to it with your hand.
Thanks for your cooperation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Figure 3 shows, for all 40 subjects (pooled),
distributions of amounts of money, available
with certainty, between which, and $1,000
237
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estimate has a distribution around it and to ignore this distribution is to assume it is 
degenerate. As the example above showed, this cannot be the case. Furthermore, to 
use some measure of central tendency, like the median as in RRC, to select the 
sample’s indifference point for each probability is to ignore the distribution of 
indifference points in the sample. As Figure V shows, for every probability in the 
experimental task there is a distribution of indifference points. Statistical techniques, 
which treat each choice by every subject in the elicitation procedure as a datum, 
should be used so that important information is not thrown away and the uncertainty 
surrounding derived indifference points is modelled appropriately. 
 
Thus, the PD model suffers from several theoretical shortcomings, and, in addition, 
the methodological and statistical approaches used to generate and analyse PD data 
have notable drawbacks. It seems premature then for Rachlin and colleagues to have 
claimed that probability is best interpreted as delay, and that they have provided a 
behavioural foundation for KT’s cognitive theory of choice, PT. 
 
In this section I traced the historical development of the PD model. The key feature of 
this model is that probabilities are interpreted as delays to, or rates of reinforcement 
of, rewards which therefore ties choice under risk to a temporal framework.27 I have 
discussed a number of shortcomings of this model, not least that the link between 
probability and delay was severed so as to derive a form for the PD function which is 
similar to a hyperbolic delay discounting function. In the next section I will 





                                                
27 As discussed in Chapter 2, intertemporal risk preferences represent a person’s preferences over 
intertemporal lotteries, the outcomes of which may be serially correlated. By assuming that probability 
is best interpreted as delay, Rachlin and colleagues not only confound instantaneous risk and time 
preferences but also fail to recognise the importance of intertemporal risk preferences. 
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IV. THE PD MODEL AND OTHER THEORIES OF CHOICE UNDER RISK 
 
A natural question when first encountering the PD model is: how does it relate to 
other theories of choice under risk? To answer this question, one must first understand 
the lotteries to which the theory applies. The PD model only applies to a limited class 
of gambles: simple, regular prospects in the terminology used earlier (i.e., those that 
take the form (x, p; 0, q)).  The model can incorporate gambles with a negative 
outcome (x < 0) but to keep the discussion simple I will focus exclusively on gambles 
with a positive outcome (x > 0). While the class of simple, regular prospects is 
undoubtedly interesting, the PD model does not address gambles involving two non-
zero outcomes (i.e., gambles with rewards x > 0 and y > 0), nor gambles with mixed 
domains (i.e., gambles with rewards x > 0 and y < 0), nor gambles involving more 
than two outcomes (i.e., gambles of the form (x, p; y, q; z, 1 – p – q). The model could 
be extended to incorporate these other types of lotteries but the form that this model 
would take, and whether the purported link between probability and delay would 
remain, is not clear. 
 
An issue that has been neglected in the literature on the PD model is that it employs 
the implicit assumption that utility or value is linear in outcomes. To see this, recall 
that the PD function takes the following form: V = x / (1 + γΘ) = xπ(Θ) = xπ(p) as Θ = 
((1 / p) – 1). Researchers use an elicitation procedure to find the value V which is 
subjectively equivalent to the gamble (x, p; 0, q). Thus, the experimental procedure is 
being used to elicit the certainty equivalent for gamble (x, p; 0, q). The certainty 
equivalent (CE) of a gamble is defined as the outcome or amount of money received 
with certainty that provides the same utility as the prospective utility of the gamble: 
 
 v(CE) = π(p)v(x) (14)  
 
By replacing v(CE) with V and v(x) with x, one assumes that utility is linear in 
outcomes. A large body of empirical research (see, for example, Harless and Camerer 
(1994), Hey and Orme (1994), Holt and Laury (2002), Andersen, Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2008), Harrison and Rutström (2008)) suggests that v is typically concave 
in outcomes. To assume that v is linear in x implies that risk preferences in the PD 
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model are determined solely by the function π(p) where π(p) = 1 / (1 + γΘ) and Θ = 
((1 / p) – 1).  
 
Note that apart from the specific functional form for π(p), the PD model is therefore 
exactly Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk (i.e., the RDEV model) 
limited to simple, regular prospects; recall that the RDEV model incorporates the 
potential for non-linear transformations of probabilities while assuming that utility is 
linear in outcomes. Yaari’s model is more general than the PD approach to risk 
preferences though because it admits different PWFs, lotteries with more than two 
prizes28, and lotteries which incorporate both positive and negative prizes (i.e., mixed 
domain gambles). Thus, the RDEV model is arguably the preferable theory if one 
wants to assume linear utility. 
 
When one recognises that the PD model is just the dual theory of choice under risk 
with a specific functional form for the PWF, the question of interest changes to 
whether this function is useful in applied research. Writing the PWF π(p) in terms of 
probabilities p rather than odds against Θ, it is clear what form this function takes:  
 
 π(p) = p / [p + γ(1 – p)] (15)  
 
Figure VI plots this PWF for different values of γ. When γ = 1, π(p) is linear. When γ 
< 1, π(p) is concave, which represents probability optimism, and when γ > 1, π(p) is 
convex, which represents probability pessimism and risk aversion. Given that this 
function is linear, concave or convex throughout its range, it cannot account for 
overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high 
probabilities. This function is very similar therefore to the common power PWF: π(p) 
= pγ. 
 
KT suggest that the PD model’s PWF might be too restrictive in that it cannot account 
for overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high 
probabilities. I sought to test this by comparing the PD model’s PWF to two functions 
                                                
28 In these cases, the RDEV model applies rank-dependent non-linear transformations of probabilities 
so that stochastic dominance is not violated. 
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commonly used in the literature.29 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (TK) popularised 
the following PWF: 
 
 π(p) = pγ / [pγ + (1 – p)γ]1/γ, (16)  
 
which is defined for 1 > p > 0. This function permits linear, inverse S-shaped and S-
shaped forms. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) review the empirical evidence on this 
function and find that 1 > γ > 0 in most studies. This gives the function an inverse S-
shape with overweighting of low probabilities up to a crossover point where π(p) = p, 




Prelec (1998) axiomatically derived the following two-parameter PWF: 
 
 π(p) =  exp[ -η(-ln p)γ ], (17)  
 
                                                
29 Stott (2006) reviews the “menagerie” of PWFs which have been developed for models (e.g., PT, 
RDU, and RDEV) that incorporate subjective distortions of probabilities.  
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Figure VI: PD model probability weighting function
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which is defined for 1 > p > 0, η > 0, and γ > 0.31,32 This function exhibits 
considerable flexibility in that it admits linear, inverse S-shaped and S-shaped forms 
when η = 1, and it incorporates objective weighting, underweighting, or 
overweighting of all probabilities when γ = 1. Thus, the Prelec function incorporates 
the qualitative properties of both the PD and TK functions for different parameter 
values. 
 
The data from Richards, Zhang, Mitchell and de Wit (1999) (RZMW) will be used to 
test the efficacy of the PD model’s PWF in applied research in comparison to those 
provided by TK and Prelec. 
 
 
V. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PD MODEL’S PWF 
 
RZMW recruited 24 subjects to take part in a within-subject experimental study, 
using real as opposed to hypothetical rewards, of the acute effects of moderate doses 
of alcohol on delay and probability discounting. They used the titration procedure 
discussed at length in Chapter 3, to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries which paid 
out $10 with various probabilities, and to determine the SS rewards which were 
subjectively equivalent to $10 at different delays. Participants took part in four 
experimental sessions or treatments: a pre-placebo session, a post-placebo session, a 
pre-ethanol session, and a post-ethanol session. Subjects were blind to the treatments.  
 
RZMW fitted hyperbolic and exponential delay discounting functions to each 
participant’s derived indifference points, and fitted hyperbolic and exponential PD 
functions to each participant’s elicited certainty equivalents. The researchers saved 
the R2 values for each function and for each participant, and then used them as data to 
construct tests of whether the hyperbolic or exponential functions provided better fits 
to the risk and time preference data. Note that using the point estimate of a statistic 
like R2 as a datum ignores the uncertainty of this estimate and, thus, does not produce 
                                                
31 Prelec (1998, proposition 1, part C, p. 503) provides these parameter restrictions. Prelec (1998, 
proposition 1, part B, p. 503) constrains 1 > γ > 0, but this constraint can be quite restrictive in practice 
because it ensures that the PWF is either linear, S-shaped or inverse-S shaped. 
32 Note that I impose these constraints when estimating the models using nonlinear transformations of 
the parameters. 
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a valid test of one function’s ability to better explain subject choices. Ignoring this 
issue, RZMW used Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests on these estimated R2 
values and “found” that the hyperbolic delay and PD functions explained the subject’s 
choices significantly better than the exponential delay and PD functions, respectively.  
 
Given the apparent superiority of the hyperbolic delay and PD functions, only these 
functions were used in subsequent analyses. Appendix C of RZMW (p. 140) includes 
all of the elicited certainty equivalents from the probability discounting task in the 
four experimental sessions, and these data will be used to determine the efficacy of 
the PD model’s PWF in empirical research.33 These data are used because they are 
readily available and the study’s experimental methodology has been replicated 
numerous times, both in incentivised (see, for example, Mitchell (1999), Reynolds, 
Karraker, Horn and Richards (2003), Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004)) 
and non-incentivised (see Ohmura, Takahashi and Kitamura (2005) and Sheffer et al. 
(2013)) studies. 
 
RZMW elicited certainty equivalents for simple, regular prospects of the form ($10, 
p; 0, q) where p took on the values: 1, 0.9, 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25. These certainty 
equivalents were elicited in each of the four experimental choice sessions and, thus, 
each participant provides 20 data points for analysis. Note that each subject’s elicited 
certainty equivalents are not independent observations and this should be taken into 
account in the analyses; RZMW did not cluster the standard errors of the estimates to 
accommodate this lack of independence.  
 
RZMW converted the five probabilities listed above into odds against winning and 
then used non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimation to find the best fitting 
hyperbolic function (13) for these data. RZMW (see Appendix A, p. 138) estimated 
the value of γ in (13) for each subject in each experimental session, they averaged the 
certainty equivalents in the pre-placebo and pre-ethanol sessions and then estimated 
the value of γ for each subject (see Table 1, p. 131), and they used the median 
                                                
33 Unfortunately RZMW do not provide the choice data which was used to derive the certainty 
equivalents and I am forced, therefore, to analyse the certainty equivalents in this section rather than 
the choice data itself. Nevertheless, the statistical approach I adopt is the appropriate method for 
analysing these data. 
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certainty equivalent of the sample for each probability to estimate a grand value of γ 
for all subjects (see RZMW (p. 132), Figure 4).34,35 
 
I adopt a different approach to data analysis which uses all of the data (i.e., elicited 
certainty equivalents and not statistics like the mean or median of elicited certainty 
equivalents) provided by all of the subjects across all of the sessions to estimate the 
parameters of PWFs at the level of the sample. In addition, I formally incorporate the 
fact that each subject made multiple choices in the task and across the sessions. By 
using all of the information that the data provides while accounting for the lack of 
independence of observations, I am able to draw accurate inferences from these data. 
Note that NLLS and maximum likelihood (ML) estimators are consistent as the 
sample size n tends toward infinity. All of RZMW’s estimates rely on 5 observations 
so it is highly questionable whether any of the asymptotic properties of the estimators 
can be invoked. 
 
To compare the PD model’s PWF to those provided by TK and Prelec, I will use 
probabilities rather than odds against in my estimating equations. Expressions (13) 
and (15) can be used derive the non-linear equation for estimating γ when odds 
against has been transformed back into probability: 
 
 Vi = xi(pi / [pi + γ(1 – pi)]) + εi, (18)  
 
where the subscript i denotes each observation, V is the elicited certainty equivalent of 
the reward x = $10 for a probability p, and ε is the regression error term assumed to be 
a Normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. 
 
To estimate this model in a ML framework one must explicitly identify the log-
likelihood by expanding (18): 
 
ln Li(γ, σ; y, X) = ln Φ {[Vi – xi(pi / [pi + γ(1 – pi)])] / σi} – ln σi, (19)  
 
                                                
34 Note that using the average and/or the median of elicited certainty equivalents discards useful 
information on the distribution of these data and does not allow one, therefore, to draw accurate 
inferences from these data. 
35 I have replicated these results but do not present them here because they are available in RZMW. 
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where Φ is the standard normal density with mean 0 and variance 1, y represents the 
data that is used to estimate γ and σ (i.e., V, x, and p), and X is a vector of individual 
characteristics and task parameters like age, gender, and experimental treatment. 
 
An ML framework is attractive because it is straightforward to allow for multiple 
responses by the same subject (i.e., clustering), to perform non-nested model selection 
tests which rely on comparisons of the log-likelihoods of each observation in each 
model, to make the parameter of interest (i.e., γ in (19)) a linear function of 
observable characteristics, and to estimate a mixture model of the different PWFs.36 It 
is also simple to adjust (19) to incorporate the TK and Prelec PWFs. 
 
TABLE I: PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  PD TK Prelec 
PWF parameter (γ) 1.303*** 0.754*** 0.739*** 
 
(0.181) (0.053) (0.062) 
PWF parameter (η) 
  
1.039*** 
   
(0.082) 
Sigma (σ) 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
N 480 480 480 
log-likelihood 257.853 274.844 278.315 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table I presents estimates of the RDEV model which employs the PD, TK and Prelec 
PWFs and accounts for multiple responses by the same subject. The estimate of γ = 
1.303 for the PD function, which is significantly greater than 1 (p = 0.094), implies 
underweighting of all probabilities. By contrast, the estimate of γ = 0.754 for the TK 
PWF, which is significantly less than 1 (p < 0.001), implies overweighting of low 
probabilities and underweighting of moderate to high probabilities. Similarly, the 
estimate of γ = 0.793 for the Prelec PWF also yields an inverse S-shaped function. 
The estimate of η = 1.039, however, is not significantly different to 1 (p = 0.637).  
 
                                                
36 With NLLS it is also straightforward to incorporate clustering and to make the parameter of interest a 
linear function of observable characteristics. Thus, one benefits from an ML approach if one wants to 
conduct non-nested model selection tests or estimate mixture models. 
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Figure VII plots the PWFs, and implied decision weights, for the estimates in Table I. 
The decision weights are graphed for an equi-probable (i.e., 50:50) reference lottery 
and show the decision weight applied to the worst outcome in the lottery ($0 in the 
PD task) and the decision weight applied to the best outcome in the lottery ($10 in the 
PD task). Focussing on the implied decision weights for the PD model, the decision 
weight applied to the worst outcome ($0) is 0.57 and the decision weight applied to 
the best outcome ($10) is 0.43. In other words, the PD PWF implies that the 
probability of the worst outcome is overweighted (0.57), and the probability of the 
best outcome is underweighted (0.43), relative to the objective probabilities of 0.5.  
 
The same pattern emerges for the other PWFs but it is not as pronounced. In the case 
of the TK PWF, the decision weight applied to the worst outcome is 0.53 and the 
decision weight applied to the best outcome is 0.47. Finally, for the Prelec PWF, the 
decision weight applied to the worst outcome is 0.55 and the decision weight applied 
to the best outcome is 0.45. To reiterate, these decision weights are based on an equi-
probable reference lottery and the decision weights will change as the probabilities in 






























































Based on an equi-probable (i.e., 50:50) reference lottery
Figure VII: Estimated probability weighting functions and implied decision weights
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The log-likelihoods for the TK and Prelec functions exceed the log-likelihood for the 
PD function, suggesting that the TK and Prelec functions better characterise the data. 
This hypothesis can be tested formally using Vuong (1989) and Clarke (2007) non-
nested model selection tests. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Clarke test is 
asymptotically more efficient and has greater power in discriminating between 
models than the Vuong test when the distribution of the models’ individual log-ratios 
is highly peaked. In other words, when the distribution of these log-ratios is 
leptokurtic37, the Clarke test is superior, from both statistical efficiency and power 




Figure VIII plots the distribution of the individual log-ratios, with a normal density 
overlay, for the three PWF comparisons. The distribution of these log-ratios is 
leptokurtic (i.e., highly peaked) which suggests that the Clarke test is more 
appropriate for these data. The Clarke test yields a test statistic based on the binomial 
distribution which must be compared to a critical value to determine which model, in 
a pairwise comparison, receives the most support in the data. A Clarke test comparing 
                                                
37 The normal distribution is the quintessential mesokurtic distribution. A distribution which has 
















Figure VIII: Distribution of individual log-ratios
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the PD and TK functions yields a test statistic of 197, which is below the critical value 
of 240, implying that the TK function better characterises the data (p < 0.001).  
 
A Clarke test comparing the PD PWF and the Prelec PWF finds in favour of the 
Prelec function (p < 0.001). Finally, a Clarke test of the TK and Prelec PWFs suggests 
that the Prelec function finds more support in the data (p < 0.001). Based on these 
tests the following transitive ranking of PWFs emerges: the Prelec function finds the 
most support in the data, followed by the TK function, and then the PD function. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is straightforward to make the parameter(s) of interest in our 
models a linear function of observable characteristics and thereby admit heterogeneity 
in the PWF estimates. RZMW collected each participant’s gender and Appendix C (p. 
140) groups the elicited certainty equivalents by experimental session and divides 
participants by whether they received a low or high dose of ethanol. Table II presents 
estimates of the RDEV model which incorporates these variables in the three models. 
 
Gender and ethanol dose are not statistically significant in any of the models and none 
of the experimental treatment variables are statistically significant in the TK model. 
However, the estimate of γ in the PD model is significantly higher in the pre-ethanol 
session than in the pre-placebo session (the omitted base category). Wald tests show 
that the estimate in the pre-ethanol session is also significantly greater than the 
estimates in the post-placebo (p = 0.038) and the post-ethanol (p = 0.034) sessions. 
This result is contrary to the hypothesis that ethanol increases probabilistic 
discounting, which the researchers set out to test, and differs to RZMW who found no 
statistically significant difference between the estimates of γ in the pre- and post-
ethanol sessions.38 Note that RZMW used estimates of γ as data to conduct t-tests of 
potential differences across the pre- and post-ethanol sessions. The valid approach to 
analysis which I have adopted uses all of the information which a dataset imparts to 
estimate the parameters of a model and conduct hypothesis tests on these estimates. 
These differences in analysis likely explain the contradictory findings. 
 
                                                
38 RZMW did not compare the estimate of γ in the pre-ethanol session to the estimates of γ in the pre-
placebo and post-placebo sessions. 
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The estimates of γ for the Prelec PWF do not differ significantly according to 
observable characteristics and task parameters but the estimate of η in the pre-ethanol 
session is significantly higher than in the pre-placebo session (the omitted base 
category). In addition, Wald tests show that the estimate of η in the pre-ethanol 
session is significantly higher than estimates in the post-placebo (p = 0.017) and post-
ethanol (p < 0.038) sessions. These results mirror those for γ in the PD model. 
 
TABLE II: PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  PD TK Prelec 
PWF parameter (γ) 
   Male 0.035 -0.011 0.007 
 
(0.341) (0.096) (0.130) 
Ethanol - high dose 0.45 -0.08 0.023 
 
(0.378) (0.107) (0.130) 
Post-placebo session -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.048) (0.018) (0.027) 
Pre-ethanol session 0.223** -0.045 0.005 
 
(0.108) (0.031) (0.045) 
Post-ethanol session 0.062 0.005 0.044 
 
(0.099) (0.036) (0.042) 
Constant 1.003*** 0.811*** 0.715*** 
  (0.184) (0.073) (0.118) 
PWF parameter (η) 
   Male 
  
0.027 
   
(0.172) 
Ethanol - high dose 
  
0.215 




















      (0.116) 
Sigma (σ) 
   Constant 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.132*** 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
N 480 480 480 
log-likelihood 269.434 278.331 289.727 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The Clarke tests conducted earlier are based on the implicit assumption that the 
observations are produced by only one data generating process (DGP) (i.e., the PD 
PWF or the TK PWF) when more may be present in the data. In other words, the PD 
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function may explain some choices in the data better than the TK function whereas 
the TK function may explain other choices in the data better than the PD function. 
The assumption that only one DGP characterises all of the data, clearly precludes 
such a possibility.  
 
Mixture models39 allow two or more DGPs to account for the data and also provide a 
measure of the proportion of the data which is explained by each process. In the 
current context, one can estimate a mixture model of, say, the PD and TK PWFs and 
then ask the data to tell one how much support each function has. To do so one 
specifies a “grand likelihood” function which is just a probability-weighted average of 
the likelihoods of the two models. 
 
Letting πPD represent the probability that the PD model’s PWF is correct, and πTK = (1 
– πPD) the probability that the TK function is correct, the grand likelihood is the 
probability-weighted average of the two conditional likelihoods LPD and LTK for the 
PD and TK models, respectively. Thus, the likelihood for the mixture model is given 
by: 
 
 ln Li(γPD, γTK, κ; y, X) = Σi ln [(πPD × LPD) + (πTK × LTK)], (20)  
 
where κ is a parameter which defines the log odds of the probability of the PD model: 
πPD = 1 / (1 + exp(κ)). Note that this transformation allows the parameter κ to take on 
any value during the maximisation process but it constrains the probabilities πPD and 
πTK to lie within the unit interval. The grand likelihood in (20) is maximised to 
estimate the parameters of each model and the weight accorded to each model in the 
data. 
 
Table III presents estimates of the mixture model of the PD and TK PWFs. The 
estimate of γPD = 4.802 is large and implies extreme underweighting of probabilities 
but the 95% confidence interval shows that it is estimated very imprecisely. The 
mixture probability πPD = 0.130 implies that approximately 13% of the data is best 
characterised by the PD model’s PWF but this estimate is not significantly different to 
                                                
39 For detailed discussions of mixture models consult McLachlan and Peel (2000), Harrison and 
Rutström (2009), and Conte, Hey and Moffatt (2011). 
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zero (p = 0.146).40 The estimate of γTK =  0.855, which is significantly less than 1 (p = 
0.005) implies overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate to 
high probabilities. Finally, the estimate of πTK = 0.870 implies that approximately 
87% of the data is best characterised by the TK PWF, although I cannot reject the 
hypothesis that this estimate is equal to 1 (p = 0.146). Thus, the PD model’s PWF 
finds almost no support in the data, even when it is allowed to account for only a 
fraction of the choices in the experiment. 
 
TABLE III: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
PD AND TK FUNCTIONS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      PD probability weighting function
      PWF parameter (γPD) 4.802** 2.163 0.026 0.563 9.042 
      Mixture probability (πPD) 0.130 0.089 0.146 -0.045 0.304 
      TK probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γTK) 0.855*** 0.052 0.000 0.752 0.957 
      Mixture probability (πTK) 0.870*** 0.089 0.000 0.696 1.045 
      Sigma 
      Constant (σ) 0.110*** 0.016 0.000 0.079 0.141 
            
N 480 
    log-likelihood 298.681     
      H0: πTK = 1, p-value = 0.146 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
The preceding results suggest that the PD model’s PWF is potentially too restrictive 
when trying to classify risk preferences using the RDEV model. According to Clarke 
tests, the TK and Prelec PWFs find more support in the data than the PD function. A 
                                                
40 The lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for the mixture probability πPD is less than 0 and the 
upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the mixture probability πTK is greater than 1, even 
though the log odds transformation constrains these probabilities to lie within the unit interval. These 
values lie outside the unit interval due to the use of the delta method (see Oehlert (1992)), which is an 
approximation, much like a Taylor series, to transform κ into the mixture probabilities. 
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mixture model of the PD and TK PWFs confirms this result and finds almost no 
support for the PD model in the data.41,42  
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter reviewed the development of the PD model so as to link it to other 
theories of choice under risk and to highlight its theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings. The PD model attempts to tie choice under risk to a temporal 
framework by reinterpreting probability as delay to, or rate of reinforcement of, 
reward. This interpretation is loose in the context of one-shot gambles, and RRC 
abandoned the purported link between probability and delay so as to develop a PWF 
which has a similar form to a hyperbolic delay discounting function when 
probabilities have been transformed into odds against winning. This chapter showed 
that the PD model is formally isomorphic to Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice 
under risk, limited to a certain class of lotteries and with a specific functional form for 
the PWF. 
 
The theoretical issues with the PD model are matched by the methodological problem 
of using an experimental procedure, which is not incentive compatible, to elicit 
certainty equivalents. Furthermore, the statistical tools applied to these data do not 
take into account the DGP and the use of estimates as data is invalid. Finally, 
estimators which only have attractive asymptotic properties should not be used with 
tiny samples.  
 
An obvious critique of the analyses conducted in Section V is that I did not 
incorporate concave utility when comparing the virtues of different PWFs. This 
                                                
41 Appendix D presents estimates from a mixture model of the TK and Prelec PWFs and discusses 
problems I encountered when trying to estimate a mixture model of the Prelec and PD PWFs. 
42 Harrison and Rutström (2009) extend mixture models to incorporate observable heterogeneity in 
individual characteristics and treatments. Conte, Hey and Moffatt (2011), by contrast, show that one 
can estimate the mixture probability as a random coefficient, and thereby attain a better econometric 
characterisation of unobserved heterogeneity. I adopt the approach of Harrison and Rutström (2009) in 
Chapters 3 and 5 by making the mixture probability a linear function of observable characteristics and 
task parameters. I do not incorporate observable heterogeneity in estimates of the mixture probability 
in this chapter because the focus is on the ability of different PWFs to explain the data, under the 
assumption of homogenous preferences; incorporating observable heterogeneity is also not warranted 
given the small sample size of the RZMW data.  
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choice was deliberate because I wanted to judge the PD model as it was formulated 
rather than reformulate it to account for risk attitudes which are affected by the shape 
of the utility function.43 
 
Another critique of the analyses conducted in Section V is that I focussed on only two 
PWFs when numerous others exist in the literature. I selected the TK and Prelec 
functions because they have been used extensively, they allow for overweighting and 
underweighting of probabilities, and the two-parameter Prelec function is remarkably 
flexible. The crucial finding is that the RZMW data is better characterised by 
functions which allow for overweighting and underweighting of probabilities, which 
implies that the PD function may be too restrictive in some circumstances. 
 
In sum, the PD model adds little to our understanding of choice under risk and suffers 
from a number of theoretical and empirical limitations. Researchers in psychology 
and addiction studies would be well served by embracing other theories of choice 
under risk, using experimental methods which promote, rather than hinder, elicitation 
of preferences, and statistical techniques that are appropriate to the data generated by 




                                                
43 In Chapter 5, I estimate RDU models which allow risk preferences to be determined both by the 
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5. RISK AND TIME PREFERENCES AND 




The literature review in Chapter 3 suggested that there is a positive relationship 
between smoking and discounting behaviour: smokers tend to discount the future 
more heavily than non-smokers. However, the bulk of studies in this literature rely on 
small samples, hypothetical rewards, restrictive assumptions about the form that 
discounting takes, and statistical tools which are not appropriate to the data that are 
collected. I sought to remedy some of these shortcomings by investigating the 
smoking-discounting relationship using two relatively large samples, four distinct 
discounting functions, and a maximum likelihood estimation framework which is 
consistent with the process(es) which generate time preference data.  
 
However, the analyses in Chapter 3 did not directly incorporate the shape of people’s 
utility functions in the estimation of discounting parameters.1 This is a crucial issue 
because time preferences are defined over time-dated utility flows, not flows of 
money. These are equivalent if a utility function is linear but Andersen, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström (2008) (AHLR) showed that if a utility function is concave then the 
assumption of linearity will bias the estimation of discounting parameters upwards. 
Thus, to draw accurate inferences about discounting behaviour it is important to 
incorporate utility function curvature in the estimation of discounting models.  
 
In this chapter I report the results from a set of instantaneous risk2 and time preference 
experiments conducted on a sample of student smokers and non-smokers at the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) in 2012. The experimental design allows me to 
                                                
1 In Appendix B I present a parametric approach to this identification problem which involves the 
estimation of  “profile likelihoods” to determine the optimal shape of the sample’s utility function 
given the data. This approach has its merits but is second-best to collecting experimental data which 
allows one to estimate the shape of the utility function jointly with the parameters of discounting 
models. I will adopt this latter approach in this chapter. 
2 The discussion in chapter 2 highlighted the importance of both instantaneous and intertemporal risk 
preferences in the analysis of choice behaviour. As mentioned previously, this thesis only empirically 
examines instantaneous risk preferences so all subsequent references to “risk preferences” refer to the 
instantaneous or atemporal variety, unless otherwise noted. 
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explore potential differences in the risk and time preferences of smokers and non-
smokers and jointly estimate utility function curvature and discounting behaviour. I 
find no significant differences in the risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers but 
find that smokers discount significantly more heavily than non-smokers. These results 
are robust to different assumptions about the way people evaluate lotteries and the 
way they discount utility flows. In addition, I find that smokers may be more likely to 
discount hyperbolically than non-smokers, which, under the assumption of an 
additively-separable intertemporal utility function, means they may be more prone to 
time inconsistency. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section II I review previous research on the 
relationship between risk preferences and smoking behaviour. This section 
complements the review in Chapter 3 of the relationship between time preferences 
and smoking behaviour and ties in the discussion of probability discounting in 
Chapter 4. In Section III I discuss the experimental design and present summary 
statistics for the sample and in Section IV I formulate the statistical approach to data 
analysis. Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. A REVIEW OF THE SMOKING AND RISK PREFERENCES LITERATURE 
 
The decision to smoke involves clear risks, like the potential for negative health 
consequences, and is made under conditions of uncertainty, i.e., without knowing 
one’s susceptibility to these risks. It is presumably linked, therefore, to an individual’s 
attitudes toward risk and uncertainty. Specifically, smokers may be less risk averse 
than non-smokers and this greater penchant to take on risk may incline them to 
smoke. In this section I review the experimental literature on risk preferences and 
smoking behaviour.  
 
Table I provides a detailed summary of studies investigating this relationship. Online 
searches of PubMed and Econlit, employing the search criteria “smoking” and “risk 
preferences” and their variants (e.g., “smoke,” “risk”, and “probability discounting”), 
were used to locate these papers. Unlike the literature on time preferences and 
smoking behaviour there is a dearth of studies analysing the risk preferences of 
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smokers and non-smokers. An initial list of studies was trimmed according to the 
following rules: the study had to include a clear smoker, non-smoker comparison3; 
and study participants had to make choices between lotteries4 involving amounts of 
money, rather than cigarettes or quality-adjusted life years.5 The 11 studies satisfying 
these criteria are listed in Table I. 
 
Mitchell (1999) conducted the first experimental study investigating the risk 
preferences of 20 relatively heavy6, current smokers (NS = 20) and 20 never-smokers 
(NNS = 20). She presented subjects with 137 choice questions between a lottery which 
paid out $10 with specific probabilities (p = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, and 1) and $0 
with the complementary probability (i.e., the lottery ($10, p; $0, 1 – p) using the 
notation from Chapter 4), and a sure amount of money which varied between $0.01 
and $10.50. The questions were drawn randomly from this battery, without 
replacement, and presented to subjects sequentially. At the end of the experiment, one 
of a subject’s choices was selected randomly for payment. 
 
Mitchell used each subject’s choices to determine a certainty equivalent for the lottery 
($10, p; $0, 1 – p) at different values of p. For example, if a subject chose $4 over the 
lottery ($10, 0.5; $0, 0.5) but then chose the lottery ($10, 0.5; $0, 0.5) over $3.50, the 
subject was assigned a certainty equivalent of $3.75. Taking the average of these two 
values is arbitrary and doing so throws away information about the uncertainty of this 
estimate; all that one can infer from this pattern of choices is that a subject’s certainty 
equivalent lies in the open interval ($3.50, $4). Interval data of this form is analysed 
appropriately using interval regression methods but Mitchell used the estimated 
certainty equivalents (i.e., the point estimate $3.75 in the example) as data to 
construct Mann-Whitney tests of differences in the certainty equivalents of heavy 
smokers and never-smokers; no significant differences between these groups were 
found. 
                                                
3 Lawyer, Schoepflin, Green and Jenks (2011) investigate whether the risk preferences of smokers and 
non-smokers differ when they make choices over hypothetical or real rewards. However, the 
researchers do not compare the risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers so this study is not 
included in Table I. 
4 A number of studies (e.g., Bradford (2010), Jusot and Khlat (2013)) use survey questions which try to 
elicit general attitudes toward risk and were excluded for this reason. 
5 van der Pol and Ruggeri (2008) investigate risk preferences over hypothetical health outcomes. 
6 The smokers in Mitchell’s (1999) study stated that they smoked at least 15 cigarettes per day and 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition, Mitchell fitted the probability discounting (PD) probability weighting 
function (PWF)7 to the certainty equivalents for each subject and then compared the 
estimated PWF parameters of smokers and never-smokers. She found evidence of risk 
aversion in both groups (i.e., γ > 1) but no significant differences in the risk 
preferences of smokers and never-smokers. Echoing the issue raised earlier, using the 
point estimate of any parameter as a datum ignores the uncertainty of this estimate 
and should not be used for inferential purposes.8 
 
Reynolds, Karraker, Horn and Richards (2003) (RKHR) found that risk preferences 
differ according to smoking status but perhaps not in the way that would be expected, 
and with a statistical approach which is not valid. RKHR used the titration algorithm 
of Richards, Zhang, Mitchell and de Wit (1999), which was discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3, to elicit certainty equivalents for the lottery ($10, p; $0, 1 – p) at different 
values of p among adolescent smokers (NS = 19), adolescent never-smokers (NNS = 
19), and adolescent “triers” (NT = 17).9,10 Subjects also completed a delay discounting 
task and they were paid for one choice across both tasks; this payment scheme is 
referred to as 1-out-of-2-tasks in Table I.  
 
RKHR fitted the PD PWF to the estimated certainty equivalents, using non-linear 
least squares (NLLS) estimation, and then used the estimated PWF parameters as data 
in an ANOVA model so as to compare the three smoking status groups. For reasons 
                                                
7 Chapter 4 showed that the PD model is just Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk limited to 
a circumscribed class of lotteries and with a specific PWF: π(p) = p / [p + γ(1 – p)]; if γ > 1 this 
represents probability pessimism and risk aversion. Recall that to derive this form for the PWF, 
Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991) severed the purported link between probability and delay which they 
argued was so central to the way people interpret probabilities. Thus, the specific form of this PWF 
lacks consistent theoretical foundations.  
8 The seventh column of Table I lists the statistical method that was adopted in each study and provides 
a binary summary judgement (i.e., valid or not valid), in parentheses, of whether the statistical 
approach was valid given the data obtained in the experiment. This binary summary judgement does 
not imply that the estimates which the researchers obtained were “wrong” but rather that the method 
used to derive the estimates was not appropriate for the data. 
9 “Triers” had smoked cigarettes for the first time in the 6 months prior to the study and they smoked 
an average of 3.76 cigarettes in total over this time span. Smokers, by contrast, had smoked every week 
for at least 6 months prior to the study and they smoked 46.42 cigarettes, on average, per week. 
10 As discussed in Chapter 3, a titration algorithm is susceptible to being “gamed” by subjects because 
it narrows the search for the interval within which a person’s certainty equivalent, for a particular value 
of p, lies by making the choices an experimental subject faces contingent on his prior choices. Thus, 
titration procedures lack incentive compatibility. Moreover, RKHR used the mid-point of the titration-
derived interval as the person’s certainty equivalent, even though any value within this interval is 
consistent with the data generating process (DGP). In other words, RKHR used an estimate as data, 
without taking into account the uncertainty of this estimate.  
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outlined earlier, this statistical approach is not valid but RKHR report that they found 
evidence of risk aversion in all groups (γ > 1) and they found that “triers” were more 
risk averse than smokers (p < 0.05) and never-smokers (p < 0.05); there were no 
significant differences between smokers and never-smokers. 
 
This two-step approach to analysis (i.e., using NLLS, or some other technique, to 
estimate risk preference parameters and then using the point estimates as data in 
subsequent statistical models) is remarkably common in this literature. Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström (2010) (HLR) is the only study in Table I which does not use this 
method, and for good reason. The problem with the two-step approach, other than that 
it often uses tiny samples to estimate risk preference parameters at the level of the 
individual, is that estimated risk preference parameters are estimates, and not data. 
Such estimates comprise both a point estimate (of the mean) and a standard error, and 
to use only the point estimate is to throw away information on the uncertainty of that 
estimate.11 Moreover, using an estimated risk preference parameter as data violates 
the statistical assumptions of the second-stage models: specifically, that the covariates 
are measured without error. Thus, the statistical inferences drawn from this approach 
are simply not valid. HLR estimate risk preference parameters as a linear function of 
observable characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and smoking status) so that the 
uncertainty of the risk preference parameter estimates propagates into the inferences 
which are drawn from the data. This valid statistical approach will be used in this 
chapter. 
 
Table I collates the results from the other studies. A clear majority of the studies (8 
out of 11) were conducted in the US, with only one study a piece taking place in 
Japan, Denmark, and South Africa. An important feature of these studies is that only 3 
use student subject pools while the rest recruit from the community at large; diverse 
samples help to bolster the external validity of the results so it is unfortunate that the 
statistical analyses in every study except HLR hinder meaningful inferences. 
 
                                                
11 This problem is compounded when certainty equivalents are computed by taking an average of the 
interval within which a person’s certainty equivalent lies (i.e., taking the average of an interval derived 
by a titration mechanism). In this case, there are two levels of uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about the 
certainty equivalents and uncertainty about the parameter estimates) which are ignored when the final 
point estimate of a risk preference parameter is used as data. 
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The majority of studies on risk preferences and smoking behaviour have small sample 
sizes: the first 7 studies listed in Table I recruited less than 60 people. Fortunately, 
since 2008, 4 relatively large studies have taken place: Anderson and Mellor (2008) 
(AM) elicited risk preference data on 79 smokers and 898 non-smokers; HLR 
recruited 252 subjects; Szrek, Chao, Ramlagan and Peltzer (2012) (SCRP) used a 
sample of 351 individuals; and Poltavski and Weatherley (2013) recruited 182 people. 
 
With regards to elicitation mechanisms, there is a roughly equal split between titration 
(6 out of 11 studies) and choice procedures. AM, HLR, and SCRP used an ordered 
choice elicitation mechanism, originally devised by Miller, Meyer and Lanzetta 
(1969) and refined by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL), which has been used extensively 
in the experimental economics literature on choice under risk, and thereby deserves 
further comment.12 This elicitation procedure is referred to as a multiple price list 
(MPL). 
 
In a MPL, subjects are given a table with 10 rows, and on each row they must choose 
between a “safe” and a “risky” lottery. In Table II, which is adapted from Table I in 
HL (p. 1645), Option A is the “safe” lottery because the range of the prizes is small 
(e.g., ($2.00, p; $1.60, 1 – p)), and Option B is the “risky” lottery because the range of 
the prizes is large (e.g., ($3.85, p; $0.10, 1 – p)). On row 1 of the table p = 0.1, and as 
you move down the table p increases by 0.1 on each row, implying that by row 10, p 
= 1. In the last 3 columns of the table I have included the expected value (EV) of 
Option A, the EV of Option B, and their difference, although this information is not 
usually provided to subjects.  
 
In row 1 of Table II, the EV of Option A exceeds the EV of Option B but by row 5 
the EV of Option B exceeds the EV of Option A. The logic behind this elicitation 
mechanism is that only a very risk loving subject would choose Option B (the “risky” 
lottery) on row 1, and only a very risk averse subject would choose Option A (the 
“safe” lottery) on row 9.13 A risk neutral subject would switch from choosing Option 
                                                
12 Harrison and Rutström (2008, p. 44-61) provide a detailed discussion of different risk preference 
elicitation mechanisms. 
13 As row 10 involves sure outcomes (i.e., p = 1) it is not relevant to risk preferences at all but is a good 
test of whether subjects understood the experiment because one would expect them to choose the larger 
sure outcome (e.g., $3.85 from the example) over the smaller sure outcome (e.g., $2.00 from the 
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A to Option B as the EV difference first changes sign (i.e., on row 5 of the table). 
Thus, if a subject switches to Option B before row 5 he is risk loving, if he switches 
to Option B on row 5 he is risk neutral, and if he switches to Option B after row 5 he 
is risk averse. 
 




Option B EVA EVB Difference 
Row p $ p $   p $ p $ ($) ($) ($) 
1 0.1 2.00 0.9 1.60 
 
0.1 3.85 0.9 0.10 1.64 0.48 1.17 
2 0.2 2.00 0.8 1.60 
 
0.2 3.85 0.8 0.10 1.68 0.85 0.83 
3 0.3 2.00 0.7 1.60 
 
0.3 3.85 0.7 0.10 1.72 1.23 0.50 
4 0.4 2.00 0.6 1.60 
 
0.4 3.85 0.6 0.10 1.76 1.60 0.16 
5 0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60 
 
0.5 3.85 0.5 0.10 1.80 1.98 -0.18 
6 0.6 2.00 0.4 1.60 
 
0.6 3.85 0.4 0.10 1.84 2.35 -0.51 
7 0.7 2.00 0.3 1.60 
 
0.7 3.85 0.3 0.10 1.88 2.73 -0.85 
8 0.8 2.00 0.2 1.60 
 
0.8 3.85 0.2 0.10 1.92 3.10 -1.18 
9 0.9 2.00 0.1 1.60 
 
0.9 3.85 0.1 0.10 1.96 3.48 -1.52 
10 1 2.00 0 1.60   1 3.85 0 0.10 2.00 3.85 -1.85 
Source: HL (p. 1645) 
 
We can say even more about risk preferences by putting some parametric structure on 
the subjects’ utility functions. Specifically, if we assume that subjects employ a power 
utility function U(y) = yr, which displays constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), and 
that they evaluate lotteries according to expected utility (EU) theory, then we can use 
a subject’s pattern of choices on the MPL to define bounds on the risk preference 
parameter r.14  
 
For example, suppose that a subject chose Option A on the first 5 rows of Table II and 
then switched to Option B on row 6. To calculate the upper bound on r we solve the 
following equation: 
 
0.5($2.00)r + 0.5($1.60)r = 0.5($3.85)r + 0.5($0.10)r ⇔ r  ≈ 0.85 
                                                                                                                                      
example). Harrison and Rutström (2009, p. 132) also advocate including a row 0 where the smaller 
outcome under each lottery (i.e., $1.60 under Option A and $0.10 under Option B) is received with 
certainty so as to “bracket” the MPL logic. In other words, if subjects can see that they should choose 
Option A on row 0 and Option B on row 10, then all they need to determine is the row on which they 
switch. 
14 Under EU theory the shape of a utility function determines attitudes toward risk. Using the power 
utility function above, r > 1 denotes risk loving behaviour, r = 1 denotes risk neutral behaviour, and r < 
1 denotes risk aversion. If r = 0, U(y) = ln y, and if r < 0, U(y) = -yr, following Wakker (2008). AM, 
HLR and SCRP use a different parameterisation of the CRRA utility function: U(y) = y(1-r)/(1-r). Under 
this formulation, r < 0 denotes risk loving behaviour, r = 0 implies risk neutral behaviour, and r > 0 
denotes risk aversion; if r = 1, U(y) = ln y. 
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This equation defines the value of r which makes a subject indifferent between the 
two lotteries on row 5. To calculate the lower bound on r we solve the following 
equation: 
 
0.6($2.00)r + 0.4($1.60)r = 0.6($3.85)r + 0.4($0.10)r ⇔ r  ≈ 0.59 
 
This equation defines the value of r which makes a subject indifferent between the 
two lotteries on row 6. Thus, if a subject chooses the Option A lottery on the first 5 
rows and then switches to the Option B lottery on row 6, this pattern of choices 
implies a risk preference parameter r which lies in the open interval (0.59, 0.85). 
Interval data of this form is analysed appropriately using interval regression methods 
but AM and SCRP used the mid-point of these intervals as data to compare the risk 
preferences of smokers and non-smokers. As discussed previously, this approach 
throws away useful information on the uncertainty of the parameter estimates and 
violates the statistical assumptions of the second-stage models. Thus, the inferences 
drawn from these data are not valid statistically. 
 
In contrast to studies of smoking and discounting behaviour, there is a greater 
proportion of studies using real rewards or probabilistic payment schemes in the 
literature on smoking and risk preferences. Table I shows that 4 studies (Mitchell 
(1999), Reynolds et al. (2007), AM, SCRP) used only real rewards, whereas 3 studies 
used probabilistic payment schemes (RKHR, Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker 
(2004), HLR).15 The remaining 4 studies (Ohmura, Takahashi and Kitamura (2005), 
Reynolds (2006), Yi, Chase and Bickel (2007), Poltavski and Weatherly (2013)) used 
entirely hypothetical rewards. As discussed in Chapter 3, the use of real rewards or 
probabilistic payment schemes – coupled with a task that is easily understood, a 
transparent payment scheme, salient rewards, and an incentive-compatible 
                                                
15 Studies employing real rewards typically make use of the random lottery incentive mechanism 
(RLIM) to determine subject payment. RLIM randomly selects one of a subject’s choices on a task and, 
in a study with real rewards, pays out this choice with certainty. A probabilistic payment scheme also 
makes use of RLIM but subjects are only given some chance of being paid for the randomly selected 
choice (i.e., subjects are not paid with certainty). In HLR subjects were given a 1-in-10 chance of being 
paid for one of their choices. By contrast, RKHR and Reynolds, Richards, Horn and Karraker (2004) 
paid subjects for 1 choice across 2 different tasks, implying that subjects had roughly a 50% chance of 
being paid for one of their choices on the risk preference task. 
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experimental design – promotes the truthful revelation of preferences and, thus, far 
more credence should be given to the results from these studies than those which 
employ hypothetical rewards. 
 
A majority of the studies in Table I (8 out of 11) adopted the PD approach16 to risk 
preferences, which defines risk aversion solely in terms of the shape of the PWF.17 As 
subjective probability distortions drive risk preferences in the PD framework, it is 
surprising that 6 out of these 8 studies only used 5 probabilities in the elicitation task; 
the remaining two studies (Mitchell (1999) and Yi, Chase and Bickel (2007)) only 
used 6 and 7 probabilities, respectively. AM, HLR, and SCRP assumed that EU 
theory characterises choice under risk, so risk preferences are determined solely by 
the shape of the utility function. All of these studies use a MPL, which has 10 
probabilities, and they assumed a CRRA utility function: specifically, U(y) =  
y(1-r)/(1-r). In this chapter, I allow risk preferences to be determined both by the shape 
of the utility function and the shape of the PWF so as to provide a bridge between 
prior studies in the literature. In addition, this allows me to explore whether smokers 
and non-smokers differ in the shape of their utility functions, the shape of their PWFs, 
or both. 
 
The final column of Table I shows whether the studies found a significant statistical 
relationship between risk preferences and smoking behaviour: the results are 
equivocal and, other than HLR, the statistical analyses are not valid. To interpret this 
column, note that a positive relationship between smoking and risk preferences means 
that smokers are more risk averse than non-smokers whereas a negative relationship 
means that smokers are less risk averse than non-smokers. Null results were reported 
in 3 studies, positive results were reported in 5 studies, and negative results were 
                                                
16 Chapter 4 showed that the PD model is just Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk limited to 
a circumscribed class of lotteries and with a specific PWF: π(p) = p / [p + γ(1 – p)]; if γ > 1 this 
represents probability pessimism and risk aversion. Recall that to derive this form for the PWF, 
Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991) severed the purported link between probability and delay which they 
argued was so central to the way people interpret probabilities. Thus, the specific form of this PWF 
lacks consistent theoretical foundations. 
17 Of these studies, 3 also employed the area under the curve (AUC) method of Myerson, Green and 
Warusawitharana (2001). When using the AUC method, one calculates the area under a subject’s 
derived certainty equivalents and normalizes this to lie in the closed unit interval. Larger AUCs imply 
less risk aversion and, thus, the AUCs of smokers and non-smokers can be compared to determine 
whether the groups differ in their risk preferences.  
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reported in 3 studies. 18 These conflicting results cut across different elicitation 
mechanisms, real and hypothetical rewards, different frameworks for choice under 
risk, and different methods of analysis. Thus, Table I shows that the relationship 
between risk preferences and smoking behaviour, or lack thereof, differs markedly 
across studies. 
 
In this chapter I will add to the extant literature by investigating the smoking-risk 
preference relationship using an incentive-compatible experimental design, a 
relatively large sample of South African university students, and a statistical 
framework which allows one to draw robust inferences about smokers and non-
smokers. Rather than define risk preferences solely in terms of utility function 
curvature or probability weighting, I allow both sources to affect attitudes toward 
risk.19 In addition, I use choices over risky prospects to determine the shape of 
subjects’ utility functions which I then estimate jointly with models of discounting 
behaviour to characterise time preferences over time-dated utility flows, not flows of 
money. This will allow me to draw strong conclusions about the relationship between 
discounting and smoking behaviour. 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
The study of risk and time preferences and smoking behaviour recruited 175 subjects 
from undergraduate classes at UCT. Given the focus on smoking behaviour, sign-up 
sheets included a simple screening question asking for the potential participant’s 
smoking status. A large number of people applied to take part in the study and 
individuals from the smoking and non-smoking groups were randomly selected for 
inclusion in the project. Those that were selected were added to a website which 
                                                
18 Some of the studies classified smokers using more than one category (e.g., heavy smokers and light 
smokers in Poltavski and Weatherly (2013), and smokers and “triers” in RKHR), and HLR separated 
male and female smokers and non-smokers. I adopt the classification scheme from Chapter 3 which 
codes a study as having found a significant result if at least one smoker, non-smoker comparison was 
statistically significant, even if all comparisons were not. 
19 Several researchers (e.g., Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor (2009), Harrison and Rutström (2009), 
Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010), Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014)) have conducted 
experimental studies where both utility function curvature and probability weighting affect attitudes 
toward risk. To my knowledge, this is the first study of smoking behaviour which incorporates both 
sources of risk preferences. 
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allowed them to sign up for an experimental session that worked with their academic 
timetable.  
 
The experiments took place in a computer lab at UCT which had been set up to run 
the risk and time preference software developed by Todd Swarthout at Georgia State 
University. Subjects were separated by partitions and were not allowed to talk to each 
other during the session. Experiments were conducted in August 2012 and 10 sessions 
took place in total. The median group size was 17 participants and the author assumed 
the role of experimenter for every session; two research assistants (RAs) were also 
employed to help administer subject payments and answer questions. 
 
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals and 
given an overview of the tasks that they would complete. Subjects then signed 
informed consent before being taken through a detailed presentation of the risk or 
time preference task20; the order of these tasks was counter-balanced across sessions 
so subjects either performed the risk or time preference task first. Participants were 
given the opportunity to ask questions at any stage of the presentations or during the 
tasks. After questions had been addressed, subjects completed the first task. 
 
Once all participants had completed the first task, the experimenter went through a 
detailed presentation of the other task. Subjects then completed this task before filling 
out a questionnaire which collected standard demographic characteristics and 
information on smoking behaviour. The experimenter or RAs then determined their 
earnings for the tasks. All subjects received a show-up fee of R20. Earnings for the 
risk preference task were paid out immediately in cash and earnings for the time 
preference task were paid out on the date corresponding to the subject’s choice on the 
randomly selected discounting question. Delayed payments were done via electronic 
transfer and subjects received a payment notification on their cell phones as soon as 
the transfer took place. Experimental sessions lasted approximately an hour and 
                                                
20 The introductory presentation used in this study is included in Appendix E, the risk preference task 
presentation is included in Appendix F, and the time preference task presentation is included in 
Appendix G. The presentations, and explanations therein, were carefully developed to make the tasks 
transparent and easy to understand. The payment system is also discussed in detail so that subjects 
understand how their final earnings are determined. This attention to detail, coupled with salient 
rewards, promotes incentive compatibility and the truthful revelation of preferences. 
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subjects earned R370 ($66 at PPP at the time) on average. The risk and time 
preference tasks will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Risk Preference Task 
 
The risk preference task was based on the seminal contribution of Hey and Orme 
(1994). It presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries on each screen; these 
lotteries were displayed as pie charts with accompanying text that listed the 
probabilities of the prizes. Figure I shows a screenshot of the risk preference task. 
 
The task used prize magnitudes between R0 and R280 ($0 - $50 at PPP at the time) 
and probabilities which varied in increments of 0.05 between 0 and 1. Thus, other 
than HLR, this study used larger lottery prizes than any of the studies in Table I which 
have incentive-compatible experimental designs. In addition, this study had more 
variation in the probability domain than every other study in Table I.  
 
 




   
  
The lottery pairs in the task were based on the set developed by Loomes and Sugden 
(1998) (LS) to test different stochastic specifications of choice under risk. LS 
designed the lottery pairs to accommodate a wide range of risk preferences, to provide 
good coverage of the probability space, and to generate common ratio tests of EU 
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theory. However, all the lotteries over which each subject made choices had the same 
context (i.e., the same set of prizes).21 By contrast, I used four prize contexts in my 
experiments: (R0, R140, R280), (R40, R80, R240), (R20, R100, R220), and (R60, 
R120, R180). Incorporating a number of different prizes and probabilities is helpful 
for the separate identification of the utility function and the PWF in models which 




Figure II shows the set of Marschak-Machina (MM) triangles representing the 
lotteries, and lottery pairs, which were used in the risk preference task. At the top of 
each diagram I list the context of the lotteries (e.g., (R0, R140, R280)) and the 
gradient of the lines connecting lottery pairs. In a MM triangle the vertical axis 
represents the probability of the highest prize in a lottery (e.g., R280) and the 
horizontal axis represents the probability of the lowest prize in a lottery (e.g., R0). 
The probability of the intermediate prize (e.g., R140) can be determined by 
subtracting the sum of high and low prize probabilities from 1. Each point in the MM 
                                                
21 LS used two experimental treatments: one where subjects made choices over lotteries defined on the 
context ($0, $10, $20) and one where subjects made choices over lotteries defined on the context ($0, 
$10, $30). The probability distributions over these contexts were identical across the two groups except 
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Figure II: Marschak-Machina triangles of lotteries in the risk preference task
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triangle represents a lottery and the line connecting two, or more, points represents a 
lottery pair, or set of lottery pairs, on offer in the task. The figure shows that the risk 
preference task provided excellent coverage of the MM triangle and that it captures 
the full range of risk preferences: risk-loving (gradients less than 1); risk neutral 
(gradients equal to 1); and risk averse (gradients greater than 1). 
 
Subjects made 40 choices in the risk preference task and one choice was selected at 
random at the end of the experimental session for payment. 
 
Time Preference Task 
 
The time preference task presented subjects with choices between smaller, sooner 
(SS) and larger, later (LL) monetary rewards. Figure III shows a screenshot of the 
time preference task. On each screen subjects had to make 4 choices before 
proceeding to the next screen. The principal (i.e., SS reward) and time horizon were 
fixed on each screen but varied across screens. A calendar was displayed on every 
screen so as to show the subjects when they would receive the amounts of money they 
chose. 
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Following Coller and Williams (1999), three front end delays (FEDs) to the SS 
rewards were used: zero days, 7 days, and 14 days. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
design allows one to hold subjective transaction costs constant for the SS and LL 
rewards at positive FEDs. It also facilitates estimation of the parameters of a quasi-
hyperbolic discounting function because the zero day FED allows one to pin down the 
estimate of β, which captures a “passion for the present” or “present-bias” in decision 
making, whereas the positive FEDs allow one to estimate the long-term discounting 
parameter δ.22 Subjects in an experimental session were only exposed to one of these 
FED treatments. 
 
Two principals (R150 and R250: $27 and $45 at PPP at the time), 14 time horizons 
between the SS and LL rewards (7 – 98 days), and nominal annual interest rates 
between 5% and 250% were used in the time preference task. These parameters 
define a battery of 224 possible choice pairs. Each subject made 60 choices in the task 
which were drawn randomly, without replacement, from this battery. At the end of the 




Table III presents summary statistics for the sample of 175 students. The average age 
in the sample is approximately 20 years old, 42% of the sample is white23, two-thirds 
of the sample is enrolled in the Commerce faculty at UCT, and approximately one-
third of the sample receives financial aid. Current smokers make up 62% of the 
sample24 and this is the largest number of smokers (i.e., 108 smokers) ever recruited 
for a study exploring risk preferences and smoking behaviour. 25  They were 
deliberately oversampled to investigate whether intensity of smoking is related to risk 
                                                
22 Coller, Harrison and Rutström (2012) explain that to estimate the β parameter in the quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting function one must use an experimental design which incorporates a zero day FED because 
this allows one to identify a subject’s passion for the present. In designs which do not incorporate a 
zero day FED, one must assume that a subject’s present-bias persists beyond the present to estimate β; 
this assumption is highly questionable. 
23 Approximately 24% of the sample is black, 14% is Coloured (“Coloured” is an officially designated 
population group in South Africa which refers to individuals of mixed-race origin), and 17% is 
Asian/Indian. The remaining 3% preferred not to classify their race. 
24 The remaining 38% of the sample comprises both former-smokers and never-smokers who will be 
referred to collectively as non-smokers. 
25 Smokers were defined as those people who answered “yes” to the question: “Do you currently smoke 
cigarettes?”  
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and time preferences. The mean number of cigarettes smoked per day is 8.67 with a 
standard deviation of 5.81 and a range of 1 - 25.  
 
Smokers also completed the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND) 
(Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker and Fagerström (1991)) which is a measure of 
smoking severity that scores people on a scale of 0 - 10, where higher numbers 
indicate greater severity. The average FTND score among smokers is 2.22 with a 
standard deviation of 2.08. Thus, on average, the smokers in this sample are relatively 
mild smokers. In addition, given the young age of the sample, the smokers’ lifetime 
exposure to cigarettes is relatively low. In the literature on risk and time preferences 
and smoking behaviour, researchers usually try to maximise the difference between 
smokers and non-smokers by selecting heavy smokers to take part in the study. I 
decided to recruit smokers across the entire spectrum of severity to determine whether 
being a smoker, irrespective of intensity, is associated with risk and time preferences. 
This also allows me to explore the relationship, if any, between smoking severity and 




   Variable Mean Std Deviation 
Demographics 
  Age 19.789 1.815 
White 0.417 0.495 
Male 0.549 0.499 
Commerce faculty 0.674 0.470 
Financial aid 0.314 0.466 
Smoke 0.617 0.487 
Treatments 
  Risk task first 0.514 0.501 
FED: 0 days 0.343 0.475 
FED: 1 week 0.326 0.469 
FED: 2 weeks 0.331 0.471 
High Principal 0.498 0.500 
 
Table III shows that randomisation across experimental treatments ensured that 
approximately 50% of the sample completed the risk preference task prior to the time 
preference task. FED treatments were split evenly across the sample and 50% of 
choices in the time preference task involved the high principal of R250. 
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IV. STATISTICAL SPECIFICTION 
 
The statistical method I employ is direct estimation by maximum likelihood of a 
structural model of a latent choice process; the explanation in this section closely 
follows AHLR. The latent choice process in question is captured by models of risk 
and time preferences. These models provide the structure necessary to estimate 
people’s risk and time preferences using their choice data. One of the major benefits 
of the maximum likelihood approach is that it uses all of the available information 
which the participants’ data impart to estimate discounting and risk preference 
parameters and the precision of these estimates. I review the basic logic of the 
estimation strategy below, focussing on the canonical cases of EU theory and 
exponential (E) discounting. I will then briefly discuss the straightforward extension 
to other risk and time preference models. 
 
Assume that utility of income is defined by a power utility function which displays 
CRRA: 
 
 U(y) = yr, (1)  
 
where y is a lottery prize in the risk preference task and r is a parameter to be 
estimated. If r = 0, U(y) = ln y, and if r < 0, U(y) = -yr, following Wakker (2008). We 
know that under EU theory risk preferences are determined by the shape of the utility 
function so with the power utility function parameterisation, r > 1 yields a convex 
utility function and risk loving behaviour, r = 1 implies a linear utility function and 
risk neutrality, and r < 1 yields a concave utility function and risk aversion. 
 
Let there be three possible outcomes in a lottery, just like the risk preference task 
reported in this chapter. Under EU theory the probabilities for each outcome yj, p(yj), 
are those that are used in the experimental task, so expected utility is simply the 
probability-weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery i: 
 
 EUi = ∑ j=1,2,3 [ p(yj) × U(yj) ] (2)  
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To determine the value of r, the EU for each lottery pair (i.e., the Left and Right 
lotteries in Figure I) is calculated for a candidate estimate of r and the index below is 
formed: 
 
 ∇EU = EUR – EUL (3)  
 
Note that this is a latent index, based on latent preferences, which captures the 
difference in EU of the Right and Left lotteries presented to subjects. This index is 
then linked to the subjects’ observed choices using the cumulative normal distribution 
function Φ(∇EU). This function takes any argument (∇EU) between ±∞ and 
transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. Thus, we have the so-called “probit” 
link function: 
 
 Pr(Choose lottery R) = Φ(∇EU) (4)  
 
The latent index in (3) is linked to subjects’ observed choices by specifying that 
lottery R is chosen when Φ(∇EU) > ½, which is precisely what (4) tells us. To see 
this note that if EUR = EUL then ∇EU = 0. Plugging 0 into the cumulative normal 
distribution function (i.e., Φ(0)) yields a value of 0.5. In other words, when the EU of 
the lotteries L and R are equal, the probability of choosing lottery R is 0.5 (i.e., there 
is an equal chance of choosing lottery L or R). By contrast, if ∇EU > 0 then Φ(∇EU) 
> 0.5 (i.e., the probability of selecting lottery R is greater than 0.5 when its EU 
exceeds the EU of lottery L) and if ∇EU < 0 then Φ(∇EU) < 0.5 (i.e., the probability 
of selecting lottery R is less than 0.5 when its EU is less than the EU of lottery L). 
 
Thus, the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the power utility and 
EU model being true, depends on the estimates of r given the statistical model above 
and the choices of subjects in the risk preference task. The conditional log-likelihood 
for the risk preference responses is: 
 
ln LiRP(r; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇EU) × I( zi = 1)) + (ln (1 - Φ(∇EU)) × I( zi = 0))], (5)  
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where I(·) is the indicator function, zi = 1(0) denotes the choice of the R (L) lottery in 
choice pair i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics capturing age, gender, 
education etc. 
 
One of the advantages of structural maximum likelihood estimation is that it is a 
straightforward extension to make the parameter of interest, the risk preference 
parameter r, a linear function of individual characteristics. In this case, one estimates 
r = r0 + rβ×X, where r0 is a fixed parameter and rβ is a coefficient vector linked to the 
variable vector X of individual characteristics. If no individual characteristics are 
included in the model we estimate r = r0, which is the risk preference parameter 
estimated at the level of the sample without taking into account observed, individual 
heterogeneity (i.e., assuming homogenous preferences). Note that every estimate of r 
includes a standard error which reflects our ignorance and uncertainty as to the “true” 
value of r. This stands in stark contrast to the bulk of studies in Table I which use risk 
preference estimates as data in subsequent statistical models. 
 
Another important extension to the simple model defined above is to allow for some 
errors on the part of subjects when they make choices between lotteries L and R. This 
error could be as simple as a “tremble,” where, say, a subject wants to choose lottery 
R but mistakenly selects lottery L instead. I adopt the “contextual utility” (CU) 
behavioural error specification of Wilcox (2011) to allow mistakes on the part of 
subjects from the perspective of the deterministic EU model and to draw robust 
inferences about the primitive “stochastically more risk averse than” relation.26 The 
CU specification normalises the ∇EU index so that it falls within the closed unit 
interval [0, 1] and it incorporates the behavioural error term originally due to Fechner 
(1966). Thus, rather than adopt the simple ∇EU index in (3), I make use of the index 
below: 
 
 ∇EU = [(EUR – EUL) / λ] / µ, (6)  
 
where λ is the normalising term and µ is the Fechner error term. Note how different 
values of µ affect our ∇EU index. As µ → 0 our specification collapses to a 
                                                
26 The “stochastically more risk averse than” relation is the stochastic choice counterpart to the “more 
risk averse than” relation (see Pratt (1964)) which is defined for the deterministic EU model. 
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deterministic choice model where the choice is strictly determined by the EU of the 
two lotteries. However, as µ → ∞, ∇EU → 0, and a subject’s choice is essentially 
random (i.e., the probability of selecting either lottery is 0.5). When µ = 1 we are back 
to specification (3), so the Fechner error term is a parameter which basically flattens 
the probit link function as its value increases. The new conditional log-likelihood is: 
 
ln LiRP(r, µ; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇EU) × I( zi = 1)) + (ln (1 - Φ(∇EU)) × I( zi = 0))] (7)  
 
The expression in (7) can be maximised using standard numerical methods to estimate 
the power function parameter r, which defines risk preferences under EU theory, and 
the Fechner error term µ which determines the extent to which choices involve errors 
on the part of subjects. 
 
Fortunately it is a simple matter to incorporate other theories of choice under risk in 
this statistical framework. Quiggin (1982) developed the rank-dependent utility 
(RDU) model which assumes that a decision maker transforms objective probabilities 
into subjective decision weights which are then used to evaluate lotteries. According 
to this theory, risk preferences are determined both by the shape of the utility 
function, like EU theory, and the shape of the PWF, like the PD approach27 to risk 
attitudes. Under RDU we replace (2) with: 
 




 wj = π(pj + … + pn) – π(pj+1 + … + pn), (9)  
 
for j = 1, … , n-1, and 
 
                                                
27 Chapter 4 showed that the PD model is just Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk limited to 
a circumscribed class of lotteries and with a specific PWF: π(p) = p / [p + γ(1 – p)]; if γ > 1 this 
represents probability pessimism and risk aversion. Recall that to derive this form for the PWF, 
Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991) severed the purported link between probability and delay which they 
argued was so central to the way people interpret probabilities. Thus, the specific form of this PWF 
lacks consistent theoretical foundations. 
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 wj = π(pj), (10)  
 
for j = n. Note that the subscript j represents outcomes ranked from worst to best, and 
π(p) is a specific PWF. A number of different PWFs have been used in the literature 
and Stott (2006) provides a useful review. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (TK) 
popularised the following PWF: 
 
 π(p) = pγ / [ pγ + (1-p)γ ]1/γ, (11)  
 
for 1 > p > 0. This function permits linear, “inverse S-shaped” and “S-shaped” forms. 
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) review the empirical evidence on this function and find that 
1 > γ > 0 in most studies. This gives the function an inverse S-shape with 
overweighting of low probabilities up to a crossover point where π(p) = p, and then 
underweighting of moderate to high probabilities.28 In this chapter I will estimate the 
TK PWF, amongst others, to see whether I replicate this inverse S-shaped result in 
this sample. 
 
To estimate a RDU model, assuming power utility, the TK PWF, and the CU 
behavioural error specification, one simply forms the RDU index ∇RDU = [(RDUR - 
RDUL)/λ]/µ and then links this to the subjects’ observed choices using the cumulative 
normal distribution function. This defines the conditional log-likelihood for the model 
which is then used to estimate r, µ, and γ, where γ is the parameter defining the TK 
PWF. In this chapter I will estimate EU and RDU models to compare the risk 
preferences of smokers and non-smokers. In addition, I will estimate the parameters 
of a variety of PWFs to ensure that the results are robust across different 
specifications. 
 
Shifting the focus to time preferences, recall from Chapter 3 that under the E model, δ 
is the discounting parameter which equalises the utility of income received at time t 
with the utility of income received at time t + τ: 
 
 [1 / (1 + δ)t]U(yt) = [1 / (1 + δ)t+τ]U(yt+τ), (12)  
                                                
28 However, Ingersoll (2008) shows that this function is not monotonic at very small values of γ. 
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for some utility function U(·). Under the assumptions that EU characterises choices 
over risky prospects and that subjects employ the power utility function, we can add 
more structure to this indifference condition. Specifically, (12) becomes: 
 
 [1 / (1 + δ)t](yt)r = [1 / (1 + δ)t+τ](yt+τ)r, (13)  
 
where the general form of the utility function U(·) in (12) has been replaced with the 
specific power utility function U(y) = yr in (13). Note that the left hand side (LHS) of 
(13) represents the present value (PV) of the utility of the SS reward in the time 
preference task whereas the right hand side (RHS) of (13) represents the present value 
of the utility of the LL reward. Thus, 
 




 PVLL = [1 / (1 + δ)t+τ](yt+τ)r (15)  
 
To estimate the parameters of our time preference model, conditional on EU theory, 
power utility, and the E model, we form the latent index below: 
 
 ∇PV = (PVSS – PVLL) / ν, (16)  
 
where ν is a Fechner error term for the time preference task, just as µ was the 
behavioural error term for the risk preference task. We could force µ = ν but there is 
little sense in doing so if we think that one task may be more cognitively challenging 
than the other, and hence more prone to subject error. To remain open to this 
possibility, I allow µ and ν to vary independently.29 The latent index (16) captures the 
difference in the present values of the utility of the SS and LL rewards. It is linked to 
                                                
29 My prior is that the risk preference task, which incorporated up to three prizes in each lottery and a 
host of different probabilities, is more cognitively challenging than the time preference task, where 
subjects simply had to make choices between two rewards available at different points in time. 
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subjects’ observed choices using the cumulative normal distribution function 
Φ(∇PV). This defines our probit link function: 
 
 Pr(Choose SS reward) = Φ(∇PV) (17)  
 
The latent index in (16) is linked to subjects’ observed choices by specifying that the 
SS reward is chosen when Φ(∇PV) > ½, which is exactly what (17) tells us. 
 
Thus, the likelihood of the observed time preference responses, conditional on the 
EU, power utility, and E models being true, depends on the estimates of r, δ, and ν, 
given the statistical model above. The conditional log-likelihood is: 
 
 ln LiTP(r, δ, ν; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇PV) × I( zi = 1)) 
+ (ln (1 - Φ(∇PV)) × I( zi = 0))] 
(18)  
 
The joint likelihood of the risk and time preference responses can then be formed as: 
 
 ln Li (r, δ, µ, ν; z, X) = ln LiRP + ln LiTP (19)  
 
This “joint estimation” approach uses subjects’ choices in the risk preference task to 
pin down the parameters of the utility function, and subjects’ choices in the time 
preference task to pin down the parameters of the E discounting model, conditional on 
the shape of the utility function. This approach ensures, therefore, that we estimate 
time preferences defined over utility flows, and not flows of money. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, it is straightforward to incorporate other discounting 
models in this statistical framework. In the case of Weibull (WB) discounting, (13) 
becomes: 
 
 [exp(-δt(1/β))](yt)r = [exp(-δ(t+τ)(1/β))](yt+τ)r (20)  
 
(14) and (15) are adjusted appropriately to incorporate this new expression and then 




In this section I present the results from a set of risk and time preference models so as 
to explore potential differences in the risk and time preferences of smokers and non-
smokers. I begin with the risk preference results because they provide a natural segue 
to the time preference results which are conditional on the utility function curvature 
identified by the risk preference task.  
 
A. Risk Preferences: EU Theory 
 
Table IV presents baseline estimates of an EU model employing a power utility 
function and the CU behavioural error specification. Note that the results pool choices 
across all individuals, which means I am estimating the value of r0 for the sample as a 
whole. In other words, I am assuming homogenous preferences. Note further that the 
results account for clustering at the individual level which adjusts the standard errors 
of the estimates to take into account the fact that each respondent made multiple 
choices across the 40 risk preference questions. 
 
The estimate of r = 0.306 implies a relatively high level of risk aversion in the 
sample. The estimate of µ = 0.175 is positive and statistically significant, implying 
that subjects make behavioural errors in the risk preference task and it is important, 
therefore, to take this into account so as to draw accurate inferences concerning the 
“stochastically more risk averse than” relation.  
 
TABLE IV: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 
  CU error 
Power function parameter (r) 0.306*** 
 (0.028) Error (µ) 0.175*** 
  (0.009) 
N 7000 
log-likelihood -4198.932 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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To analyse the link between risk preferences and smoking behaviour, one can make 
the parameter of interest r a linear function of smoking status. This captures the “total 
effect” of smoking status on risk preferences without controlling for any potential 
differences between smokers and non-smokers like age, education, and gender. In 
other words, this model provides a first pass at exploring this relationship. The point 
estimate of the “smoker” variable in this model is -0.027 with a standard error of 
0.048 which means there is not a statistically significant relationship between risk 
preferences and smoking status in this sample.30 
 
Table V presents the results from a model that takes into account observed, individual 
heterogeneity by conditioning the power function parameter estimate on a set of 
covariates and task parameters. Specifically, the model includes the demographic 
variables from Table III and a variable specifying whether the risk preference task 
preceded the time preference task. This model captures the marginal effect of 
smoking status on risk preferences while controlling for other factors which may 
mediate this relationship. 
 
TABLE V: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 
  Estimate Std Error 
Power function parameter (r)   Age 0.005 0.012 
White 0.045 0.05 
Male 0.119** 0.047 
Commerce faculty 0.081 0.055 
Financial aid -0.033 0.055 
Risk task first -0.031 0.046 
Smoker -0.036 0.058 
Constant 0.123 0.223 
Error (µ)   Constant 0.173*** 0.009 
N 7000  
log-likelihood -4180.528   
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table V shows that the only variable which is significantly, individually related to 
risk preferences in this sample is gender: men are less risk averse than women. Thus, 
                                                
30 I also estimated a model which allows risk preferences to vary as a quadratic function of smoking 
intensity as measured by the average number of cigarettes smoked per day: risk preferences were not 
significantly related to smoking intensity. 
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estimates from the EU model with a power utility function and CU error specification, 
point to no statistically significant differences in the risk preferences of smokers and 
non-smokers. 
 
To explore the possibility that the power utility function is too restrictive to accurately 
characterise choice under risk in this sample, I also estimated the expo-power (EP) 
utility function of Saha (1993) which admits increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), 
decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), and CRRA. The EP utility function takes 
the following form: 
 
 U(y) =  θ - exp(-αyr), (21)  
 
where θ > 1 and αr > 0.31 Note that the parameter θ is simply included to make utility 
positive and monotonically increasing, and has no effect on risk preferences.32 This is 
most easily seen by focussing on the coefficient of relative risk aversion R which for 
the EP utility function is: R(y) = 1 – r + rα(yr). Note that this function nests CRRA as 
α → 0.  
 
Thus, the parameters of interest in the EP utility function are α and r because these 
determine whether relative risk aversion is increasing, decreasing, or constant relative 
to income. Baseline estimates (i.e., assuming homogenous preferences) of the EP 
utility function indicate IRRA in the sample: α = 0.002 is significantly greater than 0 
(p = 0.020) and r = 1.373 is significantly greater than 1 (p < 0.001). Figure IV shows 
the estimates of relative risk aversion, with a 95% confidence interval, for the range 
of prizes in the risk preference task; dashed lines in the figure represent the prizes in 
the task. Thus, it appears that the assumption of a power utility function, which 
displays CRRA, is too restrictive. 
 
                                                
31 Holt and Laury (2002) adopted a different specification of the EP utility function: U(y) =   
[(1 - exp(-αy1-r)) / α]. 




However, when I allow the parameters of the EP utility function to vary according to 
demographic characteristics and task parameters, a different picture emerges. Table 
VI presents the results and shows that, for the expo parameter α, none of the 
covariates, nor the constant term, is significantly different to zero. In addition, a test 
of the joint hypothesis that all of the covariates, including the constant term, are equal 
to zero, cannot be rejected (p = 0.833). 33 Thus, while there is some evidence of IRRA 
in the sample, it does not vary according to demographic characteristics and, 
specifically, smoking status. Consequently, the power utility function will be used in 




                                                
33 Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007, p. 358) used this approach to determine whether CRRA held over 
the range of prizes used in their experiments. They too found that a test of the joint hypothesis that all 
of the covariates, and the constant term, are equal to zero, could not be rejected, which lead them to 
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Figure IV: Relative risk aversion
 -209- 
TABLE VI: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
EP UTILITY FUNCTION AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 
  Estimate Std Error 
Power parameter (r)   Age 0.004 0.021 
White 0.214** 0.107 
Male -0.014 0.045 
Commerce faculty 0.117 0.075 
Financial aid 0.025 0.031 
Risk task first 0.054 0.037 
Smoker 0.020 0.055 
Constant 1.078** 0.420 
Expo parameter (α)   Age 0.000 0.000 
White -0.002 0.001 
Male 0.000 0.000 
Commerce faculty -0.001 0.001 
Financial aid 0.000 0.000 
Risk task first 0.000 0.000 
Smoker 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.004 0.004 
Error (µ)   Constant 0.141*** 0.008 
N 7000  log-likelihood -4110.578   
Results account for clustering at the individual level  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
B. Risk Preferences: RDU Theory 
 
The EU results in the previous subsection suggest that there are no significant 
differences in the risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers. However, this 
analysis, by assumption, ignored the role of probability weighting and it may be the 
case that smokers perceive probabilities differently to non-smokers. To explore this 
possibility, I estimate RDU models in this subsection. 
 
One of the key components of a RDU model is the specification of the PWF. The TK 
PWF was presented in (11) and two other commonly used PWFs are: the power 
function, and the Prelec (1998) function. The power PWF is just like the power utility 
function except that prizes are replaced with probabilities. Specifically, the power 
PWF takes the following form: 
 
 π(p) = pγ (22)  
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An important feature of the power PWF is that it is concave, convex, or linear 
throughout its range. This means that interior probabilities are either viewed 
objectively (i.e., linear weighting), always overweighted, or always underweighted. 
Thus, the power PWF does not permit the inverse S-shaped or S-shaped forms of the 
TK PWF.  
 
Prelec (1998) axiomatically derived a two-parameter PWF which exhibits 
considerable flexibility. The functional form for this PWF is: 
 
 π(p) =  exp[ -η(-ln p)γ ], (23)  
 
which is defined for 1 > p > 0, η > 0, and γ > 0.34,35 This function allows independent 
specification of location and curvature in probability weighting. Note that it nests the 
power PWF when γ = 1, and it nests a one-parameter function when η = 1, which is 
very similar to the TK function in that it admits linear, inverse S-shaped, and S-
shaped forms.  
 
Table VII presents baseline estimates of RDU models employing the power utility 
function, the CU behavioural error specification, and the three PWFs discussed 
above. 36  In Model 1, the power PWF parameter γ = 0.953, implying slight 
overweighting of all probabilities. However, this estimate is not significantly different 
to 1 (p = 0.301) so we cannot rule out a linear PWF where probabilities are viewed 
objectively.  
 
In Model 2, the TK PWF parameter γ = 0.868 which yields an inverse S-shaped 
function implying overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of moderate 
to high probabilities. The estimate of γ is significantly less than 1 at any regular level 
                                                
34 Prelec (1998, proposition 1, part C, p. 503) provides these parameter restrictions. Prelec (1998, 
proposition 1, part B, p. 503) constrains 1 > γ > 0, but this constraint can be quite restrictive in practice 
because it ensures that the PWF is either linear, S-shaped or inverse-S shaped. 
35 Note that I impose these constraints when estimating the models using nonlinear transformations of 
the parameters. 
36 As mentioned previously, I impose the PWF constraints, using nonlinear transformations of the 
parameters, when estimating the models. To recover the core parameters I use the inverse of these 
nonlinear transformations, and then apply the “delta method” to derive standard errors and p-values for 
the estimates (see Oehlert (1992)). 
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of significance (p < 0.001)37 and this has a marked effect on the estimate of the power 
function parameter r. To see this, compare the estimate of r under the EU model in 
Table IV (i.e., r = 0.306) to the estimate of r in Model 2 of Table VII (i.e., r = 0.351). 
A Wald test that the estimate of r under the EU model is equal to the estimate of r 
under the RDU model with the TK function, is easily rejected (p < 0.001), implying 
that the power utility function is more concave in the EU model. 
 
TABLE VII: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Power TK Prelec 
Power function parameter (r) 0.283*** 0.351*** 0.324*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.026) PWF parameter (γ) 0.953*** 0.868*** 0.797*** 
 (0.045) (0.022) (0.025) PWF parameter (η)   0.882*** 
   (0.033) Error (µ) 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
N 7000 7000 7000 
log-likelihood -4197.975 -4177.421 -4151.295 
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
Standard errors in parentheses    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Under RDU, both probability weighting and utility function curvature influence risk 
attitudes. The RDU model with the TK PWF shows that the EU estimate of r is biased 
downward, yielding a more concave utility function. This is an important issue 
because when jointly estimating utility function curvature and discounting behaviour, 
the extent of utility function curvature identified by the risk preference task 
propagates into estimates of discounting parameters. Thus, if one ignores probability 
weighting when it is present, this may lead to biased estimates of utility function 
curvature and, hence, biased estimates of discounting parameters. In effect, when 
probability weighting is present, one wants to apportion risk preferences into their 
concave utility and probability weighting components so that accurate inferences 
about discounting behaviour can be drawn. 
 
                                                
37 The presence of inverse S-shaped probability weighting explains why the estimate of γ is not 
significantly different to 1 in the model with the power PWF: the power PWF is “confused” because it 
has to be linear, concave, or convex throughout its range. 
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The Prelec estimates in Table VII replicate the inverse S-shaped PWF that I find with 
the TK function. The estimates of γ = 0.797 and η = 0.882 are significantly less than 1 
(p < 0.001 in both cases) and the estimate of r = 0.324 is greater than in the EU model 
of Table IV, although I cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimate of r under the 
EU model is the same as the estimate of r under the RDU model with the Prelec PWF 
(p = 0.358). Thus, the estimates in Table VII show that probability weighting plays a 
role in the determination of risk attitudes in this sample. This will need to be taken 




Figure V plots the PWFs, and implied decision weights, for the estimates in Table 
VII. The decision weights are graphed for equi-probable reference lotteries and show 
the decision weight applied to the worst outcome, the decision weight applied to the 
intermediate outcome, and the decision weight applied to the best outcome in a 
lottery. Focussing on the implied decision weights for a two outcome equi-probable 
(i.e., 50:50) reference lottery, the power PWF assigns a decision weight of 0.48 to the 
worst outcome and a decision weight of 0.52 to the best outcome in a lottery. The 
Prelec PWF also assigns a decision weight of 0.48 to the worst outcome and a 
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Figure V: Estimated probability weighting functions and implied decision weights
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PWFs imply that the probability of the worst outcome is underweighted (0.48) and the 
probability of the best outcome is overweighted (0.52), relative to the objective 
probabilities of 0.5. By contrast, the TK PWF assigns a decision weight of 0.51 to the 
worst outcome and a decision weight of 0.49 to the best outcome in a lottery. In this 
case, the worst outcome is overweighted and the best outcome is underweighted 
relative to the objective probabilities of 0.5. 
 
Focussing on the implied decision weights for a three outcome equi-probable 
reference lottery, the power PWF assigns a decision weight of 0.32 to the worst 
outcome, a decision weight of 0.33 to the intermediate outcome, and a decision 
weight of 0.35 to the best outcome. Thus, the power PWF implies that the worst 
outcome is slightly underweighted, the intermediate outcome is viewed objectively, 
and the best outcome is overweighted, relative to the objective probabilities of 0.33. 
By contrast, the TK PWF assigns a decision weight of 0.36 to the worst outcome, a 
decision weight of 0.29 to the intermediate outcome, and a decision weight of 0.35 to 
the best outcome in a lottery. Similarly, the Prelec PWF assigns a decision weight of 
0.35 to the worst outcome, a decision weight of 0.26 to the intermediate outcome, and 
a decision weight of 0.39 to the best outcome in a lottery. Thus, the TK and Prelec 
PWFs overweight the best and worst outcomes, and underweight the intermediate 
outcome, of a lottery, relative to the objective probabilities of 0.33. 
 
To investigate the possibility that smokers perceive probabilities differently to non-
smokers, even if their utility functions do not differ, I estimated the two models in 
Table VII which admit inverse S-shaped PWFs and allowed the parameters to vary as 
a function of observable characteristics and task parameters. Results are presented in 
Table VIII.38 
 
                                                
38 As mentioned previously, the experimental design of the risk preference task lends itself to common 
ratio tests of EU theory. To complement the analyses in this section, I conducted a set of common ratio 
tests for the lotteries represented in the MM triangles in Figure II to determine whether smokers were 
more or less EU-consistent than non-smokers. I adopted the non-parametric Cochran Q test for this 
purpose and found that both smokers and non-smokers violated EU theory in every MM triangle in 
Figure II (p < 0.001 in every test) except the MM triangle with a gradient of 3. In this latter MM 
triangle, I could not reject the hypothesis that non-smokers satisfy EU theory (p = 0.111) but I could 
reject this hypothesis for smokers (p = 0.027). Thus, in only 1 of the 8 MM triangles of Figure II were 
non-smokers more EU-consistent than smokers. The bulk of the evidence, therefore, suggests little 
difference in the extent to which smokers and non-smokers violate EU theory; one reaches the same 
conclusion from the estimates in Table VIII. 
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TABLE VIII: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 TK Prelec 
  Estimate Std Error Estimate 
Std 
Error 
Power function parameter (r)     Age 0.005 0.013 -0.004 0.011 
White 0.038 0.060 0.029 0.051 
Male 0.114** 0.055 0.062 0.049 
Commerce faculty 0.113* 0.060 0.030 0.062 
Financial aid -0.057 0.065 -0.051 0.058 
Risk task first -0.057 0.055 -0.015 0.050 
Smoker -0.048 0.068 -0.005 0.055 
Constant 0.179 0.246 0.366 0.230 
PWF parameter (γ)     Age -0.002 0.011 -0.003 0.006 
White 0.021 0.054 0.001 0.047 
Male 0.016 0.050 -0.009 0.044 
Commerce faculty -0.083 0.057 -0.084 0.120 
Financial aid 0.061 0.059 0.034 0.056 
Risk task first 0.055 0.051 0.054 0.080 
Smoker 0.026 0.056 0.028 0.049 
Constant 0.876*** 0.228 0.871*** 0.206 
PWF parameter (η)     Age   -0.027 0.046 White   -0.062 0.121 Male   -0.166 0.137 Commerce faculty   -0.216 0.184 Financial aid   -0.014 0.139 Risk task first   0.166 0.153 Smoker   0.146 0.153 Constant     1.425** 0.676 
Error (µ)     Constant 0.168*** 0.008 0.166*** 0.008 
N 7000  7000  
log-likelihood -4153.594   -4119.762   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01     
In both of the models in Table VIII, smokers do not differ significantly to non-
smokers in the shape of their utility functions (i.e., in the estimate of r) nor in the way 
they perceive probabilities (i.e., in the estimates of γ and η). In addition, tests of the 
joint hypothesis that the coefficients for smokers across r, γ, and η are equal to zero, 
cannot be rejected under either model (p = 0.771 for the TK model and p = 0.823 for 
the Prelec model).39 Thus, at least in this sample, there are no significant differences 
in the risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers. This result is robust to different 
                                                
39 I also estimated a RDU model with the expo-power utility function, the CU error specification, the 
Prelec PWF, and the full set of covariates from Table VIII. The smoker variable was not significantly 
different to zero for any of the parameters in the model. In addition, a test of the joint hypothesis that 
the coefficients for smokers across r, α, γ, and η are equal to zero, cannot be rejected (p = 0.967). 
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theories of choice under risk, different PWFs, and a utility function that admits 
DRRA, IRRA, and CRRA. 
 
C. Time Preferences: Baseline Results 
 
In this subsection I will estimate the four time preference models introduced in 
Chapter 3 and discussed extensively in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014): 
the E model, Mazur’s (1984) hyperbolic (H) model, the quasi-hyperbolic (QH) model, 
and the Weibull (WB) model. Unlike Chapter 3 though, I will jointly estimate the 
parameters of these models with the curvature of the utility function to focus on the 
discounting of utility flows, not flows of money. In addition, I will allow both EU and 
RDU to characterise choices over risky prospects. This will ensure that the results are 
robust to different assumptions about how people evaluate lotteries and will determine 
whether assuming EU, rather than RDU, biases the estimates of discounting 
parameters. 
 
Recall from Chapter 3 that the discount factor for the E model is: 
 
 DE(t) = 1 / (1 + δ)t, (24)  
 
for t ≥ 0. By contrast, the discount factor for the QH model is: 
 
 DQH(t) = 1  if t = 0 (25a)  
 
 DQH(t) = β / (1 + δ)t  if t > 0 (25b)  
 
Note that if β = 1, the QH specification collapses to the E model whereas if β < 1 
discounting is quasi-hyperbolic. Recall that I use β and δ to represent the parameters 
in all of the discounting models even though there is nothing which implies that they 





Mazur’s (1984) H discounting function has a discount factor: 
 
 DH(t) = 1 / (1 + δt) (26)  
 
Finally, the WB model has a discount factor: 
 
 DWB(t) = exp(-δt(1/β)), (27)  
 
for δ > 0 and β > 0. Note that when β = 1, (27) collapses to the E specification so, in 
the terminology of Jamison and Jamison (2011, p. 25), the parameter β either 
“expands” or “contracts” time. When β > 1, it is as if time has contracted or is 
perceived to be “slowing down” by the individual. By contrast, when β < 1, it is as if 
time has expanded or is “speeding up” as perceived by the individual.  
 
TABLE IX: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
LINEAR UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Discounting parameter (δ) 3.234*** 1.715*** 2.833*** 0.890*** 
 (0.287) (0.096) (0.271) (0.066) Discounting parameter (β)   0.962*** 1.518*** 
   (0.013) (0.107) Error (ν) 24.272*** 24.043*** 23.669*** 23.573*** 
  (1.774) (1.742) (1.626) (1.591) 
N 10500 10500 10500 10500 
log-likelihood -5419.508 -5335.484 -5352.777 -5233.649 
Results account for clustering at the individual level   Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table IX presents results from the four discounting models employing the Fechner 
error term, assuming linear utility, and using years, rather days, as the unit of 
measurement for the estimation of the parameters40; this table is included for 
comparative purposes. Note, from Chapter 3, that if no individual characteristics are 
included in the model we estimate δ = δ0 and β = β0, which are the discounting 
parameters estimated at the level of the sample without taking into account observed, 
individual heterogeneity (i.e., assuming homogenous preferences). Note further that 
the results account for clustering at the individual level which adjusts the standard 
                                                
40 All of the discounting results in this chapter refer to annual, rather than daily, time periods. 
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errors of the estimates to take into account the fact that each respondent made 
multiple choices across the 60 time preference questions. 
 
Under the assumption of linear utility, estimated discount rates are huge and differ 
markedly across the different specifications. In the E model, the estimate of δ = 3.234 
implies an annual discount rate in excess of 320%. In Table X, by contrast, where I 
have estimated the discounting models jointly with the curvature of the utility 
function, discount rates are far lower, and more similar. In the E model in Table X, 
the estimate of δ = 0.507 implies an annual discount rate of 50%. Similar declines are 
evident in the other discounting models in Table X, which highlights the point, now 
familiar from AHLR, that the assumption of linear utility biases estimates of δ 
upwards. Thus, to draw accurate inferences about discounting behaviour it is crucial 
to estimate time preferences jointly with the curvature of the utility function.  
 
TABLE X: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Power function parameter (r) 0.283*** 0.309*** 0.273*** 0.260*** 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.037) Discounting parameter (δ) 0.507*** 0.472*** 0.441*** 0.223*** 
 (0.070) (0.049) (0.065) (0.032) Discounting parameter (β)   0.987*** 1.608*** 
   (0.004) (0.114) Risk error (µ) 0.183*** 0.174*** 0.187*** 0.192*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) Time error (ν) 0.159*** 0.198*** 0.145*** 0.128*** 
  (0.047) (0.050) (0.045) (0.044) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9519.026 -9488.92 -9430.8 -9282.495 
Results account for clustering at the individual level  
 Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
With regard to utility curvature, note that in a joint estimation framework, the 
parameter r is estimated jointly with the parameters of the discounting models and, 
thus, its value inevitably varies across the different specifications. However, the point 
estimates of r fall within a narrow range, i.e., from 0.260 in the WB model to 0.309 in 
the H model, and are very similar to the estimate of r = 0.306 in Table IV.41  
                                                
41 Using a 10% level of significance, one-sided Wald tests show that the estimates of r, across the 
different discounting models, fall within the interval (0.21, 0.35). 
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In the QH model in Table X, the estimate of β = 0.987 is significantly less than 1 (p = 
0.003), which provides evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and declining 
discount rates. The same is true in the WB results: the estimate of β = 1.608 is 
significantly greater than 1 (p < 0.001) which means people perceive time as “slowing 
down” and this generates declining discount rates. Thus, both the QH and WB results 
suggest that discount rates decline over time, which, when coupled with an additively-
separable intertemporal utility function, raises the spectre of time-inconsistent 
choices. However, the two discounting functions provide competing explanations for 
this result: a present-bias in the case of the QH model and subjective time perception 
in the case of the WB model. Note, finally, that the WB model has the highest log-
likelihood of all the specifications in Table X, which provides preliminary evidence 
that it best characterises all of the data. 
 
To estimate the four discounting models under the assumption that RDU characterises 
choices over risky prospects, a specific PWF had to be selected, lest I present an 
endless series of results.42 The analyses in the previous subsection showed that 
probability weighting takes an inverse S-shaped form which rules out the power PWF 
as a candidate. Of the remaining PWFs, the Prelec function is easily the most flexible 
so it will be used to incorporate probability weighting in the estimation of discounting 
models.43 
 
Table XI presents the results from the four discounting models assuming RDU and 
the Prelec PWF. Despite the presence of probability weighting in choices over risky 
prospects (i.e., γ and η are significantly less than 1 across all models), estimates of the 
power function parameter r are very similar in the models in Table X and Table XI. 
Consequently, the estimates of β and δ do not differ significantly across EU and RDU 
specifications. Specifically, for the E discounting model, the estimate of δ assuming 
EU in Table X does not differ significantly to the estimate of δ assuming RDU in 
Table XI (p = 0.731). Similarly, the estimates of δ for the H, QH, and WB models in 
                                                
42 Four discounting functions and three PWFs yield a total of 12 models. Note that I have estimated all 
of these models but the results across the PWFs are very similar so a representative set of results, 
employing one PWF, will be reported here.  
43 I also attempted to estimate the different discounting models, assuming that either EU or RDU 
characterises choice under risk, at the individual level. Unfortunately I did not get numerical 
convergence in enough subjects to be able to provide reliable estimates at this level of analysis. 
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Table X do not differ significantly to the estimates of δ for the H, QH, and WB 
models in Table XI (p = 0.322, p = 0.471, p = 0.253, respectively). Finally, the 
estimates of β in the QH and WB models in Table X do not differ significantly to the 
estimates of β in the QH and WB models in Table XI (p = 0.500, p = 0.269, 
respectively). Thus, while probability weighting is certainly a feature of the subjects’ 
choices over risky prospects, it does not significantly affect the estimates of concavity 
in our discounting models and, thus, it does not significantly affect the estimates of 
our discounting parameters 
 
TABLE XI: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull   Prelec Prelec Prelec Prelec 
Power function parameter (r) 0.277*** 0.327*** 0.260*** 0.238*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.796*** 0.795*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) PWF parameter (η) 0.838*** 0.884*** 0.823*** 0.804*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) Discounting parameter (δ) 0.493*** 0.502*** 0.415*** 0.204*** 
 (0.062) (0.050) (0.057) (0.028) Discounting parameter (β)   0.988*** 1.611*** 
   (0.004) (0.115) Risk error (µ) 0.178*** 0.169*** 0.181*** 0.186*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) Time error (ν) 0.151*** 0.231*** 0.128*** 0.104*** 
  (0.041) (0.055) (0.036) (0.031) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9471.828 -9441.151 -9383.297 -9234.32 
Results account for clustering at the individual level   Standard errors in parentheses     * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01     
Consequently, on a qualitative level, the results in tables X and XI are identical: 
incorporating utility function curvature leads to a marked decline in estimates of δ; 
and there is evidence of declining discount rates in both the QH (β < 1, p = 0.002) and 
WB (β > 1, p < 0.001) models. 
 
While the presence of probability weighting in choices over risky prospects does not 
significantly affect the discounting parameter estimates, relative to the EU case, I 
make use of a RDU model and the Prelec PWF in my subsequent analyses to 
incorporate this feature (i.e., probability weighting) of the data. To highlight the 
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robustness of the results though, in Appendix H I report discounting estimates which 




A comparison of the models’ log-likelihoods in Table XI suggests that the WB model 
best characterises the data, followed by the QH model, the H model, and the E model. 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the hypothesis that one model outperforms another 
can be tested formally using Vuong (1989) and Clarke (2007) non-nested model 
selection tests.44 The choice between these tests is based on the distributions of 
individual log-ratios of the various models. Figure VI plots the distribution of 
individual log-ratios, with a normal density overlay, for the six discounting model 
comparisons. The distribution of these log-ratios is leptokurtic45 which suggests that 
the Clarke (2007) test is more appropriate for these data.  
 
                                                
44 The E model is nested in the QH and WB models, but the QH and WB models are not nested in each 
other. We know from earlier that if β = 1 in either the QH or WB models, these models collapse to the 
E model. So an obvious test of whether discounting is, say, E or WB is to test whether β = 1 in the WB 
model, as I did earlier. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to conduct formal model selection tests even 
if models are nested in each other, as will become clear later. 
45 As explained in earlier chapters, the normal distribution is the quintessential mesokurtic distribution. 































Figure VI: Distribution of individual log-ratios
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The Clarke (2007) test yields a test statistic based on the binomial distribution which 
must be compared to a critical value to determine which model, in a pairwise 
comparison, receives the most support in the data. A Clarke (2007) test comparing the 
E and H models yields a test statistic of 6488, which is below the critical value of 
8750, implying that the H model better characterises the data (p < 0.001). Thus, in 
this sample, the H model outperforms the E model. This stands in direct contrast to 
the finding from Chapter 3 where the E model outperformed the H model and 
suggests that one should estimate a range of discounting models rather than assume 
that one model always best characterises the data. 
 
A Clarke (2007) test comparing the E and QH models finds in favour of the E model 
(p < 0.001) whereas a test comparing the E and WB models finds in favour of the WB 
model (p < 0.001). A test of the H and QH models suggests that the H model finds 
more support in the data (p < 0.001) while a test of the H and WB models finds in 
favour of the WB model (p < 0.001). Finally, a Clarke (2007) test of the QH and WB 
models suggests that the WB model better characterises the data (p < 0.001).  
 
The preceding results provide the following transitive ranking of discounting models: 
WB > H > E > QH. In words, the WB model finds the most support in the data, the 
QH model finds the least support in the data, and the E and H models are intermediate 
to these. Thus, if one had to select a single model that best characterises the time 
preferences of this sample, the WB model would be the obvious choice. However, 
when multiple time preference processes are present in a dataset, it is preferable to 
estimate mixture models which allow these different processes to explain discounting 
choices; this will be taken up in the final subsection. 
 
D. Smoking and Discounting Behaviour 
 
As a prelude to the results in this subsection, Figure VII shows a kernel-weighted 
local polynomial regression, with a 95% confidence interval, of the fraction of LL 
choices by smokers and non-smokers for the nominal annual interest rates on offer in 
the time preference task. At each interest rate, the fraction of LL choices by smokers 
is less than the fraction of LL choices by non-smokers. This suggests that smokers 
 -222- 
discount more heavily than non-smokers, but clearly this result must be subjected to 




Table XII presents results from the four time preference models, assuming RDU and 
the Prelec PWF, where risk and discounting parameters are allowed to vary by 
smoking status. These models, therefore, capture the “total effect” of smoking on 
discounting behaviour without controlling for any potential differences between 
smokers and non-smokers like age, gender, etc. Across all specifications, the effect of 
smoking on the estimate of δ is positive and statistically significant, implying that 
smokers tend to discount the future more heavily than non-smokers. The magnitude of 
this difference in discounting behaviour is substantial. In the E model, for example, 
smokers have an annual discount rate which is 20% higher than non-smokers. Thus, 
the positive relationship between smoking and discounting identified in Chapter 3 has 
                                                
46 A simplistic approach to this endeavour, which can be referred to as “descriptive modelling,” is to 
estimate a probit model of LL choices on the demographic characteristics and task parameters in Table 
III. Given that subjects made multiple choices in the time preference task, it is imperative to cluster the 
standard errors of the estimates by subject ID. Estimating this model I find that the coefficient on the 
“smoker” variable is -0.449 (std error = 0.138) which means smokers are significantly less likely to 
choose the LL reward than non-smokers. Although suggestive of a relationship between discounting 
and smoking, a full structural model of discounting behaviour, which takes into account all of the 
information which the participants’ data imparts, is necessary to determine whether the time 
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Figure VII: Fraction of LL choices and interest rate offered
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been replicated using a completely different subject pool, different elicitation 
mechanisms, and a joint estimation approach to time preferences which controls for 
utility function curvature and probability weighting.47 
 
TABLE XII: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Power function parameter (r)     Smoker 0.020 0.023 0.019 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) Constant 0.259*** 0.310*** 0.245*** 0.224*** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) 
PWF parameter (γ)     Smoker 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.039 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.056) Constant 0.774*** 0.774*** 0.773*** 0.772*** 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) 
PWF parameter (η)     Smoker 0.099 0.105 0.096 0.094 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) Constant 0.776*** 0.820*** 0.764*** 0.747*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Smoker 0.200*** 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.081** 
 (0.060) (0.051) (0.059) (0.032) Constant 0.359*** 0.385*** 0.306*** 0.156*** 
  (0.053) (0.047) (0.052) (0.029) 
Discounting parameter (β)     Smoker   0.001 -0.149 
   (0.007) (0.268) Constant   0.989*** 1.670***       (0.006) (0.247) 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.179*** 0.169*** 0.182*** 0.187*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.136*** 0.213*** 0.118*** 0.097*** 
  (0.035) (0.048) (0.032) (0.028) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9338.422 -9306.809 -9263.355 -9118.667 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The estimates of β in the QH and WB models, by contrast, do not vary according to 
smoking status. Thus, smokers are no more present-biased than non-smokers in the 
QH model nor are they more likely to perceive time as slowing down in the WB 
                                                
47 Appendix H presents results from the four time preference models where EU is assumed to 
characterise choice under risk: the results are virtually identical to the models in Table XII. 
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model. It is only the long-term discount rate δ which differs between smokers and 
non-smokers in these models.  
 
TABLE XIII: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Power function parameter (r)     Number of cigarettes 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (Number of cigarettes)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Constant 0.262*** 0.312*** 0.251*** 0.219*** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.034) 
PWF parameter (γ)     Number of cigarettes -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (Number of cigarettes)2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Constant 0.809*** 0.807*** 0.809*** 0.810*** 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) 
PWF parameter (η)     Number of cigarettes 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (Number of cigarettes)2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Constant 0.782*** 0.826*** 0.773*** 0.747*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Number of cigarettes 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.026*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (Number of cigarettes)2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) Constant 0.372*** 0.396*** 0.317*** 0.137*** 
  (0.053) (0.046) (0.050) (0.027) 
Discounting parameter (β)     Number of cigarettes   0.001 -0.107* 
   (0.001) (0.056) (Number of cigarettes)2   0.000 0.004* 
   (0.000) (0.002) Constant   0.987*** 1.948***       (0.005) (0.261) 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.129*** 0.199*** 0.116*** 0.088*** 
  (0.035) (0.046) (0.033) (0.028) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9337.392 -9308.739 -9264.074 -9106.204 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 -225- 
To investigate whether smoking intensity and discounting behaviour are related, I 
estimated the four time preference models and allowed the parameters of interest to 
vary as a quadratic function of number of cigarettes smoked per day; results are 
presented in Table XIII. In all models, both the linear and quadratic terms are 
statistically significant in the estimate of δ: the linear term is positive and significant 
whereas the quadratic term is negative and significant. Thus, there is a concave 
relationship between discounting behaviour and number of cigarettes smoked per day: 
every additional cigarette leads to an increase in discounting, but at a decreasing rate 
until a maximum is reached, after which every additional cigarette leads to a decrease 
in discounting.  
 
Table XIV maps out the response surface for estimates of δ in the four time 
preference models evaluated at different values of number of cigarettes smoked per 
day.48 At low values of number of cigarettes, the conditional marginal effect of 
additional cigarettes is positive. By 15 cigarettes though, the conditional marginal 
effect of additional cigarettes is negative. Thus, Table XIV highlights the nonlinear 
effect of smoking intensity on discounting behaviour. To my knowledge, this is the 
first study of time preferences and smoking behaviour which has identified this effect. 
 
TABLE XIV: NUMBER OF CIGARETTES CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR δ 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Number of cigarettes     0 0.041 (0.013) 0.036 (0.011) 0.038 (0.012) 0.026 (0.008) 
5 0.023 (0.007) 0.020 (0.006) 0.022 (0.007) 0.016 (0.005) 
10 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.002) 
15 -0.013 (0.006) -0.013 (0.006) -0.011 (0.005) -0.004 (0.002) 
20 -0.031 (0.011) -0.029 (0.011) -0.028 (0.009) -0.014 (0.004) 
25 -0.049 (0.017) -0.045 (0.016) -0.044 (0.014) -0.025 (0.007) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
                                                
48 I map out the response surface by calculating the conditional marginal effect of “number of 
cigarettes” on estimates of δ at different levels of cigarette consumption per day. Note that the 
conditional marginal effect evaluated at zero cigarettes in Table XIV is identical to the point estimate 
of the “number of cigarettes” linear term in Table XIII. In other words, the estimate of the linear term 
of δ in Table XIII is the marginal effect of an infinitesimal increase in cigarette consumption around 
zero cigarettes, and not the effect evaluated at the average number of cigarettes. To see this, note that 
∂δ/∂numberofcigarettes = B1 + 2B2(numberofcigarettes), where B1 and B2 represent the coefficient 
estimates of the linear and quadratic terms, respectively. When numberofcigarettes = 0, 
∂δ/∂numberofcigarettes = B1 and this is the coefficient estimate of the linear term of δ in Table XIII. At 
positive levels of cigarette consumption, both the linear and quadratic terms affect the estimate of δ. 
For example, at 5 cigarettes per day in the E model in Table XIV, an infinitesimal increase in number 
of cigarettes smoked increases the estimate of δ by 0.023 (p = 0.002). 
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In the QH model in Table XIII, smoking intensity is not significantly related to the 
extent of present-bias (i.e, the estimate of β). In the WB model, by contrast, the 
number of cigarettes’ linear term is negative and significant in the estimate of β, albeit 
at the 10% level. Thus, the more cigarettes smoked per day, the less likely people are 
to perceive time as slowing down.  
 
The preceding results are only preliminary because we need to control for a number 
of factors which may mediate the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. Table XV:A presents the results from the E and H models, and Table 
XV:B presents the results from the QH and WB models, that take into account 
observed, individual heterogeneity by conditioning the discounting and risk 
preference parameter estimates on the set of covariates and task parameters from 
Table III.49  
 
In the E model in Table XV:A, smokers discount significantly more than non-
smokers. There is also evidence of a magnitude effect in that the higher principal in 
the time preference task (i.e., R250 as opposed to R150) is associated with 
significantly lower discounting.50 Finally, men tend to have higher discount rates than 
women, although this result is only significant at the 10% level.  
 
  
                                                
49 In Appendix I I estimate the marginal effect of smoking status across the four discounting 
specifications using the demographic characteristics and task parameters from Table III but under the 
assumption of linear utility. On a qualitative level, the results across linear and concave utility 
specifications are very similar, except in the WB and, to a lesser extent, the QH models. For example, 
in the WB model I find that the smoker variable is not statistically significant in the equations for β and 
δ. Recall that the WB model better characterises the data in this chapter than the other discounting 
specifications. Thus, if one adopted a “naïve” approach to data analysis, which entailed selecting the 
one function which best characterises the data and then using it for multivariate analysis, one could 
conclude that smoking and discounting behaviour are not related. I do not advocate this approach but 
the example highlights the fact that one can reach importantly different conclusions about the 
relationship between time preferences and smoking without incorporating the concavity of the utility 
function when estimating discounting parameters. 
50  Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013) provide a comprehensive review of studies 
investigating the magnitude effect. They find evidence of a magnitude effect, albeit slight, in a study of 
risk and time preferences conducted on a representative sample of the Danish population in 2009. The 
size of the magnitude effect identified in this chapter is far larger than that identified by Andersen, 
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013).  
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TABLE XV:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r)     Age -0.008 0.006 -0.009 0.006 
White -0.016 0.020 -0.020 0.022 
Male -0.019 0.017 -0.019 0.018 
Commerce faculty 0.008 0.020 0.008 0.022 
Financial aid 0.043** 0.019 0.046** 0.021 
Risk task first 0.006 0.018 0.009 0.019 
Smoker 0.060*** 0.022 0.067*** 0.024 
Constant 0.443*** 0.125 0.528*** 0.131 
PWF parameter (γ)     Age -0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.012 
White -0.019 0.062 -0.020 0.059 
Male -0.006 0.056 -0.003 0.053 
Commerce faculty -0.108 0.071 -0.108 0.068 
Financial aid 0.014 0.059 0.005 0.056 
Risk task first 0.090* 0.052 0.083* 0.050 
Smoker 0.022 0.061 0.021 0.058 
Constant 0.890*** 0.275 0.882*** 0.265 
PWF parameter (η)     Age -0.022 0.019 -0.023 0.020 
White -0.125 0.087 -0.134 0.089 
Male -0.218*** 0.081 -0.216*** 0.082 
Commerce faculty -0.202** 0.102 -0.209** 0.104 
Financial aid 0.061 0.086 0.059 0.087 
Risk task first 0.130* 0.078 0.133* 0.080 
Smoker 0.158* 0.096 0.168* 0.098 
Constant 1.458*** 0.389 1.550*** 0.398 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.003 0.016 -0.001 0.015 
White -0.101 0.074 -0.095 0.064 
Male 0.132** 0.064 0.124** 0.052 
Commerce faculty 0.032 0.078 0.018 0.068 
Financial aid 0.121 0.075 0.095 0.063 
Risk task first 0.024 0.066 0.031 0.058 
FED: 1 week 0.059 0.071 0.058 0.062 
FED: 2 weeks -0.004 0.072 0.004 0.063 
High Principal -0.208*** 0.036 -0.191*** 0.026 
Smoker 0.260*** 0.070 0.220*** 0.062 
Constant 0.512 0.320 0.490* 0.289 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.169*** 0.008 0.159*** 0.007 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.196*** 0.048 0.338*** 0.070 
N 17500  17500  log-likelihood -9076.945   -9024.286   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, I now find that smoking is significantly related to the 
concavity of the utility function: smokers have less concave utility functions than 
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non-smokers, and this holds across all of the discounting specifications. This result 
highlights the importance of a joint estimation approach to risk and time preferences 
because while smoking status does not affect risk preferences in and of themselves, 
there are clearly feedback effects from discounting to risk preferences that the models 
capture. 
 
The pattern of results in the H model is the same as the E model. Specifically, 
smokers discount more than non-smokers, men discount more than women, and the 
high principal in the time preference task is associated with significantly lower 
discounting. In addition, in both the E and H models, the estimate of η is significantly 
higher among smokers than non-smokers, albeit at the 10% level. Consequently, 
smokers’ PWFs depart less from linearity than non-smokers’ PWFs. In other words, 
smokers tend to overweight and underweight probabilities less than non-smokers. 
 
TABLE XV:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r)     Age -0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.005 
White -0.019 0.019 -0.013 0.016 
Male -0.021 0.017 -0.025* 0.015 
Commerce faculty 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.016 
Financial aid 0.035* 0.019 0.025 0.017 
Risk task first -0.002 0.023 -0.001 0.015 
Smoker 0.060*** 0.022 0.049** 0.022 
Constant 0.414*** 0.111 0.339*** 0.116 
PWF parameter (γ)     Age -0.003 0.013 -0.004 0.013 
White -0.019 0.063 -0.018 0.064 
Male -0.006 0.057 -0.006 0.058 
Commerce faculty -0.109 0.072 -0.11 0.073 
Financial aid 0.017 0.06 0.023 0.061 
Risk task first 0.093* 0.053 0.094* 0.054 
Smoker 0.022 0.062 0.024 0.063 
Constant 0.892*** 0.276 0.898*** 0.279 
PWF parameter (η)     Age -0.021 0.019 -0.018 0.02 
White -0.129 0.087 -0.12 0.087 
Male -0.220*** 0.08 -0.225*** 0.081 
Commerce faculty -0.203** 0.101 -0.194* 0.1 
Financial aid 0.055 0.085 0.048 0.084 
Risk task first 0.122 0.08 0.123 0.077 
Smoker 0.157 0.097 0.144 0.098 
Constant 1.429*** 0.387 1.349*** 0.403 
Table continues on next page     
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TABLE XV:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES (CONTINUED) 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.007 0.013 0.007 0.007 
White -0.088 0.071 -0.049 0.031 
Male 0.142** 0.06 0.053*** 0.02 
Commerce faculty 0.018 0.075 -0.003 0.03 
Financial aid 0.103 0.067 0.001 0.026 
Risk task first -0.044 0.065 -0.027 0.028 
FED: 1 week 0.344*** 0.079 0.139** 0.068 
FED: 2 weeks 0.287*** 0.066 0.204** 0.088 
High Principal -0.156*** 0.03 -0.056*** 0.015 
Smoker 0.224*** 0.073 0.082*** 0.028 
Constant 0.279 0.266 0.003 0.133 
Discounting parameter (β)     Age -0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.079 
White -0.002 0.012 0.285 0.306 
Male 0.011 0.009 -0.492 0.357 
Commerce faculty 0.002 0.012 -0.032 0.238 
Financial aid -0.005 0.012 0.520* 0.284 
Risk task first -0.021* 0.011 0.929** 0.4 
FED: 1 week 0.348 0.273 2.840* 1.45 
FED: 2 weeks 0.167 0.217 4.155* 2.39 
High Principal 0.006** 0.002 0.081 0.107 
Smoker -0.002 0.012 -0.382 0.701 
Constant 1.040*** 0.067 2.161 1.709 
Risk error (µ) 
    Constant 0.172*** 0.008 0.175*** 0.01 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.195*** 0.051 0.130*** 0.047 
N 17500  17500  log-likelihood -8826.297   -8522.212   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
In the QH model in Table XV:B, with a full set of covariates, the estimate of δ for 
smokers is significantly larger than non-smokers, but there are no differences in these 
groups in terms of present-bias (i.e., the estimate of β). As with δ in the E and H 
models, men tend to discount more than women, and the high principal is negatively 
related to the extent of discounting. I find that positive FEDs are associated with 
significantly more discounting in the estimate of δ; a test of the joint hypothesis that 
positive FEDs have no effect across the estimates of β and δ, is easily rejected too (p 
< 0.001). My prior was that positive FEDs, which hold subjective transaction costs for 
the SS and LL rewards constant, would lead to less, rather than more, discounting; 
clearly this assumption is not borne out by these results. Focussing on the estimates of 
β, I find that task order has a significant effect on present-bias: subjects who 
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completed the risk task first tend to make more present-oriented choices than people 
who completed the time preference task first. Finally, the high principal in the time 
preference task tends to mitigate the extent of present-bias. 
 
The WB model estimates of δ share the same properties as the QH model. 
Specifically, smokers discount more than non-smokers, men discount more than 
women, positive FEDs are linked to greater discounting, and a high principal tends to 
attenuate the extent of discounting. With regard to β, receiving financial aid, 
completing the risk task first, and being exposed to positive FEDs, all tend to contract 
time and thereby produce declining discount rates. 
 
In sum, there is a positive relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour 
which holds across all of the time preference models estimated in this chapter. This 
result is also robust to the assumption that EU characterises choice under risk (see 
Appendix H). However, smokers do not differ from non-smokers with regard to 
present-bias in the QH model nor in terms of time perception in the WB model.  
 
E. Mixture Models of Discounting Behaviour 
 
The analyses conducted thus far have been based on the implicit assumption that the 
observations are produced by only one discounting DGP (i.e., E, H, QH, or WB) 
when more may be present in the data. In other words, the E model may explain some 
discounting choices better than the H model whereas the H model may explain other 
choices better than the E model. The assumption that only one DGP characterises all 
of the data, precludes such a possibility. 
 
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, finite mixture models51 allow two or more DGPs to 
account for the data and also provide a measure of the proportion of the data which is 
explained by each process. In the current context, one can estimate a mixture model 
of, say, the E and H discounting functions and then ask the data to determine how 
much support each function has. To do so one specifies a “grand likelihood” function 
which is just a probability-weighted average of the likelihoods of the two models. 
                                                
51 For detailed discussions of mixture models consult McLachlan and Peel (2000), Harrison and 
Rutström (2009), and Conte, Hey and Moffatt (2011). 
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Letting πE represent the probability that the E model is correct, and πH = (1 – πE) the 
probability that the H model is correct, the grand likelihood is the probability-
weighted average of the two conditional likelihoods LE and LH for the E and H 
models, respectively. Thus, the likelihood for the mixture model is given by: 
 
ln Li(r, γ, η, δE, δH, µ, ν, κ; z, X) = Σi ln [(πE × LE) + (πH × LH)], (28)  
 
where κ is a parameter which defines the log odds of the probability of the E model: 
πE = 1 / (1 + exp(κ)). Note that this transformation allows the parameter κ to take on 
any value during the maximisation process but it constrains the probabilities πE and 
πH to lie within the unit interval. The grand likelihood in (28) is maximised to 
estimate the parameters of each model and the weight accorded to each model in the 
data, under the assumptions that RDU and the Prelec PWF characterise choice under 
risk. 
 
Table XVI presents estimates of the mixture model of the E and H discounting 
functions assuming homogenous preferences.52 The estimate of πE = 0.347 implies 
that the E model accounts for approximately 35% of the choices in the data; the H 
model therefore accounts for roughly 65% of the choices. A hypothesis test that πE = 
0.5 is easily rejected (p < 0.001 as noted in the table) but so too is the hypothesis that 
πE = 0 (p < 0.001).53 Thus, the E and H discounting models both find significant 
support in the data, even though the H model finds more support. This means that it is 
a mistake to assume that only one DGP characterises the data. 
 
  
                                                
52 Appendix J contains the results from all of the two process mixture models that can be estimated 
from the four discounting specifications used in this chapter. I only present the results from the E and 
H mixture model in this section because these are the most commonly used discounting functions in the 
addiction literature and they are representative of the results from the other mixture models.  
53 In all of the mixture models in Appendix J, one of the discounting functions explains significantly 
more of the choices than the other discounting function. However, all discounting functions find 
significant support in the data which reinforces the point that it is a mistake to assume only one DGP 
characterises all discounting choices all of the time. The mixture probability estimates for the other 
mixture models are: E-QH model - πE = 0.636; E-WB model - πE = 0.406; H-QH model - πH = 0.634; 
H-WB model - πH = 0.611; QH-WB model - πQH = 0.609. 
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TABLE XVI: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.336*** 0.027 0.000 0.283 0.390 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.749 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.893*** 0.035 0.000 0.825 0.961 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.137*** 0.017 0.000 0.104 0.169 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.347*** 0.034 0.000 0.280 0.414 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.730*** 0.069 0.000 0.596 0.865 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.653*** 0.034 0.000 0.586 0.720 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.167*** 0.008 0.000 0.152 0.182 
Time Error (ν) 0.051*** 0.015 0.001 0.021 0.081 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8808.992         
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value < 0.001 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
The mixture model in Table XVI also shows how discounting parameter estimates are 
distorted when the E or H models have to account for all the data. Figure VIII plots 
the discount factors from the E and H models in Table XI (i.e., when they are 
assumed to account for all the data) and the discount factors from the mixture model 
in Table XVI. 
 
In Model 1 of Table XI, where the E model was assumed to be the sole DGP, the 
estimate of δE = 0.493. In the mixture model, the estimate of δE, which I refer to as 
δEmix in Table XVI and Figure VIII, is far lower at 0.137. This implies that when one 
tries to make all the data fit the E model, one inflates the estimate of the discounting 
parameter since 65% of the data “wants” to be modelled as H. Similarly, in Model 2 
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of Table XI, where the H model was assumed to be the sole DGP, the estimate of δH = 
0.502. In the mixture model in Table XVI, the estimate of δHmix is far higher at 0.730. 
Thus, by assuming one DGP we are averaging the estimates that we derive when 




Finally, notice that the estimate of the Fechner error term ν = 0.051 in the mixture 
model in Table XVI is far lower than the estimates of ν for the E and H models in 
Table XI. Thus, what was being captured as subject errors in decision making when 
estimating the E and H models separately is partly the product of forcing the data to 
fit one DGP. 
 
Mixture models also allow one to explore the hypothesis that smokers are more likely 
to discount hyperbolically than non-smokers by making the mixture probability a 
function of smoking status. Recall that with an additively-separable intertemporal 
                                                
54 Harrison and Rutström (2009) reach a similar conclusion in the context of choice under risk. 
Specifically, under the assumption that prospect theory (PT) is the sole DGP, Harrison and Rutström 
(2009, p. 146) find limited evidence of loss aversion, no significant evidence of probability weighting, 
and utility function estimates for the gain and loss frames which are not significantly different to one 
another. In a mixture model of EU and PT, by contrast, the researchers find substantial evidence of loss 
aversion, significant probability weighting, and utility function estimates which differ significantly 
across the gain and loss frames.  
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Figure VIII: Exponential and hyperbolic discount factors
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utility function the E model implies time-consistent preferences whereas the H model 
may yield time-inconsistent choices. If one finds that current smokers are more likely 
to discount according to the H model as opposed to the E model, this suggests that 
they may be more prone to time inconsistency. 
 
TABLE XVII: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence Interval Power function parameter (r)      Smoker 0.055** 0.028 0.047 0.001 0.110 
Constant 0.302*** 0.028 0.000 0.247 0.358 
PWF parameter (γ)      Smoker 0.036 0.052 0.488 -0.066 0.138 
Constant 0.778*** 0.039 0.000 0.701 0.854 
PWF parameter (η)      Smoker 0.139* 0.082 0.091 -0.022 0.300 
Constant 0.812*** 0.048 0.000 0.718 0.905 
Discounting parameter (δEmix)      Smoker 0.051* 0.026 0.052 -0.000 0.102 
Constant 0.111*** 0.020 0.000 0.073 0.150 
Discounting parameter (δHmix)      Smoker 0.164** 0.081 0.044 0.004 0.323 
Constant 0.622*** 0.077 0.000 0.472 0.773 
Mixture probability (πE)      Smoker -0.149** 0.074 0.044 -0.293 -0.004 
Constant 0.440*** 0.064 0.000 0.315 0.565 
Error terms      Risk error (µ) 0.167*** 0.008 0.000 0.152 0.182 
Time error (ν) 0.048*** 0.013 0.000 0.023 0.073 
N 17500     log-likelihood -8657.459         
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table XVII presents estimates of the mixture model of the E and H discounting 
functions where the parameters of interest are allowed to vary by smoking status. The 
results for the risk and time preference parameters mirror those from Table XV:A. 
Specifically, smokers have significantly less concave utility functions than non-
smokers and the estimate of η is significantly higher among smokers than non-
smokers. With regard to the time preference parameters, smokers discount 
significantly more than non-smokers under both the E and H models. Finally, I find 
that smokers are significantly less likely to discount exponentially, which means they 
are significantly more likely to discount hyperbolically, than non-smokers. The 
magnitude of this result is economically significant in that smokers are 15% more 
likely to discount hyperbolically than non-smokers. Consequently, under the 
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assumption of an additively-separable intertemporal utility function, smokers may be 
more likely to make time-inconsistent choices than non-smokers. 
 
TABLE XVIII: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS MIXTURE PROBABILITY 
 Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence Interval Power function parameter (r)      Smoker 0.053* 0.029 0.069 -0.004 0.111 
Constant 0.314*** 0.029 0.000 0.257 0.371 
PWF parameter (γ)      Smoker 0.037 0.052 0.478 -0.065 0.138 
Constant 0.777*** 0.039 0.000 0.701 0.853 
PWF parameter (η)      Smoker 0.138* 0.083 0.096 -0.024 0.300 
Constant 0.822*** 0.050 0.000 0.725 0.920 
Discounting parameter (δEmix)      Smoker 0.054** 0.026 0.038 0.003 0.105 
Constant 0.118*** 0.020 0.000 0.078 0.158 
Discounting parameter (δHmix)      Smoker 0.154* 0.088 0.080 -0.019 0.327 
Constant 0.652*** 0.083 0.000 0.489 0.814 
Mixture probability (πE)      Age 0.003 0.015 0.858 -0.026 0.032 
White 0.109 0.085 0.200 -0.058 0.275 
Male -0.105 0.083 0.207 -0.268 0.058 
Commerce faculty 0.009 0.083 0.912 -0.153 0.171 
Financial aid -0.093 0.069 0.181 -0.229 0.043 
Risk task first -0.045 0.070 0.519 -0.183 0.092 
FED: 1 week -0.084 0.080 0.291 -0.241 0.072 
FED: 2 weeks -0.014 0.083 0.864 -0.178 0.149 
High Principal 0.199*** 0.021 0.000 0.158 0.239 
Smoker -0.141 0.089 0.116 -0.316 0.035 
Constant 0.385 0.290 0.183 -0.182 0.953 
Error terms      Risk error (µ) 0.166*** 0.007 0.000 0.151 0.180 
Time error (ν) 0.054*** 0.014 0.000 0.027 0.080 
N 17500     log-likelihood -8552.916         
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The finding that smokers are more likely to discount hyperbolically than non-smokers 
should be tempered by the results in Table XVIII. This table presents estimates of the 
mixture model with a heterogenous mixture probability which varies according to the 
demographic characteristics and task parameters from Table III. With a full set of 
covariates for the mixture probability, the point estimate of the smoker variable is 
very similar to the estimate in Table XVII, but it does not quite reach statistical 
significance (p = 0.116). The only factor which significantly affects the mixture 
probability in this model is a high principal in the time preference task: at the higher 
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principal of R250, people are approximately 20% more likely to discount 
exponentially than hyperbolically. 
 
Figure IX shows a kernel density plot, based on the estimates in Table XVIII, of the 
mixture probability πE for smokers and non-smokers. The distribution of estimates for 
smokers, in comparison to non-smokers, is concentrated at low values of πE, which 
highlights the finding from Table XVII that smokers are more likely to discount 
hyperbolically than non-smokers. However, as Table XVIII shows, the evidence for 
this finding is inconclusive once the full set of demographic characteristics and task 




In sum, the results from the mixture model analyses suggest that it is mistaken to 
assume that only one model of discounting behaviour accurately characterises all 
discounting choices by all subjects. Recognising that some choices are better 
explained by one specification while other choices are better explained by another 
specification, allows one to draw more accurate inferences about the type and extent 
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Figure IX: Smoking status, exponential and hyperbolic discounting
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to discount hyperbolically than exponentially but conclusive evidence of this assertion 
is still lacking. 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter provided a detailed review of studies investigating the relationship 
between risk preferences and smoking behaviour. This review brought to light a 
number of patterns in the literature: 1) the majority of studies were conducted in the 
US; 2) the samples, although relatively small, were predominantly drawn from the 
general population; 3) there was a roughly equal split between choice and titration 
elicitation mechanisms; 4) every study except HLR adopted a two-step approach to 
statistical analysis; 5) the majority of studies used real rewards or probabilistic 
payment schemes; 6) most studies adopted the PD approach55 to risk preferences 
where risk attitudes are determined solely by the shape of the PWF; and, unlike the 
literature on time preferences and smoking, 7) the results linking risk preferences to 
smoking behaviour are equivocal.  
 
I sought to analyse the relationship between risk and time preferences and smoking 
behaviour by drawing a relatively large sample of smokers and non-smokers from the 
student population at UCT. The experimental tasks were carefully designed so as to 
promote the truthful revelation of preferences and the statistical approach to data 
analysis allowed me to draw accurate inferences about the preferences of smokers and 
non-smokers. 
 
I found that both probability weighting and utility function curvature affect attitudes 
to risk in this sample but I found no statistically significant relationship between risk 
preferences and smoking status. This result was robust to different theories of choice 
under risk, different PWFs, and different utility functions which admit IRRA, DRRA, 
and CRRA. 
                                                
55 Chapter 4 showed that the PD model is just Yaari’s (1987) dual theory of choice under risk limited to 
a circumscribed class of lotteries and with a specific PWF: π(p) = p / [p + γ(1 – p)]; if γ > 1 this 
represents probability pessimism and risk aversion. Recall that to derive this form for the PWF, 
Rachlin, Raineri and Cross (1991) severed the purported link between probability and delay which they 
argued was so central to the way people interpret probabilities. Thus, the specific form of this PWF 
lacks consistent theoretical foundations. 
 -238- 
 
To analyse the time preferences of smokers and non-smokers I adopted the 
methodology of HLR which jointly estimates utility function curvature and 
discounting behaviour so as to characterise time preferences over utility flows, not 
flows of money. I found that controlling for the concavity of the utility function led to 
a dramatic decline in estimates of δ, thereby replicating the result of AHLR. I also 
allowed RDU to characterise choice under risk so as to apportion risk preferences into 
their utility curvature and probability weighting components.  
 
Despite the presence of probability weighting in this sample, I found that EU 
estimates of the power function parameter r were not significantly different to the 
estimates I obtained under RDU and the Prelec PWF. Consequently, assuming EU or 
RDU had no significant impact on the estimates from the discounting models. 
Nevertheless, I chose to estimate the discounting models assuming RDU and the 
Prelec PWF so as to incorporate this feature (i.e., probability weighting) of the data.  
  
In the homogenous preferences discounting models, the estimate of the Fechner error 
term was positive and statistically significant, which highlights the importance of 
formally incorporating behavioural errors in decision making when analysing time 
preference data. I also found that the estimate of β in the QH model was significantly 
less than 1, and the estimate of β in the WB model was significantly greater than 1, 
which generates declining discount rates over time. Finally, a comparison of the 
models’ log-likelihoods in Table XI suggested that the WB model best characterises 
the data, followed by the QH model, the H model, and the E model. 
 
To formally adjudicate between the discounting models, Clarke (2007) non-nested 
model selection tests were conducted. These tests confirmed that the WB model 
outperformed its competitors. In addition, the Clarke (2007) tests provided a transitive 
ranking of the discounting specifications: WB > H > E > QH. Thus, despite its 
relatively high log-likelihood, the QH model was the least successful in explaining all 
of the discounting choices in these data. 
 
The relationship between time preferences and smoking behaviour was explored in 
three ways. First, a smoking status covariate was added to the discounting models to 
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capture the “total effect” of smoking on discounting behaviour without controlling for 
other factors like age, gender, etc. Across every discounting model, the estimate of δ 
for smokers was positive and statistically significant, implying smokers discount more 
heavily than non-smokers. However, smoking status was not related to the extent of 
present-bias in the QH model nor in the perception of time in the WB model. 
 
Second, to investigate whether smoking intensity was related to discounting 
behaviour, I estimated the four time preference models and allowed the parameters of 
interest to vary as a quadratic function of number of cigarettes smoked per day. These 
analyses revealed a concave relationship between smoking intensity and estimates of 
the discounting parameter δ. Specifically, every additional cigarette leads to an 
increase in discounting, but at a decreasing rate until a maximum is reached, after 
which every additional cigarette leads to a decrease in discounting.  
 
Finally, to explore the “marginal effect” of smoking status on time preferences, I 
estimated the discounting models and made the parameters of interest a linear 
function of observable characteristics and task parameters. Across all specifications, 
the estimate of δ for smokers was positive and statistically significant, which thereby 
replicated the earlier result while controlling for other variables which may mediate 
the relationship between smoking and discounting. In Appendix H I also test to see 
whether these results are robust to the assumption that EU characterises choice under 
risk: the results are qualitatively identical to those in Section V. In Appendix I I 
estimate the four discounting specifications under the assumption of linear utility. The 
appendix shows that one can reach different qualitative conclusions when one does 
not jointly estimate utility function curvature and discounting behaviour. Appendix I 
further shows, therefore, that it is imperative to incorporate the shape of the utility 
function when estimating time preferences. 
 
The final set of statistical analyses was the estimation of mixture models of the 
different discounting specifications, assuming that RDU and the Prelec PWF capture 
choice under risk. These mixture models showed that multiple decision processes 
characterise the discounting of delayed rewards and that it is a mistake to force all 
discounting choices to fit one particular model. In addition, the mixture models 
allowed me to explore the hypothesis that smokers are more likely to discount 
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hyperbolically than non-smokers by making the mixture probability a function of 
smoking status. I found that smokers are significantly more likely than non-smokers 
to discount hyperbolically, but this result does not attain statistical significance when 
the full set of demographic characteristics and task parameters are added to the 
mixture probability. 
 
This research makes a number of contributions to the literature. When analysing risk 
preferences and smoking behaviour, I allowed risk attitudes to be determined both by 
utility function curvature and probability weighting. Prior studies in the literature 
were always open to the critique that the other source of risk attitudes, i.e., the one not 
explored in the paper, differed between smokers and non-smokers. Incorporating both 
utility function curvature and probability weighting in estimates of risk attitudes, 
allowed me to make strong claims about differences in the risk preferences of 
smokers and non-smokers which were immune to this critique. 
 
This is only the second study in the smoking-discounting literature to incorporate 
utility function curvature in the estimation of time preference models, and it is the 
first which allows RDU to characterise choice under risk. Although the discounting 
estimates do not differ significantly across the EU and RDU specifications, it is 
nevertheless theoretically appropriate to apportion risk preferences into their utility 
curvature and probability weighting components. 
 
This is the first study in this literature to identify a nonlinear effect of smoking 
intensity on discounting behaviour. Smoking more cigarettes tends to increase 
discounting but only up to a point, after which each additional cigarette tends to lower 
discounting. This nonlinear effect may explain why some studies, which only 
recruited heavy smokers and never-smokers, failed to find a difference in discounting 
behaviour between these groups.  
 
In addition, this nonlinear effect of smoking intensity may provide an explanation for 
patterns of cigarette consumption. It has long been assumed that the marked modal 
clustering around 20 cigarettes per day in mature smokers simply reflects the fact that 
cigarettes are typically sold in packs of 20. It may be the case though that cigarette 
companies learned to sell cigarettes in packs of 20 because that is where the 
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psychofunctional, and not merely the homeostatic, equilibrium lies for the majority of 
mature smokers. 
 
This research also reiterates the point made in HLR and Chapter 3, that multiple 
decision processes characterise the discounting of delayed rewards. It is crucial for 
researchers to be cognisant of this fact when exploring the smoking-discounting 
relationship. As the analyses in this chapter showed, smokers may be more likely than 
non-smokers to discount hyperbolically and this may be a factor in addiction. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study in the literature to have identified this difference 
between a set of smokers and non-smokers. 
 
This research also suffers from a number of limitations. Clearly a young, university 
sample of smokers is not representative of smokers in general, so the external validity 
of these results for the South African population as a whole is questionable. This 
study is an important first step though towards population-based studies of risk and 
time preferences and smoking behaviour. The tasks and instructions developed for 
this study could be used to elicit a representative sample of South African’s attitudes 
toward risk and time, which can then be analysed using the tools adopted in this 
chapter. Funding permitting, this will be taken up in future research. 
 
A perennial problem with economic experiments is whether the rewards on offer are 
salient enough to incentivise truthful revelation of preferences over an income domain 
which is relevant to policy analysis. The rewards in this study were large in 
comparison to those typically paid out in the literature but still larger incentives would 
help to alleviate concerns about the extent to which these results scale up as the 
magnitude of the prizes increases. 
 
Another potential issue with these results is whether the sample in this study is 
representative of smokers and non-smokers at UCT. As discussed earlier, a large 
number of people applied to take part in the study so people in the smoking and non-
smoking groups were randomly selected to form part of the study pool. It may be the 
case that those who were selected are not representative of their group. Ideally I 
would use information on the population of smokers and non-smokers at UCT to 
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correct for any sample selection issues present in the data.56 Unfortunately, I do not 
have any additional information on the population of smokers and non-smokers at 
UCT to perform these sample selection corrections. 
 
These issues notwithstanding, this chapter provides a rigorous framework within 
which to analyse risk and time preferences and smoking behaviour. In this sample, 
there is no statistically significant relationship between smoking and risk preferences, 
a result which, to the uninitiated, may suggest that it is unnecessary to collect these 
data in future studies (but see Appendix I). As this chapter hopefully showed though, 
it is still crucial to collect risk preference data so as to define time preferences over 






                                                
56 Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2009) and Harrison and Lau (2014) analyse the effect of sample 
selection bias on estimated risk preference parameters. They used the Danish registry to gather 
information on people who were invited to participate in their experiments but who did not take part 
and this allowed them to make sample selection corrections for the sample of people who were invited 
and who did participate in the experiments. Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2009) find that correcting for 
sample selection bias leads to attenuated risk aversion estimates, implying that their sample was more 
risk averse than the population from which it was drawn. Similarly, Harrison and Lau (2014) find that 
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This thesis considered experiments investigating the relationship between 
instantaneous risk and time preferences and addiction. Addiction is a pressing public 
health concern and economic models of this phenomenon suggest that instantaneous 
risk and time preferences play important roles in the causes, course, and consequences 
of substance dependence. Detailed reviews of the experimental literature linking these 
preferences to smoking status highlighted a number of methodological and statistical 
flaws in the way these data have been collected and analysed. Consequently, this 
thesis, following Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014), motivated for an approach to the 
study of addiction which views theory, experimental design, and econometrics as 
complementary. 
 
Chapter 2 provided a motivation for studying addiction and then focussed on 
economic models of this phenomenon to isolate the preferences which may be a factor 
in substance dependence. Emphasis was given to the roles that instantaneous risk and 
time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs play in these 
models. The empirical focus of the thesis shifted to instantaneous risk and time 
preferences, with research into intertemporal risk preferences and subjective beliefs, 
and their relationship to addiction, deferred for future study. 
 
Chapter 3 used two relatively large datasets, which were generated by choices on the 
Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999) discounting task, to explore the relationship between 
time preferences and smoking behaviour. Unfortunately these data did not include 
information which would allow for the joint estimation of utility function curvature 
and discounting behaviour so the common assumption of linear utility was employed. 
The chapter introduced a full information maximum likelihood statistical framework, 
which is consistent with the data generating processes (DGP) proposed by structural 
theories and accounts for subject errors in decision making, to estimate four distinct 
discounting models: exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, and Weibull.  
 
Non-nested model selection tests were conducted and the exponential discounting 
model better characterised the data than the hyperbolic discounting model, which 
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challenges a maintained assumption in the discounting literature in psychology and 
addiction studies. Despite the better fit of the exponential function relative to the 
hyperbolic function, mixture model analyses conducted later in the chapter showed 
that multiple decision making processes characterise the discounting of delayed 
rewards and it is a mistake, therefore, to declare any single model the “winner” in 
terms of goodness of fit. 
 
The relationship between time preferences and smoking behaviour was explored in 
two ways. The first simply added a smoking status covariate to the discounting 
models so as to capture the “total effect” of smoking. The second used a full set of 
covariates and task parameters in the models so as to estimate the “marginal effect” of 
smoking, over and above what could be accounted for by other observable 
characteristics. Across the different discounting models, and the two approaches to 
investigating the relationship between smoking and time preferences, a robust picture 
emerged: current smokers tended to discount the future more heavily than never-
smokers. These results replicated previous findings in the literature but with a valid 
statistical approach to data analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 then presented a mixture model of exponential and hyperbolic discounting 
specifications and found that the exponential model accounted for roughly 54% of the 
choices in the data whereas the hyperbolic model accounted for the remaining 46%. A 
test that the two models explained the same proportion of the data could not be 
rejected, which highlights the point made earlier that multiple decision making 
processes characterise the discounting of delayed rewards. The mixture model results 
also showed that by forcing the data to conform to one DGP this yields biased 
estimates of the underlying parameters. Finally, a mixture model employing a full set 
of covariates and task parameters showed that current smokers were no more likely 
than ex-smokers and never-smokers to discount hyperbolically. 
 
Chapter 4 traced the development of the probability discounting (PD) model which 
has become a popular framework in psychology and addiction studies for exploring 
people’s atemporal attitudes to risk. This review critiqued the theoretical foundations 
of the model and reinterpreted it in language familiar to economists, statisticians, and 
decision theorists. Specifically, the chapter showed that the PD model is just Yaari’s 
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(1987) dual theory of choice under risk limited to a certain class of lotteries and 
employing a specific probability weighting function (PWF). The efficacy of this PWF 
was then tested against others which are commonly used in the literature on 
instantaneous risk preferences: the PWF popularised by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) and the Prelec (1998) PWF. Non-nested model selection tests suggested that 
both the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) PWFs better characterised 
the data than the PD model’s PWF. In addition, in a mixture model of the PD and TK 
PWFs, a test that the mixture probability assigned to the PD model was zero could not 
be rejected. Chapter 4 therefore highlighted the theoretical and empirical inadequacy 
of the PD model. 
 
Chapter 5 embodied the logic on which this thesis is based: that theory, experimental 
design, and econometrics are complementary. The chapter discussed a relatively large 
study of instantaneous risk and time preferences conducted at the University of Cape 
Town (UCT) in 2012. For this study, risk and time preference tasks were carefully 
designed to promote the truthful revelation of preferences and to facilitate estimation 
of several different theories of choice under risk and over time. In addition, a 
theoretically-motivated joint estimation approach to time preferences was adopted. 
 
Across expected utility and rank-dependent utility models of choice under risk, and 
across different utility and probability weighting functions, no statistically significant 
relationship between atemporal attitudes to risk and smoking behaviour could be 
identified. By contrast, across four distinct discounting functions, which were 
estimated jointly with the concavity of the utility function, smokers robustly 
discounted more heavily than non-smokers. In addition, a concave relationship 
between smoking intensity and discounting behaviour was found: every additional 
cigarette leads to an increase in discounting, but at a decreasing rate until a maximum 
is reached, after which every additional cigarette leads to a decrease in discounting. 
 
A mixture model of the exponential and hyperbolic discounting specifications showed 
that the exponential model accounted for approximately 35% of the choices in the 
data whereas the hyperbolic model accounted for the remaining 65%. A test that the 
exponential model explained 50% of the data was easily rejected but so too was a test 
that the exponential model explained none of the choices in the dataset. This mixture 
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model therefore reiterated the conclusion from Chapter 3 that multiple decision 
making process characterise the discounting of delayed rewards and that when one 
tries to force all the data to fit one discounting model, this yields biased estimates of 
the underlying parameters.  
 
To test whether smokers were more likely than non-smokers to discount 
hyperbolically as opposed to exponentially, a smoking status covariate was added to 
the mixture model. In this specification, smokers were significantly less likely than 
non-smokers to discount exponentially, implying that they were significantly more 
likely to discount hyperbolically. However, when the mixture probability was allowed 
to vary as a linear function of the full set of demographic characteristics and task 
parameters, the smoking status covariate was not statistically significant. Thus, while 
there was some evidence that smokers were more likely than non-smokers to discount 
hyperbolically rather than exponentially, this result was not robust to the inclusion of 
a full set of covariates. 
 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it advocates an 
approach to the study of addiction which views theory, experimental design, and 
econometrics as complementary. Unfortunately, the experimental literature on 
addiction is plagued by studies that make strong, and unwarranted, assumptions about 
the nature of instantaneous risk and time preferences, experimental designs which do 
not satisfy Smith’s (1982) precepts, and statistical tools which are not valid. 
Embracing the theory, experimental design, and econometric trinity allows one to 
avoid the pitfalls of misconstrued theory, ineffectual experimental design, and sloppy 
statistical analysis. 
 
Second, this thesis is the first examination of the relationship between time 
preferences and smoking behaviour which estimated four distinct discounting 
specifications. These estimates were produced using a statistical framework which 
recognises, and takes into account, the uncertainty of discounting parameter estimates 
and the potential for subject errors in decision making. Hence, this framework makes 
it possible to draw accurate statistical inferences. That the smoking-discounting 
relationship was robust to different discounting models lends further credence to the 
hypothesis that smokers discount the future more heavily than non-smokers. 
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Third, this thesis conducted the first valid statistical tests to adjudicate between the 
different time preference models. In Chapter 3, non-nested model selection tests 
showed that the exponential discounting model outperformed the hyperbolic 
discounting model, but in Chapter 5 these same tests showed that the hyperbolic 
model outperformed the exponential model. In addition, the Weibull discounting 
function had the least explanatory power in the data used in Chapter 3 but it had the 
most explanatory power in the data used in Chapter 5. These results show that the 
efficacy of different discounting functions varies from population to population. 
Consequently, it is not appropriate to assume that one discounting function is always 
superior to others; this hypothesis can and should be tested on a case-by-case basis 
using valid statistical tests. 
 
Fourth, this is the first study in the smoking-discounting literature to have estimated 
“profile likelihoods” to determine the optimal shape of the utility function conditional 
on the subjects’ discounting choices. This approach was adopted by Harrison and 
Rutström (2009) in the context of choice under risk but it has not been applied to time 
preference data. Recall that the data in Chapter 3 did not include information which 
would make it possible to estimate discounting parameters jointly with the concavity 
of the utility function. However, Appendix B shows that by incrementally varying the 
parameter defining an assumed utility function, one can identify the optimal shape of 
the utility function conditional on the subjects’ discounting choices. The appendix 
discusses the logic of this method and presents results for the four discounting 
specifications used in the chapter.  
 
Fifth, this thesis provides the first explanation of the PD model in language familiar to 
economists. It is also the first study to have conducted valid statistical tests of the PD 
model’s ability to characterise risk preference data and the first study which estimated 
a mixture model of the PD model’s PWF and the PWF popularised by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). 
 
Sixth, Chapter 5’s analyses of the relationship between atemporal attitudes to risk and 
smoking behaviour are the first to have allowed both utility function curvature and 
probability weighting to characterise choice under risk. It is also the first study in the 
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addiction literature to use multiple utility and probability weighting functions in the 
analysis of risk preference data. 
 
Seventh, Chapter 5 is only the second study in the literature on smoking and time 
preferences to have jointly estimated utility function curvature and discounting 
behaviour, and the first to employ a rank-dependent utility characterisation of choice 
under risk when jointly estimating the parameters of time preference theories. By 
using the rank-dependent utility model, Chapter 5 apportioned risk preferences into 
their concave utility and probability weighting components, which can have important 
implications for the inferences one draws about discounting behaviour; the time 
preference results in Chapter 5 were not very sensitive though to the assumption that 
rank-dependent utility theory rather than expected utility theory characterised choice 
under risk. 
 
Eighth, this thesis is the first research to have identified a nonlinear effect of smoking 
intensity on discounting behaviour. Across all of the discounting specifications, 
estimates of the long-term discounting parameter δ revealed that every additional 
cigarette leads to an increase in discounting, but at a decreasing rate until a maximum 
is reached, after which every additional cigarette leads to a decrease in discounting. 
These results may provide an explanation for why cigarettes are typically sold in 
packs of 20 and why some studies that recruited heavy smokers and never-smokers 
failed to find a significant difference in discounting behaviour. 
 
Finally, this thesis is only the second study in the addiction literature to have 
estimated mixture models of discounting behaviour. The crucial insight which these 
models provide is that multiple decision making processes characterise the 
discounting of delayed rewards and it is a mistake, therefore, to force the data to 
conform to one model. In addition, the mixture model of exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting in Chapter 5 provided the first, tentative evidence that smokers may be 
more likely to discount hyperbolically rather than exponentially. If this finding is 
replicated it will sharpen our understanding of addiction. Recall that under an 
additively-separable intertemporal utility function, exponential discounting yields 
time consistency whereas hyperbolic discounting may yield time inconsistency. Thus, 
if smokers are more likely to discount hyperbolically they may be more prone to time 
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inconsistency, and this inconsistency may be an important factor in their susceptibility 
to addiction.  
 
This thesis also suffers from a number of limitations. In Chapter 3, only a small subset 
(N = 174) of the experimental subjects were incentivised, and they were only 
incentivised probabilistically. Thus, to a large extent, the inferences which were 
drawn were based on the choices people think they would make when faced with 
those contingencies, or the choices they thought the experimenter wanted them to 
make, rather than the choices they made and experienced. 
 
In addition, the Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999) discounting task is a relatively blunt 
instrument for making precise inferences about discounting behaviour. A task 
employing more choices, different reward magnitudes, a larger range of implied 
interest rates, and a front end delay to the smaller, sooner reward, would lend itself 
more to the precise estimation of discounting parameters.  
 
While this thesis estimated more models of time preference than other studies in the 
addiction literature, there are a host of alternative discounting models which were not 
entertained. In future research it may be worthwhile to estimate additional time 
preference models to determine whether these alter, or refine, our conclusions 
concerning the relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour. 
 
The research in Chapter 5 was limited solely to university students so this sample is 
clearly not representative of the South African population as a whole, and the external 
validity of the results is questionable. But, as discussed in Chapter 5, this research is 
an important first step towards population-based studies of instantaneous risk and 
time preferences and smoking behaviour. The tasks and instructions developed for 
this study could be used to elicit a representative sample of South African’s attitudes 
to risk and time, which can then be analysed using the tools adopted in this thesis. 
 
Another potential issue with the results in Chapter 5 is whether the sample was 
representative of smokers and non-smokers at UCT. Given that a large number of 
people applied to take part in the study, people in the smoking and non-smoking 
groups were randomly selected to form part of the study pool. This process may have 
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generated a sample which is not representative of the UCT population. Unfortunately 
without additional information on the population of smokers and non-smokers at 
UCT, it was not possible to perform any sample selection corrections on the data.  
 
The review of economic models in Chapter 2 highlighted the roles that instantaneous 
risk and time preferences, intertemporal risk preferences, and subjective beliefs play 
in the initiation, maintenance, and resolution of addiction. But this thesis only 
empirically examined the instantaneous risk and time preferences of smokers and 
non-smokers. I am unaware of any incentivised experimental studies that compare the 
subjective beliefs and intertemporal risk preferences of addicts and non-addicts. In 
relation to smoking, it would be valuable to elicit the subjective beliefs of smokers 
and non-smokers concerning, say, the proportion of lung cancer cases attributable to 
smoking. Smokers may have better- or worse-informed subjective beliefs, relative to 
non-smokers, about the potential harms from smoking and incentivised experimental 
research could shed light on this issue. Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström 
(2013) discuss a method for eliciting and jointly estimating instantaneous risk 
preferences and subjective beliefs, and this approach could be put to good use with a 
sample of smokers and non-smokers. 
 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2014) conducted a set of instantaneous risk 
and time preference experiments, coupled with an intertemporal risk preference 
experiment, on a representative sample of 413 people in Denmark. The researchers 
used a full information maximum likelihood statistical framework to jointly estimate 
instantaneous risk and time preference parameters and an intertemporal risk 
preference parameter. They found that, on average, the sample displayed 
intertemporal risk aversion but that about 5% of the sample was intertemporally risk 
neutral or risk seeking. As discussed in Chapter 2, it would be valuable to use this 
robust experimental design and statistical framework to explore potential differences 
in the intertemporal risk preferences of addicts and non-addicts. 
 
In sum, this thesis adopted an approach to scientific research which views theory, 
experimental design, and econometrics as complementary. Put simply, only with a 
firm grasp of theory is it possible to design experiments and conduct statistical 
analyses which lend themselves to accurate and reliable inferences about the latent 
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constructs of interest. The economic models of addiction in Chapter 2 guided the 
search for preferences which may be a factor in addiction. The detailed reviews of the 
extant literature on instantaneous risk preferences, time preferences and smoking then 
highlighted the ways in which these preferences have been investigated. Given some 
of the issues which these reviews raised, statistical tools were chosen so as to be 
consistent with the DGPs proposed by structural theories and to account for subject 
errors in decision making. Finally, the experimental design in Chapter 5 was 
formulated to promote the estimation of several different theories of choice under risk 
and over time, and to allow for the theoretically-motivated joint estimation approach 
to time preferences which incorporates the curvature of the utility function. Thus, this 
thesis sought to embody the theory, experimental design, and econometric trinity. 
 
This thesis challenged some of the maintained assumptions in the addiction literature; 
e.g., that the probability discounting and hyperbolic discounting models best 
characterise choice under risk and over time, respectively. But it also replicated a 
previous finding; i.e., that smokers tend to discount the future more heavily than non-
smokers. The thesis shows, therefore, that some results withstand careful 
methodological and statistical scrutiny, whereas other results do not. Even though the 
experimental literature linking addiction to choice under risk and over time is at least 
15 years old, this thesis provides a new set of methodological and statistical tools to 
better investigate the behavioural correlates of addiction, and thereby hopefully 
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In this appendix I investigate an inferential issue that arises when using the KPB task 
to estimate or infer annual, rather than daily, discount rates. This problem was first 
uncovered when I sought to evaluate annual equivalents of the daily discount rates 
normally reported in the psychology and addiction literatures. To transform a daily 
exponential discount rate into an annual discount rate, one commonly1 uses the 
following equation: 
 
 δA = (1 + δD)365 – 1, (1)  
 
where δA is the annual discount rate and δD is the daily discount rate from the 
exponential discounting model. 
 
Table A:I shows the 27 discounting questions on the KPB task and the implied 
exponential daily and annual discount rates, assuming linear utility. The table also 
includes the ratio of the right endpoint and left endpoint of daily and annual discount 
rate intervals.2 As one proceeds down the table, the ratio of daily rate intervals varies 
between 2.17 and 2.67. By contrast, the ratio of annual rate intervals increases from 
2.57 to 9894905759808.40, albeit with less extreme values in between. The similarity 
in daily rate interval ratios and the large increase in annual rate interval ratios in Table 
A:I has important implications for the inferences one can draw from the KPB task. 
                                                
1 In the finance literature, the exponent of 365 in equation (1) is often replaced by 252 to represent the 
number of trading days in a year. I adopt the banking convention and make use of 365 days to 
transform a daily exponential discount rate into an annual exponential discount rate. 
2 The KPB task uses six discounting questions to define an exponential discount rate interval: three 
questions determine the left endpoint of the interval and three questions determine the right endpoint of 
the interval. For example, the first three rows of Table A:I are consistent with a daily discount rate of 
0.00016 and the next three rows of the table are consistent with a daily discount rate of 0.0004; 
together, these six rows define the discount rate interval (0.00016, 0.0004). To determine the ratio of 
this interval, I divided the right endpoint (i.e., 0.0004) by the left endpoint (i.e., 0.00016) which 
provides a daily rate interval ratio of 2.50. In some cases, particularly with annual discount rates, a set 
of three discounting questions is not consistent with the same discount rate. To calculate the ratio of an 
interval where the set of three questions is not consistent with a particular rate, I took the largest 
discount rate from the set as the right endpoint of the interval and the smallest discount rate of the set 
as the left endpoint of the interval. 
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Given that the daily rate interval ratios vary between 2.17 and 2.67, the KPB task is 
sensitive to 3-fold differences in daily discount rates regardless of the pattern of 
choices on the task. For example, if someone has a daily discount rate of 0.0002 and 
another person has a daily discount rate of 0.0006 (i.e., a 3-fold difference in daily 
discount rates), these people will fall into different daily discount rate intervals on the 
KPB task. Similarly, if someone has a daily discount rate of 0.01 and another person 
has a daily discount rate of 0.03 (i.e., a 3-fold difference in daily discount rates), these 
people will fall into different daily discount rate intervals on the KPB task. The daily 
discount rates in the second example are clearly larger than the daily discount rates in 
the first example. But the relative difference of the discount rates in the first example 
is the same as the relative difference in discount rates in the second example, which 
means the people in the first example fall into different discount rate intervals and so 
too do the people in the second example. Thus, the uncertainty associated with daily 
discount rate estimates on the KPB task (i.e., the size of the intervals) is relatively 
uniform, in a ratio sense, irrespective of choice patterns. 
 
By contrast, the uncertainty associated with annual discount rates increases as one 
moves down Table A:I, which implies that the sensitivity of the KPB task to 
differences in annual discount rates is tied to choice patterns. For example, if someone 
has an annual discount rate of 0.08 and another person has an annual discount rate of 
0.24 (i.e., a 3-fold difference in annual discount rates), they will fall into different 
annual discount rate intervals on the KPB task. However, if someone has an annual 
discount rate of 1.45 and another person has an annual discount rate of 4.35 (i.e., a 3-
fold difference in annual discount rates), they will fall into the same annual discount 
rate interval on the KPB task. In other words, while the KPB task can always a detect 
a 3-fold difference in daily discount rates, the same is not true of annual discount 
rates. Note that by row 16 of Table A:I, the KPB task cannot detect a 20-fold 
difference in annual discount rates, and by row 19 of Table A:I, the KPB task cannot 
detect a 600-fold difference in annual discount rates.  
 
The fact that the KPB task’s sensitivity to differences in annual discount rates is tied 
to choice patterns has at least two implications. The first is that the precision or 
reliability of annual discount rate estimates decreases as more SS choices are made on 
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the task. With only 3 SS choices, the annual discount rate falls into a relatively small 
interval: (0.06, 0.15). A subject who makes 3 SS choices may have an annual discount 
rate of 0.08 or an annual discount rate of 0.14, and one cannot determine his “true” 
annual discount rate based on his pattern of choices. Nevertheless, the relatively small 
annual discount rate interval of (0.06, 0.15) provides relatively tight bounds on the 
person’s annual discount rate. With 18 SS choices on the KPB task, however, the 
annual discount rate falls into a relatively large interval: (108, 68776). In this case, 
one is uncertain whether the person’s “true” annual discount rate is 120 or 60000.  
 
If one wanted to use choices on the KPB task to provide estimates of annual discount 
rates for use in public policy or cost-benefit analyses, this annual rate interval 
imprecision would likely be problematic. In addition, the large gaps in implied annual 
discount rates as one moves down the table, makes pooled estimation of a smooth 
annual discounting function difficult. Specifically, the estimation procedure has to 
contend with some discount rate intervals which are small and others which are large; 
relatively precise estimates can be obtained for the smaller intervals but relatively 
imprecise estimates will be obtained for the larger intervals.  
 
The second implication of the KPB task’s sensitivity to certain choice patterns with 
annual discount rates is that one’s ability to conduct group comparisons is tied to 
these choice patterns. For example, if one wants to compare the discounting 
behaviour of smokers and non-smokers, then it is easier to detect group differences if 
a large proportion of the people in these groups make a small number of SS choices 
on the task (i.e., where the task’s sensitivity to annual discount rate differences is 
greatest). For example, suppose the average non-smoker has an annual discount rate 
of 0.1 and the average smoker has an annual discount rate of 0.2. In this case, the 
average non-smoker would switch to the LL reward on row 4 of the table and the 
average smoker would switch to the LL reward on row 7 of the table, thereby making 
it possible, in principle, to detect a group difference. By contrast, suppose the average 
non-smoker has an annual discount rate of 6 and the average smoker has an annual 
discount rate of 100. In this case, the average smoker and the average non-smoker 
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Table A:I shows that up to row 15, the KPB task can detect a 5-fold difference in 
annual discount rates. After row 15 though, the task cannot detect a 20-fold difference 
in annual discount rates. With reference to the data used in Chapter 3, Table A:I 
shows that on row 16, 71% of smokers and 64% of non-smokers selected the SS 
reward. In other words, more than half of the sample selected the SS reward on row 
16 of Table A:I, which is where the KPB task’s sensitivity to differences in annual 
discount rates starts to decrease. In addition, in every row of the table, except row 26, 
a larger proportion of smokers selected the SS reward than non-smokers. This raises 
the possibility that the precision of the annual discount rate estimates for smokers may 
be lower than non-smokers. 
 
My aim in Chapter 3 was to compare the discounting behaviour of smokers and non-
smokers and not to provide precise estimates of annual discount rates for use in public 
policy. Consequently, the second implication of the KPB task’s sensitivity to certain 
choice patterns with annual discount rates (i.e., that it may be difficult to detect group 
differences with a large number of SS choices in certain rows) is more relevant to the 
inferences which I drew. Note that large annual rate intervals are irrelevant if one 
draws the same qualitative conclusions with daily and annual rates. In the remainder 
of this appendix, I will show that estimating, or inferring, annual discount rates with 
the KPB task can mask differences in the discounting behaviour of smokers and non-
smokers. 
 
To provide a concrete example of this inferential issue using the data reported in 
Chapter 3, Table A:II presents results from the exponential discounting model which 
only includes the current smoker covariate.3 The table includes four sets of results: 
Model 1 was directly estimated with daily rates; Model 2 was directly estimated with 
annual rates which were then used to infer daily rates; Model 3 was directly estimated 
with annual rates; and Model 4 was directly estimated with daily rates which were 
then used to infer annual rates. 
 
  
                                                
3 In Chapter 3 I distinguished between current smokers, ex-smokers and never-smokers. To keep things 
as simple as possible in this appendix, I focus on current smokers and non-smokers, where non-
smokers include both ex-smokers and never-smokers. 
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TABLE A:II: EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING ML ESTIMATES 
SMOKING TOTAL EFFECT AT DAILY AND ANNUAL RATES 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Daily Inferred Daily Annual Inferred Annual 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Smoker 0.00573*** 0.00573*** 177.27630 177.27650 
 
(0.00167) (0.00167) (119.57760) (119.57830) 
Constant 0.00894*** 0.00894*** 24.73189*** 24.73184*** 
 
(0.00044) (0.00044) (4.07623) (4.07622) 
Error (µ) 
    Constant 14.91274*** 14.91275*** 14.91275*** 14.91274*** 
  (0.37902) (0.37902) (0.37902) (0.37902) 
N 32535 32535 32535 32535 
log-likelihood -14668.52 -14668.52 -14668.52 -14668.52 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Note that irrespective of whether I estimate with daily rates (Model 1) or estimate 
with annual rates and then infer daily rates (Model 2), I get identical results. 
Similarly, regardless of whether I estimate with annual rates (Model 3) or estimate 
with daily rates and then infer annual rates (Model 4), I get identical results. 
Moreover, the log-likelihoods of the models with daily and annual rates are the same, 
and so too are the estimates of the Fechner error term. However, the estimate for 
smokers with daily rates is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.001) whereas 
the estimate for smokers with annual rates is not statistically significant (p = 0.138). 
Thus, one reaches a different conclusion about the relationship between smoking and 
discounting when estimating with daily or annual rates. Which set of results reflect 
the “true” relationship between smoking and discounting? 
 
As a first pass at answering this question note that the estimate of the constant term in 
Model 1 of Table A:II is 0.009 and the estimate of the smoker coefficient is 0.006. 
Looking at Table A:I, these daily rate estimates imply that the average non-smoker 
will switch to the LL reward on row 16 and the average smoker will switch to the LL 
reward on row 19, thereby potentially revealing a group difference in daily rates. 
However, with reference to annual rates, we know that the KPB task’s sensitivity to 
differences in annual rates decreases after row 15 and this may be why I do not detect 
a group difference between smokers and non-smokers when estimating, or inferring, 
annual discount rates. 
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To provide a more detailed answer to this question I simulated KPB discounting data 
so that I control the DGP and know a priori whether there is a difference in the 
discounting behaviour of smokers and non-smokers. If it turns out that the estimates 
with daily rates reflect the underlying features of the data but the estimates with 
annual rates do not, then this suggests that one should estimate daily rates with the 
KPB task so as to draw accurate inferences. 
 
For a simulation to shed light on this issue it should capture the salient features of the 
KPB data that I used in Chapter 3. Recall that 13.5% of the subjects in the sample 
were current smokers while the rest were either ex-smokers or never-smokers. As 
mentioned earlier, I want to keep things as simple as possible in this appendix so I 
will simply focus on current smokers and non-smokers, where non-smokers include 
both ex-smokers and never-smokers. Given the relatively low proportion of smokers 
in the sample, my simulation generated datasets which limited the proportion of 
smokers to a maximum of 25% of the sample. 
 
Another important feature of the KPB data used in Chapter 3 is the relatively high 
prevalence of inconsistent choices. Recall that a person’s choices on the KPB task are 
not always deterministically consistent with a particular discounting parameter. For 
example, a subject may choose the SS reward on the first 3 rows of Table A:I but then 
fail to consistently choose the LL reward thereafter. In other words, the subject may 
select the LL reward on rows 4, 5, and 6, before switching back to the SS reward on 
rows 7, 8, and 9, and then switching back to the LL reward for the remaining rows in 
the table. Note that for a subject’s choices to be deterministically consistent with a 
particular discounting parameter on the KPB task, he can only switch from the SS 
reward to the LL reward once on the table, or not at all (i.e., either select the SS 
reward on every row of the table or the LL reward on every row of the table).  
 
Figure A:I shows the distribution of the total number of switches which subjects made 
on the KPB task using the data reported in Chapter 3. Note that only 26% of the 
sample switched 0 or 1 times on the task, implying that only about a quarter of the 
sample made choices that were deterministically consistent with a particular 
discounting parameter. By contrast, 34% of the sample switched 3 times on the task 
and 20% of the sample switched 5 times on the task. As shown on the figure, the 
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mean number of switches on the task is 3.87, with a standard deviation of 3.09. Thus, 
my simulation should incorporate this feature of the data for it to mimic the process 




An important DGP design choice was whether daily or annual discount rates would be 
used to define the discounting behaviour of the sample. Taking draws from a 
distribution of daily discount rates may yield reliable daily rate estimates but 
unreliable annual rate estimates. Conversely, taking draws from a distribution of 
annual discount rates may provide reliable estimates of annual rates but unreliable 
estimates of daily rates. To determine whether daily rate estimates are more reliable 
than annual rate estimates with the KPB task, I conducted 75,000 replications where I 
took draws from distributions of daily discount rates, and 50,000 replications where I 
took draws from distributions of annual discount rates. 
 
Thus, my simulation was set up to run 125,000 times and on each replication it 
performed a number of functions which will be detailed below. The first such task 
was the creation of a dataset consisting of 1,000 subjects who would make 27 choices 
on the KPB task. This sample was then randomly split into smokers and non-smokers 
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based on draws from a uniform distribution which ensured that the minimum 
proportion of smokers in the sample was 0.05 and the maximum was 0.25. Figure A:II 
is a kernel density plot of the fraction of smokers in the sample across the 125,000 
replications in the simulated dataset. The average proportion of smokers in the sample 




After randomly allocating subjects to smoking status, the simulation used draws from 
distinct gamma distributions to define each subject’s discount rate. The gamma 
distribution Γ(k, θ) is a two-parameter family of continuous probability distributions 
which exhibits considerable flexibility. The distribution is defined by two parameters 
k and θ: k is the shape parameter, and θ is the scale parameter. The mean, mode and 
variance of the gamma distribution are simple functions of these two parameters. 
Specifically, the mean of a gamma distribution with parameters k and θ is kθ, the 
mode is (k – 1)θ for k > 1, and the variance is kθ2. The support of the gamma 
distribution is (0, ∞) which is relevant in the present context because I do not have to 
be concerned with the possibility of generating negative discount rates by taking 
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As mentioned previously, I conducted 75,000 replications where I took draws from 
distributions of daily discount rates, and 50,000 replications where I took draws from 
distributions of annual discount rates. Non-smokers’ daily discount rates were 
determined by taking draws from Γ(2, 0.01) while smokers’ daily discount rates were 
determined by taking draws from Γ(2, U[0.01, 0.02)) where U[0.01, 0.02) refers to a 
continuous uniform distribution on the interval [0.01, 0.02).4 Figure A:III:A plots the 
gamma probability density function (PDF) from which non-smokers’ daily discount 
rates were drawn (i.e., Γ(2, 0.01)), and two example gamma PDFs (i.e., Γ(2, 0.015), 
Γ(2, 0.02)) from which smokers’ daily discount rates were drawn.5 Focussing on the 
non-smokers’ gamma PDF, we see that the mode of the distribution is (k – 1)θ = 0.01, 
the mean is kθ = 0.02, and the variance is kθ2 = 0.0002; the means of the gamma 
PDFs are represented by the dashed lines on the figure. By contrast, one of the 
example gamma PDFs for smokers (i.e., Γ(2, 0.015)) has a mode of (k – 1)θ = 0.015, 
                                                
4 Note that the draw from the uniform distribution (e.g., 0.015) was taken prior to the draws from the 
gamma distribution, which means that, during one replication of the simulation, I was taking draws 
from the same gamma distribution (e.g., Γ(2, 0.015)). 
5 Technically, smokers’ daily discount rates were never drawn from Γ(2, 0.02) because draws from Γ(2, 
U[0.01, 0.02)) preclude a scale parameter θ of 0.02. In other words, draws from the left-closed, right-
open interval [0.01, 0.02) do not include 0.02; an interval which is closed and open is referred to as a 
“clopen” interval. However, I plot the gamma PDF Γ(2, 0.02) because this incorporates the scale 
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Figure A:III:A: Gamma PDFs for daily discount rates
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a mean of kθ = 0.03, and variance of kθ2 = 0.00045. Finally, the other example 
gamma PDF for smokers (i.e., Γ(2, 0.02)) has a mode of (k – 1)θ = 0.02, a mean of kθ 
= 0.04, and variance of kθ2 = 0.0008.  
 
The draws from these two gamma distributions ensured that, in almost all cases, 
smokers had higher average daily discount rates than non-smokers. Figure A:IV:A 
shows the distributions of smokers’ and non-smokers’ average daily discount rates 





For the 50,000 replications where I took draws from annual discount rate 
distributions, non-smokers’ annual discount rates were determined by taking draws 
from Γ(2, 55) while smokers’ annual discount rates were determined by taking draws 
from Γ(2, U[55, 110)) where U[55, 110) refers to a continuous uniform distribution 
on the interval [55, 110).6 Note that I chose to use the same shape parameter for the 
gamma distributions from which daily and annual discount rates were drawn. In 
                                                
6 The draw from the uniform distribution (e.g., 80) was taken prior to the draws from the gamma 
distribution, which means that, during one replication of the simulation, I was taking draws from the 
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Figure A:IV:A: Distribution of average daily discount rates across replications
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addition, across both daily and annual rate simulations, the uniform distribution which 
determined the scale parameter for smokers used the non-smokers’ scale parameter as 
the left endpoint and twice this value for the right endpoint. Finally, the daily rate 
scale parameter for non-smokers implies that the modal non-smoker would switch to 
the LL reward on row 16 of Table A:I. Similarly, the annual rate scale parameter for 
non-smokers implies that the modal non-smoker would switch to the LL reward on 
row 16 of Table A:I. Thus, although discount rates were drawn from distinct daily and 
annual rate distributions, these daily and annual rate distributions yield similar choice 




Figure A:III:B plots the gamma PDF from which non-smokers’ annual discount rates 
were drawn (i.e., Γ(2, 55)), and two example gamma PDFs (i.e., Γ(2, 80), Γ(2, 110)) 
from which smokers’ annual discount rates were drawn.7 Focussing on the non-
smokers’ gamma PDF, we see that the mode of the distribution is (k – 1)θ = 55, the 
mean is kθ = 110, and the variance is kθ2 = 6,050; the means of the gamma PDFs are 
                                                
7 Technically, smokers’ annual discount rates were never drawn from Γ(2, 110) because draws from 
Γ(2, U[55, 110)) preclude a scale parameter θ of 110. In other words, draws from the clopen interval 
[55, 110) do not include 110. However, I plot the gamma PDF Γ(2, 110) because this incorporates the 
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Figure A:III:B: Gamma PDFs for annual discount rates
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represented by the dashed lines on the figure. By contrast, one of the example gamma 
PDFs for smokers (i.e., Γ(2, 80)) has a mode of (k – 1)θ = 80, a mean of kθ = 160, and 
variance of kθ2 = 12,800. Finally, the other example gamma PDF for smokers (i.e., 
Γ(2, 110)) has a mode of (k – 1)θ = 110, a mean of kθ = 220, and variance of kθ2 = 
24,200. 
 
The draws from these two gamma distributions ensured that, in almost all cases, 
smokers had higher average annual discount rates than non-smokers. Figure A:IV:B 
shows the distributions of smokers’ and non-smokers’ average annual discount rates 





Once each subject had been assigned a daily or annual discount rate, a draw from a 
gamma distribution Γ(U[0.1, 3), U[0.01, 6)) determined the Fechner error term for 
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Figure A:IV:B: Distribution of average annual discount rates across replications
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the clopen interval [·,·).8 With a daily or annual discount rate and a Fechner error 
term, each subject’s choice behaviour could then be determined.  
 
Recall that according to the exponential discounting model, under the assumptions of 
linear utility and a Fechner behavioural error specification, a subject compares the 
present values (PVs) of SS and LL rewards (where the present values are computed 
using the subject’s discount rate) and then stochastically chooses the one with the 
higher present value. Specifically, using the notation in Chapter 3, a subject computes 
the PV of the SS reward (which is always available immediately in the KPB task): 
 
 PVSS = y0, (2)  
 
and the PV of the LL reward9: 
 
 PVLL = [1 / (1 + δ)τ]yτ, (3)  
 
and then forms the PV index: 
 
 ∇PV = (PVSS - PVLL) / µ, (4)  
 
where µ is the Fechner error term. The value of the PV index, when passed through a 
cumulative distribution function, then stochastically determines the subject’s choice. 
Specifically, in the case of the cumulative logistic distribution function, the 
probability that the subject chooses the SS reward is given by the following 
expression: 
 
 Pr(Choose SS reward) = Λ(∇PV) (5)  
 
                                                
8 Note that the draws from the two uniform distributions (U[0.1, 3) and U[0.01, 6)) were taken prior to 
the draws from the gamma distribution, which means that, during one replication of the simulation, I 
was taking draws from the same gamma distribution. 
9 Under the assumption of daily discount rates, τ in expression (3) is simply the number of days (e.g., 
119 days) between receipt of the SS reward and receipt of the LL reward. Under the assumption of 
annual discount rates, by contrast, τ is divided by 365 in expression (3) so that it represents the delay 
between the SS and LL rewards as a fraction of a year (e.g., 119/365 = 0.326 years). 
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For example, if ∇PV = 2, then the likelihood of the SS reward being chosen is Λ(2) = 
0.88 (i.e., there is an 88% chance that the SS reward will be chosen). To 
operationalise this stochastic choice procedure in the simulation, I took draws from 
U[0, 1). If the draw from this uniform distribution was below the choice likelihood 
Λ(∇PV) then the choice was implemented, but if the draw from this distribution was 
above the choice likelihood, then the opposite choice was made. Expanding on the 
example where ∇PV = 2, if the draw from the uniform distribution for this particular 
choice pair was, say, 0.75 then the SS reward was chosen because Λ(2) = 0.88, but if 




Note that by taking draws for the Fechner error term from different gamma 
distributions on each replication (e.g., draws from Γ(0.1, 0.001) during one replication 
and draws from Γ(2, 5) during another replication), I was able to vary the level of 
inconsistent choice behaviour exhibited by the sample for that replication. From (4) it 
is clear that as µ increases, ∇PV falls. In the limit, as µ → ∞, ∇PV → 0, and choice 
behaviour is essentially random (i.e., Λ(∇PV = 0) = 0.5 so there is a 50% chance that 
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Figure A:V: Average number of switches per subject across replications
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is a kernel density plot of the average number of switches per subject across 
replications of the simulation; it resembles the general shape of Figure A:I. 
 
Once the simulation had generated the choice data in the manner described above, I 
estimated the exponential discounting model with a Fechner error term and smoking 
status covariate assuming daily and annual discount rates. I also used these estimates 
to infer annual and daily rates, respectively. The simulation then saved the results 
from these estimations before starting up again. This process was repeated 125,000 
times: 75,000 times under the assumption that daily discount rates generated the data, 
and 50,000 times under the assumption that annual discount rates generated the data. 
In what follows, I will discuss the results from the daily rate DGP prior to discussing 
the results from the annual rate DGP.  
 
Daily Discount Rate DGP 
 
Figure A:VI plots estimates of the Fechner error term as a function of the average 
number of switches per subject across the 75,000 replications where daily discount 
rates define the DGP. The figure also includes a kernel-weighted local polynomial 
regression “line” which clearly shows that as the average number of switches per 
subject increases, so too does the estimate of the Fechner error term. Thus, estimates 
of the Fechner error term closely track the level of inconsistency exhibited by the 
sample.  
 
As I found in Table A:II, the daily estimates and inferred daily estimates were 
practically identical during each replication and so too were the annual estimates and 
inferred annual estimates. In addition, estimates of the Fechner error term across daily 
and annual rates were the same, and so too were the models’ log-likelihoods. 
Pronounced differences emerged though when I focussed on the statistical 





Figure A:VII plots the p-values for the smoker covariate when using annual and 
inferred annual rates, daily and inferred daily rates, and annual and daily rates. Note 
that the horizontal and vertical dashed lines are plotted at p = 0.1, which is the level of 
statistical significance used in this thesis. Note further that the figure includes a 
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression “line.” In the top panel of Figure A:VII, 
the p-values for the smoker covariate when estimating with annual rates, or estimating 
with daily rates and inferring annual rates, track each other closely. Similarly, in the 
middle panel of the figure, the p-values for the smoker covariate when estimating 
with daily rates, or estimating with annual rates and inferring daily rates, track each 
other almost perfectly. However, in the bottom panel of the figure, there is a marked 
divergence in the smoker covariate p-values when estimating with daily rates or 
estimating with annual rates. Given the small size of the figure in the bottom panel, 
this divergence can be quite difficult to see so Figure A:VIII provides a close-up view 





Figure A:VIII plots the smoker covariate annual p-values as a function of the smoker 
covariate daily p-values, for daily p-values which are statistically significant (i.e., p < 
0.1). If the smoker covariate was statistically significant with both annual and daily 
discount rates, then the annual p-values would all lie below the horizontal dashed line 
where the annual p = 0.1. However, only 15% of the annual p-values are less than 0.1 
when the associated daily p-values are less than 0.1. Furthermore, the average annual 
p-value = 0.167 (standard deviation = 0.065) for daily p-values which are strictly less 
than 0.1. The kernel-weighted local polynomial regression line in Figure A:VIII 
highlights this fact and shows that the average annual p-value is not statistically 
significant when the daily p-value is statistically significant.  
 
Thus, in only 15% of cases would one reach the same qualitative conclusion about the 
effect of smoking on discounting behaviour when using annual discount rates as 
opposed to daily discount rates. However, this does not prove that the estimates with 
daily rates reveal the correct relationship between smoking and discounting while the 
estimates with annual rates do not. To determine which set of estimates uncovers the 
true relationship, it is helpful to focus on the smoker covariate daily and annual p-
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values as a function of the difference in simulated average daily discount rates of 




Figure A:IX plots the smoker covariate daily and annual p-values as a function of the 
difference in simulated average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers. In 
the top panel of the figure, I find that the smoker covariate daily p-value converges to 
0 as the difference in smokers’ and non-smokers’ average discount rates increases; 
this is precisely what one would expect if the daily rate estimates track the difference 
in discounting behaviour of smokers and non-smokers. By contrast, the bottom panel 
of the figure shows a U-shaped relationship between the smoker covariate annual p-
value and the difference in average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers. 
The kernel-weighted local polynomial regression line in the bottom panel never 
actually crosses the horizontal dashed line where p = 0.1, and it gets further from the 
dashed line as the difference in average discount rates of smokers and non-smokers 
increases. Thus, Figure A:IX shows that the daily rate estimates reliably track the 
difference in average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers whereas the 





To further investigate this issue, I conducted some parametric analyses of the 
relationship between smoker covariate p-values and features of the simulation; these 
complement the non-parametric analyses. The dependent variables in these analyses 
are the smoker covariate daily and annual p-values. As p-values fall within the closed 
unit interval [0, 1], I make use of Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) model for fractional 
response variables which has the log-likelihood function: 
 
 ln Li(β; y, X) = yiln[Φ(Xiβ)] + (1 - yi)ln[1 -  Φ(Xiβ)], (6)  
 
where y is the fractional dependent variable of the model (i.e., the smoker covariate 
annual or daily p-value), X is a vector of covariates, β is the coefficient vector linked 
to the vector of covariates, and Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution 
function. 
 
Table A:III presents results from the fractional dependent variable model where the 
smoker covariate annual (Model 1) and daily (Model 2) p-values are estimated as a 
function of the difference in average daily discount rates of smokers and non-
smokers, the average number of switches on the KPB task, and the fraction of 
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smokers in the sample. In both models, I find that p-values tend to increase as the 
level of inconsistency (i.e., the average number of switches on the KPB task) rises, 
and p-values tend to decrease as the fraction of smokers in the sample increases.  
 
However, the relationship between smoker covariate p-values and differences in the 
average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers, differs across the two 
models, which replicates the result in Figure A:IX. Specifically, in the annual model, 
there is a U-shaped relationship between the smoker covariate p-value and differences 
in the average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers. In other words, 
annual p-values decrease as the difference in discount rates increase but only up to a 
point, after which increases in the difference in discount rates, lead to increases in 
annual p-values. In the daily model, by contrast, increases in the difference in 
discount rates of smokers and non-smokers lead to a monotonic decline in the smoker 
covariate p-value.  
 
TABLE A:III: SMOKER ESTIMATE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (DAILY DGP) 
PAPKE-WOOLDRIDGE FRACTIONAL RESPONSE MODEL 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Annual Daily 
Difference in daily discount rate: Smoker - non-smoker -177.217*** -250.353*** 
 (2.830) (10.246) (Difference in daily discount rate: Smoker - non-smoker)2 7111.990*** -20392.365*** 
 (133.293) (1801.042) Average number of switches on the KPB task 0.041*** 0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) Fraction of smokers in the sample -4.836*** -3.151*** 
 (0.172) (0.315) Constant 0.584*** 0.445*** 
  (0.030) (0.052) 
N 75000 75000 
log-likelihood -37015.382 -10718.75 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Table A:IV maps out the response surface for daily and annual smoker covariate p-
values at different values of the difference in average daily discount rates of smokers 
and non-smokers. Note that when the difference in discount rates is low, the 
conditional marginal effect of an increase in the difference is negative in both models. 
However, as the difference in discount rates reaches 0.015, the conditional marginal 
effect in the annual model becomes positive, while the conditional marginal effect in 
the daily model remains negative. Thus, the daily estimates reliably track the 
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underlying differences in daily discounting behaviour of smokers and non-smokers, 
whereas the annual estimates do not. 
 
TABLE A:IV: CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR P-VALUES (DAILY DGP) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Annual Daily 
Difference in discount rates   0.000 -177.217 (2.830) -250.353 (10.246) 
0.005 -106.097 (1.600) -454.277 (10.280) 
0.010 -34.977 (0.818) -658.201 (27.479) 
0.015 36.143 (1.527) -862.124 (45.313) 
0.020 107.262 (2.747) -1066.048 (63.248) 
0.025 178.382 (4.039) -1269.971 (81.215) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
In sum, the preceding analyses show that when daily discount rates define the DGP of 
the KPB task, daily rates provide more reliable estimates than annual rates when 
drawing inferences about the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour. However, this does not imply that one should estimate daily discount rates 
instead of annual discount rates when the DGP of the KPB task is defined by annual 
rates. I explore the relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour under the 
assumption of an annual discount rate DGP in the next section. 
 
Annual Discount Rate DGP 
 
Figure A:X plots estimates of the Fechner error term as a function of the average 
number of switches per subject for both the daily and annual DGP simulations. The 
figure also includes kernel-weighted local polynomial regression lines which clearly 
show that as the average number of switches per subject increases, so too does the 
estimate of the Fechner error term. Thus, estimates of the Fechner error term closely 
track the level of inconsistency exhibited by the sample. However, estimates of the 
Fechner error term with the daily DGP lie everywhere above estimates of the Fechner 
error term with the annual DGP. A non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms 
that estimates of the Fechner error term with the daily DGP are significantly higher 
than estimates of the Fechner error term with the annual DGP (p < 0.001). It is 
unclear why this difference in Fechner estimates emerges with daily and annual DGPs 
but it is certainly a noteworthy difference.  
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As I found in Table A:II and under the daily discount rate DGP assumption, the daily 
estimates and inferred daily estimates were practically identical during each 
replication of the annual rate DGP simulation, and so too were the annual estimates 
and inferred annual estimates. In addition, estimates of the Fechner error term across 
daily and annual rates were the same, and so too were the models’ log-likelihoods. Of 
crucial importance now is whether I replicate the result of differences in the statistical 




Figure A:XI plots the p-values for the smoker covariate when using annual and 
inferred annual rates, daily and inferred daily rates, and annual and daily rates. The 
horizontal and vertical dashed lines are plotted at p = 0.1 and the figure includes a 
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression line. In the top panel of Figure A:XI, the 
p-values for the smoker covariate, when estimating with annual rates or estimating 
with daily rates and inferring annual rates, track each other very closely. Similarly, in 
the middle panel of the figure, the p-values for the smoker covariate when estimating 
with daily rates or estimating with annual rates and inferring daily rates, track each 
other almost perfectly. However, in the bottom panel of the figure, there is a 
divergence, although not nearly as pronounced as with the daily DGP in Figure 
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A:VIII, in the smoker covariate p-values when estimating with daily rates or 




To focus on this divergence in statistical significance, Figure A:XII plots the smoker 
covariate annual p-values as a function of the smoker covariate daily p-values where 
the daily p < 0.1. If the smoker covariate was statistically significant with both annual 
and daily discount rates, then the annual p-values would all lie below the horizontal 
dashed line where the annual p = 0.1. Figure A:XII shows that for low daily p-values 
(i.e., p < 0.05), annual p-values are predominately statistically significant, but at 
higher daily p-values (i.e., 0.1 > p > 0.05) a lower proportion of annual p-values are 
statistically significant. Specifically, when daily p < 0.05, 99% of annual p-values are 
less than 0.1. However, when daily 0.05 < p < 0.1, only 31% of annual p-values are 
less than 0.1. Clearly these differences in statistical significance across daily and 
annual rates are not nearly as pronounced under the assumption of an annual DGP as 
they were under the assumption of a daily DGP. But they raise the question: which set 






As discussed in the previous section, the fact that the daily rate p-values tend to be 
lower than the annual rate p-values does not prove that the estimates with daily rates 
reveal the correct relationship between smoking and discounting while the estimates 
with annual rates do not. To determine which set of estimates uncovers the true 
relationship, it is helpful to focus on the smoker covariate daily and annual p-values 
as a function of the difference in simulated average annual discount rates of smokers 
and non-smokers. 
 
Figure A:XIII plots the smoker covariate daily and annual p-values as a function of 
the difference in simulated average annual discount rates of smokers and non-
smokers. The kernel-weighted local polynomial regression lines in the two panels 
show that the smoker covariate daily and annual p-values tend to 0 as the difference in 
simulated average annual discount rates increases; this is what one would expect if the 
estimates track the underlying relationship between smoking and discounting.  
 
However, unlike smoker covariate daily p-values in Figure A:IX (i.e., under the 
assumption of a daily rate DGP), there is far more variation in daily and annual p-
values as the difference in simulated discount rates increases. In other words, even at 
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large simulated differences in annual discount rates, a fairly high proportion of 
smoker covariate p-values are not statistically significant. Specifically, 6% of daily 
smoker covariate p-values are not statistically significant when the difference in 
average annual discount rates is greater than 55, whereas 10% of annual smoker 
covariate p-values are not statistically significant when the difference in average 
annual discount rates is greater than 55. With the daily DGP simulations, only 0.001% 
of smoker covariate daily p-values were not statistically significant when the 




Table A:I provides a possible explanation for this difference in the KPB task’s 
sensitivity to differences in the discount rates of smokers and non-smokers across the 
daily and annual rate DGP simulations: while the KPB task can always detect a 3-fold 
difference in daily discount rates, it cannot detect a 20-fold difference in annual 
                                                
10 In the daily rate DGP simulations, the average non-smoker daily discount rate was 0.02 so an 
average difference in the daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers of 0.01 means that, on 
average, smokers’ daily discount rates were 50% greater than non-smokers’ daily discount rates. In the 
annual rate DGP simulations, the average non-smoker annual discount rate was 110 so an average 
difference in annual discount rates of smokers and non-smokers of 55 means that, on average, smokers’ 
annual discount rates were 50% greater than non-smokers’ annual discount rates. Thus, a difference of 
0.01 in the average daily discount rates of smokers and non-smokers in the daily DGP simulations, is 
directly comparable to a difference of 55 in the average annual discount rates of smokers and non-
smokers in the annual rate DGP simulations. 
 -282- 
discount rates after row 15 of the table. This is relevant to the data used in Chapter 3 
because more than half of all smokers and non-smokers selected the SS reward on 
row 16 of the KPB task, and this is where the task’s precision, at least with annual 
discount rates, starts to decrease.  
 
TABLE A:V: SMOKER ESTIMATE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (ANNUAL DGP) 
PAPKE-WOOLDRIDGE FRACTIONAL RESPONSE MODEL 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Annual Daily 
Difference in annual discount rate: Smoker - non-smoker -0.0409*** -0.0433*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (Difference in annual discount rate: Smoker - non-smoker)2 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) Average number of switches on the KPB task 0.2345*** 0.2246*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0050) Fraction of smokers in the sample -3.1558*** -2.7084*** 
 (0.2649) (0.2770) Constant -0.1572*** -0.2005*** 
  (0.0450) (0.0469) 
N 50000 50000 
log-likelihood -14854.404 -13521.594 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Table A:V presents results from the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) fractional response 
model where smoker covariate annual (Model 1) and daily (Model 2) p-values are 
estimated as a function of the difference in average annual discount rates of smokers 
and non-smokers, the average number of switches on the KPB task, and the fraction 
of smokers in the sample.11 As I found in Table A:III under the assumption of a daily 
rate DGP, p-values tend to increase as the level of inconsistency (i.e., the average 
number of switches on the KPB task) rises, and p-values tend to decrease as the 
fraction of smokers in the sample increases. 
 
However, unlike Table A:III, there is a weak U-shaped relationship between smoker 
covariate p-values and differences in the average annual discount rates of smokers 
and non-smokers in both the daily and annual models. The qualifier “weak” was used 
in the previous sentence because the estimate of the quadratic term is far smaller than 
the estimate of the linear term; in Table A:III, the estimates of the quadratic terms 
                                                
11 The huge variation in smoker covariate p-values in Figure A:XIII suggests that subjecting these data 
to statistical analysis may be of limited value. Nevertheless, I conduct these analyses for completeness’ 
sake and to draw comparisons between the results from the daily rate and annual rate DGP simulations. 
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dwarfed the estimates of the linear terms. In other words, the estimates in Table A:V 
imply that smoker covariate p-values tend to decrease over almost the entire range of 
differences in the average annual discount rates of smokers and non-smokers and then 
rise very little. Specifically, the turning point in this relationship occurs at an average 
annual difference in discount rates of 120.25 in Model 1 (i.e., the annual model), and 
an average annual difference in discount rates of 127.50 in Model 2 (i.e., the daily 
model).  
 
Note that the estimate of the linear term in the daily model is significantly smaller (p 
< 0.001) than the estimate of the linear term in the annual model. This implies that an 
infinitesimal increase in the average annual discount rates of smokers and non-
smokers leads to a larger fall in smoker covariate p-values in the daily model 
compared to the annual model, at least for values of the difference in discount rates 
which produce declines in smoker covariate p-values.  
 
In sum, the results in this subsection suggest that it is more difficult to detect 
differences in the discounting behaviour of smokers and non-smokers when annual 
discount rates, as opposed to daily discount rates, define the DGP of the KPB task. In 
addition, the results in this subsection provide some support for the contention that 
estimating daily discount rates is more reliable than estimating annual discount rates, 
even when the DGP is defined by annual rates. Recall from the discussion of Figure 
A:XIII that 6% of daily smoker covariate p-values are not statistically significant 
when the difference in average annual discount rates is greater than 55, whereas 10% 
of annual smoker covariate p-values are not statistically significant when the 
difference in average annual discount rates is greater than 55. Thus, in about 4% of 
cases, the daily rate estimates detect the difference in discounting behaviour of 
smokers and non-smokers, whereas the annual rate estimates do not. 
 
The weight of the simulation evidence in this appendix suggests that to detect group 
differences in discounting behaviour on the KPB task, it is more reliable to estimate 
or infer daily, as opposed to annual, discount rates. This result holds strongly in the 
case of a daily discount rate DGP but only weakly with an annual discount rate DGP. 
It is still somewhat of a numerical puzzle as to why the daily rate estimates are more 
reliable at detecting group differences than the annual rate estimates, but to err on the 
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side of caution when drawing inferences with the KPB task, this appendix suggests 
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In Section V of Chapter 3 I discussed the estimation of discounting models under the 
assumption that utility U(·) is linear in income y. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2008) devised a method for jointly estimating the curvature of the utility 
function and the parameters of discounting models. These researchers used a subject’s 
choices on a risk preference task to pin down the shape of the utility function and then 
used the subject’s choices on a discounting task to estimate the discounting 
parameters, conditional on the shape of the utility function. As discussed earlier, 
unfortunately the UCLA and USC studies did not elicit risk preferences so the method 
of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2008) cannot be used to jointly estimate 
utility function curvature and discounting behaviour. 
 
However, if one makes some parametric assumptions about the form of the utility 
function (e.g., a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function) then one can estimate the parameters from 
discounting models subject to particular parameter values of the utility function. By 
incrementally varying the parameters defining the utility function and re-estimating 
the discounting parameters, one can then track the evolution of the model’s log-
likelihood. This process, referred to as the estimation of “profile likelihoods,”12 
allows one to find the set of parameters which yield the highest log-likelihood value 
for the model. This set of parameters defines, therefore, the optimal shape of the 
utility function conditional on the subjects’ discounting choices. 
 
To illustrate this method, assume that utility of income is defined by a power utility 
function which exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA): 
 
 U(y) = yr, (1)  
 
where the parameter r determines the shape of the utility function. With this 
parametric structure, one can re-write (12) in the main text of Chapter 3 to incorporate 
the power utility function: 
                                                




 y0r = [1 / (1 + δ)τ]yτr (2)  
 
If r = 1 then (2) collapses to (12) in the main text of Chapter 3 but this is not 
necessarily the case and one can use the estimation of profile likelihoods to find the 
optimal value of r, conditional on the subjects’ discounting choices. Note that as r 
varies over the interval (0, 1.5) the utility function changes from concave (r < 1), to 
linear (r = 1), to convex (r > 1), which implies diminishing, constant, and increasing 
marginal utility, respectively.  
 
I will vary the value of r in increments of 0.05 over the interval (0, 1.5) and then track 
the evolution of the model’s parameters and the model’s log-likelihood. I will perform 
this exercise for the E, H, QH, and WB models. 
 
Figure B:I plots estimates of the discounting parameter δ, the error term µ, and the 
log-likelihood, as a function of the power utility function parameter r, for the E 
model. The log-likelihood value is highest when r = 0.15 and a dashed line is 
included in the figure to indicate this point; there is also a dashed line at r = 1 which 
was the assumption adopted in Section V of Chapter 3. At r = 0.15, δ = 0.00145, µ = 
0.11455, and the log-likelihood value is -14100.69. The estimate of δ increases 
steadily as r rises which highlights the point made earlier that if U(·) is concave then 
the assumption of linear utility will bias estimates of the discounting parameter δ 
upwards. 
 
Figure B:II plots estimates of the discounting parameter δ, the error term µ, and the 
log-likelihood, as a function of the power utility function parameter r, for the H 
model. The log-likelihood value is highest when r = 0.15 and a dashed line is 
included in the figure to indicate this point; there is also a dashed line at r = 1 which 
was the assumption adopted in Section V of Chapter 3. At r = 0.15, δ = 0.00155, µ = 
0.11216, and the log-likelihood value is -14079.93. Note that as in Figure B:I, the 








Figure B:III plots estimates of the discounting parameters δ and β, the error term µ, 
and the log-likelihood, as a function of the power utility function parameter r, for the 
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Figure B:II: H model profile likelihood
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included in the figure to indicate this point; there is also a dashed line at r = 1 which 
was the assumption adopted in Section V of Chapter 3. At r = 0.3, δ = 0.00129, β = 
0.92765, µ = 0.26045, and the log-likelihood value is -14084.34. The estimates of δ 
and β decline sharply over the interval (0, 0.3), but δ rises and β declines slowly 
thereafter. Note that β is greater than 1 for values of r < 0.3, it drops below 1 at r = 
0.3, and then remains below 1 at higher values of r. These results show that quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (i.e., β < 1) is only present at higher values of r. The evolution 
of the model’s log-likelihood is interesting because it is relatively flat for low values 
of r, it spikes at r = 0.3 and then declines steadily as r continues to rise. As in the 




Figure B:IV plots estimates of the discounting parameters δ and β, the error term µ, 
and the log-likelihood, as a function of the power utility function parameter r, for the 
WB model. The log-likelihood value is highest when r = 0.05 and a dashed line is 
included in the figure to indicate this point; there is also a dashed line at r = 1 which 
was the assumption adopted in Section V of Chapter 3. At r = 0.05, δ = 0.00239, β = 
1.63457, µ = 0.02136, and the log-likelihood value is -14018.49. The estimate of δ 
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Figure B:III: QH model profile likelihood
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increases at an increasing rate. β declines steadily until r = 0.85, after which it rises 
slowly. Note that the estimate of β is always greater than 1, implying that subjects 
perceive time to be “slowing down” when discounting delayed rewards. The model’s 




The results in this appendix highlight the link between the shape of a utility function 
and the inferences that one draws about discounting behaviour. For every model, the 
estimate of δ is higher under the assumption that r = 1, than it is when the profile 
likelihood attains its maximum (i.e., r = 0.15 for the E and H models, r = 0.3 for the 
QH model, and r = 0.05 for the WB model). Unfortunately, without data on risk 
attitudes, one needs to make strong parametric assumptions about the form of a 
person’s utility function, and one needs to assume that the same utility function 
applies to all individuals, which means it is important to collect risk preference data 
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In this appendix I present the results from the five other two process mixture models 
that can be estimated from the four discounting functions used in Chapter 3. The take 
home message from this appendix is that all discounting models find significant 
support in the data, although in certain cases one function finds significantly more 
support than another. 
 
TABLE C:I: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.00235*** 0.00015 0.00000 0.00206 0.00263 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.43412*** 0.02073 0.00000 0.39348 0.47476 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.01268*** 0.00048 0.00000 0.01173 0.01362 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.67336 0.01644 0.00000 0.64114 0.70558 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.56588*** 0.02073 0.00000 0.52524 0.60652 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 7.14859*** 0.15164 0.00000 6.85138 7.44580 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14317.31     
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value = 0.0015 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE C:II: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.00281*** 0.00016 0.00000 0.00250 0.00312 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.49634*** 0.0255 0.00000 0.45222 0.54045 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.14458*** 0.02467 0.00000 0.09623 0.19292 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 1.83431 0.13392 0.00000 1.57184 2.09678 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.50366 0.0225 0.00000 0.45954 0.54778 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 7.79150*** 0.21057 0.00000 7.37879 8.20422 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14384.83     
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value = 0.87080 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
 
TABLE C:III: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.00277*** 0.00019 0.00000 0.00240 0.00313 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.44928*** 0.02107 0.00000 0.40798 0.49057 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.01259*** 0.00049 0.00000 0.01162 0.01355 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.66077 0.01654 0.00000 0.62834 0.69319 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.55072*** 0.02107 0.00000 0.50943 0.59202 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 6.97251*** 0.15555 0.00000 6.66763 7.27739 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14315.18     
      H0: πH = 0.5, p-value = 0.01610 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE C:IV: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.00336*** 0.00021 0.00000 0.00294 0.00377 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.51502*** 0.02278 0.00000 0.47037 0.55966 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.17057*** 0.02522 0.00000 0.12113 0.22001 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 1.98864 0.13548 0.00000 1.72309 2.25417 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.48498 0.02278 0.00000 0.44034 0.52963 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 7.46597*** 0.19772 0.00000 7.07845 7.8535 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14381.94     
      H0: πH = 0.5, p-value = 0.50970 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
 
TABLE C:V: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSKEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.01168*** 0.00039 0.00000 0.01092 0.01244 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.62259*** 0.02328 0.00000 0.57697 0.66821 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.50988*** 0.02728 0.00000 0.45642 0.56334 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.01578** 0.00621 0.01100 0.00361 0.02795 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 1.64602 0.21145 0.00000 1.23158 2.06046 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.49012 0.02728 0.00000 0.43666 0.54358 
      Fechner error term 
      Error (µ) 6.41381*** 0.20157 0.00000 6.01873 6.80888 
            
N 32535 
    log-likelihood -14311.45     
      H0: πQH = 0.5, p-value = 0.7172 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




In this appendix I present the results from the two other two process mixture models 
that can be estimated from the three PWFs used in Chapter 4. Estimating a mixture 
model of the TK and Prelec functions was straightforward and the global maximum 
that was attained provided sensible estimates of the parameters of these two functions. 
Unfortunately, estimating a mixture model of the Prelec and PD functions was fraught 
with difficulty and I will detail these issues in what follows. I first present the results 
from the mixture model of the TK and Prelec functions in Table D:I below. 
 
TABLE D:I: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
PRELEC AND TK FUNCTIONS 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      Prelec probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPrelec) 0.331** 0.150 0.027 0.038 0.625 
      PWF parameter (ηPrelec) 1.465*** 0.095 0.000 1.279 1.651 
      Mixture probability (πPrelec) 0.164* 0.084 0.052 -0.001 0.329 
      TK probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γTK) 0.859*** 0.046 0.000 0.770 0.949 
      Mixture probability (πTK) 0.836*** 0.084 0.000 0.671 1.001 
      Sigma 
      Constant (σ) 0.105*** 0.015 0.000 0.075 0.136 
            
N 480 
    log-likelihood 310.772     
      H0: πTK = 1, p-value = 0.052 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Table D:I shows that the TK function accounts for approximately 84% of the choices 
in the data and that the Prelec function, therefore, accounts for the remaining 16%; I 
can reject the hypothesis that πTK is equal to 1 (p = 0.052). The estimates of the Prelec 
parameters (γ and η) yield an inverse S-shaped function and so too does the estimate 
of γ = 0.859 in the TK model. 
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When I first tried to estimate a mixture model of the PD and Prelec functions, I did 
not constrain any of the parameter estimates. Estimation of profile likelihoods, to find 
appropriate starting values which yield a global maximum, showed that two maxima 
(one local and one global) were obtained. The local maximum (log-likelihood = 
299.572) provided sensible estimates for the parameters of the Prelec function but an 
estimate of γPD which is not significantly different to 0. This estimate is not plausible 
because it implies that the PD PWF is a constant which is equal to 1. These estimates 
are presented in Table D:II below. 
 
TABLE D:II: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
PD AND PRELEC FUNCTIONS (UNCONSTRAINED LOCAL MAXIMUM) 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      PD probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPD) 4.658 3.063 0.128 -1.344 10.661 
      Mixture probability (πPD) 0.138 0.118 0.240 -0.092 0.369 
      Prelec probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPrelec) 0.829*** 0.067 0.000 0.698 0.959 
      PWF parameter (ηPrelec) 0.959*** 0.110 0.000 0.744 1.175 
      Mixture probability (πPrelec) 0.862*** 0.118 0.000 0.631 1.092 
      Sigma 
      Constant (σ) 0.105*** 0.0080 0.0000 0.0890 0.1210 
            
N 480 
    log-likelihood 299.572     
      H0: πPrelec = 1, p-value = 0.240 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
The starting values yielding a global maximum (log-likelihood = 313.579) provided 
plausible estimates for γPD but completely implausible estimates for γPrelec and ηPrelec; 
these results are presented in Table D:III below. Recall that η, γ > 0 in the Prelec 
model and yet γPrelec in the mixture model is not significantly different to 0, its 95% 
confidence interval includes values less than 0, and the 95% confidence interval for 
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ηPrelec also includes values less than 0. As γPrelec is not significantly different to zero, 
the PWF is a step function.  
 
TABLE D:III: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
PD AND PRELEC FUNCTIONS (UNCONSTRAINED GLOBAL MAXIMUM) 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      PD probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPD) 1.266*** 0.133 0.000 1.006 1.527 
      Mixture probability (πPD) 0.883*** 0.038 0.000 0.810 0.957 
      Prelec probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPrelec) -0.285 0.315 0.366 -0.901 0.332 
      PWF parameter (ηPrelec) 0.567* 0.321 0.078 -0.063 1.120 
      Mixture probability (πPrelec) 0.117*** 0.038 0.002 0.043 0.190 
      Sigma 
      Constant (σ) 0.105*** 0.008 0.000 0.089 0.121 
            
N 480 
    log-likelihood 313.579     
      H0: πPD = 1, p-value = 0.002 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Given these issues I decided to re-estimate the models and constrain γPD, γPrelec, and 
ηPrelec > 0. The global maximum (log-likelihood = 310.034) of the constrained model 
provided sensible estimates for γPD but I could not recover estimates for γPrelec (i.e., 
the coefficient estimate as recovered using the delta method was 0 and no standard 
errors could be estimated). As noted previously, when γPrelec = 0, this yields a step 
function. These results are presented in Table D:IV below.  
 
Another issue I encountered was that a number of different starting values led to the 
“same” (i.e., down to the sixth decimal point) global maximum but every time I used 
a different set of starting values I got different estimates for exp(γPrelec)13; this issue is 
                                                
13 Note that exp(γPrelec) is the nonlinear transformation that was used to ensure that γPrelec was strictly 
positive. 
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somewhat incidental because regardless of the estimate of exp(γPrelec) I could not 
recover γPrelec using the delta method. 
 
TABLE D:IV: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
PD AND PRELEC FUNCTIONS (CONSTRAINED GLOBAL MAXIMUM) 
 
Estimate Std error p-value 95% Confidence interval 
      PD probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPD) 1.210*** 0.134 0.000 0.947 1.473 
      Mixture probability (πPD) 0.849*** 0.060 0.000 0.732 0.966 
      Prelec probability weighting function 
      PWF parameter (γPrelec) 0 . . . . 
      PWF parameter (ηPrelec) 0.853*** 0.264 0.001 0.335 1.371 
      Mixture probability (πPrelec) 0.151** 0.060 0.011 0.034 0.268 
      Sigma 
      Constant (σ) 0.107*** 0.010 0.000 0.087 0.127 
            
N 480 
    log-likelihood 310.034     
      H0: πPD = 1, p-value = 0.012 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
I then decided to estimate a mixture model of the PD and one-parameter Prelec (i.e., 
π(p) =  exp[ -(-ln p)γ ]) functions, with estimates constrained to be positive, in case the 
issue had something to do with the two-parameter Prelec function. My estimate of 
γPrelec-I was not significantly different to zero.  
 
In sum, I was unable to reliably estimate a mixture model of the PD and Prelec PWFs. 





The introductory presentation, which all experimental subjects were taken through, is 
included in this appendix. It explains the nature of the risk and time preference tasks 
and it includes a detailed discussion of the physical randomisation devices used in the 
experiments. Every effort was taken to ensure that subjects understood how their 
choices ultimately led to the earnings they received so as to incentivise the truthful 


















































































































This appendix includes the presentation which was used to explain the risk preference 
task. The presentation goes into a lot of detail about the computer environment within 
which choices are made, the lotteries on offer and how to interpret them, the payment 
scheme that is used to determine earnings, and the fact that there are no right or wrong 
choices in the task. As discussed previously, all of this was done to make the task 


























































































































































































































This appendix includes the presentation which was used to explain the time 
preference task. The presentation explains the computer environment within which 
choices are made, the calendar which shows subjects the dates at which SS and LL 
rewards are available, the payment scheme that is used to determine earnings, and the 
fact that there are no right or wrong choices in the task. As discussed previously, all 














































































































































In this appendix I analyse the smoking-discounting relationship with the four 
discounting models used in Chapter 5 but under the assumption that EU, rather than 
RDU, characterises choice under risk. Table H:I presents results from the four 
discounting specifications where the parameters of interest vary according to smoking 
status. In all models the estimate of δ for smokers is positive and statistically 
significant which means smokers discount more heavily than non-smokers. The 
estimates of β in the QH and WB models, by contrast, do not differ according to 
smoking status. Thus, I have replicated the results from Table XII in Chapter 5 where 
RDU was assumed to characterise choice under risk.   
 
TABLE H:I: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Power function parameter (r)     Smoker 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.017 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) Constant 0.266*** 0.293*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 
  (0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.038) 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Smoker 0.205*** 0.167*** 0.185*** 0.086** 
 (0.062) (0.047) (0.063) (0.035) Constant 0.369*** 0.361*** 0.323*** 0.170*** 
  (0.061) (0.047) (0.058) (0.033) 
Discounting parameter (β)     Smoker   0.001 -0.144 
   (0.007) (0.264) Constant   0.988*** 1.664***       (0.006) (0.243) 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.186*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.195*** 
  (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.143*** 0.181*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 
  (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9389.003 -9358.082 -9314.103 -9169.951 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
To investigate whether time preferences are associated with smoking intensity, I also 
estimated the discounting models as a quadratic function of number of cigarettes 
smoked per day. Table H:II shows that for the estimate of δ in all models, the linear 
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term is positive and significant while the quadratic term is negative and significant. 
Thus, there is a concave relationship between discounting behaviour and smoking 
intensity, which is precisely what I found under the assumption that RDU 
characterises choice under risk. Similarly, I find that smoking intensity is not 
associated with the estimate of β in the QH model but that the linear term is 
significant, at the 10% level, in the estimate of β in the WB model. 
 
TABLE H:II: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Power function parameter (r)     Number of cigarettes 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (Number of cigarettes)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Constant 0.273*** 0.299*** 0.266*** 0.243*** 
  (0.034) (0.029) (0.036) (0.041) 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Number of cigarettes 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (Number of cigarettes)2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Constant 0.389*** 0.378*** 0.339*** 0.151*** 
  (0.062) (0.047) (0.057) (0.032) 
Discounting parameter (β)     Number of cigarettes   0.001 -0.105* 
   (0.002) (0.056) (Number of cigarettes)2   0.000 0.004 
   (0.000) (0.002) Constant   0.986*** 1.937***       (0.006) (0.259) 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.186*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.197*** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.141*** 0.177*** 0.132*** 0.109*** 
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) 
N 17500 17500 17500 17500 
log-likelihood -9394.161 -9365.653 -9320.929 -9164.661 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table H:III maps out the response surface for estimates of δ in the four time 
preference models evaluated at different values of number of cigarettes smoked per 
day. At low values of number of cigarettes, the conditional marginal effect of 
additional cigarettes is positive. By 15 cigarettes though, the conditional marginal 
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effect of additional cigarettes is negative. Thus, Table H:III replicates the result in 
Table XIV in Chapter 5 and highlights the nonlinear effect of smoking intensity on 
discounting behaviour. 
 
TABLE H:III: NUMBER OF CIGARETTES CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR δ 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Exponential Hyperbolic Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
Number of cigarettes     0 0.043 (0.013) 0.034 (0.010) 0.041 (0.013) 0.028 (0.010) 
5 0.024 (0.008) 0.019 (0.006) 0.023 (0.008) 0.017 (0.006) 
10 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003) 
15 -0.014 (0.006) -0.012 (0.006) -0.012 (0.005) -0.005 (0.002) 
20 -0.033 (0.012) -0.028 (0.011) -0.030 (0.010) -0.016 (0.005) 
25 -0.052 (0.018) -0.043 (0.015) -0.048 (0.016) -0.027 (0.008) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Finally, tables H:IV:A and H:IV:B analyse the smoking-discounting relationship by 
making the parameters of interest a linear function of observable characteristics and 
task parameters. In the E and H models in Table H:IV:A, there is a positive and 
significant relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour: smokers 
discount the future more heavily than non-smokers. 
 
Similarly, in the QH and WB models in Table H:IV:B, the estimate of δ for smokers 
is positive and statistically significant. However, smoking status is not significantly 
related to the extent of present-bias in the QH model nor in the way people perceive 
time in the WB model (i.e., in the estimates of β). Thus, the results in tables H:IV:A 
and H:IV:B replicate those in tables XV:A and XV:B in Chapter 5. 
 
In sum, the preceding results show that the smoking-discounting relationship is robust 




TABLE H:IV:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r)     Age -0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.005 
White -0.012 0.018 -0.014 0.019 
Male -0.012 0.016 -0.010 0.017 
Commerce faculty 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.020 
Financial aid 0.039** 0.018 0.040** 0.019 
Risk task first 0.004 0.016 0.006 0.017 
Smoker 0.052*** 0.020 0.056*** 0.021 
Constant 0.382*** 0.110 0.419*** 0.111 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.004 0.014 -0.003 0.011 
White -0.091 0.066 -0.081 0.052 
Male 0.114** 0.055 0.098** 0.042 
Commerce faculty 0.027 0.067 0.014 0.055 
Financial aid 0.111* 0.067 0.085 0.052 
Risk task first 0.022 0.058 0.025 0.047 
FED: 1 week 0.053 0.063 0.048 0.051 
FED: 2 weeks -0.004 0.064 0.002 0.052 
High Principal -0.178*** 0.033 -0.149*** 0.021 
Smoker 0.232*** 0.062 0.187*** 0.050 
Constant 0.485* 0.276 0.444** 0.224 
Risk error (µ)     Constant 0.181*** 0.011 0.170*** 0.008 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.155*** 0.042 0.201*** 0.044 
N 17500  17500  log-likelihood -9163.252   -9117.061   





TABLE H:IV:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r)     Age -0.006 0.005 -0.003 0.005 
White -0.015 0.018 -0.010 0.015 
Male -0.013 0.016 -0.019 0.014 
Commerce faculty 0.010 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Financial aid 0.031* 0.018 0.023 0.016 
Risk task first -0.004 0.021 -0.002 0.015 
Smoker 0.053*** 0.020 0.044** 0.020 
Constant 0.368*** 0.101 0.307*** 0.101 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.007 0.011 0.007 0.007 
White -0.082 0.065 -0.047 0.029 
Male 0.132** 0.056 0.051*** 0.020 
Commerce faculty 0.018 0.069 -0.002 0.029 
Financial aid 0.094 0.063 0.000 0.025 
Risk task first -0.041 0.060 -0.026 0.027 
FED: 1 week 0.313*** 0.075 0.133** 0.067 
FED: 2 weeks 0.265*** 0.064 0.203** 0.092 
High Principal -0.139*** 0.029 -0.054*** 0.013 
Smoker 0.206*** 0.067 0.080*** 0.026 
Constant 0.260 0.242 0.005 0.129 
Discount parameter (β)     Age -0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.079 
White -0.002 0.011 0.288 0.306 
Male 0.011 0.009 -0.499 0.360 
Commerce faculty 0.002 0.011 -0.026 0.239 
Financial aid -0.005 0.011 0.526* 0.281 
Risk task first -0.020* 0.010 0.922** 0.397 
FED: 1 week 0.360 0.279 2.839* 1.452 
FED: 2 weeks 0.140 0.213 4.379* 2.455 
High Principal 0.005** 0.002 0.076 0.106 
Smoker -0.002 0.011 -0.382 0.706 
Constant 1.035*** 0.062 2.200 1.712 
Risk error (µ) 
    Constant 0.184*** 0.011 0.187*** 0.012 
Time error (ν)     Constant 0.163*** 0.046 0.119*** 0.039 
N 17500  17500  log-likelihood -8912.317   -8606.675   




In this appendix I estimate the marginal effect of smoking status across the four 
discounting specifications using the demographic characteristics and task parameters 
in Table III of Chapter 5 but under the assumption of linear utility. On a qualitative 
level (i.e., in terms of the sign and significance of the estimates), the results across 
linear and concave utility specifications are very similar, except in the WB and, to a 
lesser extent, the QH models. The different estimates one obtains with the WB model 
can have important implications for the inferences one draws about the relationship 
between smoking and discounting behaviour. 
 
Table I:I:A presents the results from the E and H discounting models and Table I:I:B 
presents the results from the QH and WB models. Table I:I:A shows that the results 
for the E and H models are qualitatively identical under the assumption of linear 
utility and under the assumption that RDU and the Prelec weighting function 
characterise choice under risk (i.e., in Table XV:A in Chapter 5). 
 
TABLE I:I:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
LINEAR UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.018 0.142 -0.007 0.047 
White -0.319 0.515 -0.189 0.202 
Male 0.864* 0.518 0.336* 0.175 
Commerce faculty 0.335 0.514 0.080 0.213 
Financial aid 0.759 0.615 0.295 0.207 
Risk task first 0.001 0.530 0.092 0.190 
FED: 1 week 0.201 0.500 0.205 0.195 
FED: 2 weeks 0.191 0.526 0.165 0.213 
High Principal -2.515*** 0.525 -0.882*** 0.113 
Smoker 1.512*** 0.521 0.615*** 0.193 
Constant 3.747 2.717 1.722* 0.901 
Time error (ν)     Constant 22.124*** 1.661 22.061*** 1.700 
N 10500  10500  log-likelihood -5083.655   -4945.307   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table I:I:B, by contrast, shows that one reaches different qualitative conclusions 
under the assumption of linear utility; I will first report the differences before 
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discussing their implications. The only difference in the QH model, across linear and 
concave utility specifications, is that estimate of the “FED: 1 week” coefficient in the 
β equation is statistically significant in Table I:I:B, whereas the same coefficient is 
not statistically significant in Table XV:B in Chapter 5. 
 
TABLE I:I:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
LINEAR UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate 
Std 
error 
Discounting parameter (δ)     Age -0.021 0.099 0.048** 0.02 
White -0.266 0.46 -0.134 0.125 
Male 0.977** 0.408 0.244* 0.129 
Commerce faculty 0.045 0.451 -0.039 0.107 
Financial aid 0.633 0.613 -0.093 0.139 
Risk task first -0.26 0.404 -0.177 0.183 
FED: 1 week 1.281** 0.522 0.389*** 0.129 
FED: 2 weeks 1.421*** 0.468 0.377*** 0.132 
High Principal -1.633*** 0.39 -0.259*** 0.053 
Smoker 1.160** 0.559 0.094 0.115 
Constant 2.15 1.874 -0.21 0.524 
Discount parameter (β)     Age -0.012 0.011 -0.134 0.094 
White -0.006 0.034 0.14 0.846 
Male 0.037 0.027 -0.724 1.302 
Commerce faculty -0.006 0.038 0.068 0.592 
Financial aid -0.007 0.036 1.017 0.715 
Risk task first -0.059* 0.031 1.352** 0.58 
FED: 1 week 0.551** 0.267 -0.042 0.632 
FED: 2 weeks 0.168 0.177 0.383 0.496 
High Principal 0.032** 0.016 -0.018 0.268 
Smoker -0.004 0.036 0.667 0.661 
Constant 1.153*** 0.203 3.847** 1.559 
Time error (ν)     Constant 25.314*** 2.79 19.540*** 1.314 
N 10500  10500  log-likelihood -4876.24   -4537.238   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
In the WB model, the estimate of the smoker variable in the δ equation is not 
statistically significant in Table I:I:B, but this coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant in Table XV:B in Chapter 5 where I incorporate the curvature of the utility 
function. By contrast, age in the δ equation is statistically significant in Table I:I:B 
but it is not significant in Table XV:B in Chapter 5. With regard to the β equation, I 
find that the coefficient estimates of the “Financial aid,” “FED: 1 week,” and “FED: 2 
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weeks” variables are not statistically significant in Table I:I:B whereas the same 
coefficients are statistically significant in Table XV:B in Chapter 5. Finally, the 
coefficient estimate of the “FED: 1 week” variable actually switches sign across the 
estimates in Table I:I:B and Table XV:B in Chapter 5. 
 
As Chapter 5 focussed on the relationship between smoking and discounting 
behaviour, the fact that the smoker variable is not statistically significant in the β and 
δ equations of the WB model can have important implications for the inferences one 
draws. Recall that the WB model better characterises all of the data in Chapter 5 than 
the other discounting specifications. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is common in 
addiction studies for researchers to compare the efficacy of different discounting 
models using invalid statistical tests, pick the one which “best” explains the data, and 
then use it to conduct multivariate analyses. If this approach was adopted with the 
data in Chapter 5, a researcher would select the WB model for multivariate analysis. 
If this researcher also failed to adopt the joint estimation approach to time 
preferences, which incorporates the concavity of the utility function, he may conclude 
that there is no relationship between smoking and discounting behaviour.  
 
This example highlights some important issues. It is useful to estimate a range of 
discounting models so as to check the sensitivity and reliability of the results. If the 
hypothetical researcher above estimated E, H, QH, and WB models assuming linear 
utility he would be hard-pressed to claim that smoking is not related to discounting. In 
addition, it is crucial to let theory guide experimental design and analysis. In this 
context, the hypothetical researcher should be cognisant of the fact that time 
preferences are defined over time-dated utility flows, not flows of money. If the 
researcher was determined to use only the “best” discounting function for multivariate 
analysis, but he estimated it jointly with the curvature of the utility function, he would 
conclude that smoking and discounting behaviour are related. The preceding 
discussion may have made it seem like having a good grasp of theory and estimating 
several models are substitutes; this was not my intention. The ideal hypothetical 
researcher would combine his knowledge of theory with a desire to investigate 
relationships of interest across multiple structural theories. 
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In sum, this appendix showed that one can reach different conclusions about the 
relationship between smoking and discounting when one abandons the theoretically-
motivated joint estimation approach to time preferences which incorporates the 




In this appendix I present the results from the five other two process mixture models 
that can be estimated from the four discounting functions used in Chapter 5. Note that 
RDU and the Prelec PWF are assumed to characterise choice under risk in the joint 
estimation of these models. The take home message from this appendix is that all 
discounting models find significant support in the data, even though in each mixture 
model one function finds significantly more support than the other. 
 
TABLE J:I: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.293*** 0.027 0.000 0.240 0.346 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.748 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.853*** 0.032 0.000 0.790 0.916 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.815*** 0.107 0.000 0.605 1.026 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.636*** 0.039 0.000 0.561 0.712 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.105*** 0.014 0.000 0.077 0.133 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.994*** 0.002 0.000 0.991 0.998 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.364*** 0.039 0.000 0.288 0.439 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.175*** 0.008 0.000 0.158 0.191 
Time Error (ν) 0.034*** 0.010 0.001 0.015 0.053 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8775.861         
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value < 0.001 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 




TABLE J:II: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.301*** 0.027 0.000 0.249 0.353 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.748 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.860*** 0.032 0.000 0.798 0.923 
      Exponential discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δEmix) 0.153*** 0.017 0.000 0.119 0.186 
      Mixture probability (πE) 0.406*** 0.034 0.000 0.339 0.474 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.534*** 0.131 0.000 0.279 0.790 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 5.940** 2.722 0.029 0.605 11.275 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.594*** 0.034 0.000 0.526 0.661 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.173*** 0.008 0.000 0.157 0.189 
Time Error (ν) 0.055*** 0.014 0.000 0.027 0.084 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8720.160         
      H0: πE = 0.5, p-value = 0.006 
            




TABLE J:III: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.329*** 0.027 0.000 0.277 0.381 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.749 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.886*** 0.035 0.000 0.819 0.954 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.717*** 0.067 0.000 0.585 0.849 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.634*** 0.036 0.000 0.564 0.704 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.119*** 0.015 0.000 0.090 0.148 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.994*** 0.002 0.000 0.990 0.998 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.366*** 0.036 0.000 0.296 0.436 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.168*** 0.008 0.000 0.153 0.184 
Time Error (ν) 0.046*** 0.012 0.000 0.021 0.070 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8752.007         
      H0: πH = 0.5, p-value < 0.001 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 




TABLE J:IV: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.328*** 0.026 0.000 0.276 0.379 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.749 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.884*** 0.034 0.000 0.817 0.952 
      Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δHmix) 0.720*** 0.069 0.000 0.585 0.855 
      Mixture probability (πH) 0.611*** 0.039 0.000 0.535 0.688 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.072*** 0.009 0.000 0.053 0.090 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 1.759*** 0.206 0.000 1.355 2.164 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.389*** 0.039 0.000 0.312 0.465 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.169*** 0.008 0.000 0.153 0.184 
Time Error (ν) 0.044*** 0.012 0.000 0.021 0.068 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8703.874         
      H0: πH = 0.5, p-value = 0.004 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 




TABLE J:V: MIXTURE MODEL ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 Estimate Std Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval 
      Rank-dependent utility theory 
      Power function parameter (r) 0.291*** 0.027 0.000 0.238 0.343 
      PWF parameter (γ) 0.797*** 0.025 0.000 0.748 0.846 
      PWF parameter (η) 0.851*** 0.032 0.000 0.788 0.913 
      Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δQHmix) 0.797*** 0.111 0.000 0.579 1.015 
      Discounting parameter (βQHmix) 0.996*** 0.003 0.000 0.990 1.002 
      Mixture probability (πQH) 0.609*** 0.044 0.000 0.524 0.695 
      Weibull discounting model 
      Discounting parameter (δWBmix) 0.066*** 0.009 0.000 0.047 0.084 
      Discounting parameter (βWBmix) 1.720*** 0.188 0.000 1.352 2.087 
      Mixture probability (πWB) 0.391*** 0.044 0.000 0.305 0.476 
      Error terms 
      Risk Error (µ) 0.175*** 0.008 0.000 0.159 0.192 
Time Error (ν) 0.034*** 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.052 
            
N 17500     log-likelihood -8715.090         
      H0: πQH = 0.5, p-value = 0.012 
            
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
